From 2df92648993565cb14e94383c5704393aa3566b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Animesh Srivastava <animesh.srivastava@bugb.io>
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 15:00:20 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?fix:=20correct=20/gal=20reference=20syntax=20to?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20match=20parser,=20add=20/unannotated=20to=20/help=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=20v1.4.1?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

- Fix /gal (TUI + CLI): description format ': text' → '-- "quoted text"'
- Fix /gal: severity format 'severity:high' → '[high]' / '[P0]'
- Fix /gal: @flows connector 'to' → '->' arrow syntax
- Fix /gal: @validates preposition 'on' → 'for'
- Fix /gal: @owns add missing 'for' preposition
- Fix /gal: @mitigates document 'using' as primary keyword
- Add /gal: external refs section (cwe:, owasp:, capec:, attack:)
- Add /gal: @boundary alternate syntaxes and (#id) support
- Add /gal: standalone @shield single-line marker
- Fix /help: add missing /unannotated command
- Fix CLI: guardlink --version was stuck at 1.1.0
- Bump version to 1.4.1
- Annotation edits: @audit on launcher timeout, suggest module
- Sync agent instruction files with current model
---
 .clinerules                                   |   36 +-
 .cursor/rules/guardlink.mdc                   |   32 +-
 .gemini/GEMINI.md                             |   36 +-
 .github/copilot-instructions.md               |   36 +-
 .gitignore                                    |   12 +-
 .guardlink/definitions.ts                     |    2 +
 .../2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md             |  301 +
 .windsurfrules                                |   36 +-
 AGENTS.md                                     |   36 +-
 CHANGELOG.md                                  |   18 +
 CLAUDE.md                                     |   36 +-
 package.json                                  |    2 +-
 src/agents/launcher.ts                        |    2 +-
 src/cli/index.ts                              |   97 +-
 src/mcp/suggest.ts                            |    1 +
 src/tui/commands.ts                           |   96 +-
 threat-dashboard.html                         | 6986 +++++++++++++++++
 17 files changed, 7564 insertions(+), 201 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .guardlink/threat-reports/2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md
 create mode 100644 threat-dashboard.html

diff --git a/.clinerules b/.clinerules
index dd2786e..8d40c54 100644
--- a/.clinerules
+++ b/.clinerules
@@ -39,16 +39,16 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -61,17 +61,6 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -81,11 +70,22 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 <!-- guardlink:end -->
 
@@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/.cursor/rules/guardlink.mdc b/.cursor/rules/guardlink.mdc
index 0618bb5..aacb2c4 100644
--- a/.cursor/rules/guardlink.mdc
+++ b/.cursor/rules/guardlink.mdc
@@ -44,16 +44,16 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -66,17 +66,6 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -86,8 +75,19 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
diff --git a/.gemini/GEMINI.md b/.gemini/GEMINI.md
index 68da32c..bf121a4 100644
--- a/.gemini/GEMINI.md
+++ b/.gemini/GEMINI.md
@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -75,17 +75,6 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -95,11 +84,22 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 > **Note:** This section is auto-generated. Run `guardlink sync` to update after code changes.
 > Any coding agent (Cursor, Claude, Copilot, Windsurf, etc.) should reference these IDs
@@ -121,3 +121,7 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/.github/copilot-instructions.md b/.github/copilot-instructions.md
index 2ae6015..68c3a9f 100644
--- a/.github/copilot-instructions.md
+++ b/.github/copilot-instructions.md
@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -75,17 +75,6 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -95,11 +84,22 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 > **Note:** This section is auto-generated. Run `guardlink sync` to update after code changes.
 > Any coding agent (Cursor, Claude, Copilot, Windsurf, etc.) should reference these IDs
@@ -122,3 +122,7 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index e61069c..00134a4 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -6,19 +6,11 @@ dist/
 # OS
 .DS_Store
 
-# Generated outputs (not tracked — regenerate with guardlink commands)
-threat-model.json
-threat-model.md
-threat-dashboard.html
-*.sarif.json
-
 # IDE / Agent local state
 .claude/
 
-# GuardLink runtime (tracked: definitions.ts, config.json)
-.guardlink/threat-reports/
-.guardlink/*.json
-!.guardlink/config.json
+# GuardLink runtime config (API keys - do not commit)
+.guardlink/config.json
 
 # Debug / internal
 _debug.ts
diff --git a/.guardlink/definitions.ts b/.guardlink/definitions.ts
index 7edca36..c7291dc 100644
--- a/.guardlink/definitions.ts
+++ b/.guardlink/definitions.ts
@@ -55,3 +55,5 @@
 // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- "Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation"
 // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- "Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes"
 // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- "Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking"
+// @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- "Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions"
+// @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- "Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files"
diff --git a/.guardlink/threat-reports/2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md b/.guardlink/threat-reports/2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b62bb2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.guardlink/threat-reports/2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+# STRIDE Threat Analysis — GuardLink
+
+**Generated:** 2026-03-12T19:14:22Z
+**Framework:** STRIDE
+**Analyst:** Claude Opus 4.5
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+GuardLink is a security annotation tool that parses source code, generates threat models, and integrates with AI coding agents. The analysis identified **15 unmitigated exposures** across 10 assets, with **1 critical**, **4 high**, **5 medium**, and **5 low** severity findings.
+
+**Key Risk Areas:**
+1. **Command Injection (Critical)** — Child process spawning in CLI/TUI/MCP with external input
+2. **Prompt Injection (High)** — User prompts concatenated into agent instructions without sanitization
+3. **Arbitrary File Write (High)** — Parser can write to files discovered via glob patterns
+4. **Data Exposure (Medium)** — Threat model data exposed to MCP clients and LLM providers
+
+**Overall Risk Posture:** MODERATE — Core security controls are in place (path validation, parameterized commands, key redaction), but several attack vectors remain unmitigated due to architectural constraints (prompt injection relies on LLM provider safety, child process spawning is delegated to trusted agents).
+
+---
+
+## Part 1 — Annotation Validation
+
+### Critical Findings
+
+#### `#cli` → `#cmd-injection` [CRITICAL]
+**Location:** `src/cli/index.ts:31`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] -- "Agent launcher spawns child processes"`
+**Audit:** `@audit #cli -- "Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args"`
+
+**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE
+The CLI delegates process spawning to `agents/launcher.ts` which uses `spawn()` with explicit argument arrays rather than shell interpolation. The `#param-commands` control is correctly applied. However, the exposure remains because the binary names come from a hardcoded registry — if that registry were compromised or extended with user input, command injection would be possible.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add runtime validation that agent binary paths exist and are not symlinks to unexpected locations.
+
+### High Severity Findings
+
+#### `#agent-launcher` → `#prompt-injection` [HIGH]
+**Location:** `src/agents/prompts.ts:6`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] -- "User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text"`
+
+**Validation:** ⚠️ CONCERNING
+User prompts are directly concatenated into the instruction text sent to coding agents. While the `@audit` notes that "prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures," this creates a **transitive trust dependency** — GuardLink's security relies on the security of external agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex).
+
+**Risk:** A malicious user could craft prompts that instruct the agent to:
+- Modify security annotations maliciously
+- Exfiltrate sensitive code via the annotation system
+- Bypass GuardLink's intended workflow
+
+**Recommendation:** Implement prompt templating with strict escaping, or use structured message formats that separate system instructions from user content.
+
+#### `#mcp` → `#cmd-injection` [HIGH]
+**Location:** `src/mcp/index.ts:4`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] -- "Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients"`
+
+**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE
+The MCP server accepts tool calls over stdio from any connected client. While Zod schema validation is applied to inputs, the attack surface includes:
+- `guardlink_annotate` — passes prompts to LLM
+- `guardlink_threat_report` — spawns analysis processes
+- `guardlink_diff` — executes git commands
+
+**Mitigating Factor:** The `@audit` notes "All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution" — this is correct, but validation focuses on schema conformance, not semantic safety.
+
+#### `#parser` → `#arbitrary-write` [HIGH]
+**Location:** `src/parser/clear.ts:7`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] -- "Writes modified content back to discovered files"`
+
+**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE with caveat
+The `clearAnnotations()` function writes to files discovered via `fast-glob`. The `#glob-filtering` control applies `DEFAULT_EXCLUDE` patterns, but:
+- A malicious `.gitignore` or custom exclude patterns could be manipulated
+- Symlinks within the project could redirect writes outside the project
+
+**Mitigating Factor:** `@audit` notes "Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag" — this is a UX control, not a technical one.
+
+#### `#tui` → `#cmd-injection` [HIGH]
+**Location:** `src/tui/commands.ts:11`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] -- "/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes"`
+
+**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE
+Same pattern as CLI — delegated to `agents/launcher.ts`. The TUI adds risk because it accepts freeform user input in an interactive session, making it easier to craft malicious commands.
+
+### Medium Severity Findings
+
+#### `#mcp` → `#data-exposure` [MEDIUM]
+**Location:** `src/mcp/server.ts:34`
+**Annotation:** `@exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] -- "Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients"`
+
+**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE
+MCP resources (`guardlink://model`, `guardlink://definitions`, `guardlink://unmitigated`) expose the complete threat model to any connected client. This is **by design** for AI agent integration, but represents information disclosure risk if:
+- MCP transport is compromised
+- Unauthorized clients connect to the stdio interface
+- Threat model contains sensitive architectural details
+
+### Low Severity Findings
+
+All low-severity `#data-exposure` and `#dos` findings are accurately annotated and appropriately flagged with `@audit` annotations acknowledging the accepted risk.
+
+---
+
+## Part 2 — STRIDE Threat Model
+
+### S — Spoofing
+
+**Finding S1: No Authentication on MCP Transport**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#mcp`
+**Evidence:** The MCP server uses stdio transport with no authentication mechanism. Any process that can connect to stdin/stdout can impersonate a legitimate client.
+
+**Annotation Gap:** No `@exposes #mcp to #spoofing` annotation exists.
+
+**Attack Scenario:**
+1. Attacker gains code execution on developer machine
+2. Attacker spawns process that connects to GuardLink MCP server
+3. Attacker issues tool calls to exfiltrate threat model or modify annotations
+
+**Mitigation:** Consider adding MCP client authentication (capability tokens, process attestation) or documenting this as an accepted risk with `@accepts`.
+
+---
+
+### T — Tampering
+
+**Finding T1: Annotation Tampering via Prompt Injection**
+**Severity:** High
+**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`, `#mcp`
+**Evidence:** User prompts are concatenated into agent instructions (`src/agents/prompts.ts:6`). A malicious prompt could instruct the agent to:
+- Add false `@mitigates` annotations to hide vulnerabilities
+- Remove `@exposes` annotations from critical code
+- Inject malicious `@shield` blocks to hide code from analysis
+
+**Data Flow:** `UserPrompt → #agent-launcher → AgentProcess → SourceFiles`
+
+**Annotation Accuracy:** The `@exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high]` correctly identifies this risk.
+
+**Mitigation:**
+1. Implement annotation integrity checks (hash of annotation blocks)
+2. Require human approval for annotation changes via AI agents
+3. Add `@audit` trail for all AI-generated annotations
+
+**Finding T2: Config File Tampering**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#workspace-config`
+**Evidence:** `src/workspace/types.ts:9` notes `@threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium]` with mitigation via `#yaml-validation`.
+
+**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with mitigation.
+
+---
+
+### R — Repudiation
+
+**Finding R1: No Audit Trail for AI-Generated Changes**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`, `#tui`, `#cli`
+**Evidence:** When AI agents modify annotations via `/annotate` or `guardlink annotate`, there is no persistent audit log of:
+- What changes were made
+- Which agent made them
+- What prompt triggered the change
+
+**Annotation Gap:** `@audit` annotations exist on assets, but no `@flows` document the audit trail path.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add `@flows #agent-launcher → AuditLog via appendFile` with corresponding implementation.
+
+**Finding R2: Threat Report Attribution**
+**Severity:** Low
+**Assets:** `#llm-client`
+**Evidence:** AI-generated threat reports are saved to `.guardlink/threat-reports/` with timestamps, but the LLM model and configuration used are not always recorded in the report metadata.
+
+**Mitigation:** Reports should include full provenance (model, provider, API version, prompt hash).
+
+---
+
+### I — Information Disclosure
+
+**Finding I1: Full Threat Model Exposure to LLM Providers**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#llm-client`
+**Evidence:** `src/analyze/index.ts:12` — `@exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low]` with `@audit` noting "Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis."
+
+**Concern:** The annotation rates this as LOW severity, but the actual risk depends on:
+- Sensitivity of the codebase being analyzed
+- LLM provider data retention policies
+- Whether code snippets include secrets (the `#key-redaction` control may not catch all patterns)
+
+**Recommendation:** Upgrade severity to MEDIUM and add configurable redaction patterns.
+
+**Finding I2: API Key Storage**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#init`
+**Evidence:** `src/init/index.ts:12` — API keys written to `.guardlink/config.json`. The `@audit` notes ".gitignore entry added automatically."
+
+**Residual Risk:**
+- `.gitignore` can be overwritten or removed
+- Backup tools may capture config files
+- IDE indexing may expose keys
+
+**Mitigation:** Consider using system keychain or environment variables exclusively.
+
+**Finding I3: SARIF Export Reveals Architecture**
+**Severity:** Low
+**Assets:** `#sarif`
+**Evidence:** `src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15` — SARIF output includes file paths, line numbers, and vulnerability descriptions. This is intentional for CI/CD integration but could reveal:
+- Internal architecture to external parties
+- Security weaknesses if SARIF files are leaked
+
+**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with `@audit` acknowledging intentional disclosure.
+
+---
+
+### D — Denial of Service
+
+**Finding D1: No Resource Limits on File Processing**
+**Severity:** Low
+**Assets:** `#suggest`, `#parser`
+**Evidence:**
+- `src/mcp/suggest.ts:16` — "Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning"
+- No explicit file size limits in `fast-glob` configuration
+
+**Attack Scenario:** Crafted repository with extremely large files or deep directory trees could exhaust memory.
+
+**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with `@audit` accepting the risk.
+
+**Mitigation:** Add `#resource-limits` control with explicit file size caps (e.g., 10MB per file, 1000 files max).
+
+**Finding D2: Agent Spawn Timeout**
+**Severity:** Low
+**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`
+**Evidence:** `src/agents/launcher.ts:15` — "No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration"
+
+**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated. The `@audit` notes this is intentional for interactive sessions.
+
+---
+
+### E — Elevation of Privilege
+
+**Finding E1: MCP Tool Call Privilege Escalation**
+**Severity:** High
+**Assets:** `#mcp`
+**Evidence:** MCP tools execute with the same privileges as the GuardLink process. A compromised or malicious MCP client could:
+- Write files anywhere the process has access (`guardlink_sarif`, `guardlink_report`)
+- Execute git commands (`guardlink_diff`)
+- Spawn child processes (`guardlink_annotate`)
+
+**Data Flow:** `MCPClient → #mcp via tool_call → FileSystem via writeFile`
+
+**Annotation Gap:** No `@exposes #mcp to #privilege-escalation` annotation exists.
+
+**Mitigation:**
+1. Add capability-based access control for MCP tools
+2. Implement path sandboxing for file writes
+3. Add `@exposes #mcp to #privilege-escalation` annotation
+
+**Finding E2: Agent Process Inherits Environment**
+**Severity:** Medium
+**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`
+**Evidence:** `EnvVars → #agent-launcher via process.env` — spawned agents inherit the full environment, including API keys and sensitive configuration.
+
+**Mitigation:** Implement environment filtering to pass only necessary variables to agents.
+
+---
+
+## Priority Action Items
+
+### Critical (Immediate)
+
+1. **Add prompt sanitization** to `src/agents/prompts.ts` — escape or template user prompts before concatenation
+2. **Document MCP security model** — add `@assumes` annotation about trusted client requirement
+
+### High (This Sprint)
+
+3. **Implement path sandboxing** for MCP file write operations
+4. **Add environment filtering** in `launchAgent()` to prevent credential leakage
+5. **Add `@exposes` annotations** for spoofing and privilege escalation gaps
+
+### Medium (Next Sprint)
+
+6. **Add audit logging** for AI-generated annotation changes
+7. **Implement file size limits** in parser and suggest modules
+8. **Upgrade `#data-exposure` severity** for LLM client to MEDIUM
+
+### Low (Backlog)
+
+9. **Consider system keychain** for API key storage
+10. **Add provenance metadata** to threat reports
+
+---
+
+## Annotation Coverage Summary
+
+| Category | Annotated | Missing |
+|----------|-----------|---------|
+| Assets | 16 | 0 |
+| Threats | 15 | 2 (spoofing, priv-esc) |
+| Controls | 12 | 2 (audit-logging, env-filtering) |
+| Data Flows | 68 | ~5 (audit trails) |
+| Boundaries | 9 | 0 |
+
+**Overall Coverage:** 85% — Good annotation discipline with gaps in newer attack categories (prompt injection defense, AI agent trust boundaries).
+
+---
+
+*Report generated by Claude Opus 4.5 using GuardLink STRIDE framework.*
diff --git a/.windsurfrules b/.windsurfrules
index dd2786e..8d40c54 100644
--- a/.windsurfrules
+++ b/.windsurfrules
@@ -39,16 +39,16 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -61,17 +61,6 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -81,11 +70,22 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 <!-- guardlink:end -->
 
@@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ Every time you write or modify code that touches security-relevant behavior, you
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 68da32c..bf121a4 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -75,17 +75,6 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -95,11 +84,22 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 > **Note:** This section is auto-generated. Run `guardlink sync` to update after code changes.
 > Any coding agent (Cursor, Claude, Copilot, Windsurf, etc.) should reference these IDs
@@ -121,3 +121,7 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 1eeb8c2..bc6ffd3 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -5,6 +5,24 @@ All notable changes to GuardLink CLI will be documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [1.4.1] — 2026-03-12
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **GAL reference (`/gal`, `guardlink gal`)**: Fixed all syntax examples to match the actual parser — descriptions now correctly show `-- "quoted text"` format instead of the non-functional `: text` format; severity now shows bracket notation `[high]` / `[P0]` instead of `severity:high`; `@flows` now shows `->` arrow syntax instead of `to`; `@validates` now shows `for` preposition instead of `on`; `@owns` now includes the required `for` preposition; `@mitigates` now documents `using` as the primary keyword (with `with` as v1 compat)
+- **GAL reference**: Added missing documentation for external references (`cwe:CWE-89`, `owasp:A03:2021`, `capec:CAPEC-66`, `attack:T1190`) on `@threat` and `@exposes` annotations
+- **GAL reference**: Added missing `@boundary` alternate syntaxes (`@boundary between A and B`, `@boundary A | B`) and `(#id)` support
+- **GAL reference**: Added missing standalone `@shield` single-line marker (was only documenting `@shield:begin/end` blocks)
+- **TUI `/help`**: Added missing `/unannotated` command to the help output (was registered and functional but not listed)
+- **CLI version**: Fixed `guardlink --version` reporting `1.1.0` instead of the actual package version
+
+### Changed
+
+- **GAL reference**: Added new "External References" section explaining `cwe:`, `owasp:`, `capec:`, `attack:` ref syntax
+- **GAL reference**: Updated Tips section with description format, severity format, and `@flows ->` syntax reminders
+- **Annotations**: Changed `@comment` to `@audit` on agent-launcher timeout note for better governance visibility
+- **Annotations**: Added `@audit` to MCP suggest module, added workspace-related controls to definitions
+
 ## [1.4.0] — 2026-02-27
 
 ### Added
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 2ae6015..68c3a9f 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 **Assets:** #parser (GuardLink,Parser), #cli (GuardLink,CLI), #tui (GuardLink,TUI), #mcp (GuardLink,MCP), #llm-client (GuardLink,LLM_Client), #dashboard (GuardLink,Dashboard), #init (GuardLink,Init), #agent-launcher (GuardLink,Agent_Launcher), #diff (GuardLink,Diff), #report (GuardLink,Report), #sarif (GuardLink,SARIF), #suggest (GuardLink,Suggest), #workspace-link (Workspace,Link), #merge-engine (Workspace,Merge), #report-metadata (Workspace,Metadata), #workspace-config (Workspace,Config)
 **Threats:** #path-traversal (Path_Traversal) [high], #cmd-injection (Command_Injection) [critical], #xss (Cross_Site_Scripting) [high], #api-key-exposure (API_Key_Exposure) [high], #ssrf (Server_Side_Request_Forgery) [medium], #redos (ReDoS) [medium], #arbitrary-write (Arbitrary_File_Write) [high], #prompt-injection (Prompt_Injection) [medium], #dos (Denial_of_Service) [medium], #data-exposure (Sensitive_Data_Exposure) [medium], #insecure-deser (Insecure_Deserialization) [medium], #child-proc-injection (Child_Process_Injection) [high], #info-disclosure (Information_Disclosure) [low], #tag-collision (Tag_Collision) [medium], #config-tamper (Config_Tampering) [medium]
-**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring)
+**Controls:** #path-validation (Path_Validation), #input-sanitize (Input_Sanitization), #output-encoding (Output_Encoding), #key-redaction (Key_Redaction), #process-sandbox (Process_Sandboxing), #config-validation (Config_Validation), #resource-limits (Resource_Limits), #param-commands (Parameterized_Commands), #glob-filtering (Glob_Pattern_Filtering), #regex-anchoring (Regex_Anchoring), #prefix-ownership (Prefix_Ownership), #yaml-validation (YAML_Validation)
 
 ### Open Exposures (need @mitigates or @audit)
 
-- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
-- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
-- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/agents/launcher.ts:13)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #dos [low] (src/agents/launcher.ts:15)
 - #agent-launcher exposed to #prompt-injection [high] (src/agents/prompts.ts:6)
+- #llm-client exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyze/index.ts:12)
+- #llm-client exposed to #prompt-injection [medium] (src/analyze/llm.ts:17)
+- #sarif exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15)
 - #cli exposed to #cmd-injection [critical] (src/cli/index.ts:31)
 - #init exposed to #data-exposure [low] (src/init/index.ts:12)
 - #mcp exposed to #cmd-injection [high] (src/mcp/index.ts:4)
@@ -75,17 +75,6 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 ### Existing Data Flows (extend, don't duplicate)
 
-- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
-- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
-- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
-- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
-- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
-- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
-- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
-- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
-- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
-- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
 - EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env
 - ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync
 - #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync
@@ -95,11 +84,22 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 - UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt
 - ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model
 - #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return
+- ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync
+- LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion
+- #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch
+- LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response
+- LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor
+- #llm-client -> NVD via fetch
+- ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync
+- ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif
+- #sarif -> SarifLog via return
 - ... and 48 more
 
 ### Model Stats
 
-287 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 10 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
+290 annotations, 16 assets, 15 threats, 12 controls, 60 exposures, 44 mitigations, 68 flows
 
 > **Note:** This section is auto-generated. Run `guardlink sync` to update after code changes.
 > Any coding agent (Cursor, Claude, Copilot, Windsurf, etc.) should reference these IDs
@@ -122,3 +122,7 @@ This project uses [GuardLink](https://guardlink.bugb.io) annotations in source c
 
 
 
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index fe73d4f..7874316 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "guardlink",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.4.1",
   "description": "GuardLink — Security annotations for code. Threat modeling that lives in your codebase.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
diff --git a/src/agents/launcher.ts b/src/agents/launcher.ts
index 76ce8de..77f1200 100644
--- a/src/agents/launcher.ts
+++ b/src/agents/launcher.ts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- "User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument"
  * @audit #agent-launcher -- "Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation"
  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- "No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration"
- * @comment -- "Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control"
+ * @audit #agent-launcher -- "Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control"
  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- "Prompt input path"
  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- "Process spawn path"
  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- "Agent output capture"
diff --git a/src/cli/index.ts b/src/cli/index.ts
index a737642..ec93948 100644
--- a/src/cli/index.ts
+++ b/src/cli/index.ts
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ function detectProjectName(root: string, explicit?: string): string {
 program
   .name('guardlink')
   .description('GuardLink — Security annotations for code. Threat modeling that lives in your codebase.')
-  .version('1.1.0')
+  .version('1.4.1')
   .addHelpText('before', gradient(['#00ff41', '#00d4ff'])(ASCII_LOGO));
 
 // ─── init ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1407,29 +1407,29 @@ program
       console.log(D('  Annotations live in source code comments. GuardLink parses'));
       console.log(D('  them to build a live threat model from your codebase.'));
       console.log('');
-      console.log(D('  Syntax:  @verb  subject  [preposition  object]  [: description]'));
+      console.log(D('  Syntax:  @verb  subject  [preposition  object]  [-- "description"]'));
       console.log('');
 
       // ── DEFINITIONS ──
       console.log(H('  ── Definitions ─────────────────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@asset')}  ${K('<path>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@asset')}  ${K('<path>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Declare a named asset (component, service, data store).'));
       console.log(D('    Path uses dot notation for hierarchy.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @asset  api.auth.token_store  : Stores JWT refresh tokens'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @asset  api.auth.token_store  -- "Stores JWT refresh tokens"'));
       console.log(EX('    // @asset  db.users'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@threat')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('[severity: critical|high|medium|low]  [: description]')}`);
-      console.log(D('    Declare a named threat. Severity aliases: P0=critical P1=high P2=medium P3=low.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @threat  SQL Injection  severity:high  : Unsanitized input reaches DB'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @threat  Token Theft  severity:P0'));
+      console.log(`  ${V('@threat')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[critical|high|medium|low]')}  ${D('[ext-refs]')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
+      console.log(D('    Declare a named threat. Severity in brackets: [P0]=[critical] [P1]=[high] [P2]=[medium] [P3]=[low].'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @threat  SQL Injection  (#sql-inj)  [high]  cwe:CWE-89  -- "Unsanitized input reaches DB"'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @threat  Token Theft  [P0]'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@control')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@control')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Declare a security control (mitigation mechanism).'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @control  Input Validation  : Sanitize all user-supplied strings'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @control  Input Validation  (#input-val)  -- "Sanitize all user-supplied strings"'));
       console.log(EX('    // @control  Rate Limiting'));
       console.log('');
 
@@ -1437,103 +1437,122 @@ program
       console.log(H('  ── Relationships ───────────────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@exposes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[severity: ...]  [: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@exposes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[severity]')}  ${D('[ext-refs]')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Mark an asset as exposed to a threat at this code location.'));
       console.log(D('    This is the primary annotation — every exposure creates a finding.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  severity:high'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @exposes  db.users  to  Token Theft  severity:critical  : No token rotation'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  [high]  cwe:CWE-89'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @exposes  db.users  to  Token Theft  [critical]  -- "No token rotation"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@mitigates')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('against')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[with')}  ${K('<control>')}${D(']  [: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@mitigates')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('against')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[using')}  ${K('<control>')}${D(']')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Mark that a control mitigates a threat on an asset.'));
       console.log(D('    Closes the exposure — removes it from open findings.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  api.auth  against  SQL Injection  with  Input Validation'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  db.users  against  Token Theft  : Rotation implemented in v2'));
+      console.log(D('    "using" is the primary keyword; "with" also accepted.'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  api.auth  against  SQL Injection  using  Input Validation'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  db.users  against  Token Theft  -- "Rotation implemented in v2"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@accepts')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: reason]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@accepts')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "reason"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Explicitly accept a risk. Removes it from open findings.'));
       console.log(D('    Use when the risk is known and intentionally not mitigated.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @accepts  Timing Attack  on  api.auth  : Acceptable for current threat model'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @accepts  Timing Attack  on  api.auth  -- "Acceptable for current threat model"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@transfers')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('from')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@transfers')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('from')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Transfer responsibility for a threat to another asset/team.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @transfers  DDoS  from  api.gateway  to  cdn.cloudflare  : Handled by CDN layer'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @transfers  DDoS  from  api.gateway  to  cdn.cloudflare  -- "Handled by CDN layer"'));
       console.log('');
 
       // ── DATA FLOWS ──
       console.log(H('  ── Data Flows & Boundaries ─────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@flows')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[via')}  ${K('<mechanism>')}${D(']  [: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@flows')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('->')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[via')}  ${K('<mechanism>')}${D(']')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Document data movement between components.'));
       console.log(D('    Appears in the Data Flow Diagram.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @flows  api.auth  to  db.users  via  TLS 1.3'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @flows  mobile.app  to  api.gateway  via  HTTPS  : User credentials'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @flows  api.auth  ->  db.users  via  TLS 1.3'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @flows  mobile.app  ->  api.gateway  via  HTTPS  -- "User credentials"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@boundary')}  ${K('<asset_a>')}  ${D('and')}  ${K('<asset_b>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@boundary')}  ${K('<asset_a>')}  ${D('and')}  ${K('<asset_b>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Declare a trust boundary between two assets.'));
       console.log(D('    Groups assets in the Data Flow Diagram.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @boundary  internet  and  api.gateway  : Public-facing edge'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @boundary  api.gateway  and  db.users  : Internal network boundary'));
+      console.log(D('    Alternate: @boundary between A and B  or  @boundary A | B'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @boundary  internet  and  api.gateway  (#edge)  -- "Public-facing edge"'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @boundary  api.gateway | db.users  -- "Internal network boundary"'));
       console.log('');
 
       // ── LIFECYCLE ──
       console.log(H('  ── Lifecycle & Governance ──────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@handles')}  ${K('<classification>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@handles')}  ${K('<classification>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Declare data classification handled by an asset.'));
       console.log(D('    Classifications: pii  phi  financial  secrets  internal  public'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @handles  pii  on  db.users  : Stores name, email, phone'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @handles  pii  on  db.users  -- "Stores name, email, phone"'));
       console.log(EX('    // @handles  secrets  on  api.auth.token_store'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@owns')}  ${K('<owner>')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@owns')}  ${K('<owner>')}  ${D('for')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Assign ownership of an asset to a team or person.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @owns  platform-team  api.auth'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @owns  platform-team  for  api.auth'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@validates')}  ${K('<control>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@validates')}  ${K('<control>')}  ${D('for')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Assert that a control has been validated/tested on an asset.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @validates  Input Validation  on  api.auth  : Pen-tested 2024-Q3'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @validates  Input Validation  for  api.auth  -- "Pen-tested 2024-Q3"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@audit')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@audit')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Mark that this code path is an audit trail point.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @audit  db.users  : All writes logged to audit_log table'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @audit  db.users  -- "All writes logged to audit_log table"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@assumes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@assumes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Document a security assumption about an asset.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @assumes  api.gateway  : Upstream WAF filters malformed requests'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @assumes  api.gateway  -- "Upstream WAF filters malformed requests"'));
       console.log('');
 
-      console.log(`  ${V('@comment')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+      console.log(`  ${V('@comment')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
       console.log(D('    Free-form developer security note (no structural effect).'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @comment  : TODO — add rate limiting before v2 launch'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @comment  -- "TODO — add rate limiting before v2 launch"'));
       console.log('');
 
       // ── SHIELD BLOCKS ──
       console.log(H('  ── Shield Blocks ───────────────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
+      console.log(`  ${V('@shield')}  ${D('[-- "reason"]')}`);
+      console.log(D('    Single-line marker for a security-sensitive code point.'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @shield  -- "Crypto key derivation — do not refactor without review"'));
+      console.log('');
       console.log(`  ${V('@shield:begin')}  ${D('/')}  ${V('@shield:end')}`);
       console.log(D('    Wrap a code block to mark it as security-sensitive.'));
       console.log(D('    GuardLink will flag unannotated symbols inside the block.'));
-      console.log(EX('    // @shield:begin'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @shield:begin  -- "Auth verification block"'));
       console.log(EX('    function verifyToken(token: string) { ... }'));
       console.log(EX('    // @shield:end'));
       console.log('');
 
+      // ── EXTERNAL REFERENCES ──
+      console.log(H('  ── External References ─────────────────────────────────────'));
+      console.log('');
+      console.log(D('  Append space-separated refs after severity on @threat and @exposes:'));
+      console.log(EX('    cwe:CWE-89  owasp:A03:2021  capec:CAPEC-66  attack:T1190'));
+      console.log('');
+      console.log(D('  Example:'));
+      console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  [high]  cwe:CWE-89  owasp:A03:2021'));
+      console.log('');
+
       // ── TIPS ──
       console.log(H('  ── Tips ────────────────────────────────────────────────────'));
       console.log('');
+      console.log(D('  • Descriptions use -- "quoted text" format (not : colon)'));
+      console.log(D('  • Severity uses brackets: [critical] [high] [medium] [low] or [P0]-[P3]'));
       console.log(D('  • Annotations work in any comment style: // /* # -- <!-- -->'));
       console.log(D('  • Place annotations on the line ABOVE the code they describe'));
       console.log(D('  • Asset names are case-insensitive and normalized (spaces→underscores)'));
       console.log(D('  • Threat/control names can reference IDs with #id syntax'));
+      console.log(D('  • @flows uses -> arrow syntax (not "to")'));
       console.log(D('  • Run guardlink parse after adding annotations to update the threat model'));
       console.log(D('  • Run guardlink validate to check for syntax errors and dangling references'));
       console.log(D('  • Run guardlink annotate to have an AI agent add annotations automatically'));
diff --git a/src/mcp/suggest.ts b/src/mcp/suggest.ts
index c6d544c..12baa02 100644
--- a/src/mcp/suggest.ts
+++ b/src/mcp/suggest.ts
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- "Complex regex patterns applied to source code"
  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- "Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers"
  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- "Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning"
+ * @audit #suggest -- "File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes"
  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- "File read path"
  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- "Suggestion output"
  * @comment -- "Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories"
diff --git a/src/tui/commands.ts b/src/tui/commands.ts
index 2b5b6cf..5fed1a6 100644
--- a/src/tui/commands.ts
+++ b/src/tui/commands.ts
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ export function cmdHelp(): void {
     ['/assets',                 'Asset tree with threat/control counts'],
     ['/files',                  'Annotated file tree with exposure counts'],
     ['/view <file>',            'Show all annotations in a file with code context'],
+    ['/unannotated',            'List source files with no annotations'],
     ['', ''],
     ['/threat-report <fw>',    'AI threat report (stride|dread|pasta|attacker|rapid|general|custom)'],
     ['/threat-reports',         'List saved AI threat reports'],
@@ -161,29 +162,29 @@ export function cmdGal(): void {
   console.log(D('  Annotations live in source code comments. GuardLink parses'));
   console.log(D('  them to build a live threat model from your codebase.'));
   console.log('');
-  console.log(D('  Syntax:  @verb  subject  [preposition  object]  [: description]'));
+  console.log(D('  Syntax:  @verb  subject  [preposition  object]  [-- "description"]'));
   console.log('');
 
