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UNIT 8B: Coronavirus
----------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTRA
Done in great haste; should add simple models of human response to pathogen damage, among other things
Make it all more actionable
----------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC Initial projections
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Flattening the curve
FIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-0.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Flattening the curve
FIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-1.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Flattening the curve
FIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-2.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Flattening the curve
FIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-3.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
What happens when we flatten?
BCC
PIC CFIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-3.pdf
NCC
POLL Which scenario has the lowest total number of cases shown (area under
the curve)? | Which scenario has the fewest total cases? No control; 20%;
40%; all the same
EC
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Flattening the curve
FIG dd/flatResponsePlots.Rout.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Flattening the curve
DOUBLEFIG dd/flatSimPlots.Rout-3.pdf dd/flatResponsePlots.Rout.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Flattening the curve
More flattening than reduction in total
ANS As long as \Ro\ is medium-to-large we expect almost everyone to get
infected in a simple model
ANS Changes in \Ro\ don't affect area under the curve
ANS But they can have big effects on the peak
What are some benefits of just flattening?
ANS Less peak demand
ANS More time to find solutions:
ANS Better treatments
ANS Vaccines
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Behaviour and policy change
Why were our early models so wrong?
ANS People and governments changed behaviour much more than we expected
ANS Fear of overflowing hospitals and chaos in general
ANS Population heterogeneity
ANS Not everyone mixes the same, or at the same time
ANS A less important effect so far
----------------------------------------------------------------------
TSEC Endemic coronavirus
POLL What does it mean for \scv\ to become ``endemic'' | What do we mean by endemic?
ANS Not going extinct
ANS Not \emph{too} much variation in annual incidence
What it doesn't mean:
ANS Not fluctuating
ANS Not dangerous
COMMENT A lot of double negatives, make sure you're clear!
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Disease burnout
A disease that has a big epidemic and leaves very few susceptibles
behind can go locally or globally extinct -- we call this burnout
Lots of evidence for influenza or measles burning out in isolated
areas during less global times
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Disease burnout
FIG sims/recurrent.plots.Rout.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Disease burnout
FIG sims/recurrent.newplots.Rout.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Disease burnout
DOUBLEFIG sims/recurrent.plots.Rout.pdf sims/recurrent.newplots.Rout.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Adaptive responses
How do people respond to fear of \cnv?
ANS Masking, distancing, booster shots
ANS Mandates, lockdowns
What effects do we expect if people's worry levels about \scv\
fluctuate with virus levels?
ANS Will increase spread when levels are high (or growing)
ANS Tendency to stabilize the dynamics
ANS Smaller outbreaks, less chance of random extinction
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Burnout and \scv
Burnout seems very rare in the global era
Adaptive responses work against burnout
When things are bad, people are more careful: less overshoot
When things are good, people are less careful: less chance to
keep the virus down
----------------------------------------------------------------------
TSEC Pathogen aggressiveness
POLL Should viruses evolve to become more or less dangerous? more; less; it depends
ANS It depends
ANS The virus evolves in the way that's best for the virus
ANS Host death and host recovery are equally bad!
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Tradeoffs
FIG life_history/frontier.Rout-2.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Which strain will win?
If the competing strains produce similar immune responses, this is
exactly like equal competition: infections are competing for a
single resource:
ANS Susceptible humans
The winner will be the strain that has the highest ``carrying
capacity'':
ANS Removes the largest number from susceptible pool
ANS Highest \Ro
ANS This could be more or less deadly
ANS Removal by killing and removal by recovery have similar
effects on the virus
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Pathogen aggressiveness
FIG life_history/aggressionPlots.Rout-0.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Pathogen aggressiveness
FIG life_history/aggressionPlots.Rout-1.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
REPSLIDE Pathogen aggressiveness
FIG life_history/aggressionPlots.Rout-2.pdf
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Pathogen aggressiveness
BC
CFIG life_history/aggressionPlots.Rout-2.pdf
NC
Pathogen will evolve to maximize \Ro.
Is not affected by whether duration $D$ is ended by host death, or by immune
system clearing the pathogen
EC
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Human evolution
We have evolved very good immune systems, but we can't always stay ahead of
the viruses
Should people evolve to favor the spread of more or less dangerous viruses?
ANS Less dangerous!
ANS Viruses that do well in the upper respiratory tract may spread better
ANS Viruses that do well in the lower respiratory tract are more dangerous
ANS Have we evolved to make this a tradeoff for viruses?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Omicron example
Omicron spreads \emph{much} better than earlier \scv\ viruses
It does less well in the lungs and better in the upper airways
\scv\ \emph{may} be evolving in a less dangerous direction
There is no guarantee
Delta spread better and was \emph{more} dangerous than previous
----------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC The future of \scv
----------------------------------------------------------------------
What is different about \scv?
What is the main difference between \scv\ and other colds and flus?
ANS There was almost no immunity before 2020
ANS It is still adapting to humans
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Human immunity
The immune system is very complicated and very effective
T cells and B cells recognize different parts of the
\textbf{pathogen}
Even partial recognition often protects people against severe
outcomes
Vaccines
Also likely to protect against severe outcomes
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Immunity and the virus
Our immune systems may see different variants of the virus
differently:
Cross-immunity to a different strain might be less effective than
direct immunity to the strain I was infected with
How will this change our picture of competition?
ANS It makes it easier for different strains to co-exist
ANS We don't know yet how much easier. Some viruses (HPV) have
dozens of co-existing strains. Others (influenza A) have limited
cross-immunity, but strong population-level competition
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Herd immunity
POLL What is meant by herd immunity?
ANS A level of immunity in the population that interferes with
\emph{the spread of the pathogen}
ANS In particular, the phenomenon of immune people protecting
others by reducing population-level spread
ANS May or may not mean that the pathogen cannot survive
How much herd immunity do we need?
ANS About $1-1/\Ro$ for $\Reff\approx1$
ANS In the long run, we expect to see about the right number of
susceptibles to keep the infectious individuals in balance
ANS If we can get above this level through vaccination, there is
a chance to drive the pathogen extinct, in theory
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Can herd immunity drive \scv\ extinct?
What extinct viruses do we know about? How did they get there?
ANS Smallpox and rinderpest
ANS Vaccination!
ANS Herd immunity by vaccination is the only realistic hope for
driving \scv\ extinct
ANS Burnout did not work!
ANS What about our luck with measles, mumps, polio, influenza,
etc?
ANS \scv\ is mutating more effectively than most of these!
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Levels of disease
In the long run, how long we go between \cnv\ infections will likely
depend mostly on how long our immunity lasts, or else on
ANS how often we get vaccine boosters
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PRESLIDE Terminology
FIG webpix/giantSpider.png
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Just another seasonal coronavirus (JASC)
This is a \emph{theory} that lack of population immunity is the
\emph{only} difference between \scv\ and other viruses that cause
common colds
Some versions of the theory account for \scv\ continuing to
evolve in that direction
POLL What do you think of this theory?
ANS We all had versions of the common cold viruses as young
children
ANS The common cold viruses face a high level of population
immunity and can't have big outbreaks the way \scv\ does.
ANS Smaller doses may be correlated with less-severe cases
ANS It's good to hope, but we shouldn't count on it
ANS We don't know how \scv\ is going to evolve
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving forward
We need to pay attention and figure out how strongly to prioritize
\scv\ control
We also need to be thinking about detecting and responding to the
next pandemic!
ANS Better surveillance
ANS Routine monitoring of viruses from patient samples