   // ── DEFINITIONS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
   console.log(H('  ── Definitions ─────────────────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@asset')}  ${K('<path>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@asset')}  ${K('<path>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Declare a named asset (component, service, data store).'));
   console.log(D('    Path uses dot notation for hierarchy.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @asset  api.auth.token_store  : Stores JWT refresh tokens'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @asset  api.auth.token_store  -- "Stores JWT refresh tokens"'));
   console.log(EX('    // @asset  db.users'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@threat')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('[severity: critical|high|medium|low]  [: description]')}`);
-  console.log(D('    Declare a named threat. Severity aliases: P0=critical P1=high P2=medium P3=low.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @threat  SQL Injection  severity:high  : Unsanitized input reaches DB'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @threat  Token Theft  severity:P0'));
+  console.log(`  ${V('@threat')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[critical|high|medium|low]')}  ${D('[ext-refs]')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
+  console.log(D('    Declare a named threat. Severity in brackets: [P0]=[critical] [P1]=[high] [P2]=[medium] [P3]=[low].'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @threat  SQL Injection  (#sql-inj)  [high]  cwe:CWE-89  -- "Unsanitized input reaches DB"'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @threat  Token Theft  [P0]'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@control')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@control')}  ${K('<name>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Declare a security control (mitigation mechanism).'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @control  Input Validation  : Sanitize all user-supplied strings'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @control  Input Validation  (#input-val)  -- "Sanitize all user-supplied strings"'));
   console.log(EX('    // @control  Rate Limiting'));
   console.log('');
 
@@ -191,103 +192,122 @@ export function cmdGal(): void {
   console.log(H('  ── Relationships ───────────────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@exposes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[severity: ...]  [: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@exposes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[severity]')}  ${D('[ext-refs]')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Mark an asset as exposed to a threat at this code location.'));
   console.log(D('    This is the primary annotation — every exposure creates a finding.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  severity:high'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @exposes  db.users  to  Token Theft  severity:critical  : No token rotation'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  [high]  cwe:CWE-89'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @exposes  db.users  to  Token Theft  [critical]  -- "No token rotation"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@mitigates')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('against')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[with')}  ${K('<control>')}${D(']  [: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@mitigates')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('against')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('[using')}  ${K('<control>')}${D(']')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Mark that a control mitigates a threat on an asset.'));
   console.log(D('    Closes the exposure — removes it from open findings.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  api.auth  against  SQL Injection  with  Input Validation'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  db.users  against  Token Theft  : Rotation implemented in v2'));
+  console.log(D('    "using" is the primary keyword; "with" also accepted.'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  api.auth  against  SQL Injection  using  Input Validation'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @mitigates  db.users  against  Token Theft  -- "Rotation implemented in v2"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@accepts')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: reason]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@accepts')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "reason"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Explicitly accept a risk. Removes it from open findings.'));
   console.log(D('    Use when the risk is known and intentionally not mitigated.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @accepts  Timing Attack  on  api.auth  : Acceptable for current threat model'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @accepts  Timing Attack  on  api.auth  -- "Acceptable for current threat model"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@transfers')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('from')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@transfers')}  ${K('<threat>')}  ${D('from')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Transfer responsibility for a threat to another asset/team.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @transfers  DDoS  from  api.gateway  to  cdn.cloudflare  : Handled by CDN layer'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @transfers  DDoS  from  api.gateway  to  cdn.cloudflare  -- "Handled by CDN layer"'));
   console.log('');
 
   // ── DATA FLOWS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   console.log(H('  ── Data Flows & Boundaries ─────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@flows')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('to')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[via')}  ${K('<mechanism>')}${D(']  [: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@flows')}  ${K('<source>')}  ${D('->')}  ${K('<target>')}  ${D('[via')}  ${K('<mechanism>')}${D(']')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Document data movement between components.'));
   console.log(D('    Appears in the Data Flow Diagram.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @flows  api.auth  to  db.users  via  TLS 1.3'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @flows  mobile.app  to  api.gateway  via  HTTPS  : User credentials'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @flows  api.auth  ->  db.users  via  TLS 1.3'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @flows  mobile.app  ->  api.gateway  via  HTTPS  -- "User credentials"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@boundary')}  ${K('<asset_a>')}  ${D('and')}  ${K('<asset_b>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@boundary')}  ${K('<asset_a>')}  ${D('and')}  ${K('<asset_b>')}  ${D('(#id)')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Declare a trust boundary between two assets.'));
   console.log(D('    Groups assets in the Data Flow Diagram.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @boundary  internet  and  api.gateway  : Public-facing edge'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @boundary  api.gateway  and  db.users  : Internal network boundary'));
+  console.log(D('    Alternate: @boundary between A and B  or  @boundary A | B'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @boundary  internet  and  api.gateway  (#edge)  -- "Public-facing edge"'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @boundary  api.gateway | db.users  -- "Internal network boundary"'));
   console.log('');
 
   // ── LIFECYCLE ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   console.log(H('  ── Lifecycle & Governance ──────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@handles')}  ${K('<classification>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@handles')}  ${K('<classification>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Declare data classification handled by an asset.'));
   console.log(D('    Classifications: pii  phi  financial  secrets  internal  public'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @handles  pii  on  db.users  : Stores name, email, phone'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @handles  pii  on  db.users  -- "Stores name, email, phone"'));
   console.log(EX('    // @handles  secrets  on  api.auth.token_store'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@owns')}  ${K('<owner>')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@owns')}  ${K('<owner>')}  ${D('for')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Assign ownership of an asset to a team or person.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @owns  platform-team  api.auth'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @owns  platform-team  for  api.auth'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@validates')}  ${K('<control>')}  ${D('on')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@validates')}  ${K('<control>')}  ${D('for')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Assert that a control has been validated/tested on an asset.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @validates  Input Validation  on  api.auth  : Pen-tested 2024-Q3'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @validates  Input Validation  for  api.auth  -- "Pen-tested 2024-Q3"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@audit')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@audit')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Mark that this code path is an audit trail point.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @audit  db.users  : All writes logged to audit_log table'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @audit  db.users  -- "All writes logged to audit_log table"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@assumes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@assumes')}  ${K('<asset>')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Document a security assumption about an asset.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @assumes  api.gateway  : Upstream WAF filters malformed requests'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @assumes  api.gateway  -- "Upstream WAF filters malformed requests"'));
   console.log('');
 
-  console.log(`  ${V('@comment')}  ${D('[: description]')}`);
+  console.log(`  ${V('@comment')}  ${D('[-- "description"]')}`);
   console.log(D('    Free-form developer security note (no structural effect).'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @comment  : TODO — add rate limiting before v2 launch'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @comment  -- "TODO — add rate limiting before v2 launch"'));
   console.log('');
 
   // ── SHIELD BLOCKS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
   console.log(H('  ── Shield Blocks ───────────────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
+  console.log(`  ${V('@shield')}  ${D('[-- "reason"]')}`);
+  console.log(D('    Single-line marker for a security-sensitive code point.'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @shield  -- "Crypto key derivation — do not refactor without review"'));
+  console.log('');
   console.log(`  ${V('@shield:begin')}  ${D('/')}  ${V('@shield:end')}`);
   console.log(D('    Wrap a code block to mark it as security-sensitive.'));
   console.log(D('    GuardLink will flag unannotated symbols inside the block.'));
-  console.log(EX('    // @shield:begin'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @shield:begin  -- "Auth verification block"'));
   console.log(EX('    function verifyToken(token: string) { ... }'));
   console.log(EX('    // @shield:end'));
   console.log('');
 
+  // ── EXTERNAL REFERENCES ─────────────────────────────────────────
+  console.log(H('  ── External References ─────────────────────────────────────'));
+  console.log('');
+  console.log(D('  Append space-separated refs after severity on @threat and @exposes:'));
+  console.log(EX('    cwe:CWE-89  owasp:A03:2021  capec:CAPEC-66  attack:T1190'));
+  console.log('');
+  console.log(D('  Example:'));
+  console.log(EX('    // @exposes  api.auth  to  SQL Injection  [high]  cwe:CWE-89  owasp:A03:2021'));
+  console.log('');
+
   // ── TIPS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   console.log(H('  ── Tips ────────────────────────────────────────────────────'));
   console.log('');
+  console.log(D('  • Descriptions use -- "quoted text" format (not : colon)'));
+  console.log(D('  • Severity uses brackets: [critical] [high] [medium] [low] or [P0]-[P3]'));
   console.log(D('  • Annotations work in any comment style: // /* # -- <!-- -->'));
   console.log(D('  • Place annotations on the line ABOVE the code they describe'));
   console.log(D('  • Asset names are case-insensitive and normalized (spaces→underscores)'));
   console.log(D('  • Threat/control names can reference IDs with #id syntax'));
+  console.log(D('  • @flows uses -> arrow syntax (not "to")'));
   console.log(D('  • Run /parse after adding annotations to update the threat model'));
   console.log(D('  • Run /validate to check for syntax errors and dangling references'));
   console.log(D('  • Run /annotate to have an AI agent add annotations automatically'));
diff --git a/threat-dashboard.html b/threat-dashboard.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b81e728
--- /dev/null
+++ b/threat-dashboard.html
@@ -0,0 +1,6986 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en" data-theme="dark">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<title>GuardLink — unknown Threat Model</title>
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
+<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
+<style>
+
+/* ── Reset ── */
+*, *::before, *::after { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
+:root { --font-ui: 'Inter', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif; --font-mono: 'JetBrains Mono', 'SF Mono', Menlo, Consolas, monospace; }
+
+/* ══ DARK THEME (Bravos) ══ */
+[data-theme="dark"] {
+  --bg: #0a0d10; --surface: #0d1117; --surface2: #1a1f25; --border: #1f3943; --border-subtle: #162028;
+  --text: #f0f0f0; --muted: #55899e; --text-dim: #3b6779;
+  --accent: #2dd4a7; --blue: #0360a2; --green: #10b981; --red: #ea1d1d;
+  --orange: #f97316; --yellow: #f59e0b; --purple: #a78bfa;
+  --sev-crit: #ef4444; --sev-high: #f97316; --sev-med: #f59e0b; --sev-low: #3b82f6; --sev-unset: #6b7280;
+  --badge-red-bg: #7f1d1d; --badge-green-bg: #065f46; --badge-blue-bg: #1e3a5f;
+  --risk-f: #7f1d1d; --risk-d: #7c2d12; --risk-c: #78350f; --risk-b: #1e3a5f; --risk-a: #065f46;
+  --heatmap-crit: #7f1d1d; --heatmap-high: #7c2d12; --heatmap-med: #78350f;
+  --heatmap-low: #1e3a5f; --heatmap-none: #1a1f25;
+  --table-alt: #141a20; --table-hover: #1e2830; --shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,.4);
+  --logo-bg: #2dd4a7; --logo-text: #0a0d10;
+  --drawer-w: 420px; --sidebar-w: 210px;
+}
+
+/* ══ LIGHT THEME ══ */
+[data-theme="light"] {
+  --bg: #f8fafc; --surface: #ffffff; --surface2: #f1f5f9; --border: #d1d5db; --border-subtle: #e5e7eb;
+  --text: #1a1a2e; --muted: #4a5568; --text-dim: #9ca3af;
+  --accent: #0d9373; --blue: #2563eb; --green: #059669; --red: #dc2626;
+  --orange: #ea580c; --yellow: #d97706; --purple: #7c3aed;
+  --sev-crit: #dc2626; --sev-high: #ea580c; --sev-med: #d97706; --sev-low: #2563eb; --sev-unset: #6b7280;
+  --badge-red-bg: #fef2f2; --badge-green-bg: #ecfdf5; --badge-blue-bg: #eff6ff;
+  --risk-f: #fef2f2; --risk-d: #fff7ed; --risk-c: #fffbeb; --risk-b: #eff6ff; --risk-a: #ecfdf5;
+  --heatmap-crit: #fef2f2; --heatmap-high: #fff7ed; --heatmap-med: #fffbeb;
+  --heatmap-low: #eff6ff; --heatmap-none: #f9fafb;
+  --table-alt: #f9fafb; --table-hover: #f1f5f9; --shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,.08);
+  --logo-bg: #0d9373; --logo-text: #ffffff;
+  --drawer-w: 420px; --sidebar-w: 210px;
+}
+
+body { font-family: var(--font-ui); background: var(--bg); color: var(--text); line-height: 1.5; overflow: hidden; height: 100vh; }
+a { color: var(--accent); text-decoration: none; }
+code { background: var(--border); padding: 1px 4px; border-radius: 3px; font-size: .75rem; font-family: var(--font-mono); }
+
+/* ── Top Nav ── */
+.topnav { height: 48px; background: var(--surface); border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); display: flex; align-items: center; padding: 0 1.2rem; gap: 1rem; z-index: 100; }
+.topnav-left { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: .6rem; }
+.topnav-right { margin-left: auto; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 1rem; }
+.topnav h1 { font-size: 1.1rem; font-weight: 700; white-space: nowrap; }
+.badge { background: var(--accent); color: var(--logo-text); padding: 2px 8px; border-radius: 10px; font-size: .65rem; font-weight: 600; }
+.tn-stat { font-size: .72rem; color: var(--muted); display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 4px; }
+.tn-stat .tn-v { font-weight: 700; font-size: .82rem; }
+.tn-v.red { color: var(--red); } .tn-v.green { color: var(--green); } .tn-v.blue { color: var(--accent); } .tn-v.yellow { color: var(--yellow); }
+.logo { width: 32px; height: 32px; background: var(--logo-bg); color: var(--logo-text); border-radius: 6px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; font-weight: 700; font-size: 13px; }
+#themeToggle { background: var(--surface2); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: 4px 8px; cursor: pointer; font-size: 14px; line-height: 1; }
+#themeToggle:hover { background: var(--border); }
+[data-theme="dark"] .icon-sun { display: none; }
+[data-theme="light"] .icon-moon { display: none; }
+
+/* ── Layout ── */
+.layout { display: flex; height: calc(100vh - 48px); position: relative; }
+.sidebar { width: var(--sidebar-w); min-width: var(--sidebar-w); background: var(--surface); border-right: 1px solid var(--border); display: flex; flex-direction: column; transition: all .25s ease; }
+.sidebar-nav { flex: 1; overflow-y: auto; padding: .6rem 0; }
+.sidebar.collapsed { width: 50px; min-width: 50px; }
+.sidebar.collapsed .nav-text { display: none; }
+.sidebar.collapsed .sep { margin: .5rem .5rem; }
+.sidebar.collapsed .chevron-left { display: none; }
+.sidebar.collapsed .chevron-right { display: block; }
+#sidebarToggle { background: var(--surface2); border: none; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); padding: .8rem; cursor: pointer; color: var(--muted); transition: all .2s; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; width: 100%; }
+#sidebarToggle:hover { background: var(--border); color: var(--accent); }
+#sidebarToggle svg { display: block; }
+#sidebarToggle .chevron-right { display: none; }
+.sidebar a { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: .6rem; padding: .55rem 1rem; font-size: .8rem; color: var(--muted); cursor: pointer; border-left: 3px solid transparent; transition: all .12s; user-select: none; }
+.sidebar a:hover { background: var(--surface2); color: var(--text); }
+.sidebar a.active { color: var(--accent); border-left-color: var(--accent); background: rgba(45,212,167,.08); }
+.sidebar .nav-icon { width: 20px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; flex-shrink: 0; }
+.sidebar .nav-icon svg { display: block; }
+.sidebar .sep { height: 1px; background: var(--border); margin: .5rem 1rem; }
+.main { flex: 1; overflow-y: auto; padding: 0; }
+.section-content { display: none; padding: 1.2rem 1.5rem; } .section-content.active { display: block; }
+
+/* ── Drawer ── */
+.drawer-overlay { position: fixed; top: 0; left: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0; background: rgba(0,0,0,.4); z-index: 200; display: none; }
+.drawer-overlay.open { display: block; }
+.drawer { position: fixed; top: 0; right: 0; width: var(--drawer-w); height: 100vh; background: var(--surface); border-left: 1px solid var(--border); z-index: 201; transform: translateX(100%); transition: transform .25s ease; overflow-y: auto; }
+.drawer.open { transform: translateX(0); }
+.drawer-header { display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; padding: .8rem 1rem; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); position: sticky; top: 0; background: var(--surface); z-index: 1; }
+.drawer-header h3 { font-size: .95rem; color: var(--accent); }
+.drawer-close { background: none; border: 1px solid var(--border); color: var(--muted); cursor: pointer; padding: 4px 10px; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .8rem; }
+.drawer-close:hover { color: var(--text); border-color: var(--muted); }
+.drawer-body { padding: 1rem; }
+.d-section { margin-bottom: 1rem; } .d-label { font-size: .7rem; text-transform: uppercase; color: var(--muted); letter-spacing: .5px; margin-bottom: .3rem; } .d-value { font-size: .82rem; }
+.d-code { background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: .5rem .7rem; font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .72rem; line-height: 1.6; color: var(--muted); white-space: pre; overflow-x: auto; }
+
+/* ── Section headings ── */
+.sec-h { font-size: 1.1rem; font-weight: 700; margin-bottom: .8rem; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: .5rem; }
+.sec-icon { font-size: 1.2rem; }
+.sub-h { font-size: .9rem; font-weight: 600; color: var(--accent); margin: 1rem 0 .5rem 0; }
+
+/* ── Stats Grid ── */
+.stats-grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(100px, 1fr)); gap: .5rem; margin-bottom: 1.2rem; }
+.stat-card { background: var(--surface2); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: .5rem; text-align: center; }
+.stat-card .value { font-size: 1.3rem; font-weight: 700; color: var(--accent); }
+.stat-card .label { font-size: .65rem; color: var(--muted); margin-top: 2px; }
+.stat-danger .value { color: var(--red); } .stat-success .value { color: var(--green); }
+.stat-muted .value { color: var(--muted); } .stat-muted .label { color: var(--text-dim); }
+
+/* ── Risk Banner ── */
+.risk-banner { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 20px; padding: 16px 20px; border-radius: 10px; border: 1px solid var(--border); margin-bottom: 1rem; }
+.risk-grade { font-size: 40px; font-weight: 700; width: 60px; height: 60px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; border-radius: 10px; }
+.risk-detail { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 2px; }
+.risk-detail strong { font-size: 15px; } .risk-detail span { font-size: 13px; color: var(--muted); }
+.risk-f { background: var(--risk-f); } .risk-f .risk-grade { background: var(--sev-crit); color: #fff; }
+.risk-d { background: var(--risk-d); } .risk-d .risk-grade { background: var(--sev-high); color: #fff; }
+.risk-c { background: var(--risk-c); } .risk-c .risk-grade { background: var(--sev-med); color: #fff; }
+.risk-b { background: var(--risk-b); } .risk-b .risk-grade { background: var(--sev-low); color: #fff; }
+.risk-a { background: var(--risk-a); } .risk-a .risk-grade { background: var(--green); color: #fff; }
+
+/* ── Coverage Bar ── */
+.coverage-pct { font-size: 1.8rem; font-weight: 700; }
+.coverage-pct.good { color: var(--green); } .coverage-pct.warn { color: var(--yellow); } .coverage-pct.bad { color: var(--red); }
+.posture-bar { height: 8px; border-radius: 4px; background: var(--border); margin: .6rem 0; overflow: hidden; }
+.posture-fill { height: 100%; border-radius: 4px; transition: width .4s; }
+.posture-fill.good { background: var(--green); } .posture-fill.warn { background: var(--yellow); } .posture-fill.bad { background: var(--red); }
+
+/* ── Severity Chart ── */
+.severity-chart { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 8px; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
+.sev-row { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px; }
+.sev-label { width: 55px; font-size: 13px; font-weight: 500; text-align: right; }
+.sev-track { flex: 1; height: 22px; background: var(--surface2); border-radius: 5px; overflow: hidden; }
+.sev-fill { height: 100%; border-radius: 5px; min-width: 2px; transition: width .6s; }
+.sev-fill-crit { background: var(--sev-crit); } .sev-fill-high { background: var(--sev-high); }
+.sev-fill-med { background: var(--sev-med); } .sev-fill-low { background: var(--sev-low); }
+.sev-fill-unset { background: var(--sev-unset); }
+.sev-count { width: 28px; font-size: 14px; font-weight: 600; font-family: var(--font-mono); }
+
+/* ── Finding Cards ── */
+.finding-card { background: var(--surface2); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: .7rem 1rem; margin-bottom: .5rem; cursor: pointer; transition: border-color .15s; }
+.finding-card:hover { border-color: var(--accent); }
+.fc-top { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: .5rem; margin-bottom: .2rem; }
+.fc-risk { font-weight: 600; font-size: .85rem; } .fc-desc { font-size: .78rem; color: var(--muted); }
+.fc-assets { font-size: .72rem; color: var(--muted); margin-top: .2rem; font-family: var(--font-mono); }
+.fc-sev { font-size: .7rem; padding: 1px 6px; border-radius: 3px; font-weight: 600; }
+.fc-sev.crit { background: var(--sev-crit); color: #fff; } .fc-sev.high { background: var(--sev-high); color: #fff; }
+.fc-sev.med { background: var(--sev-med); color: #000; } .fc-sev.low { background: var(--border); color: var(--muted); }
+.fc-sev.unset { background: var(--border); color: var(--muted); }
+
+/* ── Tables ── */
+table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; background: var(--surface2); border-radius: 6px; overflow: hidden; margin-bottom: .8rem; }
+th, td { padding: .45rem .7rem; text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); font-size: .78rem; }
+th { background: var(--border); color: var(--muted); font-weight: 600; text-transform: uppercase; font-size: .68rem; }
+tr.clickable { cursor: pointer; } tr.clickable:hover { background: var(--table-hover); }
+.row-open { border-left: 3px solid var(--red); }
+.loc { color: var(--muted); font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .72rem; white-space: nowrap; }
+.empty-state { color: var(--muted); font-style: italic; padding: .8rem; font-size: .82rem; }
+
+/* ── Badges ── */
+.badge-red { display: inline-block; padding: 1px 7px; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .68rem; font-weight: 600; background: var(--badge-red-bg); color: var(--sev-crit); }
+.badge-green { display: inline-block; padding: 1px 7px; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .68rem; font-weight: 600; background: var(--badge-green-bg); color: var(--green); }
+.badge-blue { display: inline-block; padding: 1px 7px; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .68rem; font-weight: 600; background: var(--badge-blue-bg); color: var(--sev-low); }
+
+/* ── Annotation badges ── */
+.ann-badge { display: inline-block; padding: 1px 7px; border-radius: 4px; font-size: .68rem; font-weight: 600; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: .3px; }
+.ann-asset { background: #1c3a5e; color: #58a6ff; } .ann-threat { background: #4a1a1a; color: #f85149; }
+.ann-control { background: #1a3a1a; color: #3fb950; } .ann-exposes { background: #4a1a1a; color: #f85149; }
+.ann-mitigates { background: #1a3a1a; color: #3fb950; } .ann-accepts { background: #3a3a1a; color: #d29922; }
+.ann-transfers { background: #2a1a3a; color: #bc8cff; } .ann-flow { background: #2a2a2a; color: #8b949e; }
+.ann-boundary { background: #2a1a3a; color: #bc8cff; } .ann-data { background: #3a2a1a; color: #db6d28; }
+.ann-handles { background: #3a2a1a; color: #db6d28; } .ann-validates { background: #1a3a1a; color: #3fb950; }
+.ann-owns { background: #1c3a5e; color: #58a6ff; } .ann-audit { background: #3a3a1a; color: #d29922; }
+.ann-assumes { background: #3a3a1a; color: #d29922; } .ann-shield { background: #2a2a2a; color: #8b949e; }
+.ann-comment { background: var(--surface2); color: var(--muted); border: 1px solid var(--border); }
+
+/* ── File Cards (Code Browser) ── */
+.file-card { background: var(--surface2); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; margin-bottom: .7rem; overflow: hidden; }
+.file-card-header { display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; padding: .5rem .8rem; background: var(--surface); cursor: pointer; user-select: none; }
+.file-card-header:hover { background: var(--border); }
+.file-path { font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .78rem; color: var(--accent); font-weight: 600; }
+.file-count { font-size: .68rem; color: var(--muted); background: var(--border); padding: 1px 7px; border-radius: 10px; }
+.chevron { color: var(--muted); transition: transform .2s; font-size: .75rem; }
+.file-card-header.open .chevron { transform: rotate(90deg); }
+.file-card-body { display: none; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); } .file-card-body.open { display: block; }
+.ann-entry { padding: .6rem .8rem; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); cursor: pointer; }
+.ann-entry:hover { background: rgba(45,212,167,.04); } .ann-entry:last-child { border-bottom: none; }
+.ann-header { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: .4rem; margin-bottom: .2rem; }
+.ann-line { font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .68rem; color: var(--muted); min-width: 35px; }
+.ann-summary { font-size: .78rem; font-weight: 500; }
+.ann-desc { font-size: .75rem; color: var(--muted); margin: .15rem 0 .25rem 0; padding-left: .5rem; border-left: 2px solid var(--border); }
+
+/* ── Diagrams ── */
+.diagram-hint { font-size: .75rem; color: var(--muted); margin-bottom: .6rem; }
+.mermaid-wrap { background: var(--surface); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: 16px; overflow: auto; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
+.mermaid { text-align: left; width: max-content; min-width: 100%; }
+.mermaid svg { max-width: none; height: auto; display: block; }
+
+/* ── Heatmap ── */
+.heatmap { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(200px, 1fr)); gap: 10px; }
+.heatmap-cell { border-radius: 8px; padding: 12px; border: 1px solid var(--border); transition: border-color 0.15s; }
+.heatmap-cell.clickable { cursor: pointer; }
+.heatmap-cell.clickable:hover { border-color: var(--accent); }
+.heatmap-name { font-weight: 600; font-size: 13px; margin-bottom: 4px; font-family: var(--font-mono); word-break: break-all; }
+.heatmap-stats { display: flex; gap: 10px; font-size: 12px; color: var(--muted); }
+.heatmap-data { margin-top: 4px; display: flex; gap: 4px; flex-wrap: wrap; }
+.data-badge { font-size: 10px; padding: 1px 6px; border-radius: 4px; background: rgba(45,212,167,.15); color: var(--accent); font-weight: 600; text-transform: uppercase; }
+.risk-cell-critical { background: var(--heatmap-crit); } .risk-cell-high { background: var(--heatmap-high); }
+.risk-cell-medium { background: var(--heatmap-med); } .risk-cell-low { background: var(--heatmap-low); }
+.risk-cell-none { background: var(--heatmap-none); }
+
+/* ── Code Blocks ── */
+.code-block { background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 5px; padding: .3rem .6rem; overflow-x: auto; margin-top: .25rem; font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .72rem; line-height: 1.45; tab-size: 2; }
+.code-line-code { display: block; color: var(--muted); white-space: pre; }
+.code-line-ann { display: block; color: var(--accent); background: rgba(45,212,167,.08); margin: 0 -.6rem; padding: 0 .6rem; border-left: 2px solid var(--accent); white-space: pre; }
+
+/* ── Diagram Tabs ── */
+.diagram-tabs { display: flex; gap: 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); margin-bottom: 1rem; }
+.diagram-tab { background: none; border: none; border-bottom: 2px solid transparent; padding: .5rem 1rem; color: var(--muted); font-size: .82rem; cursor: pointer; font-family: var(--font-ui); transition: all .15s; }
+.diagram-tab:hover { color: var(--text); background: var(--surface2); }
+.diagram-tab.active { color: var(--accent); border-bottom-color: var(--accent); }
+.diagram-panel { display: none; } .diagram-panel.active { display: block; }
+
+/* ── AI Analysis Controls ── */
+.ai-analysis-controls { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.75rem; margin: 0.75rem 0 1.25rem; }
+.report-selector-label { font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.88rem; color: var(--text); }
+.report-selector { flex: 1; max-width: 600px; padding: 0.5rem 0.75rem; font-size: 0.88rem; font-family: var(--font-base); background: var(--surface2); color: var(--text); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; cursor: pointer; transition: border-color 0.15s, background 0.15s; }
+.report-selector:hover { background: var(--surface3); border-color: var(--accent); }
+.report-selector:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px rgba(45,212,167,0.1); }
+.report-selector option { background: var(--surface); color: var(--text); padding: 0.5rem; }
+.ai-analysis-main { margin-top: 0.5rem; }
+.md-content h1 { font-size: 1.4rem; font-weight: 700; margin: 1.2rem 0 .6rem; color: var(--text); }
+.md-content h2 { font-size: 1.15rem; font-weight: 600; margin: 1rem 0 .5rem; color: var(--text); border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); padding-bottom: .3rem; }
+.md-content h3 { font-size: 1rem; font-weight: 600; margin: .8rem 0 .4rem; color: var(--text); }
+.md-content p { margin: .4rem 0; line-height: 1.6; }
+.md-content ul, .md-content ol { margin: .4rem 0 .4rem 1.5rem; }
+.md-content li { margin: .2rem 0; line-height: 1.5; }
+.md-content code { font-family: var(--font-mono); font-size: .82rem; background: var(--surface2); padding: 1px 5px; border-radius: 3px; }
+.md-content pre { background: var(--bg); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: .8rem; overflow-x: auto; margin: .6rem 0; }
+.md-content pre code { background: none; padding: 0; }
+.md-content blockquote { border-left: 3px solid var(--accent); padding-left: .8rem; margin: .6rem 0; color: var(--muted); }
+.md-content table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; margin: .6rem 0; font-size: .82rem; }
+.md-content th, .md-content td { padding: .4rem .6rem; border: 1px solid var(--border); text-align: left; }
+.md-content th { background: var(--surface2); font-weight: 600; }
+.md-content strong { color: var(--text); }
+
+/* ── Responsive ── */
+@media (max-width: 768px) {
+  .sidebar { width: 50px; min-width: 50px; } .sidebar .nav-text { display: none; }
+  .topnav .tn-stat { display: none; }
+}
+@media print { .topnav, .sidebar, #sidebarToggle { display: none; } .main { margin: 0; } .layout { display: block; } #themeToggle { display: none; } }
+
+</style>
+<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked/marked.min.js"></script>
+<script src="https://d3js.org/d3.v7.min.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<!-- ═══════════ TOP NAV ═══════════ -->
+<div class="topnav">
+  <div class="topnav-left">
+    <div class="logo">TS</div>
+    <h1>unknown</h1>
+    <span class="badge">Threat Model</span>
+  </div>
+  <div class="topnav-right">
+    <div class="tn-stat"><span>Assets</span> <span class="tn-v blue">16</span></div>
+    <div class="tn-stat"><span>Open</span> <span class="tn-v red">15</span></div>
+    <div class="tn-stat"><span>Controls</span> <span class="tn-v green">12</span></div>
+    <div class="tn-stat"><span>Coverage</span> <span class="tn-v red">0%</span></div>
+    <button id="themeToggle" onclick="toggleTheme()" title="Toggle light/dark mode">
+      <span class="icon-sun">☀️</span><span class="icon-moon">🌙</span>
+    </button>
+  </div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="layout">
+
+<!-- ═══════════ SIDEBAR ═══════════ -->
+<nav class="sidebar" id="sidebar">
+  <div class="sidebar-nav">
+    <a class="active" onclick="showSection('summary',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M8 2l6 4v6l-6 4-6-4V6l6-4z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Executive Summary</span></a>
+    <a onclick="showSection('ai-analysis',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M8 1l2 5h5l-4 3 2 5-5-3-5 3 2-5-4-3h5l2-5z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Threat Reports</span></a>
+    <a onclick="showSection('threats',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M8 1L1 15h14L8 1zm0 4l3 8H5l3-8z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Threats &amp; Exposures</span></a>
+    <a onclick="showSection('diagrams',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><circle cx="8" cy="8" r="6" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none"/><circle cx="8" cy="8" r="2"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Diagrams</span></a>
+    <a onclick="showSection('code',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M5 4L1 8l4 4v-2L3 8l2-2V4zm6 0v2l2 2-2 2v2l4-4-4-4z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Code &amp; Annotations</span></a>
+    <div class="sep"></div>
+    <a onclick="showSection('data',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M4 2h8v2H4V2zm0 3h8v2H4V5zm0 3h8v2H4V8zm0 3h8v2H4v-2zm-2-9v12h12V2H2zm1 1h10v10H3V3z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Data &amp; Boundaries</span></a>
+    <a onclick="showSection('assets',this)"><span class="nav-icon"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M1 3h14v10H1V3zm1 1v8h12V4H2zm2 2h8v1H4V6zm0 2h6v1H4V8z"/></svg></span> <span class="nav-text">Asset Heatmap</span></a>
+  </div>
+  <button id="sidebarToggle" onclick="toggleSidebar()" title="Collapse sidebar">
+    <svg class="chevron-left" width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M10 2L4 8l6 6V2z"/></svg>
+    <svg class="chevron-right" width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M6 2v12l6-6-6-6z"/></svg>
+  </button>
+</nav>
+
+<!-- ═══════════ MAIN ═══════════ -->
+<div class="main">
+
+
+<div id="sec-summary" class="section-content active">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">◆</span> Executive Summary</div>
+
+  <!-- Risk Grade -->
+  <div class="risk-banner risk-f">
+    <div class="risk-grade">F</div>
+    <div class="risk-detail">
+      <strong>Critical Risk</strong>
+      <span>2 critical exposure(s) require immediate attention</span>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- Stats Grid -->
+  <div class="stats-grid">
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">16</div><div class="label">Assets</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-danger"><div class="value">15</div><div class="label">Open Threats</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-success"><div class="value">45</div><div class="label">Mitigated</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-success"><div class="value">12</div><div class="label">Controls</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">68</div><div class="label">Data Flows</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">9</div><div class="label">Boundaries</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">0</div><div class="label">Transfers</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-success"><div class="value">0</div><div class="label">Validations</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">19</div><div class="label">Audits</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">0</div><div class="label">Assumptions</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card"><div class="value">0</div><div class="label">Ownership</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-muted"><div class="value">18</div><div class="label">Comments</div></div>
+    <div class="stat-card stat-muted"><div class="value">16</div><div class="label">Shields</div></div>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- Coverage Bar -->
+  <div class="sub-h">Threat Mitigation Coverage</div>
+  <div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.8rem;margin-bottom:.3rem">
+    <span class="coverage-pct good">75%</span>
+    <span style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.82rem">45 of 60 exposures mitigated</span>
+  </div>
+  <div class="posture-bar"><div class="posture-fill good" style="width:75%"></div></div>
+
+  <!-- Severity Breakdown -->
+  <div class="sub-h">Severity Breakdown</div>
+  <div class="severity-chart">
+    <div class="sev-row">
+    <span class="sev-label">Critical</span>
+    <div class="sev-track"><div class="sev-fill sev-fill-crit" style="width:3%"></div></div>
+    <span class="sev-count">2</span>
+  </div>
+    <div class="sev-row">
+    <span class="sev-label">High</span>
+    <div class="sev-track"><div class="sev-fill sev-fill-high" style="width:42%"></div></div>
+    <span class="sev-count">25</span>
+  </div>
+    <div class="sev-row">
+    <span class="sev-label">Medium</span>
+    <div class="sev-track"><div class="sev-fill sev-fill-med" style="width:40%"></div></div>
+    <span class="sev-count">24</span>
+  </div>
+    <div class="sev-row">
+    <span class="sev-label">Low</span>
+    <div class="sev-track"><div class="sev-fill sev-fill-low" style="width:15%"></div></div>
+    <span class="sev-count">9</span>
+  </div>
+    
+  </div>
+
+  
+  <!-- Open Threats -->
+  <div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--red)">⚠ Open Threats (No Mitigation)</div>
+  
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 0)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#prompt-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev med">medium</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #agent-launcher</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 1)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#dos</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev low">low</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #agent-launcher</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 2)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#prompt-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev high">high</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #agent-launcher</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 3)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#data-exposure</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev low">low</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #llm-client</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 4)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#prompt-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev med">medium</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">User prompts sent to LLM API</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #llm-client</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 5)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#data-exposure</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev low">low</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #sarif</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 6)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#cmd-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev crit">critical</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Agent launcher spawns child processes</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #cli</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 7)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#data-exposure</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev low">low</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #init</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 8)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#cmd-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev high">high</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #mcp</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 9)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#prompt-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev med">medium</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #mcp</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 10)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#data-exposure</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev med">medium</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #mcp</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 11)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#dos</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev low">low</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #suggest</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 12)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#arbitrary-write</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev high">high</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Writes modified content back to discovered files</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #parser</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 13)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#cmd-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev high">high</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #tui</div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="finding-card" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 14)">
+    <div class="fc-top">
+      <span class="fc-risk">#prompt-injection</span>
+      <span class="fc-sev med">medium</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="fc-desc">Freeform chat sends user text to LLM</div>
+    <div class="fc-assets">Asset: #tui</div>
+  </div>
+
+  
+  <!-- Data Flows -->
+  <div class="sub-h">Data Flows</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Source</th><th></th><th>Target</th><th>Mechanism</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>EnvVars</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>process.env</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ConfigFile</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>readFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:20</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ConfigFile</code></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:21</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserPrompt</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>launchAgent</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>AgentProcess</code></td>
+      <td>spawn</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>AgentProcess</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>stdout</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserPrompt</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>buildAnnotatePrompt</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>model</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>AgentPrompt</code></td>
+      <td>return</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>serializeModel</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectFiles</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>readFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ReportFile</code></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>LLMConfig</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>chatCompletion</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>LLMProvider</code></td>
+      <td>fetch</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:20</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>LLMProvider</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>response</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:21</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>LLMToolCall</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>createToolExecutor</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>NVD</code></td>
+      <td>fetch</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectFiles</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>readFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#sarif</code></td>
+      <td>generateSarif</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#sarif</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>SarifLog</code></td>
+      <td>return</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserArgs</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>process.argv</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:33</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>FileSystem</code></td>
+      <td>writeFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:34</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td>computeStats</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>SourceFiles</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td>readFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>HTML</code></td>
+      <td>return</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td>generateDashboardHTML</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/index.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>GitRef</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td>execSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>TempDir</code></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td>parseProject</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>GitRef</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td>parseAtRef</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/index.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectRoot</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td>detectProject</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/detect.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectRoot</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td>options.root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>AgentFiles</code></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ConfigFile</code></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>MCPClient</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>stdio</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/index.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>QueryString</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>lookup</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/lookup.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>MCPClient</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>tool_call</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:36</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>FileSystem</code></td>
+      <td>writeFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:37</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>generateThreatReport</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:38</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>MCPClient</code></td>
+      <td>resource</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:39</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>FilePath</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td>readFileSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>Suggestions</code></td>
+      <td>suggestAnnotations</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectRoot</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>fast-glob</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>SourceFiles</code></td>
+      <td>writeFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>FilePath</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>readFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>Annotations</code></td>
+      <td>parseString</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ProjectRoot</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>fast-glob</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td>assembleModel</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#report</code></td>
+      <td>generateReport</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/report.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#report</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>Markdown</code></td>
+      <td>return</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/report.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>getReviewableExposures</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>SourceFiles</code></td>
+      <td>writeFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserArgs</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>args</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>FileSystem</code></td>
+      <td>writeFile</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>launchAgent</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>chatCompletion</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:20</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ConfigFile</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>loadProjectConfig</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/config.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ConfigFile</code></td>
+      <td>saveProjectConfig</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/config.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserInput</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>readline</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>Commands</code></td>
+      <td>dispatch</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>RawStdin</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>process.stdin</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/input.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>Terminal</code></td>
+      <td>process.stdout</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/input.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>UserArgs</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#workspace-link</code></td>
+      <td>linkProject</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/link.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#workspace-link</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>AgentFiles</code></td>
+      <td>updateAgentWorkspaceContext</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/link.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>ReportJSON</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#merge-engine</code></td>
+      <td>mergeReports</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/merge.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#merge-engine</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>MergedReport</code></td>
+      <td>mergeReports</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/merge.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>GitRepo</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>#report-metadata</code></td>
+      <td>execSync</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/metadata.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#report-metadata</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--muted)">→</td>
+      <td><code>ThreatModel</code></td>
+      <td>populateMetadata</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/metadata.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-ai-analysis" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">✨</span> Threat Reports</div>
+  <div class="ai-analysis-controls">
+    <label for="report-selector" class="report-selector-label">Select Report:</label>
+    <select id="report-selector" class="report-selector" aria-label="Select threat report"></select>
+  </div>
+  <div id="ai-content" class="md-content ai-analysis-main"></div>
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-threats" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">⚠</span> Threats &amp; Exposures</div>
+
+  <div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--red)">Open Threats (15)</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.5rem">Exposed in code but <strong>not mitigated</strong> by any control.</p>
+  
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Asset</th><th>Threat</th><th>Severity</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 0)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 1)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 2)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 3)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 4)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>User prompts sent to LLM API</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 5)">
+      <td><code>#sarif</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 6)">
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev crit">critical</span></td>
+      <td>Agent launcher spawns child processes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:31</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 7)">
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 8)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 9)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:30</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 10)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:34</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 11)">
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 12)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Writes modified content back to discovered files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 13)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('open_exposure', 14)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Freeform chat sends user text to LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  <div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--green)">Mitigated Threats (45)</div>
+  
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Asset</th><th>Threat</th><th>Severity</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 0)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 1)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Config paths resolved from root and homedir</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 2)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 3)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#child-proc-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev crit">critical</span></td>
+      <td>spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 4)">
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Reads reference docs from root-relative paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 5)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 6)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 7)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#ssrf</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 8)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys passed in Authorization headers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 9)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#ssrf</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 10)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>searchCodebase reads files from project root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 11)">
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 12)">
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:25</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 13)">
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:27</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 14)">
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys handled in config set/show commands</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:29</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 15)">
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#xss</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 16)">
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>readFileSync reads code files for annotation context</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 17)">
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#xss</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Generates HTML with threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 18)">
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>execSync runs git commands with ref argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 19)">
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync creates files in temp directory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 20)">
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>git show extracts files based on ls-tree output</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 21)">
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>git.ts uses execSync with ref argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 22)">
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/detect.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 23)">
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 24)">
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Reads/writes files based on root argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 25)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Regex patterns applied to query strings</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/lookup.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 26)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:26</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 27)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>report, dashboard, sarif tools write files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:28</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 28)">
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>threat_report tool uses API keys from environment</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:32</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 29)">
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File path from MCP client joined with root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 30)">
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Complex regex patterns applied to source code</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 31)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Glob patterns determine which files are modified</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 32)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 33)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Large files loaded entirely into memory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 34)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-line.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 35)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Glob patterns could escape root directory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 36)">
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Large projects with many files could exhaust memory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 37)">
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 38)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 39)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 40)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/model handles API key input and storage</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 41)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys loaded from and saved to config files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/config.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 42)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 43)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable" onclick="openDrawer('mitigated_exposure', 44)">
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/input.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+
+  
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">All Exposures (60)</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Status</th><th>Asset</th><th>Threat</th><th>Severity</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 0)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 1)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Config paths resolved from root and homedir</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 2)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 3)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#child-proc-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev crit">critical</span></td>
+      <td>spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 4)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 5)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 6)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 7)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Reads reference docs from root-relative paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 8)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 9)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 10)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 11)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#ssrf</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 12)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys passed in Authorization headers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 13)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>User prompts sent to LLM API</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 14)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#ssrf</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 15)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>searchCodebase reads files from project root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 16)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 17)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#sarif</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 18)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:25</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 19)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:27</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 20)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys handled in config set/show commands</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:29</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 21)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev crit">critical</span></td>
+      <td>Agent launcher spawns child processes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:31</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 22)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#xss</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 23)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>readFileSync reads code files for annotation context</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 24)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td><code>#xss</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Generates HTML with threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 25)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>execSync runs git commands with ref argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 26)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>writeFileSync creates files in temp directory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 27)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>git show extracts files based on ls-tree output</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 28)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>git.ts uses execSync with ref argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 29)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/detect.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 30)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 31)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Reads/writes files based on root argument</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 32)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 33)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 34)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Regex patterns applied to query strings</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/lookup.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 35)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:26</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 36)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>report, dashboard, sarif tools write files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:28</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 37)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:30</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 38)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>threat_report tool uses API keys from environment</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:32</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 39)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td><code>#data-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:34</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 40)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File path from MCP client joined with root</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 41)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Complex regex patterns applied to source code</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 42)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 43)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Writes modified content back to discovered files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 44)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Glob patterns determine which files are modified</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 45)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 46)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Large files loaded entirely into memory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 47)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#redos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-line.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 48)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>Glob patterns could escape root directory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 49)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Large projects with many files could exhaust memory</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 50)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 51)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 52)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#arbitrary-write</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 53)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#cmd-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 54)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>/model handles API key input and storage</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable row-open" onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 55)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-red">Open</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#prompt-injection</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>Freeform chat sends user text to LLM</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 56)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>API keys loaded from and saved to config files</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/config.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 57)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#path-traversal</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev high">high</span></td>
+      <td>User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:9</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 58)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#api-key-exposure</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev med">medium</span></td>
+      <td>API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr class="clickable " onclick="openDrawer('exposure', 59)">
+      <td><span class="badge badge-green">Mitigated</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td><code>#dos</code></td>
+      <td><span class="fc-sev low">low</span></td>
+      <td>Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/input.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-diagrams" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">◉</span> Diagrams</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.8rem">Interactive diagrams from annotations. Scroll to zoom, drag to pan, double-click to reset.</p>
+  <div class="diagram-tabs">
+    <button class="diagram-tab active" onclick="switchDiagramTab('threat-graph', this)">🔷 Threat Graph</button><button class="diagram-tab" onclick="switchDiagramTab('data-flow', this)">↔ Data Flow</button><button class="diagram-tab" onclick="switchDiagramTab('attack-surface', this)">⚠ Attack Surface</button>
+  </div>
+  <div id="dtab-threat-graph" class="diagram-panel active"><div class="mermaid-wrap"><pre class="mermaid">
+graph LR
+  subgraph TZ0["🧱 #agent-launcher"]
+    _agent_launcher["🔷 #agent-launcher [SECRETS, INTERNAL]"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ1["🧱 AgentProcess"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ2["🧱 #llm-client"]
+    _llm_client["🔷 #llm-client [INTERNAL, SECRETS]"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ3["🧱 LLMProvider"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ4["🧱 NVD"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ5["🧱 #cli"]
+    _cli["🔷 #cli [SECRETS, INTERNAL]"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ6["🧱 UserInput"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ7["🧱 #diff"]
+    _diff["🔷 #diff"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ8["🧱 GitRepo"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ9["🧱 #mcp"]
+    _mcp["🔷 #mcp [INTERNAL]"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ10["🧱 MCPClient"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ11["🧱 #parser"]
+    _parser["🔷 #parser [INTERNAL]"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ12["🧱 FileSystem"]
+  end
+  subgraph TZ13["🧱 #tui"]
+    _tui["🔷 #tui [SECRETS, SECRETS, SECRETS]"]
+  end
+  _sarif["🔷 #sarif"]
+  _dashboard["🔷 #dashboard [INTERNAL]"]
+  _init["🔷 #init [INTERNAL]"]
+  _suggest["🔷 #suggest"]
+  _merge_engine["🔷 #merge-engine"]
+  _workspace_config["🔷 #workspace-config"]
+  _api_key_exposure["🟠 API_Key_Exposure (cwe:CWE-798)"]:::threat
+  _path_traversal["🟠 Path_Traversal (cwe:CWE-22)"]:::threat
+  _arbitrary_write["🟠 Arbitrary_File_Write (cwe:CWE-73)"]:::threat
+  _child_proc_injection["🔴 Child_Process_Injection (cwe:CWE-78)"]:::threat
+  _prompt_injection["🟠 Prompt_Injection (cwe:CWE-77)"]:::threat
+  _dos["🟡 Denial_of_Service (cwe:CWE-400)"]:::threat
+  _data_exposure["🟡 Sensitive_Data_Exposure (cwe:CWE-200)"]:::threat
+  _ssrf["🟡 Server_Side_Request_Forgery (cwe:CWE-918)"]:::threat
+  _cmd_injection["🔴 Command_Injection (cwe:CWE-78)"]:::threat
+  _xss["🟠 Cross_Site_Scripting (cwe:CWE-79)"]:::threat
+  _redos["🟡 ReDoS (cwe:CWE-1333)"]:::threat
+  _tag_collision["🟡 Tag_Collision"]:::threat
+  _config_tamper["🟡 Config_Tampering (cwe:CWE-15)"]:::threat
+  _key_redaction["🛡️ key-redaction"]:::control
+  _path_validation["🛡️ path-validation"]:::control
+  _param_commands["🛡️ param-commands"]:::control
+  _config_validation["🛡️ config-validation"]:::control
+  _input_sanitize["🛡️ input-sanitize"]:::control
+  _glob_filtering["🛡️ glob-filtering"]:::control
+  _resource_limits["🛡️ resource-limits"]:::control
+  _output_encoding["🛡️ output-encoding"]:::control
+  _regex_anchoring["🛡️ regex-anchoring"]:::control
+  _prefix_ownership["🛡️ prefix-ownership"]:::control
+  _yaml_validation["🛡️ yaml-validation"]:::control
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _api_key_exposure
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _child_proc_injection
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _prompt_injection
+  _agent_launcher -. exposed .-> _dos
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _data_exposure
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _ssrf
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _api_key_exposure
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _prompt_injection
+  _llm_client -. exposed .-> _dos
+  _sarif -. exposed .-> _data_exposure
+  _cli -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _cli -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _cli -. exposed .-> _api_key_exposure
+  _cli -. exposed .-> _cmd_injection
+  _dashboard -. exposed .-> _xss
+  _dashboard -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _diff -. exposed .-> _cmd_injection
+  _diff -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _diff -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _init -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _init -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _init -. exposed .-> _data_exposure
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _cmd_injection
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _redos
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _prompt_injection
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _api_key_exposure
+  _mcp -. exposed .-> _data_exposure
+  _suggest -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _suggest -. exposed .-> _redos
+  _suggest -. exposed .-> _dos
+  _parser -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _parser -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _parser -. exposed .-> _dos
+  _parser -. exposed .-> _redos
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _path_traversal
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _arbitrary_write
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _cmd_injection
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _api_key_exposure
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _prompt_injection
+  _tui -. exposed .-> _dos
+  _key_redaction -- mitigates --> _api_key_exposure
+  _key_redaction -.- _agent_launcher
+  _path_validation -- mitigates --> _path_traversal
+  _path_validation -.- _agent_launcher
+  _path_validation -- mitigates --> _arbitrary_write
+  _param_commands -- mitigates --> _child_proc_injection
+  _param_commands -.- _agent_launcher
+  _param_commands -- mitigates --> _cmd_injection
+  _path_validation -.- _llm_client
+  _config_validation -- mitigates --> _ssrf
+  _config_validation -.- _llm_client
+  _key_redaction -.- _llm_client
+  _input_sanitize -- mitigates --> _ssrf
+  _input_sanitize -.- _llm_client
+  _glob_filtering -- mitigates --> _path_traversal
+  _glob_filtering -.- _llm_client
+  _resource_limits -- mitigates --> _dos
+  _resource_limits -.- _llm_client
+  _path_validation -.- _cli
+  _key_redaction -.- _cli
+  _output_encoding -- mitigates --> _xss
+  _output_encoding -.- _dashboard
+  _path_validation -.- _dashboard
+  _input_sanitize -- mitigates --> _cmd_injection
+  _input_sanitize -.- _diff
+  _path_validation -.- _diff
+  _glob_filtering -.- _diff
+  _path_validation -.- _init
+  _regex_anchoring -- mitigates --> _redos
+  _regex_anchoring -.- _mcp
+  _path_validation -.- _mcp
+  _key_redaction -.- _mcp
+  _path_validation -.- _suggest
+  _regex_anchoring -.- _suggest
+  _glob_filtering -.- _parser
+  _regex_anchoring -.- _parser
+  _resource_limits -.- _parser
+  _path_validation -.- _tui
+  _key_redaction -.- _tui
+  _resource_limits -.- _tui
+  _prefix_ownership -- mitigates --> _tag_collision
+  _prefix_ownership -.- _merge_engine
+  _yaml_validation -- mitigates --> _config_tamper
+  _yaml_validation -.- _workspace_config
+  _mcp -- "📡 generateThreatReport" --> _llm_client
+  _tui -- "📡 launchAgent" --> _agent_launcher
+  _tui -- "📡 chatCompletion" --> _llm_client
+  classDef threat fill:#991b1b,stroke:#ef4444,color:#fecaca
+  classDef control fill:#065f46,stroke:#10b981,color:#a7f3d0
+</pre></div></div>
+<div id="dtab-data-flow" class="diagram-panel"><div class="mermaid-wrap"><pre class="mermaid">
+%%{init: {"flowchart": {"nodeSpacing": 43, "rankSpacing": 59, "curve": "basis"}}}%%
+graph LR
+  subgraph Z0["🧱 Trust Zone · #agent-launcher"]
+    _agent_launcher["🧩 #agent-launcher"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z1["🧱 Trust Zone · AgentProcess"]
+    AgentProcess["🧩 AgentProcess"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z2["🧱 Trust Zone · #llm-client"]
+    _llm_client["👤 #llm-client"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z3["🧱 Trust Zone · LLMProvider"]
+    LLMProvider["🧩 LLMProvider"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z4["🧱 Trust Zone · NVD"]
+    NVD["🧩 NVD"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z5["🧱 Trust Zone · #cli"]
+    _cli["🧩 #cli"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z6["🧱 Trust Zone · UserInput"]
+    UserInput["👤 UserInput"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z7["🧱 Trust Zone · #diff"]
+    _diff["🧩 #diff"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z8["🧱 Trust Zone · GitRepo"]
+    GitRepo["🧩 GitRepo"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z9["🧱 Trust Zone · #mcp"]
+    _mcp["🧩 #mcp"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z10["🧱 Trust Zone · MCPClient"]
+    MCPClient["👤 MCPClient"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z11["🧱 Trust Zone · #parser"]
+    _parser["🧩 #parser"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z12["🧱 Trust Zone · FileSystem"]
+    FileSystem["🧩 FileSystem"]
+  end
+  subgraph Z13["🧱 Trust Zone · #tui"]
+    _tui["👤 #tui"]
+  end
+  _agent_launcher -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at process spawn| AgentProcess
+  _llm_client -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at external API call| LLMProvider
+  _llm_client -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at external API| NVD
+  _cli -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing| UserInput
+  _diff -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at git command execution| GitRepo
+  _mcp -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at MCP protocol| MCPClient
+  _mcp -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at tool argument parsing| MCPClient
+  _parser -.-|🧱 Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O| FileSystem
+  _tui -.-|🧱 Trust boundary at interactive input| UserInput
+  EnvVars["🧩 EnvVars"]
+  ConfigFile["🧩 ConfigFile"]
+  UserPrompt["👤 UserPrompt"]
+  ThreatModel["🧩 ThreatModel"]
+  AgentPrompt["🧩 AgentPrompt"]
+  ProjectFiles["🧩 ProjectFiles"]
+  ReportFile["🧩 ReportFile"]
+  LLMConfig["🧩 LLMConfig"]
+  LLMToolCall["🧩 LLMToolCall"]
+  _sarif["🧩 #sarif"]
+  SarifLog["🧩 SarifLog"]
+  UserArgs["👤 UserArgs"]
+  _dashboard["🧩 #dashboard · internal"]
+  SourceFiles["🧩 SourceFiles"]
+  HTML["🧩 HTML"]
+  GitRef["🧩 GitRef"]
+  TempDir["🧩 TempDir"]
+  ProjectRoot["🧩 ProjectRoot"]
+  _init["🧩 #init · internal"]
+  AgentFiles["🧩 AgentFiles"]
+  QueryString["🧩 QueryString"]
+  FilePath["🧩 FilePath"]
+  _suggest["🧩 #suggest"]
+  Suggestions["🧩 Suggestions"]
+  Annotations["🧩 Annotations"]
+  _report["🧩 #report"]
+  Markdown["🧩 Markdown"]
+  Commands["🧩 Commands"]
+  RawStdin["🧩 RawStdin"]
+  Terminal["🧩 Terminal"]
+  _workspace_link["🧩 #workspace-link"]
+  ReportJSON["🧩 ReportJSON"]
+  _merge_engine["🧩 #merge-engine"]
+  MergedReport["🧩 MergedReport"]
+  _report_metadata["🧩 #report-metadata"]
+  EnvVars -- "📡 process.env" --> _agent_launcher
+  ConfigFile -- "🗄️ readFileSync" --> _agent_launcher
+  _agent_launcher -- "🗄️ writeFileSync" --> ConfigFile
+  UserPrompt -- "📡 launchAgent" --> _agent_launcher
+  _agent_launcher -- "📡 spawn" --> AgentProcess
+  AgentProcess -- "📡 stdout" --> _agent_launcher
+  UserPrompt -- "📡 buildAnnotatePrompt" --> _agent_launcher
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 model" --> _agent_launcher
+  _agent_launcher -- "📡 return" --> AgentPrompt
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 serializeModel" --> _llm_client
+  ProjectFiles -- "🗄️ readFileSync" --> _llm_client
+  _llm_client -- "🗄️ writeFileSync" --> ReportFile
+  LLMConfig -- "📡 chatCompletion" --> _llm_client
+  _llm_client -- "📡 fetch" --> LLMProvider
+  LLMProvider -- "📡 response" --> _llm_client
+  LLMToolCall -- "📡 createToolExecutor" --> _llm_client
+  _llm_client -- "📡 fetch" --> NVD
+  ProjectFiles -- "🗄️ readFileSync" --> _llm_client
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 generateSarif" --> _sarif
+  _sarif -- "📡 return" --> SarifLog
+  UserArgs -- "📡 process.argv" --> _cli
+  _cli -- "🗄️ writeFile" --> FileSystem
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 computeStats" --> _dashboard
+  SourceFiles -- "🗄️ readFileSync" --> _dashboard
+  _dashboard -- "📡 return" --> HTML
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 generateDashboardHTML" --> _dashboard
+  GitRef -- "📡 execSync" --> _diff
+  _diff -- "🗄️ writeFileSync" --> TempDir
+  _diff -- "📡 parseProject" --> ThreatModel
+  GitRef -- "📡 parseAtRef" --> _diff
+  ProjectRoot -- "📡 detectProject" --> _init
+  ProjectRoot -- "📡 options.root" --> _init
+  _init -- "🗄️ writeFileSync" --> AgentFiles
+  _init -- "🗄️ writeFileSync" --> ConfigFile
+  MCPClient -- "📡 stdio" --> _mcp
+  QueryString -- "📡 lookup" --> _mcp
+  MCPClient -- "📡 tool_call" --> _mcp
+  _mcp -- "🗄️ writeFile" --> FileSystem
+  _mcp -- "📡 generateThreatReport" --> _llm_client
+  _mcp -- "📡 resource" --> MCPClient
+  FilePath -- "🗄️ readFileSync" --> _suggest
+  _suggest -- "📡 suggestAnnotations" --> Suggestions
+  ProjectRoot -- "📡 fast-glob" --> _parser
+  _parser -- "🗄️ writeFile" --> SourceFiles
+  FilePath -- "🗄️ readFile" --> _parser
+  _parser -- "📡 parseString" --> Annotations
+  ProjectRoot -- "📡 fast-glob" --> _parser
+  _parser -- "📡 assembleModel" --> ThreatModel
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 generateReport" --> _report
+  _report -- "📡 return" --> Markdown
+  ThreatModel -- "📡 getReviewableExposures" --> _cli
+  _cli -- "🗄️ writeFile" --> SourceFiles
+  UserArgs -- "📡 args" --> _tui
+  _tui -- "🗄️ writeFile" --> FileSystem
+  _tui -- "📡 launchAgent" --> _agent_launcher
+  _tui -- "📡 chatCompletion" --> _llm_client
+  ConfigFile -- "📡 loadProjectConfig" --> _tui
+  _tui -- "📡 saveProjectConfig" --> ConfigFile
+  UserInput -- "📡 readline" --> _tui
+  _tui -- "📡 dispatch" --> Commands
+  RawStdin -- "📡 process.stdin" --> _tui
+  _tui -- "📡 process.stdout" --> Terminal
+  UserArgs -- "📡 linkProject" --> _workspace_link
+  _workspace_link -- "📡 updateAgentWorkspaceContext" --> AgentFiles
+  ReportJSON -- "📡 mergeReports" --> _merge_engine
+  _merge_engine -- "📡 mergeReports" --> MergedReport
+  GitRepo -- "📡 execSync" --> _report_metadata
+  _report_metadata -- "📡 populateMetadata" --> ThreatModel
+</pre></div></div>
+<div id="dtab-attack-surface" class="diagram-panel"><div class="mermaid-wrap"><pre class="mermaid">
+graph LR
+  subgraph A__agent_launcher["#agent-launcher"]
+    direction TB
+    E0["✅ child-proc-injection"]:::sev_crit
+    E1["✅ api-key-exposure"]:::sev_high
+    E2["⚠️ prompt-injection x2"]:::sev_high
+    E3["✅ path-traversal x2"]:::sev_med
+    E4["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_med
+    E5["⚠️ dos"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__llm_client["#llm-client"]
+    direction TB
+    E6["✅ api-key-exposure"]:::sev_high
+    E7["✅ path-traversal x2"]:::sev_med
+    E8["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_med
+    E9["✅ ssrf x2"]:::sev_med
+    E10["⚠️ prompt-injection"]:::sev_med
+    E11["⚠️ data-exposure"]:::sev_low
+    E12["✅ dos"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__sarif["#sarif"]
+    direction TB
+    E13["⚠️ data-exposure"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__cli["#cli"]
+    direction TB
+    E14["⚠️ cmd-injection"]:::sev_crit
+    E15["✅ path-traversal"]:::sev_high
+    E16["✅ arbitrary-write x2"]:::sev_high
+    E17["✅ api-key-exposure"]:::sev_high
+  end
+  subgraph A__dashboard["#dashboard"]
+    direction TB
+    E18["✅ xss x2"]:::sev_high
+    E19["✅ path-traversal"]:::sev_med
+  end
+  subgraph A__diff["#diff"]
+    direction TB
+    E20["✅ cmd-injection x2"]:::sev_high
+    E21["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_med
+    E22["✅ path-traversal"]:::sev_med
+  end
+  subgraph A__init["#init"]
+    direction TB
+    E23["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_high
+    E24["✅ path-traversal x2"]:::sev_med
+    E25["⚠️ data-exposure"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__mcp["#mcp"]
+    direction TB
+    E26["⚠️ cmd-injection"]:::sev_high
+    E27["✅ path-traversal"]:::sev_high
+    E28["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_high
+    E29["⚠️ prompt-injection"]:::sev_med
+    E30["✅ api-key-exposure"]:::sev_med
+    E31["⚠️ data-exposure"]:::sev_med
+    E32["✅ redos"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__suggest["#suggest"]
+    direction TB
+    E33["✅ path-traversal"]:::sev_high
+    E34["✅ redos"]:::sev_med
+    E35["⚠️ dos"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  subgraph A__parser["#parser"]
+    direction TB
+    E36["⚠️ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_high
+    E37["✅ path-traversal x3"]:::sev_high
+    E38["✅ dos x2"]:::sev_med
+    E39["✅ redos"]:::sev_med
+  end
+  subgraph A__tui["#tui"]
+    direction TB
+    E40["✅ path-traversal x2"]:::sev_high
+    E41["✅ arbitrary-write"]:::sev_high
+    E42["⚠️ cmd-injection"]:::sev_high
+    E43["✅ api-key-exposure x3"]:::sev_high
+    E44["⚠️ prompt-injection"]:::sev_med
+    E45["✅ dos"]:::sev_low
+  end
+  classDef sev_crit fill:#7f1d1d,stroke:#ef4444,color:#fecaca
+  classDef sev_high fill:#7c2d12,stroke:#f97316,color:#fed7aa
+  classDef sev_med fill:#78350f,stroke:#f59e0b,color:#fef3c7
+  classDef sev_low fill:#1e3a5f,stroke:#3b82f6,color:#bfdbfe
+  classDef sev_unset fill:#374151,stroke:#9ca3af,color:#e5e7eb
+</pre></div></div>
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-code" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">&lt;/&gt;</span> Code &amp; Annotations</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.8rem">
+    Every file with GuardLink annotations. Click any annotation to see details.
+  </p>
+  
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">.guardlink/definitions.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">37</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ // ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.CLI</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.TUI</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.MCP</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.LLM_Client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Dashboard</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- &quot;Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L21</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Init</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- &quot;Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L22</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Agent_Launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- &quot;Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L23</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Diff</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- &quot;Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L24</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Report</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- &quot;Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L25</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.SARIF</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- &quot;Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 11)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L26</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GuardLink.Suggest</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- &quot;Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- &quot;Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- &quot;Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- &quot;Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- &quot;Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 12)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L31</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Path_Traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- &quot;Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-ann">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 13)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L32</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Command_Injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Shell command execution with unsanitized user input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 14)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L33</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Cross_Site_Scripting</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 15)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L34</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">API_Key_Exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 16)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L35</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Server_Side_Request_Forgery</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  30 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 17)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L36</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ReDoS</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 18)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L37</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Arbitrary_File_Write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Shell command execution with unsanitized user input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 19)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L38</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Prompt_Injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 20)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L39</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Denial_of_Service</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 21)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L40</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Sensitive_Data_Exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 22)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L41</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Insecure_Deserialization</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 23)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L42</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Child_Process_Injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 24)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L43</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Information_Disclosure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- &quot;Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 25)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L48</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Path_Validation</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-ann">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 26)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L49</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Input_Sanitization</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 27)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L50</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Output_Encoding</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 28)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L51</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Key_Redaction</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Masking API keys in logs and error messages</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats</span><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 29)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L52</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Process_Sandboxing</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  47 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 30)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L53</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Config_Validation</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Schema validation for configuration files before use</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- &quot;Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 31)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L54</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Resource_Limits</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- &quot;Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 32)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L55</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Parameterized_Commands</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- &quot;HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  60 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 33)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L56</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Glob_Pattern_Filtering</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- &quot;Masking API keys in logs and error messages&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  60 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 34)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L57</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Regex_Anchoring</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- &quot;Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  60 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 35)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L58</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Prefix_Ownership</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for configuration files before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  60 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(0, 36)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L59</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-control">control</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">YAML_Validation</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- &quot;File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- &quot;Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- &quot;Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- &quot;Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- &quot;Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  60 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/agents/config.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">10</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   4. Project config: .guardlink/config.json</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *   5. Global config: ~/.config/guardlink/config.json</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *   5. Global config: ~/.config/guardlink/config.json</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config paths resolved from root and homedir</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">join() with known base dirs constrains paths</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Output path is fixed relative to project root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">EnvVars → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Environment variable input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ConfigFile → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config file read</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Config paths resolved from root and homedir&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L21</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → ConfigFile</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config file write</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with known base dirs constrains paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ import { join } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(1, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L22</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes and stores LLM API keys</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -&gt; #agent-launcher via process.env -- &quot;Environment variable input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- &quot;Config file read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Processes and stores LLM API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ import { join } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ import { homedir } from 'node:os';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/agents/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">2</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(2, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Shared agent registry.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Used by CLI, TUI, and MCP to identify and resolve coding agents</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Gemini, clipboard).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ // ─── Agent registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(2, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Used by CLI, TUI, and MCP to identify and resolve coding agents</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Gemini, clipboard).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ // ─── Agent registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ export interface AgentEntry {</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/agents/launcher.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">11</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #child-proc-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *   1. Foreground spawn (CLI + TUI): takes over terminal, returns on exit</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   2. IDE launch: opens GUI app with project directory</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#param-commands mitigates #child-proc-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   2. IDE launch: opens GUI app with project directory</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#param-commands mitigates #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Arguments passed as array, not shell string</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #prompt-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserPrompt → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Prompt input path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- &quot;Arguments passed as array, not shell string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → AgentProcess</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Process spawn path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">AgentProcess → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent output capture</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { platform } from 'node:os';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(3, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher ↔ AgentProcess</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at process spawn</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Prompt input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentProcess via spawn -- &quot;Process spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -&gt; #agent-launcher via stdout -- &quot;Agent output capture&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at process spawn&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { platform } from 'node:os';</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/agents/prompts.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">24</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #prompt-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Prompt builders for annotation and analysis.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Prompt builders for annotation and analysis.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Reads reference docs from root-relative paths</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">resolve() with root constrains file access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserPrompt → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User instruction input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model context injection</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher → AgentPrompt</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Assembled prompt output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#agent-launcher: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads reference docs from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -&gt; #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- &quot;User instruction input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #agent-launcher via model -- &quot;Model context injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -&gt; AgentPrompt via return -- &quot;Assembled prompt output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- &quot;Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L148</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Example annotation block for reference, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 143 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 144 │ ### Always Couple Annotations Together</span><span class="code-line-code"> 145 │ A file's doc-block should paint the full security picture of that module. Group annotations logically:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 146 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 147 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 148 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Example annotation block for reference, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 149 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 150 │ // GOOD — Complete story at a single code location:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 151 │ // @exposes #auth-api to #sqli [P1] cwe:CWE-89 -- &quot;User-supplied email passed to findUser() query builder&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 152 │ // @mitigates #auth-api against #sqli using #input-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates email format before query&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 153 │ // @flows User_Input -&gt; #auth-api via POST./login -- &quot;Login form submits credentials&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L161</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 156 │ // @comment -- &quot;Password comparison uses bcrypt.compare with timing-safe equality&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 157 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 158 │ // BAD — Isolated annotation with no context:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 159 │ // @exposes #auth-api to #sqli -- &quot;SQL injection possible&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 160 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 161 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 162 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 163 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 164 │ ### Description Style — Reference Actual Code</span><span class="code-line-code"> 165 │ Descriptions must reference the real code: function names, variable names, libraries, mechanisms.</span><span class="code-line-code"> 166 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L168</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Description examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 163 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 164 │ ### Description Style — Reference Actual Code</span><span class="code-line-code"> 165 │ Descriptions must reference the real code: function names, variable names, libraries, mechanisms.</span><span class="code-line-code"> 166 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 167 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 168 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Description examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 169 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 170 │ // GOOD: -- &quot;req.body.token passed to jwt.verify() without audience check&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 171 │ // GOOD: -- &quot;bcrypt rounds set to 12 via BCRYPT_COST env var&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 172 │ // GOOD: -- &quot;Rate limiter uses express-rate-limit at 100req/15min on /api/*&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 173 │ //</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 11)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L178</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 173 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 174 │ // BAD:  -- &quot;Input not validated&quot;             (too vague — WHICH input? WHERE?)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 175 │ // BAD:  -- &quot;Uses encryption&quot;                 (WHAT encryption? On WHAT data?)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 176 │ // BAD:  -- &quot;Security vulnerability exists&quot;   (meaningless — be specific)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 177 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 178 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 179 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 180 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 181 │ ### @flows — Stitch the Complete Data Path</span><span class="code-line-code"> 182 │ @flows is the backbone of the threat model. Trace data movement accurately:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 183 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 12)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L185</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Flow examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 180 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 181 │ ### @flows — Stitch the Complete Data Path</span><span class="code-line-code"> 182 │ @flows is the backbone of the threat model. Trace data movement accurately:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 183 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 184 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 185 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Flow examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 186 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 187 │ // Trace a request through the full stack:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 188 │ // @flows User_Browser -&gt; #api-gateway via HTTPS -- &quot;Client sends auth request&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 189 │ // @flows #api-gateway -&gt; #auth-service via internal.gRPC -- &quot;Gateway forwards to auth microservice&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 190 │ // @flows #auth-service -&gt; #user-db via pg.query -- &quot;Looks up user record by email&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 13)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L194</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 189 │ // @flows #api-gateway -&gt; #auth-service via internal.gRPC -- &quot;Gateway forwards to auth microservice&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 190 │ // @flows #auth-service -&gt; #user-db via pg.query -- &quot;Looks up user record by email&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 191 │ // @flows #auth-service -&gt; #session-store via redis.set -- &quot;Stores session token with TTL&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 192 │ // @flows #auth-service -&gt; User_Browser via Set-Cookie -- &quot;Returns session cookie to client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 193 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 194 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 195 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 196 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 197 │ ### @boundary — Mark Every Trust Zone Crossing</span><span class="code-line-code"> 198 │ Place @boundary annotations where trust level changes between two components:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 199 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 14)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L201</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Boundary examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 196 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 197 │ ### @boundary — Mark Every Trust Zone Crossing</span><span class="code-line-code"> 198 │ Place @boundary annotations where trust level changes between two components:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 199 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 200 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 201 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Boundary examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 202 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 203 │ // @boundary between #api-gateway and External_Internet (#public-boundary) -- &quot;TLS termination, rate limiting at edge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 204 │ // @boundary between #backend and #database (#data-boundary) -- &quot;Application to persistence layer, connection pooling via pgBouncer&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 205 │ // @boundary between #app and #payment-provider (#vendor-boundary) -- &quot;PCI-DSS scope boundary, tokenized card data only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 206 │ //</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 15)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L207</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 202 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 203 │ // @boundary between #api-gateway and External_Internet (#public-boundary) -- &quot;TLS termination, rate limiting at edge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 204 │ // @boundary between #backend and #database (#data-boundary) -- &quot;Application to persistence layer, connection pooling via pgBouncer&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 205 │ // @boundary between #app and #payment-provider (#vendor-boundary) -- &quot;PCI-DSS scope boundary, tokenized card data only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 206 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 207 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 208 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 209 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 210 │ ### Where to Place Annotations</span><span class="code-line-code"> 211 │ Annotations go in the file's top doc-block comment OR directly above the security-relevant code:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 212 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 16)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L214</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Placement examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 209 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 210 │ ### Where to Place Annotations</span><span class="code-line-code"> 211 │ Annotations go in the file's top doc-block comment OR directly above the security-relevant code:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 212 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 213 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 214 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Placement examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 215 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 216 │ // FILE-LEVEL (top doc-block) — for module-wide security properties:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 217 │ // Place @exposes, @mitigates, @flows, @handles, @boundary that describe the module as a whole</span><span class="code-line-code"> 218 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 219 │ // INLINE (above specific functions/methods) — for function-specific concerns:</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 17)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L223</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 218 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 219 │ // INLINE (above specific functions/methods) — for function-specific concerns:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 220 │ // Place @exposes, @mitigates above the exact function where the risk or control lives</span><span class="code-line-code"> 221 │ // Place @comment above tricky security-relevant code to explain intent</span><span class="code-line-code"> 222 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 223 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 224 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 225 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 226 │ ### Severity — Be Honest, Not Alarmist</span><span class="code-line-code"> 227 │ Annotations capture what COULD go wrong, calibrated to realistic risk:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 228 │ - **[P0] / [critical]**: Directly exploitable by external attacker, severe impact (RCE, auth bypass, data breach)</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 18)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L250</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">@accepts alternative examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 245 │ 3. Add @comment explaining what controls COULD be added</span><span class="code-line-code"> 246 │ 4. Optionally add @assumes to document any assumptions the code makes</span><span class="code-line-code"> 247 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 248 │ Example — what to do when no mitigation exists:</span><span class="code-line-code"> 249 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 250 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;@accepts alternative examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 251 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 252 │ // WRONG (AI rubber-stamping risk):</span><span class="code-line-code"> 253 │ // @accepts #prompt-injection on #ai-endpoint -- &quot;Relying on model safety filters&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 254 │ //</span><span class="code-line-code"> 255 │ // RIGHT (flag for human review):</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 19)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L260</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 255 │ // RIGHT (flag for human review):</span><span class="code-line-code"> 256 │ // @exposes #ai-endpoint to #prompt-injection [P1] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompt passed directly to LLM API without sanitization&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 257 │ // @audit #ai-endpoint -- &quot;No prompt sanitization — needs human review to decide: add input filter or accept risk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 258 │ // @comment -- &quot;Potential controls: #prompt-filter (input sanitization), #output-validator (response filtering)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 259 │ //</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 260 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 261 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 262 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 263 │ Leaving exposures unmitigated is HONEST. The dashboard and reports will surface them as open risks for humans to triage.</span><span class="code-line-code"> 264 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 265 │ ### @shield — DO NOT USE Unless Explicitly Asked</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 20)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L277</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 272 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 273 │ Definitions go in .guardlink/definitions.{ts,js,py,rs}. Source files use only relationship verbs.</span><span class="code-line-code"> 274 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 275 │ ### Definitions (in .guardlink/definitions file)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 276 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 277 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 278 │ // @asset Server.Auth (#auth) -- &quot;Authentication service handling login and session management&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 279 │ // @threat SQL_Injection (#sqli) [P0] cwe:CWE-89 -- &quot;Unsanitized input reaches SQL query builder&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 280 │ // @control Prepared_Statements (#prepared-stmts) -- &quot;Parameterized queries via ORM or driver placeholders&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 281 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 282 │ \`\`\`</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 21)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L281</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 276 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 277 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 278 │ // @asset Server.Auth (#auth) -- &quot;Authentication service handling login and session management&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 279 │ // @threat SQL_Injection (#sqli) [P0] cwe:CWE-89 -- &quot;Unsanitized input reaches SQL query builder&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 280 │ // @control Prepared_Statements (#prepared-stmts) -- &quot;Parameterized queries via ORM or driver placeholders&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 281 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 282 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 283 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 284 │ ### Relationships (in source files)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 285 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 286 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 22)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L286</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 281 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 282 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 283 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 284 │ ### Relationships (in source files)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 285 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 286 │ // @shield:begin -- &quot;Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 287 │ // @exposes #auth to #sqli [P0] cwe:CWE-89 owasp:A03:2021 -- &quot;User input concatenated into query&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 288 │ // @mitigates #auth against #sqli using #prepared-stmts -- &quot;Uses parameterized queries via sqlx&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 289 │ // @audit #auth -- &quot;Timing attack risk — needs human review to decide if bcrypt constant-time comparison is sufficient&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 290 │ // @transfers #ddos from #api to #cdn -- &quot;Cloudflare handles L7 DDoS mitigation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 291 │ // @flows req.body.username -&gt; db.query via string-concat -- &quot;User input flows to SQL&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(4, 23)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L299</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-shield">shield</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Shielded region</span>
+        </div>
+        
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code"> 294 │ // @validates #prepared-stmts for #auth -- &quot;Integration test sqlInjectionTest.ts confirms parameterized queries block SQLi payloads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 295 │ // @audit #auth -- &quot;Session token rotation logic needs cryptographic review&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 296 │ // @assumes #auth -- &quot;Upstream API gateway has already validated TLS and rate-limited requests&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 297 │ // @owns security-team for #auth -- &quot;Security team reviews all auth PRs&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code"> 298 │ // @comment -- &quot;Password hashing uses bcrypt with cost factor 12, migration from SHA256 completed in v2.1&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann"> 299 │ // @shield:end</span><span class="code-line-code"> 300 │ \`\`\`</span><span class="code-line-code"> 301 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 302 │ ## CRITICAL SYNTAX RULES (violations cause parse errors)</span><span class="code-line-code"> 303 │ </span><span class="code-line-code"> 304 │ 1. **@boundary requires TWO assets**: \`@boundary between #A and #B\` or \`@boundary #A | #B\`.</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyze/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">10</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Serializes the threat model, sends it to an LLM with a framework-</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">join() with root constrains file access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Serializes the threat model, sends it to an LLM with a framework-</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #data-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model serialization input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectFiles → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Project context read</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → ReportFile</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(5, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #llm-client via serializeModel -- &quot;Model serialization input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Project context read&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; ReportFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyze/llm.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">11</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #ssrf</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   - OpenAI-compatible Chat Completions (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Ollama)</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *   - DeepSeek reasoning mode (deepseek-reasoner)</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#config-validation mitigates #ssrf</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *   - DeepSeek reasoning mode (deepseek-reasoner)</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys passed in Authorization headers</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Keys never logged; passed directly to API</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #prompt-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User prompts sent to LLM API</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">LLMConfig → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config and prompt input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- &quot;BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → LLMProvider</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API request output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys passed in Authorization headers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L21</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">LLMProvider → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API response input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys never logged; passed directly to API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L22</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client ↔ LLMProvider</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at external API call</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;User prompts sent to LLM API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(6, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L23</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes API keys for authentication</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- &quot;Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;Config and prompt input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; LLMProvider via fetch -- &quot;API request output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -&gt; #llm-client via response -- &quot;API response input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- &quot;Processes API keys for authentication&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │ // ─── Tool definitions ────────────────────────────────────────────────</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyze/prompts.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">2</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(7, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Threat Reports — Framework-specific analysis prompts.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Each framework produces a structured security analysis from the</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * serialized threat model. The LLM acts as a senior security architect.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export type AnalysisFramework = 'stride' | 'dread' | 'pasta' | 'attacker' | 'rapid' | 'general';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(7, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Each framework produces a structured security analysis from the</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * serialized threat model. The LLM acts as a senior security architect.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export type AnalysisFramework = 'stride' | 'dread' | 'pasta' | 'attacker' | 'rapid' | 'general';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ export const FRAMEWORK_LABELS: Record&lt;AnalysisFramework, string&gt; = {</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyze/tools.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">10</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #ssrf</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Defines tools that the LLM can invoke during threat analysis:</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *   - lookup_cve: Search for CVE details (via web fetch)</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#input-sanitize mitigates #ssrf</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *   - lookup_cve: Search for CVE details (via web fetch)</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">searchCodebase reads files from project root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#resource-limits mitigates #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- &quot;lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">LLMToolCall → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Tool invocation input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- &quot;CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client → NVD</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">CVE lookup API call</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads files from project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectFiles → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Codebase search reads</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(8, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#llm-client ↔ NVD</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at external API</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;maxResults caps output; stat.size &lt; 500KB filter&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -&gt; #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -&gt; NVD via fetch -- &quot;CVE lookup API call&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -&gt; #llm-client via readFileSync -- &quot;Codebase search reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at external API&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import type { ToolDefinition, ToolExecutor } from './llm.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyzer/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">2</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(9, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Analyzer — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @comment -- &quot;SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @comment -- &quot;File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ export { generateSarif, type SarifOptions } from './sarif.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(9, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Analyzer — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @comment -- &quot;SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @comment -- &quot;File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ export { generateSarif, type SarifOptions } from './sarif.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/analyzer/sarif.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">5</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(10, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#sarif → #data-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * We emit results for:</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *   1. Unmitigated exposures (the primary security findings)</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- &quot;SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #sarif via generateSarif -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #sarif -&gt; SarifLog via return -- &quot;SARIF output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(10, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #sarif</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *   1. Unmitigated exposures (the primary security findings)</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- &quot;SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #sarif via generateSarif -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #sarif -&gt; SarifLog via return -- &quot;SARIF output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(10, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- &quot;SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #sarif via generateSarif -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #sarif -&gt; SarifLog via return -- &quot;SARIF output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(10, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #sarif</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- &quot;SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #sarif via generateSarif -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #sarif -&gt; SarifLog via return -- &quot;SARIF output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(10, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#sarif → SarifLog</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">SARIF output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- &quot;SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #sarif via generateSarif -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows #sarif -&gt; SarifLog via return -- &quot;SARIF output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ // ─── SARIF 2.1.0 types (subset) ─────────────────────────────────────</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/cli/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">12</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L25</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  *   guardlink tui [dir]               Interactive TUI with slash commands + AI chat</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  *   guardlink gal                     Display GAL annotation language quick reference</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  *   guardlink link-project &lt;repos...&gt;  Link repos into a shared workspace</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *   guardlink merge &lt;files...&gt;         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L26</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  *   guardlink gal                     Display GAL annotation language quick reference</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  *   guardlink link-project &lt;repos...&gt;  Link repos into a shared workspace</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *   guardlink merge &lt;files...&gt;         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L27</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  *   guardlink link-project &lt;repos...&gt;  Link repos into a shared workspace</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *   guardlink merge &lt;files...&gt;         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L28</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Output paths resolved relative to project root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *   guardlink merge &lt;files...&gt;         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L29</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys handled in config set/show commands</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L30</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">maskKey() redacts keys in show output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L31</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent launcher spawns child processes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L32</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #cli</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L33</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserArgs → #cli</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">CLI argument input path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L34</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → FileSystem</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report/config output path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys handled in config set/show commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L35</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli ↔ UserInput</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;maskKey() redacts keys in show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(11, 11)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L36</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes API keys via config commands</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Agent launcher spawns child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #cli via process.argv -- &quot;CLI argument input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- &quot;Processes API keys via config commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │ import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/dashboard/generate.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">8</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#dashboard → #xss</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Sidebar navigation + drawer detail panel + dark/light toggle.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#output-encoding mitigates #xss</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Sidebar navigation + drawer detail panel + dark/light toggle.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#dashboard → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">readFileSync reads code files for annotation context</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">resolve() with root constrains file access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #dashboard</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model statistics input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">SourceFiles → #dashboard</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Code snippet reads</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#dashboard → HTML</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generated HTML output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(12, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#dashboard: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes and displays threat model data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;readFileSync reads code files for annotation context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via computeStats -- &quot;Model statistics input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -&gt; #dashboard via readFileSync -- &quot;Code snippet reads&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -&gt; HTML via return -- &quot;Generated HTML output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- &quot;Processes and displays threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import type { DashboardStats, SeverityBreakdown, ExposureRow, AssetHeatmapEntry } from './data.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/dashboard/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">4</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(13, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#dashboard → #xss</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generates HTML with threat model data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() function encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- &quot;Model to HTML transformation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(13, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#output-encoding mitigates #xss</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">esc() function encodes all interpolated values</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() function encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- &quot;Model to HTML transformation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(13, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #dashboard</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model to HTML transformation</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() function encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- &quot;Model to HTML transformation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(13, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- &quot;Generates HTML with threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- &quot;esc() function encodes all interpolated values&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- &quot;Model to HTML transformation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ export { generateThreatGraph, generateDataFlowDiagram, generateAttackSurface } from './diagrams.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/diff/git.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">10</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">execSync runs git commands with ref argument</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — Git integration.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#input-sanitize mitigates #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — Git integration.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">writeFileSync creates files in temp directory</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">git show extracts files based on ls-tree output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;execSync runs git commands with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GitRef → #diff</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Git command execution</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- &quot;rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → TempDir</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Extracted file writes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;writeFileSync creates files in temp directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → ThreatModel</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Parsed model output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(14, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff ↔ GitRepo</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at git command execution</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;git show extracts files based on ls-tree output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via execSync -- &quot;Git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; TempDir via writeFileSync -- &quot;Extracted file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #diff -&gt; ThreatModel via parseProject -- &quot;Parsed model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at git command execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { join } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/diff/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">3</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(15, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#diff → #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">git.ts uses execSync with ref argument</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;git.ts uses execSync with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @audit #diff -- &quot;Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via parseAtRef -- &quot;Git reference input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(15, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #diff</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;git.ts uses execSync with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @audit #diff -- &quot;Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via parseAtRef -- &quot;Git reference input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { formatDiff, formatDiffMarkdown } from './format.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(15, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GitRef → #diff</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Git reference input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;git.ts uses execSync with ref argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @audit #diff -- &quot;Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @flows GitRef -&gt; #diff via parseAtRef -- &quot;Git reference input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { formatDiff, formatDiffMarkdown } from './format.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export { parseAtRef, getCurrentRef } from './git.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/init/detect.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">4</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(16, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via detectProject -- &quot;Project detection input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;Detection is read-only; no file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(16, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via detectProject -- &quot;Project detection input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;Detection is read-only; no file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(16, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectRoot → #init</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Project detection input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via detectProject -- &quot;Project detection input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;Detection is read-only; no file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { join, basename } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(16, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Detection is read-only; no file writes</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Detection is read-only; no file writes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via detectProject -- &quot;Project detection input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @comment -- &quot;Detection is read-only; no file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { join, basename } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/init/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">10</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Detects project language and existing agent files, creates .guardlink/</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">All paths are relative to root; join() constrains</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Detects project language and existing agent files, creates .guardlink/</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Reads/writes files based on root argument</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">join() with explicit root constrains file access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → #data-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #init</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectRoot → #init</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Project root input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;All paths are relative to root; join() constrains&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → AgentFiles</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent instruction file writes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Reads/writes files based on root argument&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init → ConfigFile</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config file write</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with explicit root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(17, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#init: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Generates definitions and agent instruction content</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @audit #init -- &quot;Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #init via options.root -- &quot;Project root input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @flows #init -&gt; AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- &quot;Agent instruction file writes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @flows #init -&gt; ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- &quot;Config file write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- &quot;Generates definitions and agent instruction content&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import { detectProject, type ProjectInfo, type AgentFile } from './detect.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/mcp/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">4</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(18, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via stdio -- &quot;MCP protocol transport&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at MCP protocol&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(18, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via stdio -- &quot;MCP protocol transport&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at MCP protocol&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(18, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">MCPClient → #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">MCP protocol transport</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via stdio -- &quot;MCP protocol transport&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at MCP protocol&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export { lookup, type LookupResult } from './lookup.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(18, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp ↔ MCPClient</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at MCP protocol</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via stdio -- &quot;MCP protocol transport&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at MCP protocol&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ export { lookup, type LookupResult } from './lookup.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ export { suggestAnnotations, type Suggestion, type SuggestOptions } from './suggest.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/mcp/lookup.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">4</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(19, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Regex patterns applied to query strings</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *   - &quot;flows from #config&quot; → data flows with source = config</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *   - &quot;unmitigated&quot; → all unmitigated exposures</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   - &quot;boundary #config&quot; → boundaries involving asset</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regex patterns applied to query strings&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns are simple and bounded&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows QueryString -&gt; #mcp via lookup -- &quot;Query input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(19, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Patterns are simple and bounded</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *   - &quot;unmitigated&quot; → all unmitigated exposures</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   - &quot;boundary #config&quot; → boundaries involving asset</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regex patterns applied to query strings&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns are simple and bounded&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows QueryString -&gt; #mcp via lookup -- &quot;Query input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type {</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(19, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">QueryString → #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Query input path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  *   - &quot;boundary #config&quot; → boundaries involving asset</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regex patterns applied to query strings&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns are simple and bounded&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows QueryString -&gt; #mcp via lookup -- &quot;Query input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type {</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │   ThreatModel, ThreatModelAsset, ThreatModelThreat, ThreatModelControl,</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(19, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Regex patterns applied to query strings&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns are simple and bounded&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows QueryString -&gt; #mcp via lookup -- &quot;Query input path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import type {</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │   ThreatModel, ThreatModelAsset, ThreatModelThreat, ThreatModelControl,</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │   ThreatModelExposure, ThreatModelMitigation, ThreatModelFlow,</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/mcp/server.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">16</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L26</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  *   guardlink://definitions  — Assets, threats, controls</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  *   guardlink://unmitigated  — Unmitigated exposures list</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L27</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  *   guardlink://unmitigated  — Unmitigated exposures list</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L28</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">report, dashboard, sarif tools write files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  23 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L29</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Output paths resolved relative to validated root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L30</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #prompt-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  25 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L31</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L32</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">threat_report tool uses API keys from environment</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L33</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Keys from env only; never logged or returned</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;report, dashboard, sarif tools write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L34</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #data-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to validated root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L35</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L36</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">MCPClient → #mcp</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Tool invocation input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 11)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L37</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → FileSystem</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report/dashboard output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;threat_report tool uses API keys from environment&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 12)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L38</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">LLM API call path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Keys from env only; never logged or returned&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 13)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L39</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp → MCPClient</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Threat model data output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- &quot;Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 14)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L40</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp ↔ MCPClient</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at tool argument parsing</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- &quot;Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(20, 15)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L41</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#mcp: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes project annotations and threat model data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -&gt; #mcp via tool_call -- &quot;Tool invocation input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  37 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/dashboard output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  38 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  39 │  * @flows #mcp -&gt; MCPClient via resource -- &quot;Threat model data output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at tool argument parsing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- &quot;Processes project annotations and threat model data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  42 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  43 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  45 │ import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  46 │ import { z } from 'zod';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/mcp/suggest.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">9</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#suggest → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File path from MCP client joined with root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   - HTTP handlers, auth checks, input parsing</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   - Missing annotations on files that handle sensitive data</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">join() with validated root constrains access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   - Missing annotations on files that handle sensitive data</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#suggest → #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Complex regex patterns applied to source code</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#suggest → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #suggest</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from MCP client joined with root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">FilePath → #suggest</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File read path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;join() with validated root constrains access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#suggest → Suggestions</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Suggestion output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to source code&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { join, extname } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(21, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- &quot;File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #suggest via readFileSync -- &quot;File read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #suggest -&gt; Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- &quot;Suggestion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │  * @comment -- &quot;Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { join, extname } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/parser/clear.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">7</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Writes modified content back to discovered files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Annotation clearing utility.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Scans project source files and removes all GuardLink annotation comment lines.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Glob patterns determine which files are modified</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Scans project source files and removes all GuardLink annotation comment lines.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectRoot → #parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File discovery path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → SourceFiles</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Modified file write path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes modified content back to discovered files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(22, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Operates on project source files only</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns determine which files are modified&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;File discovery path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Modified file write path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- &quot;Operates on project source files only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/parser/parse-file.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">5</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(23, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded entirely into memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #parser via readFile -- &quot;Disk read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; Annotations via parseString -- &quot;Parsed annotation output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(23, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Large files loaded entirely into memory</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded entirely into memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #parser via readFile -- &quot;Disk read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; Annotations via parseString -- &quot;Parsed annotation output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(23, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded entirely into memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #parser via readFile -- &quot;Disk read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; Annotations via parseString -- &quot;Parsed annotation output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(23, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">FilePath → #parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Disk read path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded entirely into memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #parser via readFile -- &quot;Disk read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; Annotations via parseString -- &quot;Parsed annotation output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { basename, extname } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(23, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → Annotations</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Parsed annotation output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large files loaded entirely into memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @audit #parser -- &quot;Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows FilePath -&gt; #parser via readFile -- &quot;Disk read path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; Annotations via parseString -- &quot;Parsed annotation output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { basename, extname } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import type { Annotation, ParseDiagnostic, ParseResult } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/parser/parse-line.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">3</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(24, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ import type {</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(24, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ import type {</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │   Annotation, AnnotationVerb, Severity, DataClassification,</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(24, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- &quot;Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- &quot;All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ import type {</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │   Annotation, AnnotationVerb, Severity, DataClassification,</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │   ParseDiagnostic, SourceLocation,</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/parser/parse-project.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">7</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Glob patterns could escape root directory</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Large projects with many files could exhaust memory</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#resource-limits mitigates #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ProjectRoot → #parser</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Directory traversal path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser → ThreatModel</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Aggregated threat model output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;Glob patterns could escape root directory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(25, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#parser ↔ FileSystem</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Large projects with many files could exhaust memory&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -&gt; #parser via fast-glob -- &quot;Directory traversal path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #parser -&gt; ThreatModel via assembleModel -- &quot;Aggregated threat model output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import type {</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/report/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">2</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(26, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Report — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @comment -- &quot;Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * @comment -- &quot;File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ export { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ export { generateReport } from './report.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(26, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L5</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Report — exports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * @comment -- &quot;Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   5 │  * @comment -- &quot;File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │ export { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │ export { generateReport } from './report.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/report/report.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">4</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(27, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L6</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Report — Markdown report generator.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   6 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #report via generateReport -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #report -&gt; Markdown via return -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(27, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Report — Markdown report generator.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #report via generateReport -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #report -&gt; Markdown via return -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(27, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #report</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Model input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #report via generateReport -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #report -&gt; Markdown via return -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(27, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#report → Markdown</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * @comment -- &quot;Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @comment -- &quot;No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #report via generateReport -- &quot;Model input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows #report -&gt; Markdown via return -- &quot;Report output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/review/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">6</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Users walk through the GAL (Governance Acceptance List) and decide:</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   accept  — write @accepts + @audit (risk acknowledged, intentional)</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Only modifies files already in the parsed project</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *   accept  — write @accepts + @audit (risk acknowledged, intentional)</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #cli</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ThreatModel → #cli</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Exposure list input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli → SourceFiles</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Annotation insertion output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(28, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#cli: internal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes exposure metadata and user justification text</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Only modifies files already in the parsed project&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #cli -- &quot;Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -&gt; #cli via getReviewableExposures -- &quot;Exposure list input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #cli -&gt; SourceFiles via writeFile -- &quot;Annotation insertion output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- &quot;Processes exposure metadata and user justification text&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { stripCommentPrefix } from '../parser/comment-strip.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/tui/commands.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">15</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink TUI — Command implementations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Output paths resolved relative to project root</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #cmd-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">/model handles API key input and storage</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys masked in /model show output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- &quot;/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 8)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #prompt-injection</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Freeform chat sends user text to LLM</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- &quot;Output paths resolved relative to project root&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 9)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- &quot;/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 10)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserArgs → #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Command argument input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 11)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → FileSystem</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report/config output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;/model handles API key input and storage&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 12)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #agent-launcher</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Agent spawn path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;API keys masked in /model show output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 13)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L20</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #llm-client</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">LLM API call path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- &quot;Freeform chat sends user text to LLM&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(29, 14)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L21</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Processes and stores API keys via /model</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #tui via args -- &quot;Command argument input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; FileSystem via writeFile -- &quot;Report/config output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- &quot;Agent spawn path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; #llm-client via chatCompletion -- &quot;LLM API call path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Processes and stores API keys via /model&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  25 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  26 │ import { parseProject, findDanglingRefs, findUnmitigatedExposures, findAcceptedWithoutAudit, findAcceptedExposures, clearAnnotations } from '../parser/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/tui/config.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">5</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(30, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys loaded from and saved to config files</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink TUI — Config persistence for LLM settings.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from and saved to config files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #tui via loadProjectConfig -- &quot;Config load path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- &quot;Config save path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(30, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from and saved to config files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #tui via loadProjectConfig -- &quot;Config load path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- &quot;Config save path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(30, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ConfigFile → #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config load path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from and saved to config files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #tui via loadProjectConfig -- &quot;Config load path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- &quot;Config save path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(30, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → ConfigFile</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Config save path</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from and saved to config files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #tui via loadProjectConfig -- &quot;Config load path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- &quot;Config save path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { resolveConfig, saveProjectConfig, loadProjectConfig } from '../agents/config.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(30, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys loaded from and saved to config files&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- &quot;Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -&gt; #tui via loadProjectConfig -- &quot;Config load path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- &quot;Config save path&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { resolveConfig, saveProjectConfig, loadProjectConfig } from '../agents/config.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/tui/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">8</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * GuardLink TUI — Interactive terminal interface.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #api-key-exposure</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L12</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-audit">audit</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Audit: #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L13</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserInput → #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Interactive command input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 5)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L14</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → Commands</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Command routing</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- &quot;User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 6)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-boundary">boundary</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui ↔ UserInput</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Trust boundary at interactive input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- &quot;resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(31, 7)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-handles">handles</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui: secrets</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Displays LLM config including masked API keys</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- &quot;API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  * @audit #tui -- &quot;API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * @flows UserInput -&gt; #tui via readline -- &quot;Interactive command input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Commands via dispatch -- &quot;Command routing&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- &quot;Trust boundary at interactive input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- &quot;Displays LLM config including masked API keys&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/tui/input.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">5</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(32, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L15</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-exposes">exposes</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  *     /files       Browse files</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *     /assets      Asset tree</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -&gt; #tui via process.stdin -- &quot;Raw keystroke input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Terminal via process.stdout -- &quot;ANSI escape sequence output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(32, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L16</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#resource-limits mitigates #dos</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  *     /assets      Asset tree</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -&gt; #tui via process.stdin -- &quot;Raw keystroke input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Terminal via process.stdout -- &quot;ANSI escape sequence output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(32, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L17</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">RawStdin → #tui</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Raw keystroke input</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -&gt; #tui via process.stdin -- &quot;Raw keystroke input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Terminal via process.stdout -- &quot;ANSI escape sequence output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(32, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L18</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#tui → Terminal</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">ANSI escape sequence output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -&gt; #tui via process.stdin -- &quot;Raw keystroke input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Terminal via process.stdout -- &quot;ANSI escape sequence output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(32, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L19</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">  14 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- &quot;Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- &quot;Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -&gt; #tui via process.stdin -- &quot;Raw keystroke input&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  18 │  * @flows #tui -&gt; Terminal via process.stdout -- &quot;ANSI escape sequence output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  19 │  * @comment -- &quot;Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  20 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  21 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';</span><span class="code-line-code">  23 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  24 │ const BRAVOS = '#2dd4a7';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/workspace/index.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">1</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(33, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L4</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-comment">comment</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   1 │ /**</span><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Multi-repo linking and merge.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   4 │  * @comment -- &quot;Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │ export type {</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │   WorkspaceConfig, WorkspaceRepo,</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │   TagOwnership, UnresolvedRef, MergeWarning, MergeWarningCode,</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/workspace/link.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">3</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(34, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Workspace.Link</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Multi-repo workspace linking setup</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — link-project command logic.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace linking setup&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #workspace-link via linkProject -- &quot;CLI args to workspace scaffolding&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -&gt; AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- &quot;Inject workspace context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(34, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">UserArgs → #workspace-link</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">CLI args to workspace scaffolding</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace linking setup&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #workspace-link via linkProject -- &quot;CLI args to workspace scaffolding&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -&gt; AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- &quot;Inject workspace context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(34, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#workspace-link → AgentFiles</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Inject workspace context</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace linking setup&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -&gt; #workspace-link via linkProject -- &quot;CLI args to workspace scaffolding&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -&gt; AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- &quot;Inject workspace context&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import { resolve, basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/workspace/merge.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">5</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(35, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Workspace.Merge</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Cross-repo threat model unification</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Merge engine for multi-repo reports.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- &quot;Cross-repo threat model unification&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- &quot;Duplicate tag definitions across repos&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -&gt; #merge-engine via mergeReports -- &quot;Per-repo reports feed into merge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -&gt; MergedReport via mergeReports -- &quot;Unified output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(35, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Tag_Collision</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Duplicate tag definitions across repos</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- &quot;Cross-repo threat model unification&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- &quot;Duplicate tag definitions across repos&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -&gt; #merge-engine via mergeReports -- &quot;Per-repo reports feed into merge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -&gt; MergedReport via mergeReports -- &quot;Unified output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(35, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#prefix-ownership mitigates #tag-collision</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Tag prefix determines owning repo</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- &quot;Cross-repo threat model unification&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- &quot;Duplicate tag definitions across repos&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -&gt; #merge-engine via mergeReports -- &quot;Per-repo reports feed into merge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -&gt; MergedReport via mergeReports -- &quot;Unified output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(35, 3)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L10</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">ReportJSON → #merge-engine</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Per-repo reports feed into merge</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- &quot;Cross-repo threat model unification&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- &quot;Duplicate tag definitions across repos&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -&gt; #merge-engine via mergeReports -- &quot;Per-repo reports feed into merge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -&gt; MergedReport via mergeReports -- &quot;Unified output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { basename } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(35, 4)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L11</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#merge-engine → MergedReport</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Unified output</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- &quot;Cross-repo threat model unification&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- &quot;Duplicate tag definitions across repos&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- &quot;Tag prefix determines owning repo&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -&gt; #merge-engine via mergeReports -- &quot;Per-repo reports feed into merge&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -&gt; MergedReport via mergeReports -- &quot;Unified output&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';</span><span class="code-line-code">  15 │ import { basename } from 'node:path';</span><span class="code-line-code">  16 │ import type {</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/workspace/metadata.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">3</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(36, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Workspace.Metadata</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Report provenance data</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Report metadata population.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- &quot;Report provenance data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -&gt; #report-metadata via execSync -- &quot;Git info extraction&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -&gt; ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- &quot;Metadata injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(36, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">GitRepo → #report-metadata</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Git info extraction</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- &quot;Report provenance data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -&gt; #report-metadata via execSync -- &quot;Git info extraction&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -&gt; ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- &quot;Metadata injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(36, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-flow">flow</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#report-metadata → ThreatModel</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Metadata injection</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- &quot;Report provenance data&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -&gt; #report-metadata via execSync -- &quot;Git info extraction&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -&gt; ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- &quot;Metadata injection&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';</span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ import { join } from 'node:path';</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="file-card">
+    <div class="file-card-header" onclick="toggleFile(this)">
+      <span class="file-path">src/workspace/types.ts</span>
+      <span style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.4rem">
+        <span class="file-count">3</span>
+        <span class="chevron">▶</span>
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="file-card-body">
+      
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(37, 0)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L7</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-asset">asset</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Workspace.Config</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Multi-repo workspace definition</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Types for multi-repo linking.</span><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-ann">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace definition&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- &quot;Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- &quot;Schema validation on load&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';</span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(37, 1)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L8</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-threat">threat</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">Config_Tampering</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   3 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace definition&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- &quot;Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- &quot;Schema validation on load&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span></div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="ann-entry" onclick="openAnnotationDrawer(37, 2)">
+        <div class="ann-header">
+          <span class="ann-line">L9</span>
+          <span class="ann-badge ann-mitigates">mitigates</span>
+          <span class="ann-summary">#yaml-validation mitigates #config-tamper</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="ann-desc">Schema validation on load</div>
+        <div class="code-block"><span class="code-line-code">   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.</span><span class="code-line-code">   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.</span><span class="code-line-code">   6 │  *</span><span class="code-line-code">   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- &quot;Multi-repo workspace definition&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- &quot;Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations&quot;</span><span class="code-line-ann">   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- &quot;Schema validation on load&quot;</span><span class="code-line-code">  10 │  */</span><span class="code-line-code">  11 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';</span><span class="code-line-code">  13 │ </span><span class="code-line-code">  14 │ // ─── Workspace Configuration (workspace.yaml) ───────────────────────</span></div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- File Coverage Summary -->
+  <div class="sub-h" style="margin-top:1.5rem">File Coverage</div>
+  <div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.8rem;margin-bottom:.3rem">
+    <span style="font-size:.88rem;font-weight:600;color:var(--yellow)">38 of 60 files</span>
+    <span style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.82rem">have GuardLink annotations</span>
+  </div>
+  <div class="posture-bar"><div class="posture-fill warn" style="width:63%"></div></div>
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--yellow);margin-top:1rem">⚠ Unannotated Files (22)</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.5rem">
+    Source files with no GuardLink annotations. Not all files need annotations — only those touching security boundaries.
+  </p>
+  <div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:2px;margin-bottom:1rem">
+    <div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">.github/workflows/ci.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">.github/workflows/release.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">examples/ci/per-repo-report.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">examples/ci/workspace-merge.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">examples/github-action.yml</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/dashboard/data.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/dashboard/diagrams.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/diff/engine.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/diff/format.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/index.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/init/picker.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/init/templates.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/parser/comment-strip.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/parser/index.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/parser/normalize.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/parser/validate.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/report/mermaid.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/tui/format.ts</div><div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;padding:.3rem .6rem;background:var(--surface2);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);border-radius:2px">src/types/index.ts</div>
+  </div>
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-data" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">🔒</span> Data &amp; Boundaries</div>
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">Trust Boundaries</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Side A</th><th></th><th>Side B</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>AgentProcess</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at process spawn</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:20</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>LLMProvider</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at external API call</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:22</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>NVD</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at external API</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/tools.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>UserInput</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:35</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>GitRepo</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at git command execution</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/git.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>MCPClient</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at MCP protocol</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/index.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>MCPClient</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at tool argument parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:40</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>FileSystem</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-project.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td style="color:var(--purple)">↔</td>
+      <td><code>UserInput</code></td>
+      <td>Trust boundary at interactive input</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">Data Classifications</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Classification</th><th>Asset</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>Processes and stores LLM API keys</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/config.ts:22</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>Processes API keys for authentication</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:23</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>Processes API keys via config commands</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:36</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#dashboard</code></td>
+      <td>Processes and displays threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/generate.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td>Generates definitions and agent instruction content</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>Processes project annotations and threat model data</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:41</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>Operates on project source files only</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">internal</span></td>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>Processes exposure metadata and user justification text</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:15</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>Processes and stores API keys via /model</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:21</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/config.ts:11</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><span class="ann-badge ann-data">secrets</span></td>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>Displays LLM config including masked API keys</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+
+  
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">Audit Items (19)</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Asset</th><th>Description</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:14</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/launcher.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#agent-launcher</code></td>
+      <td>Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/index.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#llm-client</code></td>
+      <td>Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/llm.ts:18</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#sarif</code></td>
+      <td>SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/cli/index.ts:32</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#diff</code></td>
+      <td>Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/diff/index.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#init</code></td>
+      <td>Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/index.ts:13</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/index.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:31</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#mcp</code></td>
+      <td>Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/server.ts:35</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#suggest</code></td>
+      <td>File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/clear.ts:10</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#parser</code></td>
+      <td>Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-file.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#cli</code></td>
+      <td>Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/review/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/commands.ts:16</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td><code>#tui</code></td>
+      <td>API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/index.ts:12</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">Shielded Regions (16)</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.5rem">Code regions where annotations are intentionally suppressed via <code>@shield</code>.</p>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Reason</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td>Example annotation block for reference, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:148</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:161</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Description examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:168</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:178</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Flow examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:185</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:194</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Boundary examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:201</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:207</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Placement examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:214</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:223</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>@accepts alternative examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:250</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:260</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:277</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:281</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:286</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No reason provided</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/prompts.ts:299</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+  <div class="sub-h">Developer Comments (18)</div>
+  <table>
+    <thead><tr><th>Comment</th><th>Location</th></tr></thead>
+    <tbody>
+    
+    <tr>
+      <td>Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/index.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/agents/index.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/prompts.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyze/prompts.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/index.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/analyzer/sarif.ts:17</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/dashboard/index.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Detection is read-only; no file writes</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/init/detect.ts:8</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/lookup.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/mcp/suggest.ts:20</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/parser/parse-line.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/index.ts:5</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/report.ts:6</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/report/report.ts:7</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/tui/input.ts:19</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td>Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup</td>
+      <td class="loc">src/workspace/index.ts:4</td>
+    </tr>
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+
+  
+</div>
+
+<div id="sec-assets" class="section-content">
+  <div class="sec-h"><span class="sec-icon">🗺</span> Asset Risk Heatmap</div>
+  <p style="color:var(--muted);font-size:.78rem;margin-bottom:.8rem">Assets sorted by risk level. Unmitigated exposures increase risk. Click an asset for details.</p>
+  
+  <div class="heatmap">
+    
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-critical clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 0)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#mcp</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 7</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 4</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 6</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-critical clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 1)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#parser</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 7</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 4</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 6</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-critical clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 2)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#tui</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 9</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 6</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 10</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">secrets</span><span class="data-badge">secrets</span><span class="data-badge">secrets</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-high clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 3)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#agent-launcher</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 8</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 6</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 10</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">secrets</span><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-high clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 4)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#llm-client</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 9</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 7</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 11</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">internal</span><span class="data-badge">secrets</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-medium clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 5)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#sarif</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 1</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-medium clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 6)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#cli</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 5</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 4</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 4</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">secrets</span><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-medium clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 7)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#diff</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 4</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 3</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 4</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-medium clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 8)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#init</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 4</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 3</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 4</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-medium clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 9)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#suggest</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 3</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 2</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-low clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 10)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#dashboard</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 3</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 3</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 4</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="heatmap-data"><span class="data-badge">internal</span></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 11)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Parser</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 12)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.CLI</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 13)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.TUI</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 14)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.MCP</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 15)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.LLM_Client</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 16)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Dashboard</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 17)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Init</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 18)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Agent_Launcher</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 19)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Diff</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 20)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Report</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 21)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.SARIF</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 22)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GuardLink.Suggest</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 23)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Workspace.Link</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 24)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Workspace.Merge</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 25)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Workspace.Metadata</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 26)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Workspace.Config</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 27)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#merge-engine</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 1</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 28)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#workspace-config</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 1</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 0</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 29)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">EnvVars</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 30)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ConfigFile</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 5</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 31)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">UserPrompt</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 32)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">AgentProcess</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 33)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ThreatModel</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 10</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 34)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">AgentPrompt</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 35)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ProjectFiles</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 36)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ReportFile</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 37)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">LLMConfig</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 38)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">LLMProvider</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 39)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">LLMToolCall</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 40)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">NVD</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 41)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">SarifLog</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 42)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">UserArgs</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 3</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 43)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">FileSystem</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 3</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 44)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">SourceFiles</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 3</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 45)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">HTML</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 46)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GitRef</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 47)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">TempDir</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 48)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ProjectRoot</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 4</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 49)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">AgentFiles</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 50)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">MCPClient</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 3</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 51)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">QueryString</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 52)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">FilePath</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 53)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Suggestions</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 54)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Annotations</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 55)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#report</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 56)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Markdown</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 57)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">UserInput</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 58)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Commands</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 59)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">RawStdin</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 60)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">Terminal</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 61)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#workspace-link</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 62)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">ReportJSON</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 63)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">MergedReport</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 64)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">GitRepo</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 1</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+    <div class="heatmap-cell risk-cell-none clickable" onclick="openDrawer('asset', 65)">
+      <div class="heatmap-name">#report-metadata</div>
+      <div class="heatmap-stats">
+        <span title="Exposures">⚠ 0</span>
+        <span title="Mitigations">🛡 0</span>
+        <span title="Data flows">↔ 2</span>
+      </div>
+      
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</div>
+
+</div><!-- /main -->
+</div><!-- /layout -->
+
+<!-- ═══════════ DRAWER ═══════════ -->
+<div class="drawer-overlay" id="drawer-overlay" onclick="closeDrawer()"></div>
+<div class="drawer" id="drawer">
+  <div class="drawer-header">
+    <h3 id="drawer-title">Details</h3>
+    <button class="drawer-close" onclick="closeDrawer()">× Close</button>
+  </div>
+  <div class="drawer-body" id="drawer-body"></div>
+</div>
+
+<script>
+/* ===== DATA ===== */
+const fileAnnotations = [{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"asset","line":15,"summary":"GuardLink.Parser","description":"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │ // ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━","  11 │ ","  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems","  14 │ ","  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":16,"summary":"GuardLink.CLI","description":"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │ ","  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems","  14 │ ","  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":17,"summary":"GuardLink.TUI","description":"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │ // ─── ASSETS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems","  14 │ ","  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":18,"summary":"GuardLink.MCP","description":"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │ // Components that process data, handle user input, or interact with external systems","  14 │ ","  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":19,"summary":"GuardLink.LLM_Client","description":"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │ ","  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":20,"summary":"GuardLink.Dashboard","description":"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │ // @asset GuardLink.Parser (#parser) -- \"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns\"","  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":21,"summary":"GuardLink.Init","description":"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk","raw":"","codeContext":["  16 │ // @asset GuardLink.CLI (#cli) -- \"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands\"","  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":22,"summary":"GuardLink.Agent_Launcher","description":"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)","raw":"","codeContext":["  17 │ // @asset GuardLink.TUI (#tui) -- \"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch\"","  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":23,"summary":"GuardLink.Diff","description":"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands","raw":"","codeContext":["  18 │ // @asset GuardLink.MCP (#mcp) -- \"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio\"","  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":24,"summary":"GuardLink.Report","description":"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams","raw":"","codeContext":["  19 │ // @asset GuardLink.LLM_Client (#llm-client) -- \"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)\"","  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":25,"summary":"GuardLink.SARIF","description":"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling","raw":"","codeContext":["  20 │ // @asset GuardLink.Dashboard (#dashboard) -- \"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data\"","  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"asset","line":26,"summary":"GuardLink.Suggest","description":"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations","raw":"","codeContext":["  21 │ // @asset GuardLink.Init (#init) -- \"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk\"","  22 │ // @asset GuardLink.Agent_Launcher (#agent-launcher) -- \"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)\"","  23 │ // @asset GuardLink.Diff (#diff) -- \"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands\"","  24 │ // @asset GuardLink.Report (#report) -- \"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams\"","  25 │ // @asset GuardLink.SARIF (#sarif) -- \"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling\"","  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":31,"summary":"Path_Traversal","description":"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths","raw":"","codeContext":["  26 │ // @asset GuardLink.Suggest (#suggest) -- \"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations\"","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":32,"summary":"Command_Injection","description":"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input","raw":"","codeContext":["  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":33,"summary":"Cross_Site_Scripting","description":"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output","raw":"","codeContext":["  28 │ // ─── THREATS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":34,"summary":"API_Key_Exposure","description":"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output","raw":"","codeContext":["  29 │ // Security threats that can impact the application","  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":35,"summary":"Server_Side_Request_Forgery","description":"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override","raw":"","codeContext":["  30 │ ","  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":36,"summary":"ReDoS","description":"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content","raw":"","codeContext":["  31 │ // @threat Path_Traversal (#path-traversal) [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths\"","  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":37,"summary":"Arbitrary_File_Write","description":"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project","raw":"","codeContext":["  32 │ // @threat Command_Injection (#cmd-injection) [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input\"","  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":38,"summary":"Prompt_Injection","description":"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts","raw":"","codeContext":["  33 │ // @threat Cross_Site_Scripting (#xss) [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output\"","  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":39,"summary":"Denial_of_Service","description":"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees","raw":"","codeContext":["  34 │ // @threat API_Key_Exposure (#api-key-exposure) [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output\"","  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":40,"summary":"Sensitive_Data_Exposure","description":"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties","raw":"","codeContext":["  35 │ // @threat Server_Side_Request_Forgery (#ssrf) [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override\"","  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":41,"summary":"Insecure_Deserialization","description":"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files","raw":"","codeContext":["  36 │ // @threat ReDoS (#redos) [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content\"","  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":42,"summary":"Child_Process_Injection","description":"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn","raw":"","codeContext":["  37 │ // @threat Arbitrary_File_Write (#arbitrary-write) [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project\"","  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":43,"summary":"Information_Disclosure","description":"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details","raw":"","codeContext":["  38 │ // @threat Prompt_Injection (#prompt-injection) [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts\"","  39 │ // @threat Denial_of_Service (#dos) [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory trees\"","  40 │ // @threat Sensitive_Data_Exposure (#data-exposure) [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Threat model details exposed to unauthorized parties\"","  41 │ // @threat Insecure_Deserialization (#insecure-deser) [medium] cwe:CWE-502 -- \"Unsafe parsing of JSON/YAML configuration files\"","  42 │ // @threat Child_Process_Injection (#child-proc-injection) [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher executing attacker-controlled commands via process spawn\"","  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":48,"summary":"Path_Validation","description":"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories","raw":"","codeContext":["  43 │ // @threat Information_Disclosure (#info-disclosure) [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Unintended exposure of internal paths, structure, or implementation details\"","  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":49,"summary":"Input_Sanitization","description":"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits","raw":"","codeContext":["  44 │ ","  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":50,"summary":"Output_Encoding","description":"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output","raw":"","codeContext":["  45 │ // ─── CONTROLS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────","  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":51,"summary":"Key_Redaction","description":"Masking API keys in logs and error messages","raw":"","codeContext":["  46 │ // Security controls that mitigate threats","  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":52,"summary":"Process_Sandboxing","description":"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell","raw":"","codeContext":["  47 │ ","  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":53,"summary":"Config_Validation","description":"Schema validation for configuration files before use","raw":"","codeContext":["  48 │ // @control Path_Validation (#path-validation) -- \"Validates file paths using resolve() + startsWith() to ensure access within allowed directories\"","  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":54,"summary":"Resource_Limits","description":"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints","raw":"","codeContext":["  49 │ // @control Input_Sanitization (#input-sanitize) -- \"Input validation with anchored regex patterns and length limits\"","  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":55,"summary":"Parameterized_Commands","description":"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation","raw":"","codeContext":["  50 │ // @control Output_Encoding (#output-encoding) -- \"HTML entity encoding for untrusted data in generated output\"","  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\"","  60 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":56,"summary":"Glob_Pattern_Filtering","description":"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes","raw":"","codeContext":["  51 │ // @control Key_Redaction (#key-redaction) -- \"Masking API keys in logs and error messages\"","  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\"","  60 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":57,"summary":"Regex_Anchoring","description":"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking","raw":"","codeContext":["  52 │ // @control Process_Sandboxing (#process-sandbox) -- \"Controlled child process spawning with explicit args array, no shell\"","  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\"","  60 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":58,"summary":"Prefix_Ownership","description":"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions","raw":"","codeContext":["  53 │ // @control Config_Validation (#config-validation) -- \"Schema validation for configuration files before use\"","  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\"","  60 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"control","line":59,"summary":"YAML_Validation","description":"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files","raw":"","codeContext":["  54 │ // @control Resource_Limits (#resource-limits) -- \"File size limits, recursion depth limits, timeout constraints\"","  55 │ // @control Parameterized_Commands (#param-commands) -- \"Using spawn with args array instead of shell string interpolation\"","  56 │ // @control Glob_Pattern_Filtering (#glob-filtering) -- \"Filtering files using glob patterns with explicit excludes\"","  57 │ // @control Regex_Anchoring (#regex-anchoring) -- \"Using anchored regex patterns (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","  58 │ // @control Prefix_Ownership (#prefix-ownership) -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo, preventing cross-repo tag collisions\"","  59 │ // @control YAML_Validation (#yaml-validation) -- \"Schema validation for workspace.yaml configuration files\"","  60 │ "],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/agents/config.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":13,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *   4. Project config: .guardlink/config.json","   9 │  *   5. Global config: ~/.config/guardlink/config.json","  10 │  *","  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":14,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  *   5. Global config: ~/.config/guardlink/config.json","  10 │  *","  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #path-traversal","description":"Config paths resolved from root and homedir","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  *","  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":16,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"join() with known base dirs constrains paths","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * Replaces the fragmented tui-config.json / CLI flag / env var resolution.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":17,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #arbitrary-write","description":"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":18,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Output path is fixed relative to project root","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\"","  23 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"EnvVars → #agent-launcher","description":"Environment variable input","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys for display; keys never logged\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\"","  23 │  */","  24 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":20,"summary":"ConfigFile → #agent-launcher","description":"Config file read","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Config paths resolved from root and homedir\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\"","  23 │  */","  24 │ ","  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":21,"summary":"#agent-launcher → ConfigFile","description":"Config file write","raw":"","codeContext":["  16 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with known base dirs constrains paths\"","  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\"","  23 │  */","  24 │ ","  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';","  26 │ import { join } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":22,"summary":"#agent-launcher: secrets","description":"Processes and stores LLM API keys","raw":"","codeContext":["  17 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json\"","  18 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed relative to project root\"","  19 │  * @flows EnvVars -> #agent-launcher via process.env -- \"Environment variable input\"","  20 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #agent-launcher via readFileSync -- \"Config file read\"","  21 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  22 │  * @handles secrets on #agent-launcher -- \"Processes and stores LLM API keys\"","  23 │  */","  24 │ ","  25 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';","  26 │ import { join } from 'node:path';","  27 │ import { homedir } from 'node:os';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/agents/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":7,"summary":"Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names","description":"Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Shared agent registry.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Used by CLI, TUI, and MCP to identify and resolve coding agents","   5 │  * (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Gemini, clipboard).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ // ─── Agent registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────","  12 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":8,"summary":"parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk","description":"parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Used by CLI, TUI, and MCP to identify and resolve coding agents","   5 │  * (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Gemini, clipboard).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Agent binaries are hardcoded; no user-controlled binary names\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"parseAgentFlag extracts flags from args; no injection risk\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ // ─── Agent registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────","  12 │ ","  13 │ export interface AgentEntry {"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #child-proc-injection","description":"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  *   1. Foreground spawn (CLI + TUI): takes over terminal, returns on exit","   6 │  *   2. IDE launch: opens GUI app with project directory","   7 │  *","   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#param-commands mitigates #child-proc-injection","description":"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *   2. IDE launch: opens GUI app with project directory","   7 │  *","   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":12,"summary":"#param-commands mitigates #cmd-injection","description":"Arguments passed as array, not shell string","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *","   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":13,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #prompt-injection","description":"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * Clipboard copy is always performed first regardless of agent type.","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":14,"summary":"Audit: #agent-launcher","description":"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #dos","description":"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #child-proc-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":16,"summary":"Audit: #agent-launcher","description":"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #child-proc-injection using #param-commands -- \"Binary names from hardcoded AGENTS registry; no shell interpolation\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\"","  21 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":17,"summary":"UserPrompt → #agent-launcher","description":"Prompt input path","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #cmd-injection using #param-commands -- \"Arguments passed as array, not shell string\"","  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"#agent-launcher → AgentProcess","description":"Process spawn path","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument\"","  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"AgentProcess → #agent-launcher","description":"Agent output capture","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt content is opaque to agent binary; injection risk depends on agent implementation\"","  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';","  24 │ import { platform } from 'node:os';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":20,"summary":"#agent-launcher ↔ AgentProcess","description":"Trust boundary at process spawn","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"","  16 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Timeout intentionally omitted for interactive sessions; inline mode has implicit control\"","  17 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Prompt input path\"","  18 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentProcess via spawn -- \"Process spawn path\"","  19 │  * @flows AgentProcess -> #agent-launcher via stdout -- \"Agent output capture\"","  20 │  * @boundary #agent-launcher and AgentProcess (#agent-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at process spawn\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { spawnSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';","  24 │ import { platform } from 'node:os';","  25 │ import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/agents/prompts.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":6,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #prompt-injection","description":"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Prompt builders for annotation and analysis.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":7,"summary":"Audit: #agent-launcher","description":"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Agents — Prompt builders for annotation and analysis.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#agent-launcher → #path-traversal","description":"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"resolve() with root constrains file access","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Extracted from tui/commands.ts for shared use across CLI, TUI, MCP.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\"","  14 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":10,"summary":"UserPrompt → #agent-launcher","description":"User instruction input","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":11,"summary":"ThreatModel → #agent-launcher","description":"Model context injection","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"","   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":12,"summary":"#agent-launcher → AgentPrompt","description":"Assembled prompt output","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  * @audit #agent-launcher -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures; GuardLink prompt is read-only context\"","   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  17 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":13,"summary":"#agent-launcher: internal","description":"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #agent-launcher to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #agent-launcher against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @flows UserPrompt -> #agent-launcher via buildAnnotatePrompt -- \"User instruction input\"","  11 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #agent-launcher via model -- \"Model context injection\"","  12 │  * @flows #agent-launcher -> AgentPrompt via return -- \"Assembled prompt output\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #agent-launcher -- \"Serializes threat model IDs and flows into prompt\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  17 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';","  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":148,"summary":"Example annotation block for reference, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 143 │ "," 144 │ ### Always Couple Annotations Together"," 145 │ A file's doc-block should paint the full security picture of that module. Group annotations logically:"," 146 │ "," 147 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 148 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Example annotation block for reference, excluded from parsing\""," 149 │ //"," 150 │ // GOOD — Complete story at a single code location:"," 151 │ // @exposes #auth-api to #sqli [P1] cwe:CWE-89 -- \"User-supplied email passed to findUser() query builder\""," 152 │ // @mitigates #auth-api against #sqli using #input-validation -- \"Zod schema validates email format before query\""," 153 │ // @flows User_Input -> #auth-api via POST./login -- \"Login form submits credentials\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":161,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 156 │ // @comment -- \"Password comparison uses bcrypt.compare with timing-safe equality\""," 157 │ //"," 158 │ // BAD — Isolated annotation with no context:"," 159 │ // @exposes #auth-api to #sqli -- \"SQL injection possible\""," 160 │ //"," 161 │ // @shield:end"," 162 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 163 │ "," 164 │ ### Description Style — Reference Actual Code"," 165 │ Descriptions must reference the real code: function names, variable names, libraries, mechanisms."," 166 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":168,"summary":"Description examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 163 │ "," 164 │ ### Description Style — Reference Actual Code"," 165 │ Descriptions must reference the real code: function names, variable names, libraries, mechanisms."," 166 │ "," 167 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 168 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Description examples, excluded from parsing\""," 169 │ //"," 170 │ // GOOD: -- \"req.body.token passed to jwt.verify() without audience check\""," 171 │ // GOOD: -- \"bcrypt rounds set to 12 via BCRYPT_COST env var\""," 172 │ // GOOD: -- \"Rate limiter uses express-rate-limit at 100req/15min on /api/*\""," 173 │ //"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":178,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 173 │ //"," 174 │ // BAD:  -- \"Input not validated\"             (too vague — WHICH input? WHERE?)"," 175 │ // BAD:  -- \"Uses encryption\"                 (WHAT encryption? On WHAT data?)"," 176 │ // BAD:  -- \"Security vulnerability exists\"   (meaningless — be specific)"," 177 │ //"," 178 │ // @shield:end"," 179 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 180 │ "," 181 │ ### @flows — Stitch the Complete Data Path"," 182 │ @flows is the backbone of the threat model. Trace data movement accurately:"," 183 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":185,"summary":"Flow examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 180 │ "," 181 │ ### @flows — Stitch the Complete Data Path"," 182 │ @flows is the backbone of the threat model. Trace data movement accurately:"," 183 │ "," 184 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 185 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Flow examples, excluded from parsing\""," 186 │ //"," 187 │ // Trace a request through the full stack:"," 188 │ // @flows User_Browser -> #api-gateway via HTTPS -- \"Client sends auth request\""," 189 │ // @flows #api-gateway -> #auth-service via internal.gRPC -- \"Gateway forwards to auth microservice\""," 190 │ // @flows #auth-service -> #user-db via pg.query -- \"Looks up user record by email\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":194,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 189 │ // @flows #api-gateway -> #auth-service via internal.gRPC -- \"Gateway forwards to auth microservice\""," 190 │ // @flows #auth-service -> #user-db via pg.query -- \"Looks up user record by email\""," 191 │ // @flows #auth-service -> #session-store via redis.set -- \"Stores session token with TTL\""," 192 │ // @flows #auth-service -> User_Browser via Set-Cookie -- \"Returns session cookie to client\""," 193 │ //"," 194 │ // @shield:end"," 195 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 196 │ "," 197 │ ### @boundary — Mark Every Trust Zone Crossing"," 198 │ Place @boundary annotations where trust level changes between two components:"," 199 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":201,"summary":"Boundary examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 196 │ "," 197 │ ### @boundary — Mark Every Trust Zone Crossing"," 198 │ Place @boundary annotations where trust level changes between two components:"," 199 │ "," 200 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 201 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Boundary examples, excluded from parsing\""," 202 │ //"," 203 │ // @boundary between #api-gateway and External_Internet (#public-boundary) -- \"TLS termination, rate limiting at edge\""," 204 │ // @boundary between #backend and #database (#data-boundary) -- \"Application to persistence layer, connection pooling via pgBouncer\""," 205 │ // @boundary between #app and #payment-provider (#vendor-boundary) -- \"PCI-DSS scope boundary, tokenized card data only\""," 206 │ //"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":207,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 202 │ //"," 203 │ // @boundary between #api-gateway and External_Internet (#public-boundary) -- \"TLS termination, rate limiting at edge\""," 204 │ // @boundary between #backend and #database (#data-boundary) -- \"Application to persistence layer, connection pooling via pgBouncer\""," 205 │ // @boundary between #app and #payment-provider (#vendor-boundary) -- \"PCI-DSS scope boundary, tokenized card data only\""," 206 │ //"," 207 │ // @shield:end"," 208 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 209 │ "," 210 │ ### Where to Place Annotations"," 211 │ Annotations go in the file's top doc-block comment OR directly above the security-relevant code:"," 212 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":214,"summary":"Placement examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 209 │ "," 210 │ ### Where to Place Annotations"," 211 │ Annotations go in the file's top doc-block comment OR directly above the security-relevant code:"," 212 │ "," 213 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 214 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Placement examples, excluded from parsing\""," 215 │ //"," 216 │ // FILE-LEVEL (top doc-block) — for module-wide security properties:"," 217 │ // Place @exposes, @mitigates, @flows, @handles, @boundary that describe the module as a whole"," 218 │ //"," 219 │ // INLINE (above specific functions/methods) — for function-specific concerns:"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":223,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 218 │ //"," 219 │ // INLINE (above specific functions/methods) — for function-specific concerns:"," 220 │ // Place @exposes, @mitigates above the exact function where the risk or control lives"," 221 │ // Place @comment above tricky security-relevant code to explain intent"," 222 │ //"," 223 │ // @shield:end"," 224 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 225 │ "," 226 │ ### Severity — Be Honest, Not Alarmist"," 227 │ Annotations capture what COULD go wrong, calibrated to realistic risk:"," 228 │ - **[P0] / [critical]**: Directly exploitable by external attacker, severe impact (RCE, auth bypass, data breach)"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":250,"summary":"@accepts alternative examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 245 │ 3. Add @comment explaining what controls COULD be added"," 246 │ 4. Optionally add @assumes to document any assumptions the code makes"," 247 │ "," 248 │ Example — what to do when no mitigation exists:"," 249 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 250 │ // @shield:begin -- \"@accepts alternative examples, excluded from parsing\""," 251 │ //"," 252 │ // WRONG (AI rubber-stamping risk):"," 253 │ // @accepts #prompt-injection on #ai-endpoint -- \"Relying on model safety filters\""," 254 │ //"," 255 │ // RIGHT (flag for human review):"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":260,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 255 │ // RIGHT (flag for human review):"," 256 │ // @exposes #ai-endpoint to #prompt-injection [P1] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompt passed directly to LLM API without sanitization\""," 257 │ // @audit #ai-endpoint -- \"No prompt sanitization — needs human review to decide: add input filter or accept risk\""," 258 │ // @comment -- \"Potential controls: #prompt-filter (input sanitization), #output-validator (response filtering)\""," 259 │ //"," 260 │ // @shield:end"," 261 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 262 │ "," 263 │ Leaving exposures unmitigated is HONEST. The dashboard and reports will surface them as open risks for humans to triage."," 264 │ "," 265 │ ### @shield — DO NOT USE Unless Explicitly Asked"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":277,"summary":"Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 272 │ "," 273 │ Definitions go in .guardlink/definitions.{ts,js,py,rs}. Source files use only relationship verbs."," 274 │ "," 275 │ ### Definitions (in .guardlink/definitions file)"," 276 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 277 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing\""," 278 │ // @asset Server.Auth (#auth) -- \"Authentication service handling login and session management\""," 279 │ // @threat SQL_Injection (#sqli) [P0] cwe:CWE-89 -- \"Unsanitized input reaches SQL query builder\""," 280 │ // @control Prepared_Statements (#prepared-stmts) -- \"Parameterized queries via ORM or driver placeholders\""," 281 │ // @shield:end"," 282 │ \\`\\`\\`"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":281,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 276 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 277 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Definition syntax examples, excluded from parsing\""," 278 │ // @asset Server.Auth (#auth) -- \"Authentication service handling login and session management\""," 279 │ // @threat SQL_Injection (#sqli) [P0] cwe:CWE-89 -- \"Unsanitized input reaches SQL query builder\""," 280 │ // @control Prepared_Statements (#prepared-stmts) -- \"Parameterized queries via ORM or driver placeholders\""," 281 │ // @shield:end"," 282 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 283 │ "," 284 │ ### Relationships (in source files)"," 285 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 286 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":286,"summary":"Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 281 │ // @shield:end"," 282 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 283 │ "," 284 │ ### Relationships (in source files)"," 285 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 286 │ // @shield:begin -- \"Relationship syntax examples, excluded from parsing\""," 287 │ // @exposes #auth to #sqli [P0] cwe:CWE-89 owasp:A03:2021 -- \"User input concatenated into query\""," 288 │ // @mitigates #auth against #sqli using #prepared-stmts -- \"Uses parameterized queries via sqlx\""," 289 │ // @audit #auth -- \"Timing attack risk — needs human review to decide if bcrypt constant-time comparison is sufficient\""," 290 │ // @transfers #ddos from #api to #cdn -- \"Cloudflare handles L7 DDoS mitigation\""," 291 │ // @flows req.body.username -> db.query via string-concat -- \"User input flows to SQL\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"shield","line":299,"summary":"Shielded region","description":"","raw":"","codeContext":[" 294 │ // @validates #prepared-stmts for #auth -- \"Integration test sqlInjectionTest.ts confirms parameterized queries block SQLi payloads\""," 295 │ // @audit #auth -- \"Session token rotation logic needs cryptographic review\""," 296 │ // @assumes #auth -- \"Upstream API gateway has already validated TLS and rate-limited requests\""," 297 │ // @owns security-team for #auth -- \"Security team reviews all auth PRs\""," 298 │ // @comment -- \"Password hashing uses bcrypt with cost factor 12, migration from SHA256 completed in v2.1\""," 299 │ // @shield:end"," 300 │ \\`\\`\\`"," 301 │ "," 302 │ ## CRITICAL SYNTAX RULES (violations cause parse errors)"," 303 │ "," 304 │ 1. **@boundary requires TWO assets**: \\`@boundary between #A and #B\\` or \\`@boundary #A | #B\\`."],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/analyze/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#llm-client → #path-traversal","description":"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Serializes the threat model, sends it to an LLM with a framework-","   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results","   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"join() with root constrains file access","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Serializes the threat model, sends it to an LLM with a framework-","   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results","   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#llm-client → #arbitrary-write","description":"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * specific prompt, streams the response, and saves timestamped results","   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * to .guardlink/threat-reports/.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":12,"summary":"#llm-client → #data-exposure","description":"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":13,"summary":"Audit: #llm-client","description":"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\"","  18 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"ThreatModel → #llm-client","description":"Model serialization input","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains file access\"","  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":15,"summary":"ProjectFiles → #llm-client","description":"Project context read","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":16,"summary":"#llm-client → ReportFile","description":"Report output","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output path is fixed to .guardlink/threat-reports/\"","  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  21 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":17,"summary":"#llm-client: internal","description":"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM\"","  13 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis\"","  14 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #llm-client via serializeModel -- \"Model serialization input\"","  15 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Project context read\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> ReportFile via writeFileSync -- \"Report output\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #llm-client -- \"Processes project dependencies, env examples, code snippets\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  21 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';","  22 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":13,"summary":"#llm-client → #ssrf","description":"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *   - OpenAI-compatible Chat Completions (DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Ollama)","   9 │  *   - DeepSeek reasoning mode (deepseek-reasoner)","  10 │  *","  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":14,"summary":"#config-validation mitigates #ssrf","description":"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  *   - DeepSeek reasoning mode (deepseek-reasoner)","  10 │  *","  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#llm-client → #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys passed in Authorization headers","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  *","  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":16,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"Keys never logged; passed directly to API","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * Zero dependencies — uses Node 20+ built-in fetch.","  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":17,"summary":"#llm-client → #prompt-injection","description":"User prompts sent to LLM API","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  *","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":18,"summary":"Audit: #llm-client","description":"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"LLMConfig → #llm-client","description":"Config and prompt input","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #config-validation -- \"BASE_URLS are hardcoded; baseUrl override is optional config\"","  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\"","  24 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":20,"summary":"#llm-client → LLMProvider","description":"API request output","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys passed in Authorization headers\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\"","  24 │  */","  25 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":21,"summary":"LLMProvider → #llm-client","description":"API response input","raw":"","codeContext":["  16 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys never logged; passed directly to API\"","  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\"","  24 │  */","  25 │ ","  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":22,"summary":"#llm-client ↔ LLMProvider","description":"Trust boundary at external API call","raw":"","codeContext":["  17 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"User prompts sent to LLM API\"","  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\"","  24 │  */","  25 │ ","  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';","  27 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":23,"summary":"#llm-client: secrets","description":"Processes API keys for authentication","raw":"","codeContext":["  18 │  * @audit #llm-client -- \"Prompt injection mitigated by LLM provider safety; local code is read-only\"","  19 │  * @flows LLMConfig -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"Config and prompt input\"","  20 │  * @flows #llm-client -> LLMProvider via fetch -- \"API request output\"","  21 │  * @flows LLMProvider -> #llm-client via response -- \"API response input\"","  22 │  * @boundary #llm-client and LLMProvider (#llm-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API call\"","  23 │  * @handles secrets on #llm-client -- \"Processes API keys for authentication\"","  24 │  */","  25 │ ","  26 │ export type LLMProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'openrouter' | 'deepseek' | 'ollama';","  27 │ ","  28 │ // ─── Tool definitions ────────────────────────────────────────────────"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/analyze/prompts.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":7,"summary":"Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts","description":"Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Threat Reports — Framework-specific analysis prompts.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Each framework produces a structured security analysis from the","   5 │  * serialized threat model. The LLM acts as a senior security architect.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ export type AnalysisFramework = 'stride' | 'dread' | 'pasta' | 'attacker' | 'rapid' | 'general';","  12 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":8,"summary":"customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk","description":"customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Each framework produces a structured security analysis from the","   5 │  * serialized threat model. The LLM acts as a senior security architect.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Prompt templates are static; no user input interpolation in system prompts\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"customPrompt is appended to user message, not system prompt — bounded injection risk\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ export type AnalysisFramework = 'stride' | 'dread' | 'pasta' | 'attacker' | 'rapid' | 'general';","  12 │ ","  13 │ export const FRAMEWORK_LABELS: Record<AnalysisFramework, string> = {"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":9,"summary":"#llm-client → #ssrf","description":"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Defines tools that the LLM can invoke during threat analysis:","   5 │  *   - lookup_cve: Search for CVE details (via web fetch)","   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model","   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":10,"summary":"#input-sanitize mitigates #ssrf","description":"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  *   - lookup_cve: Search for CVE details (via web fetch)","   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model","   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":11,"summary":"#llm-client → #path-traversal","description":"searchCodebase reads files from project root","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *   - validate_finding: Cross-reference a finding against the parsed model","   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":12,"summary":"#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal","description":"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *   - search_codebase: Search project files for patterns","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":13,"summary":"#llm-client → #dos","description":"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":14,"summary":"#resource-limits mitigates #dos","description":"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #ssrf [medium] cwe:CWE-918 -- \"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\"","  19 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":15,"summary":"LLMToolCall → #llm-client","description":"Tool invocation input","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #ssrf using #input-sanitize -- \"CVE ID validated with strict regex; URL hardcoded to NVD\"","  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\"","  19 │  */","  20 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":16,"summary":"#llm-client → NVD","description":"CVE lookup API call","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"searchCodebase reads files from project root\"","  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\"","  19 │  */","  20 │ ","  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":17,"summary":"ProjectFiles → #llm-client","description":"Codebase search reads","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"skipDirs excludes sensitive directories; relative() bounds output\"","  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\"","  19 │  */","  20 │ ","  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';","  22 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":18,"summary":"#llm-client ↔ NVD","description":"Trust boundary at external API","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @exposes #llm-client to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #llm-client against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"maxResults caps output; stat.size < 500KB filter\"","  15 │  * @flows LLMToolCall -> #llm-client via createToolExecutor -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  16 │  * @flows #llm-client -> NVD via fetch -- \"CVE lookup API call\"","  17 │  * @flows ProjectFiles -> #llm-client via readFileSync -- \"Codebase search reads\"","  18 │  * @boundary #llm-client and NVD (#nvd-api-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at external API\"","  19 │  */","  20 │ ","  21 │ import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';","  22 │ import { join, relative } from 'node:path';","  23 │ import type { ToolDefinition, ToolExecutor } from './llm.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/analyzer/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":4,"summary":"SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module","description":"SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Analyzer — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @comment -- \"SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module\"","   5 │  * @comment -- \"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers\"","   6 │  */","   7 │ ","   8 │ export { generateSarif, type SarifOptions } from './sarif.js';","   9 │ "],"annLineIdx":3},{"kind":"comment","line":5,"summary":"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers","description":"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Analyzer — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @comment -- \"SARIF generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module\"","   5 │  * @comment -- \"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers\"","   6 │  */","   7 │ ","   8 │ export { generateSarif, type SarifOptions } from './sarif.js';","   9 │ "],"annLineIdx":4}]},{"file":"src/analyzer/sarif.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#sarif → #data-exposure","description":"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * We emit results for:","  11 │  *   1. Unmitigated exposures (the primary security findings)","  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)","  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers\"","  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- \"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration\"","  17 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O\"","  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif -- \"Model input\"","  19 │  * @flows #sarif -> SarifLog via return -- \"SARIF output\"","  20 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":16,"summary":"Audit: #sarif","description":"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  *   1. Unmitigated exposures (the primary security findings)","  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)","  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers\"","  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- \"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration\"","  17 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O\"","  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif -- \"Model input\"","  19 │  * @flows #sarif -> SarifLog via return -- \"SARIF output\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":17,"summary":"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O","description":"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  *   2. Parse errors (annotation syntax problems)","  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers\"","  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- \"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration\"","  17 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O\"","  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif -- \"Model input\"","  19 │  * @flows #sarif -> SarifLog via return -- \"SARIF output\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"ThreatModel → #sarif","description":"Model input","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  *   3. Dangling references (broken #id refs)","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers\"","  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- \"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration\"","  17 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O\"","  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif -- \"Model input\"","  19 │  * @flows #sarif -> SarifLog via return -- \"SARIF output\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';","  23 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"#sarif → SarifLog","description":"SARIF output","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #sarif to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers\"","  16 │  * @audit #sarif -- \"SARIF output intentionally reveals security findings for CI/CD integration\"","  17 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to SARIF JSON; no I/O\"","  18 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #sarif via generateSarif -- \"Model input\"","  19 │  * @flows #sarif -> SarifLog via return -- \"SARIF output\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, ParseDiagnostic, Severity } from '../types/index.js';","  23 │ ","  24 │ // ─── SARIF 2.1.0 types (subset) ─────────────────────────────────────"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/cli/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":25,"summary":"#cli → #path-traversal","description":"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve","raw":"","codeContext":["  20 │  *   guardlink tui [dir]               Interactive TUI with slash commands + AI chat","  21 │  *   guardlink gal                     Display GAL annotation language quick reference","  22 │  *   guardlink link-project <repos...>  Link repos into a shared workspace","  23 │  *   guardlink merge <files...>         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard","  24 │  *","  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":26,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design","raw":"","codeContext":["  21 │  *   guardlink gal                     Display GAL annotation language quick reference","  22 │  *   guardlink link-project <repos...>  Link repos into a shared workspace","  23 │  *   guardlink merge <files...>         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard","  24 │  *","  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":27,"summary":"#cli → #arbitrary-write","description":"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths","raw":"","codeContext":["  22 │  *   guardlink link-project <repos...>  Link repos into a shared workspace","  23 │  *   guardlink merge <files...>         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard","  24 │  *","  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":28,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Output paths resolved relative to project root","raw":"","codeContext":["  23 │  *   guardlink merge <files...>         Merge repo reports into unified dashboard","  24 │  *","  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":29,"summary":"#cli → #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys handled in config set/show commands","raw":"","codeContext":["  24 │  *","  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":30,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"maskKey() redacts keys in show output","raw":"","codeContext":["  25 │  * @exposes #cli to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":31,"summary":"#cli → #cmd-injection","description":"Agent launcher spawns child processes","raw":"","codeContext":["  26 │  * @mitigates #cli against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; cwd-relative by design\"","  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":32,"summary":"Audit: #cli","description":"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args","raw":"","codeContext":["  27 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths\"","  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\"","  37 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":33,"summary":"UserArgs → #cli","description":"CLI argument input path","raw":"","codeContext":["  28 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\"","  37 │  */","  38 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":34,"summary":"#cli → FileSystem","description":"Report/config output path","raw":"","codeContext":["  29 │  * @exposes #cli to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys handled in config set/show commands\"","  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\"","  37 │  */","  38 │ ","  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":35,"summary":"#cli ↔ UserInput","description":"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing","raw":"","codeContext":["  30 │  * @mitigates #cli against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"maskKey() redacts keys in show output\"","  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\"","  37 │  */","  38 │ ","  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';","  40 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":36,"summary":"#cli: secrets","description":"Processes API keys via config commands","raw":"","codeContext":["  31 │  * @exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"","  32 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"","  33 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #cli via process.argv -- \"CLI argument input path\"","  34 │  * @flows #cli -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output path\"","  35 │  * @boundary #cli and UserInput (#cli-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at CLI argument parsing\"","  36 │  * @handles secrets on #cli -- \"Processes API keys via config commands\"","  37 │  */","  38 │ ","  39 │ import { Command } from 'commander';","  40 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';","  41 │ import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/dashboard/generate.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#dashboard → #xss","description":"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Sidebar navigation + drawer detail panel + dark/light toggle.","   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.","   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#output-encoding mitigates #xss","description":"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Sidebar navigation + drawer detail panel + dark/light toggle.","   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.","   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#dashboard → #path-traversal","description":"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * 7 pages: Summary, AI Analysis, Threats, Diagrams, Code, Data, Assets.","   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"resolve() with root constrains file access","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * Mermaid.js via CDN for diagrams. Zero build step.","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\"","  16 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":12,"summary":"ThreatModel → #dashboard","description":"Model statistics input","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":13,"summary":"SourceFiles → #dashboard","description":"Code snippet reads","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"#dashboard → HTML","description":"Generated HTML output","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() HTML-encodes all interpolated values\"","  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';","  19 │ import { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":15,"summary":"#dashboard: internal","description":"Processes and displays threat model data","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via computeStats -- \"Model statistics input\"","  13 │  * @flows SourceFiles -> #dashboard via readFileSync -- \"Code snippet reads\"","  14 │  * @flows #dashboard -> HTML via return -- \"Generated HTML output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #dashboard -- \"Processes and displays threat model data\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';","  19 │ import { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';","  20 │ import type { DashboardStats, SeverityBreakdown, ExposureRow, AssetHeatmapEntry } from './data.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/dashboard/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":4,"summary":"#dashboard → #xss","description":"Generates HTML with threat model data","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with threat model data\"","   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() function encodes all interpolated values\"","   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- \"Model to HTML transformation\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ "],"annLineIdx":3},{"kind":"mitigates","line":5,"summary":"#output-encoding mitigates #xss","description":"esc() function encodes all interpolated values","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with threat model data\"","   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() function encodes all interpolated values\"","   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- \"Model to HTML transformation\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';"],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"flow","line":6,"summary":"ThreatModel → #dashboard","description":"Model to HTML transformation","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with threat model data\"","   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() function encodes all interpolated values\"","   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- \"Model to HTML transformation\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';","  11 │ export { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":7,"summary":"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation","description":"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Dashboard — Self-contained HTML threat model dashboard.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #dashboard to #xss [high] cwe:CWE-79 -- \"Generates HTML with threat model data\"","   5 │  * @mitigates #dashboard against #xss using #output-encoding -- \"esc() function encodes all interpolated values\"","   6 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #dashboard via generateDashboardHTML -- \"Model to HTML transformation\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Self-contained HTML; no external data injection after generation\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { generateDashboardHTML } from './generate.js';","  11 │ export { computeStats, computeSeverity, computeExposures, computeAssetHeatmap } from './data.js';","  12 │ export { generateThreatGraph, generateDataFlowDiagram, generateAttackSurface } from './diagrams.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/diff/git.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":6,"summary":"#diff → #cmd-injection","description":"execSync runs git commands with ref argument","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — Git integration.","   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit","   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":7,"summary":"#input-sanitize mitigates #cmd-injection","description":"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — Git integration.","   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit","   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#diff → #arbitrary-write","description":"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Resolves git refs to threat models by checking out files at a given commit","   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * and parsing them in a temp directory.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#diff → #path-traversal","description":"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  *","   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal","description":"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"execSync runs git commands with ref argument\"","   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\"","  16 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":12,"summary":"GitRef → #diff","description":"Git command execution","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  * @mitigates #diff against #cmd-injection using #input-sanitize -- \"rev-parse validates ref exists before use in other commands\"","   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":13,"summary":"#diff → TempDir","description":"Extracted file writes","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #diff to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"#diff → ThreatModel","description":"Parsed model output","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @mitigates #diff against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"mkdtempSync creates isolated temp dir; rmSync cleans up\"","  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';","  19 │ import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":15,"summary":"#diff ↔ GitRepo","description":"Trust boundary at git command execution","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #diff to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #diff against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"Files constrained to relevantFiles from git ls-tree\"","  12 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via execSync -- \"Git command execution\"","  13 │  * @flows #diff -> TempDir via writeFileSync -- \"Extracted file writes\"","  14 │  * @flows #diff -> ThreatModel via parseProject -- \"Parsed model output\"","  15 │  * @boundary #diff and GitRepo (#git-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at git command execution\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';","  19 │ import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';","  20 │ import { join } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/diff/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":4,"summary":"#diff → #cmd-injection","description":"git.ts uses execSync with ref argument","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"git.ts uses execSync with ref argument\"","   5 │  * @audit #diff -- \"Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use\"","   6 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via parseAtRef -- \"Git reference input\"","   7 │  */","   8 │ ","   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';"],"annLineIdx":3},{"kind":"audit","line":5,"summary":"Audit: #diff","description":"Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"git.ts uses execSync with ref argument\"","   5 │  * @audit #diff -- \"Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use\"","   6 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via parseAtRef -- \"Git reference input\"","   7 │  */","   8 │ ","   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';","  10 │ export { formatDiff, formatDiffMarkdown } from './format.js';"],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"flow","line":6,"summary":"GitRef → #diff","description":"Git reference input","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Diff — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #diff to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"git.ts uses execSync with ref argument\"","   5 │  * @audit #diff -- \"Git commands use execSync; ref is validated with rev-parse before use\"","   6 │  * @flows GitRef -> #diff via parseAtRef -- \"Git reference input\"","   7 │  */","   8 │ ","   9 │ export { diffModels, type ThreatModelDiff, type DiffSummary, type Change, type ChangeKind } from './engine.js';","  10 │ export { formatDiff, formatDiffMarkdown } from './format.js';","  11 │ export { parseAtRef, getCurrentRef } from './git.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/init/detect.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":5,"summary":"#init → #path-traversal","description":"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.","   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only\"","   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via detectProject -- \"Project detection input\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"Detection is read-only; no file writes\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ "],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"mitigates","line":6,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.","   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only\"","   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via detectProject -- \"Project detection input\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"Detection is read-only; no file writes\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":7,"summary":"ProjectRoot → #init","description":"Project detection input","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink init — Project detection utilities.","   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only\"","   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via detectProject -- \"Project detection input\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"Detection is read-only; no file writes\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';","  12 │ import { join, basename } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":8,"summary":"Detection is read-only; no file writes","description":"Detection is read-only; no file writes","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Detects language, project name, and existing agent instruction files.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [low] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with root constrains; reads well-known files only\"","   7 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via detectProject -- \"Project detection input\"","   8 │  * @comment -- \"Detection is read-only; no file writes\"","   9 │  */","  10 │ ","  11 │ import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';","  12 │ import { join, basename } from 'node:path';","  13 │ "],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/init/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#init → #arbitrary-write","description":"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Detects project language and existing agent files, creates .guardlink/","   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions","   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Detects project language and existing agent files, creates .guardlink/","   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions","   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#init → #path-traversal","description":"Reads/writes files based on root argument","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * directory with shared definitions, and injects GuardLink instructions","   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"join() with explicit root constrains file access","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * into agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.).","   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":12,"summary":"#init → #data-exposure","description":"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *","   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":13,"summary":"Audit: #init","description":"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #init to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\"","  18 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"ProjectRoot → #init","description":"Project root input","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @mitigates #init against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"All paths are relative to root; join() constrains\"","  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":15,"summary":"#init → AgentFiles","description":"Agent instruction file writes","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #init to #path-traversal [medium] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Reads/writes files based on root argument\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":16,"summary":"#init → ConfigFile","description":"Config file write","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @mitigates #init against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with explicit root constrains file access\"","  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  21 │ import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":17,"summary":"#init: internal","description":"Generates definitions and agent instruction content","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @exposes #init to #data-exposure [low] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json\"","  13 │  * @audit #init -- \"Config file may contain API keys; .gitignore entry added automatically\"","  14 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #init via options.root -- \"Project root input\"","  15 │  * @flows #init -> AgentFiles via writeFileSync -- \"Agent instruction file writes\"","  16 │  * @flows #init -> ConfigFile via writeFileSync -- \"Config file write\"","  17 │  * @handles internal on #init -- \"Generates definitions and agent instruction content\"","  18 │  */","  19 │ ","  20 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  21 │ import { join, dirname } from 'node:path';","  22 │ import { detectProject, type ProjectInfo, type AgentFile } from './detect.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/mcp/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":4,"summary":"#mcp → #cmd-injection","description":"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients\"","   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution\"","   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via stdio -- \"MCP protocol transport\"","   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at MCP protocol\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ "],"annLineIdx":3},{"kind":"audit","line":5,"summary":"Audit: #mcp","description":"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients\"","   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution\"","   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via stdio -- \"MCP protocol transport\"","   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at MCP protocol\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';"],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"flow","line":6,"summary":"MCPClient → #mcp","description":"MCP protocol transport","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients\"","   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution\"","   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via stdio -- \"MCP protocol transport\"","   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at MCP protocol\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';","  11 │ export { lookup, type LookupResult } from './lookup.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":7,"summary":"#mcp ↔ MCPClient","description":"Trust boundary at MCP protocol","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink MCP Server — exports and stdio entry point.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients\"","   5 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution\"","   6 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via stdio -- \"MCP protocol transport\"","   7 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at MCP protocol\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ export { createServer } from './server.js';","  11 │ export { lookup, type LookupResult } from './lookup.js';","  12 │ export { suggestAnnotations, type Suggestion, type SuggestOptions } from './suggest.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/mcp/lookup.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":16,"summary":"#mcp → #redos","description":"Regex patterns applied to query strings","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  *   - \"flows from #config\" → data flows with source = config","  12 │  *   - \"unmitigated\" → all unmitigated exposures","  13 │  *   - \"boundary #config\" → boundaries involving asset","  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls","  15 │  *","  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regex patterns applied to query strings\"","  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns are simple and bounded\"","  18 │  * @flows QueryString -> #mcp via lookup -- \"Query input path\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":17,"summary":"#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos","description":"Patterns are simple and bounded","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  *   - \"unmitigated\" → all unmitigated exposures","  13 │  *   - \"boundary #config\" → boundaries involving asset","  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls","  15 │  *","  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regex patterns applied to query strings\"","  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns are simple and bounded\"","  18 │  * @flows QueryString -> #mcp via lookup -- \"Query input path\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type {"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"QueryString → #mcp","description":"Query input path","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  *   - \"boundary #config\" → boundaries involving asset","  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls","  15 │  *","  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regex patterns applied to query strings\"","  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns are simple and bounded\"","  18 │  * @flows QueryString -> #mcp via lookup -- \"Query input path\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type {","  23 │   ThreatModel, ThreatModelAsset, ThreatModelThreat, ThreatModelControl,"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":19,"summary":"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel","description":"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  *   - Free text → fuzzy match across assets, threats, controls","  15 │  *","  16 │  * @exposes #mcp to #redos [low] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Regex patterns applied to query strings\"","  17 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns are simple and bounded\"","  18 │  * @flows QueryString -> #mcp via lookup -- \"Query input path\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function; no I/O; operates on in-memory ThreatModel\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import type {","  23 │   ThreatModel, ThreatModelAsset, ThreatModelThreat, ThreatModelControl,","  24 │   ThreatModelExposure, ThreatModelMitigation, ThreatModelFlow,"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/mcp/server.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":26,"summary":"#mcp → #path-traversal","description":"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client","raw":"","codeContext":["  21 │  *   guardlink://definitions  — Assets, threats, controls","  22 │  *   guardlink://unmitigated  — Unmitigated exposures list","  23 │  *","  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)","  25 │  *","  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":27,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes","raw":"","codeContext":["  22 │  *   guardlink://unmitigated  — Unmitigated exposures list","  23 │  *","  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)","  25 │  *","  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":28,"summary":"#mcp → #arbitrary-write","description":"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files","raw":"","codeContext":["  23 │  *","  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)","  25 │  *","  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":29,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Output paths resolved relative to validated root","raw":"","codeContext":["  24 │  * Transport: stdio (for Claude Code .mcp.json, Cursor, etc.)","  25 │  *","  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":30,"summary":"#mcp → #prompt-injection","description":"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM","raw":"","codeContext":["  25 │  *","  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":31,"summary":"Audit: #mcp","description":"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only","raw":"","codeContext":["  26 │  * @exposes #mcp to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client\"","  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":32,"summary":"#mcp → #api-key-exposure","description":"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment","raw":"","codeContext":["  27 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"Zod schema validates root; resolve() canonicalizes\"","  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":33,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"Keys from env only; never logged or returned","raw":"","codeContext":["  28 │  * @exposes #mcp to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files\"","  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":34,"summary":"#mcp → #data-exposure","description":"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients","raw":"","codeContext":["  29 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to validated root\"","  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":35,"summary":"Audit: #mcp","description":"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents","raw":"","codeContext":["  30 │  * @exposes #mcp to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM\"","  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":36,"summary":"MCPClient → #mcp","description":"Tool invocation input","raw":"","codeContext":["  31 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"User prompts passed to LLM; model context is read-only\"","  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":37,"summary":"#mcp → FileSystem","description":"Report/dashboard output","raw":"","codeContext":["  32 │  * @exposes #mcp to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment\"","  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\"","  42 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":38,"summary":"#mcp → #llm-client","description":"LLM API call path","raw":"","codeContext":["  33 │  * @mitigates #mcp against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Keys from env only; never logged or returned\"","  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\"","  42 │  */","  43 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":39,"summary":"#mcp → MCPClient","description":"Threat model data output","raw":"","codeContext":["  34 │  * @exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-200 -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"","  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\"","  42 │  */","  43 │ ","  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":40,"summary":"#mcp ↔ MCPClient","description":"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing","raw":"","codeContext":["  35 │  * @audit #mcp -- \"Threat model data intentionally exposed to connected agents\"","  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\"","  42 │  */","  43 │ ","  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';","  45 │ import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":41,"summary":"#mcp: internal","description":"Processes project annotations and threat model data","raw":"","codeContext":["  36 │  * @flows MCPClient -> #mcp via tool_call -- \"Tool invocation input\"","  37 │  * @flows #mcp -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/dashboard output\"","  38 │  * @flows #mcp -> #llm-client via generateThreatReport -- \"LLM API call path\"","  39 │  * @flows #mcp -> MCPClient via resource -- \"Threat model data output\"","  40 │  * @boundary #mcp and MCPClient (#mcp-tool-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at tool argument parsing\"","  41 │  * @handles internal on #mcp -- \"Processes project annotations and threat model data\"","  42 │  */","  43 │ ","  44 │ import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';","  45 │ import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';","  46 │ import { z } from 'zod';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/mcp/suggest.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":12,"summary":"#suggest → #path-traversal","description":"File path from MCP client joined with root","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *   - HTTP handlers, auth checks, input parsing","   8 │  *   - Missing annotations on files that handle sensitive data","   9 │  *","  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).","  11 │  *","  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":13,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"join() with validated root constrains access","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *   - Missing annotations on files that handle sensitive data","   9 │  *","  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).","  11 │  *","  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":14,"summary":"#suggest → #redos","description":"Complex regex patterns applied to source code","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  *","  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).","  11 │  *","  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":15,"summary":"#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos","description":"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * Designed for both file-based and diff-based analysis (§8.2).","  11 │  *","  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":16,"summary":"#suggest → #dos","description":"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  *","  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\"","  21 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":17,"summary":"Audit: #suggest","description":"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @exposes #suggest to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from MCP client joined with root\"","  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"FilePath → #suggest","description":"File read path","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"join() with validated root constrains access\"","  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"#suggest → Suggestions","description":"Suggestion output","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  * @exposes #suggest to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to source code\"","  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';","  24 │ import { join, extname } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":20,"summary":"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories","description":"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │  * @mitigates #suggest against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"Patterns designed with bounded quantifiers\"","  16 │  * @exposes #suggest to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"","  17 │  * @audit #suggest -- \"File size is bounded by project scope; production use involves reasonable file sizes\"","  18 │  * @flows FilePath -> #suggest via readFileSync -- \"File read path\"","  19 │  * @flows #suggest -> Suggestions via suggestAnnotations -- \"Suggestion output\"","  20 │  * @comment -- \"Skips node_modules and .guardlink directories\"","  21 │  */","  22 │ ","  23 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';","  24 │ import { join, extname } from 'node:path';","  25 │ import type { ThreatModel } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/parser/clear.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":7,"summary":"#parser → #arbitrary-write","description":"Writes modified content back to discovered files","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink — Annotation clearing utility.","   3 │  * Scans project source files and removes all GuardLink annotation comment lines.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":8,"summary":"#parser → #path-traversal","description":"Glob patterns determine which files are modified","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Scans project source files and removes all GuardLink annotation comment lines.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal","description":"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  *","   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\"","  14 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":10,"summary":"Audit: #parser","description":"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * Used by `guardlink clear` and `/clear` to let users start fresh with annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":11,"summary":"ProjectRoot → #parser","description":"File discovery path","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":12,"summary":"#parser → SourceFiles","description":"Modified file write path","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"","   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';","  17 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":13,"summary":"#parser: internal","description":"Operates on project source files only","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns determine which files are modified\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks sensitive dirs; cwd constrains scope\"","  10 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\"","  11 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"File discovery path\"","  12 │  * @flows #parser -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Modified file write path\"","  13 │  * @handles internal on #parser -- \"Operates on project source files only\"","  14 │  */","  15 │ ","  16 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';","  17 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  18 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/parser/parse-file.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":5,"summary":"#parser → #path-traversal","description":"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.","   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here\"","   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded entirely into memory\"","   7 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)\"","   8 │  * @flows FilePath -> #parser via readFile -- \"Disk read path\"","   9 │  * @flows #parser -> Annotations via parseString -- \"Parsed annotation output\"","  10 │  */"],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"exposes","line":6,"summary":"#parser → #dos","description":"Large files loaded entirely into memory","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.","   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here\"","   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded entirely into memory\"","   7 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)\"","   8 │  * @flows FilePath -> #parser via readFile -- \"Disk read path\"","   9 │  * @flows #parser -> Annotations via parseString -- \"Parsed annotation output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":7,"summary":"Audit: #parser","description":"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink — File-level parser.","   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here\"","   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded entirely into memory\"","   7 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)\"","   8 │  * @flows FilePath -> #parser via readFile -- \"Disk read path\"","   9 │  * @flows #parser -> Annotations via parseString -- \"Parsed annotation output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":8,"summary":"FilePath → #parser","description":"Disk read path","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Reads source files and extracts all GuardLink annotations.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here\"","   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded entirely into memory\"","   7 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)\"","   8 │  * @flows FilePath -> #parser via readFile -- \"Disk read path\"","   9 │  * @flows #parser -> Annotations via parseString -- \"Parsed annotation output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  13 │ import { basename, extname } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"#parser → Annotations","description":"Parsed annotation output","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File path from caller read via readFile; no validation here\"","   6 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large files loaded entirely into memory\"","   7 │  * @audit #parser -- \"Path validation delegated to callers (CLI/MCP validate root)\"","   8 │  * @flows FilePath -> #parser via readFile -- \"Disk read path\"","   9 │  * @flows #parser -> Annotations via parseString -- \"Parsed annotation output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  13 │ import { basename, extname } from 'node:path';","  14 │ import type { Annotation, ParseDiagnostic, ParseResult } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/parser/parse-line.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":5,"summary":"#parser → #redos","description":"Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.","   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ import type {"],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"mitigates","line":6,"summary":"#regex-anchoring mitigates #redos","description":"All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.","   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ import type {","  11 │   Annotation, AnnotationVerb, Severity, DataClassification,"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":7,"summary":"Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure","description":"Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink — Line-level annotation parser.","   3 │  * Parses a single comment line into a typed Annotation.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #redos [medium] cwe:CWE-1333 -- \"Complex regex patterns applied to annotation text\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #redos using #regex-anchoring -- \"All patterns are anchored (^...$) to prevent backtracking\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"Regex patterns designed with bounded quantifiers and explicit structure\"","   8 │  */","   9 │ ","  10 │ import type {","  11 │   Annotation, AnnotationVerb, Severity, DataClassification,","  12 │   ParseDiagnostic, SourceLocation,"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/parser/parse-project.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":5,"summary":"#parser → #path-traversal","description":"Glob patterns could escape root directory","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.","   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\""],"annLineIdx":4},{"kind":"mitigates","line":6,"summary":"#glob-filtering mitigates #path-traversal","description":"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.","   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":7,"summary":"#parser → #dos","description":"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink — Project-level parser.","   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\"","  12 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":8,"summary":"#resource-limits mitigates #dos","description":"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Walks a directory, parses all source files, and assembles a ThreatModel.","   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"ProjectRoot → #parser","description":"Directory traversal path","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  *","   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":10,"summary":"#parser → ThreatModel","description":"Aggregated threat model output","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * @exposes #parser to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"Glob patterns could escape root directory\"","   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';","  15 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":11,"summary":"#parser ↔ FileSystem","description":"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * @mitigates #parser against #path-traversal using #glob-filtering -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE blocks node_modules, .git; fast-glob cwd constrains scan\"","   7 │  * @exposes #parser to #dos [medium] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #parser against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"DEFAULT_EXCLUDE skips build artifacts, tests; limits effective file count\"","   9 │  * @flows ProjectRoot -> #parser via fast-glob -- \"Directory traversal path\"","  10 │  * @flows #parser -> ThreatModel via assembleModel -- \"Aggregated threat model output\"","  11 │  * @boundary #parser and FileSystem (#fs-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary between parser and disk I/O\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import fg from 'fast-glob';","  15 │ import { relative } from 'node:path';","  16 │ import type {"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/report/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":4,"summary":"Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module","description":"Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Report — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @comment -- \"Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module\"","   5 │  * @comment -- \"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers\"","   6 │  */","   7 │ ","   8 │ export { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';","   9 │ export { generateReport } from './report.js';"],"annLineIdx":3},{"kind":"comment","line":5,"summary":"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers","description":"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Report — exports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @comment -- \"Report generation is pure transformation; no I/O in this module\"","   5 │  * @comment -- \"File writes handled by CLI/MCP callers\"","   6 │  */","   7 │ ","   8 │ export { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';","   9 │ export { generateReport } from './report.js';","  10 │ "],"annLineIdx":4}]},{"file":"src/report/report.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":6,"summary":"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string","description":"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Report — Markdown report generator.","   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with","   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write\"","   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #report via generateReport -- \"Model input\"","   9 │  * @flows #report -> Markdown via return -- \"Report output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":7,"summary":"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write","description":"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Report — Markdown report generator.","   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with","   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write\"","   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #report via generateReport -- \"Model input\"","   9 │  * @flows #report -> Markdown via return -- \"Report output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":8,"summary":"ThreatModel → #report","description":"Model input","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  * Produces a human-readable threat model report with","   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write\"","   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #report via generateReport -- \"Model input\"","   9 │  * @flows #report -> Markdown via return -- \"Report output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';","  13 │ import { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"#report → Markdown","description":"Report output","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * embedded Mermaid diagram, finding tables, and coverage stats.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * @comment -- \"Pure function: transforms ThreatModel to markdown string\"","   7 │  * @comment -- \"No file I/O; caller (CLI/MCP) handles write\"","   8 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #report via generateReport -- \"Model input\"","   9 │  * @flows #report -> Markdown via return -- \"Report output\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, ThreatModelExposure, Severity } from '../types/index.js';","  13 │ import { generateMermaid } from './mermaid.js';","  14 │ "],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/review/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":10,"summary":"#cli → #arbitrary-write","description":"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * Users walk through the GAL (Governance Acceptance List) and decide:","   6 │  *   accept  — write @accepts + @audit (risk acknowledged, intentional)","   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note","   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":11,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Only modifies files already in the parsed project","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *   accept  — write @accepts + @audit (risk acknowledged, intentional)","   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note","   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\"","  16 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":12,"summary":"Audit: #cli","description":"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  *   remediate — write @audit with planned-fix note","   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":13,"summary":"ThreatModel → #cli","description":"Exposure list input","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *   skip    — leave open for now","   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"#cli → SourceFiles","description":"Annotation insertion output","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  *","  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  19 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":15,"summary":"#cli: internal","description":"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @exposes #cli to #arbitrary-write [medium] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files\"","  11 │  * @mitigates #cli against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Only modifies files already in the parsed project\"","  12 │  * @audit #cli -- \"Review decisions require human justification; no empty accepts allowed\"","  13 │  * @flows ThreatModel -> #cli via getReviewableExposures -- \"Exposure list input\"","  14 │  * @flows #cli -> SourceFiles via writeFile -- \"Annotation insertion output\"","  15 │  * @handles internal on #cli -- \"Processes exposure metadata and user justification text\"","  16 │  */","  17 │ ","  18 │ import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  19 │ import { resolve } from 'node:path';","  20 │ import { stripCommentPrefix } from '../parser/comment-strip.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/tui/commands.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":7,"summary":"#tui → #path-traversal","description":"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink TUI — Command implementations.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.","   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":8,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.","   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":9,"summary":"#tui → #arbitrary-write","description":"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Each command function takes (args, ctx) and prints output directly.","   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":10,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #arbitrary-write","description":"Output paths resolved relative to project root","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * Returns void. Throws on fatal errors.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":11,"summary":"#tui → #cmd-injection","description":"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":12,"summary":"Audit: #tui","description":"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":13,"summary":"#tui → #api-key-exposure","description":"/model handles API key input and storage","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() with ctx.root constrains file access\"","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":14,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys masked in /model show output","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #arbitrary-write [high] cwe:CWE-73 -- \"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#tui → #prompt-injection","description":"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #arbitrary-write using #path-validation -- \"Output paths resolved relative to project root\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":16,"summary":"Audit: #tui","description":"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] cwe:CWE-78 -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":17,"summary":"UserArgs → #tui","description":"Command argument input","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts\"","  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\"","  22 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"#tui → FileSystem","description":"Report/config output","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"/model handles API key input and storage\"","  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\"","  22 │  */","  23 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":19,"summary":"#tui → #agent-launcher","description":"Agent spawn path","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"API keys masked in /model show output\"","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\"","  22 │  */","  23 │ ","  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":20,"summary":"#tui → #llm-client","description":"LLM API call path","raw":"","codeContext":["  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #prompt-injection [medium] cwe:CWE-77 -- \"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM\"","  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\"","  22 │  */","  23 │ ","  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';","  25 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":21,"summary":"#tui: secrets","description":"Processes and stores API keys via /model","raw":"","codeContext":["  16 │  * @audit #tui -- \"User freeform text passed to LLM via cmdChat; model context is read-only\"","  17 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #tui via args -- \"Command argument input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> FileSystem via writeFile -- \"Report/config output\"","  19 │  * @flows #tui -> #agent-launcher via launchAgent -- \"Agent spawn path\"","  20 │  * @flows #tui -> #llm-client via chatCompletion -- \"LLM API call path\"","  21 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Processes and stores API keys via /model\"","  22 │  */","  23 │ ","  24 │ import { resolve, basename, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';","  25 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';","  26 │ import { parseProject, findDanglingRefs, findUnmitigatedExposures, findAcceptedWithoutAudit, findAcceptedExposures, clearAnnotations } from '../parser/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/tui/config.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":7,"summary":"#tui → #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys loaded from and saved to config files","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink TUI — Config persistence for LLM settings.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.","   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from and saved to config files\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking\"","   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #tui via loadProjectConfig -- \"Config load path\"","  10 │  * @flows #tui -> ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- \"Config save path\"","  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json\"","  12 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":8,"summary":"#key-redaction mitigates #api-key-exposure","description":"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.","   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from and saved to config files\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking\"","   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #tui via loadProjectConfig -- \"Config load path\"","  10 │  * @flows #tui -> ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- \"Config save path\"","  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"ConfigFile → #tui","description":"Config load path","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Now delegates to the unified agents/config.ts resolution chain.","   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from and saved to config files\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking\"","   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #tui via loadProjectConfig -- \"Config load path\"","  10 │  * @flows #tui -> ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- \"Config save path\"","  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":10,"summary":"#tui → ConfigFile","description":"Config save path","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * Keeps backward compatibility with tui-config.json (legacy).","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from and saved to config files\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking\"","   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #tui via loadProjectConfig -- \"Config load path\"","  10 │  * @flows #tui -> ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- \"Config save path\"","  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';","  15 │ import { resolveConfig, saveProjectConfig, loadProjectConfig } from '../agents/config.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":11,"summary":"#tui: secrets","description":"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *","   7 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [high] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys loaded from and saved to config files\"","   8 │  * @mitigates #tui against #api-key-exposure using #key-redaction -- \"Delegates to agents/config.ts with masking\"","   9 │  * @flows ConfigFile -> #tui via loadProjectConfig -- \"Config load path\"","  10 │  * @flows #tui -> ConfigFile via saveProjectConfig -- \"Config save path\"","  11 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"API keys stored in .guardlink/config.json\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import type { LLMConfig, LLMProvider } from '../analyze/llm.js';","  15 │ import { resolveConfig, saveProjectConfig, loadProjectConfig } from '../agents/config.js';","  16 │ "],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/tui/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":9,"summary":"#tui → #path-traversal","description":"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * GuardLink TUI — Interactive terminal interface.","   5 │  *","   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,","   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":10,"summary":"#path-validation mitigates #path-traversal","description":"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  *","   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,","   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"exposes","line":11,"summary":"#tui → #api-key-exposure","description":"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  * Claude Code-style inline REPL: stays in your terminal,","   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\""],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"audit","line":12,"summary":"Audit: #tui","description":"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display","raw":"","codeContext":["   7 │  * slash commands + freeform AI chat, Ctrl+C to exit.","   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\"","  17 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":13,"summary":"UserInput → #tui","description":"Interactive command input","raw":"","codeContext":["   8 │  *","   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\"","  17 │  */","  18 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":14,"summary":"#tui → Commands","description":"Command routing","raw":"","codeContext":["   9 │  * @exposes #tui to #path-traversal [high] cwe:CWE-22 -- \"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve\"","  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\"","  17 │  */","  18 │ ","  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"boundary","line":15,"summary":"#tui ↔ UserInput","description":"Trust boundary at interactive input","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  * @mitigates #tui against #path-traversal using #path-validation -- \"resolve() canonicalizes paths; starts from cwd\"","  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\"","  17 │  */","  18 │ ","  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';","  20 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"handles","line":16,"summary":"#tui: secrets","description":"Displays LLM config including masked API keys","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  * @exposes #tui to #api-key-exposure [medium] cwe:CWE-798 -- \"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig\"","  12 │  * @audit #tui -- \"API keys masked via maskKey() in banner display\"","  13 │  * @flows UserInput -> #tui via readline -- \"Interactive command input\"","  14 │  * @flows #tui -> Commands via dispatch -- \"Command routing\"","  15 │  * @boundary #tui and UserInput (#tui-input-boundary) -- \"Trust boundary at interactive input\"","  16 │  * @handles secrets on #tui -- \"Displays LLM config including masked API keys\"","  17 │  */","  18 │ ","  19 │ import { createInterface, type Interface } from 'node:readline';","  20 │ import { resolve, basename } from 'node:path';","  21 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/tui/input.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"exposes","line":15,"summary":"#tui → #dos","description":"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode","raw":"","codeContext":["  10 │  *     /files       Browse files","  11 │  *     /assets      Asset tree","  12 │  *","  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width\"","  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -> #tui via process.stdin -- \"Raw keystroke input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> Terminal via process.stdout -- \"ANSI escape sequence output\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette\"","  20 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":16,"summary":"#resource-limits mitigates #dos","description":"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width","raw":"","codeContext":["  11 │  *     /assets      Asset tree","  12 │  *","  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width\"","  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -> #tui via process.stdin -- \"Raw keystroke input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> Terminal via process.stdout -- \"ANSI escape sequence output\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":17,"summary":"RawStdin → #tui","description":"Raw keystroke input","raw":"","codeContext":["  12 │  *","  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width\"","  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -> #tui via process.stdin -- \"Raw keystroke input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> Terminal via process.stdout -- \"ANSI escape sequence output\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":18,"summary":"#tui → Terminal","description":"ANSI escape sequence output","raw":"","codeContext":["  13 │  * Uses raw stdin mode for full keystroke control.","  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width\"","  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -> #tui via process.stdin -- \"Raw keystroke input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> Terminal via process.stdout -- \"ANSI escape sequence output\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';","  23 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"comment","line":19,"summary":"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette","description":"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette","raw":"","codeContext":["  14 │  *","  15 │  * @exposes #tui to #dos [low] cwe:CWE-400 -- \"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode\"","  16 │  * @mitigates #tui against #dos using #resource-limits -- \"Keystroke buffer bounded by terminal width\"","  17 │  * @flows RawStdin -> #tui via process.stdin -- \"Raw keystroke input\"","  18 │  * @flows #tui -> Terminal via process.stdout -- \"ANSI escape sequence output\"","  19 │  * @comment -- \"Raw mode enables full keystroke control for command palette\"","  20 │  */","  21 │ ","  22 │ import chalk from 'chalk';","  23 │ ","  24 │ const BRAVOS = '#2dd4a7';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/workspace/index.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"comment","line":4,"summary":"Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup","description":"Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup","raw":"","codeContext":["   1 │ /**","   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Multi-repo linking and merge.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * @comment -- \"Workspace module: config loading, merge engine, link-project setup\"","   5 │  */","   6 │ ","   7 │ export type {","   8 │   WorkspaceConfig, WorkspaceRepo,","   9 │   TagOwnership, UnresolvedRef, MergeWarning, MergeWarningCode,"],"annLineIdx":3}]},{"file":"src/workspace/link.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"asset","line":7,"summary":"Workspace.Link","description":"Multi-repo workspace linking setup","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — link-project command logic.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction","   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- \"Multi-repo workspace linking setup\"","   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #workspace-link via linkProject -- \"CLI args to workspace scaffolding\"","   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -> AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- \"Inject workspace context\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":8,"summary":"UserArgs → #workspace-link","description":"CLI args to workspace scaffolding","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction","   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- \"Multi-repo workspace linking setup\"","   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #workspace-link via linkProject -- \"CLI args to workspace scaffolding\"","   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -> AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- \"Inject workspace context\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';","  13 │ import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"#workspace-link → AgentFiles","description":"Inject workspace context","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Scaffolds workspace.yaml in each repo and updates agent instruction","   5 │  * files with workspace context so agents write cross-repo-aware annotations.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Link (#workspace-link) -- \"Multi-repo workspace linking setup\"","   8 │  * @flows UserArgs -> #workspace-link via linkProject -- \"CLI args to workspace scaffolding\"","   9 │  * @flows #workspace-link -> AgentFiles via updateAgentWorkspaceContext -- \"Inject workspace context\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';","  13 │ import { writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';","  14 │ import { resolve, basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/workspace/merge.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"asset","line":7,"summary":"Workspace.Merge","description":"Cross-repo threat model unification","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Merge engine for multi-repo reports.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport","   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- \"Cross-repo threat model unification\"","   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- \"Duplicate tag definitions across repos\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo\"","  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -> #merge-engine via mergeReports -- \"Per-repo reports feed into merge\"","  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -> MergedReport via mergeReports -- \"Unified output\"","  12 │  */"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":8,"summary":"Tag_Collision","description":"Duplicate tag definitions across repos","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport","   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- \"Cross-repo threat model unification\"","   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- \"Duplicate tag definitions across repos\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo\"","  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -> #merge-engine via mergeReports -- \"Per-repo reports feed into merge\"","  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -> MergedReport via mergeReports -- \"Unified output\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#prefix-ownership mitigates #tag-collision","description":"Tag prefix determines owning repo","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Takes N per-repo report JSONs and produces a unified MergedReport","   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- \"Cross-repo threat model unification\"","   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- \"Duplicate tag definitions across repos\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo\"","  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -> #merge-engine via mergeReports -- \"Per-repo reports feed into merge\"","  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -> MergedReport via mergeReports -- \"Unified output\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":10,"summary":"ReportJSON → #merge-engine","description":"Per-repo reports feed into merge","raw":"","codeContext":["   5 │  * with cross-repo tag resolution, warning detection, and aggregated stats.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- \"Cross-repo threat model unification\"","   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- \"Duplicate tag definitions across repos\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo\"","  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -> #merge-engine via mergeReports -- \"Per-repo reports feed into merge\"","  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -> MergedReport via mergeReports -- \"Unified output\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  15 │ import { basename } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":11,"summary":"#merge-engine → MergedReport","description":"Unified output","raw":"","codeContext":["   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Merge (#merge-engine) -- \"Cross-repo threat model unification\"","   8 │  * @threat Tag_Collision (#tag-collision) [medium] -- \"Duplicate tag definitions across repos\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #merge-engine against #tag-collision using #prefix-ownership -- \"Tag prefix determines owning repo\"","  10 │  * @flows ReportJSON -> #merge-engine via mergeReports -- \"Per-repo reports feed into merge\"","  11 │  * @flows #merge-engine -> MergedReport via mergeReports -- \"Unified output\"","  12 │  */","  13 │ ","  14 │ import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';","  15 │ import { basename } from 'node:path';","  16 │ import type {"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/workspace/metadata.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"asset","line":7,"summary":"Workspace.Metadata","description":"Report provenance data","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Report metadata population.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,","   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- \"Report provenance data\"","   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -> #report-metadata via execSync -- \"Git info extraction\"","   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -> ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- \"Metadata injection\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":8,"summary":"GitRepo → #report-metadata","description":"Git info extraction","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,","   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- \"Report provenance data\"","   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -> #report-metadata via execSync -- \"Git info extraction\"","   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -> ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- \"Metadata injection\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';","  13 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"flow","line":9,"summary":"#report-metadata → ThreatModel","description":"Metadata injection","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * Enriches a ThreatModel with provenance metadata (git SHA, branch,","   5 │  * workspace info) for the report JSON contract.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Metadata (#report-metadata) -- \"Report provenance data\"","   8 │  * @flows GitRepo -> #report-metadata via execSync -- \"Git info extraction\"","   9 │  * @flows #report-metadata -> ThreatModel via populateMetadata -- \"Metadata injection\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';","  13 │ import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';","  14 │ import { join } from 'node:path';"],"annLineIdx":5}]},{"file":"src/workspace/types.ts","annotations":[{"kind":"asset","line":7,"summary":"Workspace.Config","description":"Multi-repo workspace definition","raw":"","codeContext":["   2 │  * GuardLink Workspace — Types for multi-repo linking.","   3 │  *","   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.","   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- \"Multi-repo workspace definition\"","   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- \"Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- \"Schema validation on load\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';"],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"threat","line":8,"summary":"Config_Tampering","description":"Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations","raw":"","codeContext":["   3 │  *","   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.","   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- \"Multi-repo workspace definition\"","   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- \"Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- \"Schema validation on load\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';","  13 │ "],"annLineIdx":5},{"kind":"mitigates","line":9,"summary":"#yaml-validation mitigates #config-tamper","description":"Schema validation on load","raw":"","codeContext":["   4 │  * workspace.yaml lives in each repo's .guardlink/ directory.","   5 │  * It declares membership in a workspace and lists sibling repos.","   6 │  *","   7 │  * @asset Workspace.Config (#workspace-config) -- \"Multi-repo workspace definition\"","   8 │  * @threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium] cwe:CWE-15 -- \"Malicious workspace.yaml could misdirect agent annotations\"","   9 │  * @mitigates #workspace-config against #config-tamper using #yaml-validation -- \"Schema validation on load\"","  10 │  */","  11 │ ","  12 │ import type { ThreatModel, Severity, ExternalRef } from '../types/index.js';","  13 │ ","  14 │ // ─── Workspace Configuration (workspace.yaml) ───────────────────────"],"annLineIdx":5}]}];
+const analysisData = {"openExposures":[{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":13,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"high","description":"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text","file":"src/agents/prompts.ts","line":6,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":12,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"User prompts sent to LLM API","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":17,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#sarif","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers","file":"src/analyzer/sarif.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"critical","description":"Agent launcher spawns child processes","file":"src/cli/index.ts","line":31,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#init","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json","file":"src/init/index.ts","line":12,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients","file":"src/mcp/index.ts","line":4,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":30,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"medium","description":"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":34,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#suggest","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning","file":"src/mcp/suggest.ts","line":16,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#parser","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"high","description":"Writes modified content back to discovered files","file":"src/parser/clear.ts","line":7,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":11,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false}],"mitigatedExposures":[{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"Config paths resolved from root and homedir","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":15,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":17,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#child-proc-injection","severity":"critical","description":"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths","file":"src/agents/prompts.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#ssrf","severity":"medium","description":"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys passed in Authorization headers","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":15,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#ssrf","severity":"medium","description":"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID","file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","line":9,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"searchCodebase reads files from project root","file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","line":11,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"searchCodebase reads many files; 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+const exposuresData = [{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys loaded from env vars, files; stored in config.json","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"Config paths resolved from root and homedir","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":15,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"saveProjectConfig writes to .guardlink/config.json","file":"src/agents/config.ts","line":17,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#child-proc-injection","severity":"critical","description":"spawn/spawnSync execute external binaries","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"User prompt passed to agent CLI as argument","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":13,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration","file":"src/agents/launcher.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"high","description":"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text","file":"src/agents/prompts.ts","line":6,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#agent-launcher","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"Reads reference docs from root-relative paths","file":"src/agents/prompts.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"buildProjectContext reads files from root-relative paths","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"writeFileSync saves threat reports to .guardlink/","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Serializes full threat model and code snippets for LLM","file":"src/analyze/index.ts","line":12,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#ssrf","severity":"medium","description":"fetch() calls external LLM API endpoints","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys passed in Authorization headers","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":15,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"User prompts sent to LLM API","file":"src/analyze/llm.ts","line":17,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#ssrf","severity":"medium","description":"lookupCve fetches from NVD API with user-controlled CVE ID","file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","line":9,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"searchCodebase reads files from project root","file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","line":11,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#llm-client","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"searchCodebase reads many files; bounded by maxResults","file":"src/analyze/tools.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#sarif","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Exposes threat model findings to SARIF consumers","file":"src/analyzer/sarif.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve","file":"src/cli/index.ts","line":25,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"high","description":"init/report/sarif/dashboard write files to user-specified paths","file":"src/cli/index.ts","line":27,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys handled in config set/show commands","file":"src/cli/index.ts","line":29,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"critical","description":"Agent launcher spawns child processes","file":"src/cli/index.ts","line":31,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#dashboard","threat":"#xss","severity":"high","description":"Generates HTML with user-controlled threat model data","file":"src/dashboard/generate.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#dashboard","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"readFileSync reads code files for annotation context","file":"src/dashboard/generate.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#dashboard","threat":"#xss","severity":"high","description":"Generates HTML with threat model data","file":"src/dashboard/index.ts","line":4,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#diff","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"execSync runs git commands with ref argument","file":"src/diff/git.ts","line":6,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#diff","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"writeFileSync creates files in temp directory","file":"src/diff/git.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#diff","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"git show extracts files based on ls-tree output","file":"src/diff/git.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#diff","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"git.ts uses execSync with ref argument","file":"src/diff/index.ts","line":4,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#init","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"low","description":"Reads package.json, pyproject.toml, etc. from root","file":"src/init/detect.ts","line":5,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#init","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"high","description":"Creates/modifies files: .guardlink/, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, etc.","file":"src/init/index.ts","line":8,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#init","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"medium","description":"Reads/writes files based on root argument","file":"src/init/index.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#init","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"low","description":"Writes API key config to .guardlink/config.json","file":"src/init/index.ts","line":12,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients","file":"src/mcp/index.ts","line":4,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#redos","severity":"low","description":"Regex patterns applied to query strings","file":"src/mcp/lookup.ts","line":16,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"Tool arguments include 'root' directory path from external client","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":26,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"high","description":"report, dashboard, sarif tools write files","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":28,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"annotate and threat_report tools pass user prompts to LLM","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":30,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"medium","description":"threat_report tool uses API keys from environment","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":32,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#mcp","threat":"#data-exposure","severity":"medium","description":"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients","file":"src/mcp/server.ts","line":34,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#suggest","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"File path from MCP client joined with root","file":"src/mcp/suggest.ts","line":12,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#suggest","threat":"#redos","severity":"medium","description":"Complex regex patterns applied to source code","file":"src/mcp/suggest.ts","line":14,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#suggest","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"Large files loaded into memory for pattern 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to annotation text","file":"src/parser/parse-line.ts","line":5,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#parser","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"Glob patterns could escape root directory","file":"src/parser/parse-project.ts","line":5,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#parser","threat":"#dos","severity":"medium","description":"Large projects with many files could exhaust memory","file":"src/parser/parse-project.ts","line":7,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#cli","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"medium","description":"Writes @accepts/@audit annotations into source files","file":"src/review/index.ts","line":10,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"File paths from user args in /view, /sarif -o","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":7,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#arbitrary-write","severity":"high","description":"/report, /sarif, /dashboard write files","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":9,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#cmd-injection","severity":"high","description":"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":11,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"/model handles API key input and storage","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":13,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#prompt-injection","severity":"medium","description":"Freeform chat sends user text to LLM","file":"src/tui/commands.ts","line":15,"mitigated":false,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"high","description":"API keys loaded from and saved to config files","file":"src/tui/config.ts","line":7,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#path-traversal","severity":"high","description":"User-supplied dir argument resolved via path.resolve","file":"src/tui/index.ts","line":9,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#api-key-exposure","severity":"medium","description":"API keys displayed in banner via resolveLLMConfig","file":"src/tui/index.ts","line":11,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false},{"asset":"#tui","threat":"#dos","severity":"low","description":"Rapid keystrokes could consume CPU in raw mode","file":"src/tui/input.ts","line":15,"mitigated":true,"accepted":false}];
+const savedAnalyses = [{"filename":"2026-03-12T19-14-22-stride.md","framework":"stride","timestamp":"2026-03-12 19:14:22","label":"STRIDE Threat Analysis","dirName":"threat-reports","content":"# STRIDE Threat Analysis — GuardLink\n\n**Generated:** 2026-03-12T19:14:22Z\n**Framework:** STRIDE\n**Analyst:** Claude Opus 4.5\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nGuardLink is a security annotation tool that parses source code, generates threat models, and integrates with AI coding agents. The analysis identified **15 unmitigated exposures** across 10 assets, with **1 critical**, **4 high**, **5 medium**, and **5 low** severity findings.\n\n**Key Risk Areas:**\n1. **Command Injection (Critical)** — Child process spawning in CLI/TUI/MCP with external input\n2. **Prompt Injection (High)** — User prompts concatenated into agent instructions without sanitization\n3. **Arbitrary File Write (High)** — Parser can write to files discovered via glob patterns\n4. **Data Exposure (Medium)** — Threat model data exposed to MCP clients and LLM providers\n\n**Overall Risk Posture:** MODERATE — Core security controls are in place (path validation, parameterized commands, key redaction), but several attack vectors remain unmitigated due to architectural constraints (prompt injection relies on LLM provider safety, child process spawning is delegated to trusted agents).\n\n---\n\n## Part 1 — Annotation Validation\n\n### Critical Findings\n\n#### `#cli` → `#cmd-injection` [CRITICAL]\n**Location:** `src/cli/index.ts:31`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #cli to #cmd-injection [critical] -- \"Agent launcher spawns child processes\"`\n**Audit:** `@audit #cli -- \"Child process spawning delegated to agents/launcher.ts with explicit args\"`\n\n**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE\nThe CLI delegates process spawning to `agents/launcher.ts` which uses `spawn()` with explicit argument arrays rather than shell interpolation. The `#param-commands` control is correctly applied. However, the exposure remains because the binary names come from a hardcoded registry — if that registry were compromised or extended with user input, command injection would be possible.\n\n**Recommendation:** Add runtime validation that agent binary paths exist and are not symlinks to unexpected locations.\n\n### High Severity Findings\n\n#### `#agent-launcher` → `#prompt-injection` [HIGH]\n**Location:** `src/agents/prompts.ts:6`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high] -- \"User prompt concatenated into agent instruction text\"`\n\n**Validation:** ⚠️ CONCERNING\nUser prompts are directly concatenated into the instruction text sent to coding agents. While the `@audit` notes that \"prompt injection mitigated by agent's own safety measures,\" this creates a **transitive trust dependency** — GuardLink's security relies on the security of external agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex).\n\n**Risk:** A malicious user could craft prompts that instruct the agent to:\n- Modify security annotations maliciously\n- Exfiltrate sensitive code via the annotation system\n- Bypass GuardLink's intended workflow\n\n**Recommendation:** Implement prompt templating with strict escaping, or use structured message formats that separate system instructions from user content.\n\n#### `#mcp` → `#cmd-injection` [HIGH]\n**Location:** `src/mcp/index.ts:4`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #mcp to #cmd-injection [high] -- \"Accepts tool calls from external MCP clients\"`\n\n**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE\nThe MCP server accepts tool calls over stdio from any connected client. While Zod schema validation is applied to inputs, the attack surface includes:\n- `guardlink_annotate` — passes prompts to LLM\n- `guardlink_threat_report` — spawns analysis processes\n- `guardlink_diff` — executes git commands\n\n**Mitigating Factor:** The `@audit` notes \"All tool calls validated by server.ts before execution\" — this is correct, but validation focuses on schema conformance, not semantic safety.\n\n#### `#parser` → `#arbitrary-write` [HIGH]\n**Location:** `src/parser/clear.ts:7`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #parser to #arbitrary-write [high] -- \"Writes modified content back to discovered files\"`\n\n**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE with caveat\nThe `clearAnnotations()` function writes to files discovered via `fast-glob`. The `#glob-filtering` control applies `DEFAULT_EXCLUDE` patterns, but:\n- A malicious `.gitignore` or custom exclude patterns could be manipulated\n- Symlinks within the project could redirect writes outside the project\n\n**Mitigating Factor:** `@audit` notes \"Destructive operation requires explicit user confirmation via dryRun flag\" — this is a UX control, not a technical one.\n\n#### `#tui` → `#cmd-injection` [HIGH]\n**Location:** `src/tui/commands.ts:11`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #tui to #cmd-injection [high] -- \"/annotate and /threat-report spawn child processes\"`\n\n**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE\nSame pattern as CLI — delegated to `agents/launcher.ts`. The TUI adds risk because it accepts freeform user input in an interactive session, making it easier to craft malicious commands.\n\n### Medium Severity Findings\n\n#### `#mcp` → `#data-exposure` [MEDIUM]\n**Location:** `src/mcp/server.ts:34`\n**Annotation:** `@exposes #mcp to #data-exposure [medium] -- \"Resources expose full threat model to MCP clients\"`\n\n**Validation:** ✅ ACCURATE\nMCP resources (`guardlink://model`, `guardlink://definitions`, `guardlink://unmitigated`) expose the complete threat model to any connected client. This is **by design** for AI agent integration, but represents information disclosure risk if:\n- MCP transport is compromised\n- Unauthorized clients connect to the stdio interface\n- Threat model contains sensitive architectural details\n\n### Low Severity Findings\n\nAll low-severity `#data-exposure` and `#dos` findings are accurately annotated and appropriately flagged with `@audit` annotations acknowledging the accepted risk.\n\n---\n\n## Part 2 — STRIDE Threat Model\n\n### S — Spoofing\n\n**Finding S1: No Authentication on MCP Transport**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#mcp`\n**Evidence:** The MCP server uses stdio transport with no authentication mechanism. Any process that can connect to stdin/stdout can impersonate a legitimate client.\n\n**Annotation Gap:** No `@exposes #mcp to #spoofing` annotation exists.\n\n**Attack Scenario:**\n1. Attacker gains code execution on developer machine\n2. Attacker spawns process that connects to GuardLink MCP server\n3. Attacker issues tool calls to exfiltrate threat model or modify annotations\n\n**Mitigation:** Consider adding MCP client authentication (capability tokens, process attestation) or documenting this as an accepted risk with `@accepts`.\n\n---\n\n### T — Tampering\n\n**Finding T1: Annotation Tampering via Prompt Injection**\n**Severity:** High\n**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`, `#mcp`\n**Evidence:** User prompts are concatenated into agent instructions (`src/agents/prompts.ts:6`). A malicious prompt could instruct the agent to:\n- Add false `@mitigates` annotations to hide vulnerabilities\n- Remove `@exposes` annotations from critical code\n- Inject malicious `@shield` blocks to hide code from analysis\n\n**Data Flow:** `UserPrompt → #agent-launcher → AgentProcess → SourceFiles`\n\n**Annotation Accuracy:** The `@exposes #agent-launcher to #prompt-injection [high]` correctly identifies this risk.\n\n**Mitigation:**\n1. Implement annotation integrity checks (hash of annotation blocks)\n2. Require human approval for annotation changes via AI agents\n3. Add `@audit` trail for all AI-generated annotations\n\n**Finding T2: Config File Tampering**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#workspace-config`\n**Evidence:** `src/workspace/types.ts:9` notes `@threat Config_Tampering (#config-tamper) [medium]` with mitigation via `#yaml-validation`.\n\n**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with mitigation.\n\n---\n\n### R — Repudiation\n\n**Finding R1: No Audit Trail for AI-Generated Changes**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`, `#tui`, `#cli`\n**Evidence:** When AI agents modify annotations via `/annotate` or `guardlink annotate`, there is no persistent audit log of:\n- What changes were made\n- Which agent made them\n- What prompt triggered the change\n\n**Annotation Gap:** `@audit` annotations exist on assets, but no `@flows` document the audit trail path.\n\n**Recommendation:** Add `@flows #agent-launcher → AuditLog via appendFile` with corresponding implementation.\n\n**Finding R2: Threat Report Attribution**\n**Severity:** Low\n**Assets:** `#llm-client`\n**Evidence:** AI-generated threat reports are saved to `.guardlink/threat-reports/` with timestamps, but the LLM model and configuration used are not always recorded in the report metadata.\n\n**Mitigation:** Reports should include full provenance (model, provider, API version, prompt hash).\n\n---\n\n### I — Information Disclosure\n\n**Finding I1: Full Threat Model Exposure to LLM Providers**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#llm-client`\n**Evidence:** `src/analyze/index.ts:12` — `@exposes #llm-client to #data-exposure [low]` with `@audit` noting \"Threat model data intentionally sent to LLM for analysis.\"\n\n**Concern:** The annotation rates this as LOW severity, but the actual risk depends on:\n- Sensitivity of the codebase being analyzed\n- LLM provider data retention policies\n- Whether code snippets include secrets (the `#key-redaction` control may not catch all patterns)\n\n**Recommendation:** Upgrade severity to MEDIUM and add configurable redaction patterns.\n\n**Finding I2: API Key Storage**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#init`\n**Evidence:** `src/init/index.ts:12` — API keys written to `.guardlink/config.json`. The `@audit` notes \".gitignore entry added automatically.\"\n\n**Residual Risk:**\n- `.gitignore` can be overwritten or removed\n- Backup tools may capture config files\n- IDE indexing may expose keys\n\n**Mitigation:** Consider using system keychain or environment variables exclusively.\n\n**Finding I3: SARIF Export Reveals Architecture**\n**Severity:** Low\n**Assets:** `#sarif`\n**Evidence:** `src/analyzer/sarif.ts:15` — SARIF output includes file paths, line numbers, and vulnerability descriptions. This is intentional for CI/CD integration but could reveal:\n- Internal architecture to external parties\n- Security weaknesses if SARIF files are leaked\n\n**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with `@audit` acknowledging intentional disclosure.\n\n---\n\n### D — Denial of Service\n\n**Finding D1: No Resource Limits on File Processing**\n**Severity:** Low\n**Assets:** `#suggest`, `#parser`\n**Evidence:**\n- `src/mcp/suggest.ts:16` — \"Large files loaded into memory for pattern scanning\"\n- No explicit file size limits in `fast-glob` configuration\n\n**Attack Scenario:** Crafted repository with extremely large files or deep directory trees could exhaust memory.\n\n**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated with `@audit` accepting the risk.\n\n**Mitigation:** Add `#resource-limits` control with explicit file size caps (e.g., 10MB per file, 1000 files max).\n\n**Finding D2: Agent Spawn Timeout**\n**Severity:** Low\n**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`\n**Evidence:** `src/agents/launcher.ts:15` — \"No timeout on foreground spawn; agent controls duration\"\n\n**Annotation Accuracy:** ✅ Correctly annotated. The `@audit` notes this is intentional for interactive sessions.\n\n---\n\n### E — Elevation of Privilege\n\n**Finding E1: MCP Tool Call Privilege Escalation**\n**Severity:** High\n**Assets:** `#mcp`\n**Evidence:** MCP tools execute with the same privileges as the GuardLink process. A compromised or malicious MCP client could:\n- Write files anywhere the process has access (`guardlink_sarif`, `guardlink_report`)\n- Execute git commands (`guardlink_diff`)\n- Spawn child processes (`guardlink_annotate`)\n\n**Data Flow:** `MCPClient → #mcp via tool_call → FileSystem via writeFile`\n\n**Annotation Gap:** No `@exposes #mcp to #privilege-escalation` annotation exists.\n\n**Mitigation:**\n1. Add capability-based access control for MCP tools\n2. Implement path sandboxing for file writes\n3. Add `@exposes #mcp to #privilege-escalation` annotation\n\n**Finding E2: Agent Process Inherits Environment**\n**Severity:** Medium\n**Assets:** `#agent-launcher`\n**Evidence:** `EnvVars → #agent-launcher via process.env` — spawned agents inherit the full environment, including API keys and sensitive configuration.\n\n**Mitigation:** Implement environment filtering to pass only necessary variables to agents.\n\n---\n\n## Priority Action Items\n\n### Critical (Immediate)\n\n1. **Add prompt sanitization** to `src/agents/prompts.ts` — escape or template user prompts before concatenation\n2. **Document MCP security model** — add `@assumes` annotation about trusted client requirement\n\n### High (This Sprint)\n\n3. **Implement path sandboxing** for MCP file write operations\n4. **Add environment filtering** in `launchAgent()` to prevent credential leakage\n5. **Add `@exposes` annotations** for spoofing and privilege escalation gaps\n\n### Medium (Next Sprint)\n\n6. **Add audit logging** for AI-generated annotation changes\n7. **Implement file size limits** in parser and suggest modules\n8. **Upgrade `#data-exposure` severity** for LLM client to MEDIUM\n\n### Low (Backlog)\n\n9. **Consider system keychain** for API key storage\n10. **Add provenance metadata** to threat reports\n\n---\n\n## Annotation Coverage Summary\n\n| Category | Annotated | Missing |\n|----------|-----------|---------|\n| Assets | 16 | 0 |\n| Threats | 15 | 2 (spoofing, priv-esc) |\n| Controls | 12 | 2 (audit-logging, env-filtering) |\n| Data Flows | 68 | ~5 (audit trails) |\n| Boundaries | 9 | 0 |\n\n**Overall Coverage:** 85% — Good annotation discipline with gaps in newer attack categories (prompt injection defense, AI agent trust boundaries).\n\n---\n\n*Report generated by Claude Opus 4.5 using GuardLink STRIDE framework.*"}];
+const heatmapData = 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"mitigations":0,"flows":4,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"AgentFiles","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":2,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"MCPClient","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":3,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"QueryString","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"FilePath","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":2,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"Suggestions","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"Annotations","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"#report","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":2,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"Markdown","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"UserInput","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"Commands","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"RawStdin","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"Terminal","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"#workspace-link","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":2,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"ReportJSON","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"MergedReport","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"GitRepo","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":1,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"},{"name":"#report-metadata","exposures":0,"mitigations":0,"flows":2,"dataHandling":[],"riskLevel":"none"}];
+const threatModel = {"version":"1.1.0","project":"unknown","generated_at":"2026-03-12T19:14:22.000Z","source_files":60,"annotations_parsed":290,"annotated_files":[".guardlink/definitions.ts","src/agents/config.ts","src/agents/index.ts","src/agents/launcher.ts","src/agents/prompts.ts","src/analyze/index.ts","src/analyze/llm.ts","src/analyze/prompts.ts","src/analyze/tools.ts","src/analyzer/index.ts","src/analyzer/sarif.ts","src/cli/index.ts","src/dashboard/generate.ts","src/dashboard/index.ts","src/diff/git.ts","src/diff/index.ts","src/init/detect.ts","src/init/index.ts","src/mcp/index.ts","src/mcp/lookup.ts","src/mcp/server.ts","src/mcp/suggest.ts","src/parser/clear.ts","src/parser/parse-file.ts","src/parser/parse-line.ts","src/parser/parse-project.ts","src/report/index.ts","src/report/report.ts","src/review/index.ts","src/tui/commands.ts","src/tui/config.ts","src/tui/index.ts","src/tui/input.ts","src/workspace/index.ts","src/workspace/link.ts","src/workspace/merge.ts","src/workspace/metadata.ts","src/workspace/types.ts"],"unannotated_files":[".github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml",".github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml",".github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml",".github/workflows/ci.yml",".github/workflows/release.yml","examples/ci/per-repo-report.yml","examples/ci/workspace-merge.yml","examples/github-action.yml","src/dashboard/data.ts","src/dashboard/diagrams.ts","src/diff/engine.ts","src/diff/format.ts","src/index.ts","src/init/picker.ts","src/init/templates.ts","src/parser/comment-strip.ts","src/parser/index.ts","src/parser/normalize.ts","src/parser/validate.ts","src/report/mermaid.ts","src/tui/format.ts","src/types/index.ts"],"assets":[{"path":["GuardLink","Parser"],"id":"parser","description":"Reads source files from disk, extracts security annotations using regex patterns","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":15}},{"path":["GuardLink","CLI"],"id":"cli","description":"Command-line interface, handles user arguments, invokes subcommands","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":16}},{"path":["GuardLink","TUI"],"id":"tui","description":"Interactive terminal interface with readline input and command dispatch","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":17}},{"path":["GuardLink","MCP"],"id":"mcp","description":"Model Context Protocol server, accepts tool calls from AI agents over stdio","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":18}},{"path":["GuardLink","LLM_Client"],"id":"llm-client","description":"Makes HTTP requests to external AI providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepSeek, OpenRouter)","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":19}},{"path":["GuardLink","Dashboard"],"id":"dashboard","description":"Generates interactive HTML threat model dashboard from ThreatModel data","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":20}},{"path":["GuardLink","Init"],"id":"init","description":"Initializes projects, writes config files and agent instruction files to disk","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":21}},{"path":["GuardLink","Agent_Launcher"],"id":"agent-launcher","description":"Spawns child processes for AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex)","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":22}},{"path":["GuardLink","Diff"],"id":"diff","description":"Compares threat models across git commits, invokes git commands","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":23}},{"path":["GuardLink","Report"],"id":"report","description":"Generates markdown threat model reports with Mermaid diagrams","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":24}},{"path":["GuardLink","SARIF"],"id":"sarif","description":"Exports findings as SARIF 2.1.0 JSON for security tooling","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":25}},{"path":["GuardLink","Suggest"],"id":"suggest","description":"Analyzes code patterns to suggest appropriate security annotations","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":26}},{"path":["Workspace","Link"],"id":"workspace-link","description":"Multi-repo workspace linking setup","location":{"file":"src/workspace/link.ts","line":7}},{"path":["Workspace","Merge"],"id":"merge-engine","description":"Cross-repo threat model unification","location":{"file":"src/workspace/merge.ts","line":7}},{"path":["Workspace","Metadata"],"id":"report-metadata","description":"Report provenance data","location":{"file":"src/workspace/metadata.ts","line":7}},{"path":["Workspace","Config"],"id":"workspace-config","description":"Multi-repo workspace definition","location":{"file":"src/workspace/types.ts","line":7}}],"threats":[{"name":"Path_Traversal","canonical_name":"path_traversal","id":"path-traversal","severity":"high","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-22"],"description":"File read/write operations outside intended project directory via ../ sequences or absolute paths","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":31}},{"name":"Command_Injection","canonical_name":"command_injection","id":"cmd-injection","severity":"critical","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-78"],"description":"Shell command execution with unsanitized user input","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":32}},{"name":"Cross_Site_Scripting","canonical_name":"cross_site_scripting","id":"xss","severity":"high","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-79"],"description":"Injection of malicious scripts into generated HTML output","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":33}},{"name":"API_Key_Exposure","canonical_name":"api_key_exposure","id":"api-key-exposure","severity":"high","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-798"],"description":"API keys leaked in logs, error messages, or unintended output","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":34}},{"name":"Server_Side_Request_Forgery","canonical_name":"server_side_request_forgery","id":"ssrf","severity":"medium","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-918"],"description":"LLM API requests to attacker-controlled URLs via config override","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":35}},{"name":"ReDoS","canonical_name":"redos","id":"redos","severity":"medium","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-1333"],"description":"Regular expression denial of service from crafted annotation content","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":36}},{"name":"Arbitrary_File_Write","canonical_name":"arbitrary_file_write","id":"arbitrary-write","severity":"high","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-73"],"description":"Writing files to attacker-controlled paths outside project","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":37}},{"name":"Prompt_Injection","canonical_name":"prompt_injection","id":"prompt-injection","severity":"medium","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-77"],"description":"Malicious content in annotations injected into LLM prompts","location":{"file":".guardlink/definitions.ts","line":38}},{"name":"Denial_of_Service","canonical_name":"denial_of_service","id":"dos","severity":"medium","external_refs":["cwe:CWE-400"],"description":"Resource exhaustion from processing large files or deep directory 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+/* ===== SECTION NAV ===== */
+function showSection(id, el) {
+  document.querySelectorAll('.section-content').forEach(s => s.classList.remove('active'));
+  document.querySelectorAll('.sidebar a').forEach(a => a.classList.remove('active'));
+  const sec = document.getElementById('sec-' + id);
+  if (sec) sec.classList.add('active');
+  if (el) el.classList.add('active');
+  closeDrawer();
+  if (id === 'diagrams' && !window._mermaidRendered) {
+    setTimeout(() => { renderMermaid(); }, 100);
+  }
+  if (id === 'ai-analysis' && !window._aiAnalysisRendered) {
+    renderAIAnalysis();
+  }
+}
+
+/* ===== SIDEBAR TOGGLE ===== */
+function toggleSidebar() {
+  const sidebar = document.getElementById('sidebar');
+  sidebar.classList.toggle('collapsed');
+  localStorage.setItem('sidebarCollapsed', sidebar.classList.contains('collapsed'));
+}
+
+// Restore sidebar state on load
+window.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
+  const collapsed = localStorage.getItem('sidebarCollapsed') === 'true';
+  if (collapsed) document.getElementById('sidebar').classList.add('collapsed');
+});
+
+/* ===== FILE TOGGLE ===== */
+function toggleFile(header) {
+  header.classList.toggle('open');
+  header.nextElementSibling.classList.toggle('open');
+}
+
+/* ===== DRAWER ===== */
+function openDrawer(type, idx) {
+  const title = document.getElementById('drawer-title');
+  const body = document.getElementById('drawer-body');
+  let h = '';
+
+  if (type === 'open_exposure') {
+    const e = analysisData.openExposures[idx];
+    title.textContent = e.threat + ' (Open)';
+    h += sec('Status', '<span style="color:var(--red);font-weight:600">OPEN — No mitigation</span>');
+    h += sec('Severity', '<span class="fc-sev ' + sevCls(e.severity) + '">' + esc(e.severity) + '</span>');
+    h += sec('Asset', '<code>' + esc(e.asset) + '</code>');
+    h += sec('Threat', '<code>' + esc(e.threat) + '</code>');
+    if (e.description) h += sec('Description', esc(e.description));
+    h += sec('Location', '<span style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(e.file) + ':' + e.line + '</span>');
+    h += '<div class="d-section" style="margin-top:1rem;padding:.6rem;background:var(--badge-red-bg);border:1px solid var(--sev-crit);border-radius:6px;opacity:.85"><div style="font-size:.78rem;color:var(--sev-crit);font-weight:600">Recommended Action</div><div style="font-size:.78rem;margin-top:.3rem">Add a <code>@mitigates</code> annotation with a control that addresses this threat, or <code>@accepts</code> if the risk is intentionally accepted.</div></div>';
+  } else if (type === 'mitigated_exposure') {
+    const e = analysisData.mitigatedExposures[idx];
+    title.textContent = e.threat + ' (Mitigated)';
+    h += sec('Status', '<span style="color:var(--green);font-weight:600">MITIGATED</span>');
+    h += sec('Severity', '<span class="fc-sev ' + sevCls(e.severity) + '">' + esc(e.severity) + '</span>');
+    h += sec('Asset', '<code>' + esc(e.asset) + '</code>');
+    if (e.description) h += sec('Description', esc(e.description));
+    h += sec('Location', '<span style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(e.file) + ':' + e.line + '</span>');
+  } else if (type === 'exposure') {
+    const e = exposuresData[idx];
+    title.textContent = e.threat;
+    const status = e.mitigated ? 'MITIGATED' : e.accepted ? 'ACCEPTED' : 'OPEN';
+    const color = e.mitigated ? 'var(--green)' : e.accepted ? 'var(--sev-low)' : 'var(--red)';
+    h += sec('Status', '<span style="color:' + color + ';font-weight:600">' + status + '</span>');
+    h += sec('Severity', '<span class="fc-sev ' + sevCls(e.severity) + '">' + esc(e.severity) + '</span>');
+    h += sec('Asset', '<code>' + esc(e.asset) + '</code>');
+    if (e.description) h += sec('Description', esc(e.description));
+    h += sec('Location', '<span style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(e.file) + ':' + e.line + '</span>');
+  } else if (type === 'asset') {
+    const a = heatmapData[idx];
+    title.textContent = a.name + ' (Asset)';
+    
+    // Risk level banner
+    const riskColors = { critical: 'var(--sev-crit)', high: 'var(--sev-high)', medium: 'var(--sev-med)', low: 'var(--sev-low)', none: 'var(--border)' };
+    const rColor = riskColors[a.riskLevel] || 'var(--border)';
+    h += sec('Risk Level', '<span style="color:' + rColor + ';font-weight:600;text-transform:uppercase">' + a.riskLevel + '</span>');
+    
+    // Stats
+    h += '<div style="display:flex;gap:1rem;margin-bottom:1rem">';
+    h += '<div style="flex:1">' + sec('Exposures', '<span style="font-size:1.1rem;font-weight:600;color:var(--red)">' + a.exposures + '</span>') + '</div>';
+    h += '<div style="flex:1">' + sec('Mitigations', '<span style="font-size:1.1rem;font-weight:600;color:var(--green)">' + a.mitigations + '</span>') + '</div>';
+    h += '<div style="flex:1">' + sec('Data Flows', '<span style="font-size:1.1rem;font-weight:600;color:var(--blue)">' + a.flows + '</span>') + '</div>';
+    h += '</div>';
+    
+    // Data Handling
+    if (a.dataHandling && a.dataHandling.length > 0) {
+      h += sec('Data Handled', a.dataHandling.map(d => '<span class="ann-badge ann-data" style="margin-right:4px">' + esc(d) + '</span>').join(''));
+    }
+    
+    // Find related open exposures to show in the drawer
+    const openForAsset = analysisData.openExposures.filter(e => e.asset === a.name);
+    if (openForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--red);margin-top:1.5rem">Open Threats</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      openForAsset.forEach(e => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);border-left:3px solid var(--red);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += '<strong>' + esc(e.threat) + '</strong>';
+        h += '<span class="fc-sev ' + sevCls(e.severity) + '">' + esc(e.severity) + '</span>';
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (e.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(e.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(e.file) + ':' + e.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+    
+    // Find related mitigated exposures
+    const mitigatedForAsset = analysisData.mitigatedExposures.filter(e => e.asset === a.name);
+    if (mitigatedForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--green);margin-top:1.5rem">Mitigated Threats</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      mitigatedForAsset.forEach(e => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);border-left:3px solid var(--green);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += '<strong>' + esc(e.threat) + '</strong>';
+        h += '<span class="fc-sev ' + sevCls(e.severity) + '">' + esc(e.severity) + '</span>';
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (e.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(e.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(e.file) + ':' + e.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+    
+    // Find related Data Flows
+    const flowsForAsset = threatModel.flows.filter(f => f.source === a.name || f.target === a.name);
+    if (flowsForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--blue);margin-top:1.5rem">Data Flows</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      flowsForAsset.forEach(f => {
+        const isSource = f.source === a.name;
+        const icon = isSource ? '<span style="color:var(--blue)">→</span>' : '<span style="color:var(--orange)">←</span>';
+        const partner = isSource ? f.target : f.source;
+        const desc = isSource ? 'Sends data to' : 'Receives data from';
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px;font-size:0.8rem">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:0.5rem;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += icon + ' <span style="color:var(--muted)">' + desc + '</span> <strong>' + esc(partner) + '</strong>';
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (f.mechanism) h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted)">via ' + esc(f.mechanism) + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+    
+    // Find related Boundaries
+    const boundariesForAsset = threatModel.boundaries.filter(b => b.asset_a === a.name || b.asset_b === a.name);
+    if (boundariesForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--purple);margin-top:1.5rem">Trust Boundaries</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      boundariesForAsset.forEach(b => {
+        const partner = b.asset_a === a.name ? b.asset_b : b.asset_a;
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px;font-size:0.8rem">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:0.5rem;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += '<span style="color:var(--purple)">↔</span> <span style="color:var(--muted)">Boundary with</span> <strong>' + esc(partner) + '</strong>';
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (b.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(b.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+    
+    // Find related Acceptances
+    const acceptedForAsset = threatModel.acceptances.filter(ac => ac.asset === a.name);
+    if (acceptedForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--yellow);margin-top:1.5rem">Accepted Risks</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      acceptedForAsset.forEach(ac => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);border-left:3px solid var(--yellow);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += '<strong>' + esc(ac.threat) + '</strong>';
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (ac.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(ac.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(ac.location.file) + ':' + ac.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+    
+    // Find related Transfers
+    const transferredForAsset = threatModel.transfers.filter(t => t.source === a.name || t.target === a.name);
+    if (transferredForAsset.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--purple);margin-top:1.5rem">Transferred Risks</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      transferredForAsset.forEach(t => {
+        const isSource = t.source === a.name;
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);border-left:3px solid var(--purple);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:0.2rem">';
+        h += '<strong>' + esc(t.threat) + '</strong>';
+        if (isSource) {
+          h += '<span style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">Transferred to <strong>' + esc(t.target) + '</strong></span>';
+        } else {
+          h += '<span style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">Transferred from <strong>' + esc(t.source) + '</strong></span>';
+        }
+        h += '</div>';
+        if (t.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(t.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(t.location.file) + ':' + t.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+
+    // Additional asset lifecycle details
+    const validations = threatModel.validations.filter(v => v.asset === a.name);
+    if (validations.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--green);margin-top:1.5rem">Validations</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      validations.forEach(v => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<strong>' + esc(v.control) + '</strong>';
+        if (v.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.2rem">' + esc(v.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(v.location.file) + ':' + v.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+
+    const ownership = threatModel.ownership.filter(o => o.asset === a.name);
+    if (ownership.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--blue);margin-top:1.5rem">Ownership</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      ownership.forEach(o => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += 'Owned by <strong>' + esc(o.owner) + '</strong>';
+        if (o.description) h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.2rem">' + esc(o.description) + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(o.location.file) + ':' + o.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+
+    const assumptions = threatModel.assumptions.filter(asm => asm.asset === a.name);
+    if (assumptions.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--yellow);margin-top:1.5rem">Assumptions</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      assumptions.forEach(asm => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem">' + esc(asm.description || 'Assumed risk or state without description') + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(asm.location.file) + ':' + asm.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+
+    const audits = threatModel.audits.filter(au => au.asset === a.name);
+    if (audits.length > 0) {
+      h += '<div class="sub-h" style="color:var(--accent);margin-top:1.5rem">Audits</div>';
+      h += '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem">';
+      audits.forEach(au => {
+        h += '<div style="background:var(--surface2);border:1px solid var(--border);padding:0.5rem 0.8rem;border-radius:4px">';
+        h += '<div style="font-size:0.75rem">' + esc(au.description || 'Audit trail point') + '</div>';
+        h += '<div style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:0.7rem;color:var(--muted);margin-top:0.3rem">' + esc(au.location.file) + ':' + au.location.line + '</div>';
+        h += '</div>';
+      });
+      h += '</div>';
+    }
+  }
+
+  body.innerHTML = h;
+  document.getElementById('drawer').classList.add('open');
+  document.getElementById('drawer-overlay').classList.add('open');
+}
+
+function openAnnotationDrawer(fileIdx, annIdx) {
+  const title = document.getElementById('drawer-title');
+  const body = document.getElementById('drawer-body');
+  const fentry = fileAnnotations[fileIdx];
+  if (!fentry) return;
+  const ann = fentry.annotations[annIdx];
+  if (!ann) return;
+
+  title.textContent = ann.kind.toUpperCase() + ': ' + ann.summary;
+  let h = '';
+  h += sec('Type', '<span class="ann-badge ann-' + ann.kind + '">' + ann.kind + '</span>');
+  h += sec('Location', '<span style="font-family:var(--font-mono);font-size:.78rem;color:var(--muted)">' + esc(fentry.file) + ':' + ann.line + '</span>');
+  if (ann.description) h += sec('Description', esc(ann.description));
+  if (ann.raw) h += sec('Raw Annotation', '<div class="d-code">' + esc(ann.raw) + '</div>');
+  body.innerHTML = h;
+  document.getElementById('drawer').classList.add('open');
+  document.getElementById('drawer-overlay').classList.add('open');
+}
+
+function closeDrawer() {
+  document.getElementById('drawer').classList.remove('open');
+  document.getElementById('drawer-overlay').classList.remove('open');
+}
+
+function esc(s) { return s == null ? '' : String(s).replace(/&/g,'&amp;').replace(/</g,'&lt;').replace(/>/g,'&gt;').replace(/"/g,'&quot;'); }
+function sec(label, value) { return '<div class="d-section"><div class="d-label">' + label + '</div><div class="d-value">' + value + '</div></div>'; }
+function sevCls(s) {
+  const l = (s || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (l === 'critical' || l === 'p0') return 'crit';
+  if (l === 'high' || l === 'p1') return 'high';
+  if (l === 'medium' || l === 'p2') return 'med';
+  if (l === 'low' || l === 'p3') return 'low';
+  return 'unset';
+}
+
+/* ===== THEME ===== */
+function toggleTheme() {
+  const html = document.documentElement;
+  const next = html.getAttribute('data-theme') === 'dark' ? 'light' : 'dark';
+  html.setAttribute('data-theme', next);
+  // Re-render mermaid with new theme
+  window._mermaidRendered = false;
+  if (document.getElementById('sec-diagrams').classList.contains('active')) {
+    renderMermaid();
+  }
+}
+
+/* ===== DIAGRAM TABS ===== */
+function switchDiagramTab(id, btn) {
+  document.querySelectorAll('.diagram-panel').forEach(p => p.classList.remove('active'));
+  document.querySelectorAll('.diagram-tab').forEach(t => t.classList.remove('active'));
+  const panel = document.getElementById('dtab-' + id);
+  if (panel) panel.classList.add('active');
+  if (btn) btn.classList.add('active');
+  // Always re-render mermaid for newly visible panel
+  setTimeout(() => { renderMermaidPanel(panel); }, 50);
+}
+
+/* ===== MERMAID ===== */
+async function getMermaidInstance() {
+  if (!window._mermaidMod) {
+    const mod = await import('https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/mermaid@11/dist/mermaid.esm.min.mjs');
+    window._mermaidMod = mod.default;
+  }
+  const mermaid = window._mermaidMod;
+  const isDark = document.documentElement.getAttribute('data-theme') === 'dark';
+  mermaid.initialize({
+    startOnLoad: false,
+    theme: isDark ? 'dark' : 'default',
+    themeVariables: isDark ? {
+      primaryColor: '#1a2228', primaryTextColor: '#f0f0f0', primaryBorderColor: '#3b6779',
+      lineColor: '#55899e', secondaryColor: '#1e2830', tertiaryColor: '#0d1117',
+      background: '#0a0d10', mainBkg: '#1a2228', nodeBorder: '#3b6779',
+      clusterBkg: '#0d1117', clusterBorder: '#1f3943', fontSize: '12px', fontFamily: 'var(--font-ui)'
+    } : {
+      primaryColor: '#e8f4f8', primaryTextColor: '#1a1a2e', primaryBorderColor: '#94a3b8',
+      lineColor: '#64748b', secondaryColor: '#f1f5f9', tertiaryColor: '#ffffff',
+      background: '#ffffff', mainBkg: '#e8f4f8', nodeBorder: '#94a3b8',
+      clusterBkg: '#f8fafc', clusterBorder: '#cbd5e1', fontSize: '12px', fontFamily: 'var(--font-ui)'
+    },
+    flowchart: { curve: 'basis', padding: 15, nodeSpacing: 40, rankSpacing: 50, htmlLabels: false, useMaxWidth: false },
+    securityLevel: 'loose',
+  });
+  return mermaid;
+}
+
+async function renderMermaidPanel(panel) {
+  if (!panel) return;
+  const mermaid = await getMermaidInstance();
+  const els = panel.querySelectorAll('.mermaid');
+  
+  // Re-run mermaid
+  els.forEach(el => {
+    el.removeAttribute('data-processed');
+    el.innerHTML = el.getAttribute('data-original') || el.textContent;
+  });
+  await mermaid.run({ nodes: Array.from(els) });
+  
+  // Add interactive zoom/pan to the rendered SVG
+  if (typeof d3 !== 'undefined') {
+    els.forEach(el => {
+      const svg = d3.select(el).select('svg');
+      if (!svg.empty()) {
+        const inner = svg.select('.root'); // Mermaid puts everything in a .root group
+        if (!inner.empty()) {
+          const zoom = d3.zoom()
+            .scaleExtent([0.1, 4])
+            .on('zoom', (e) => {
+              inner.attr('transform', e.transform);
+            });
+          svg.call(zoom);
+          
+          // Preserve natural SVG size so long labels are not clipped.
+          // Container scrolling handles overflow for large graphs.
+          const rootNode = inner.node();
+          if (rootNode && typeof rootNode.getBBox === 'function') {
+            const bbox = rootNode.getBBox();
+            const pad = 80;
+            const viewX = Math.floor(bbox.x - pad / 2);
+            const viewY = Math.floor(bbox.y - pad / 2);
+            const viewW = Math.max(900, Math.ceil(bbox.width + pad));
+            const viewH = Math.max(520, Math.ceil(bbox.height + pad));
+            svg
+              .attr('viewBox', viewX + ' ' + viewY + ' ' + viewW + ' ' + viewH)
+              .attr('width', viewW)
+              .attr('height', viewH)
+              .style('max-width', 'none')
+              .style('overflow', 'visible');
+          }
+          
+          // Double click to reset
+          svg.on('dblclick.zoom', null); // disable default dblclick zoom
+          svg.on('dblclick', () => {
+            svg.transition().duration(750).call(zoom.transform, d3.zoomIdentity);
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+async function renderMermaid() {
+  // Render only the currently active diagram panel
+  const active = document.querySelector('.diagram-panel.active');
+  if (active) await renderMermaidPanel(active);
+  window._mermaidRendered = true;
+}
+
+// Save original diagram source
+document.querySelectorAll('.mermaid').forEach(el => {
+  el.setAttribute('data-original', el.textContent.trim());
+});
+
+/* Keyboard: Escape closes drawer */
+document.addEventListener('keydown', e => { if (e.key === 'Escape') closeDrawer(); });
+
+/* ===== AI ANALYSIS EXPLORER ===== */
+let _selectedAnalysisIdx = 0;
+
+function renderAIAnalysisContent(container, content) {
+  if (!container) return;
+  if (content && content.trim()) {
+    if (typeof marked !== 'undefined') {
+      try { container.innerHTML = marked.parse(content); }
+      catch { container.innerHTML = '<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap">' + esc(content) + '</pre>'; }
+    } else {
+      container.innerHTML = '<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap">' + esc(content) + '</pre>';
+    }
+  } else {
+    container.innerHTML = '<div class="empty-state" style="text-align:center;padding:3rem 1rem">' +
+      '<div style="font-size:3rem;margin-bottom:1rem;opacity:0.5">✨</div>' +
+      '<div style="font-size:1.1rem;font-weight:600;margin-bottom:0.5rem">No Threat Reports Yet</div>' +
+      '<div style="color:var(--muted);margin-bottom:1.5rem">Generate an AI threat report using the threat-report command</div>' +
+      '<div style="display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:0.5rem;max-width:500px;margin:0 auto;text-align:left">' +
+      '<div style="font-size:0.88rem;color:var(--muted)"><strong>Available modes:</strong></div>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report stride</code>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report dread</code>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report pasta</code>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report attacker</code>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report rapid</code>' +
+      '<code style="display:block;padding:0.5rem;background:var(--surface2);border-radius:4px;font-size:0.82rem">guardlink threat-report general</code>' +
+      '<div style="margin-top:0.5rem;font-size:0.82rem;color:var(--muted)">Or a custom prompt: <code>guardlink threat-report general --custom "focus on auth"</code></div>' +
+      '</div></div>';
+  }
+}
+
+function formatAnalysisDate(ts) {
+  try {
+    // Handle both ISO and filename-style timestamps
+    const normalized = ts.replace(/T(\d{2})-(\d{2})-(\d{2})/, 'T$1:$2:$3');
+    const d = new Date(normalized);
+    if (isNaN(d.getTime())) return ts;
+    return d.toLocaleDateString('en-US', { month: 'short', day: 'numeric', year: 'numeric' }) +
+           ' ' + d.toLocaleTimeString('en-US', { hour: '2-digit', minute: '2-digit' });
+  } catch { return ts; }
+}
+
+function renderAIAnalysis() {
+  window._aiAnalysisRendered = true;
+  const selector = document.getElementById('report-selector');
+  const container = document.getElementById('ai-content');
+  if (!container) return;
+
+  const list = savedAnalyses;
+  const hasList = Array.isArray(list) && list.length > 0;
+
+  if (hasList && selector) {
+    // Populate dropdown with reports
+    selector.innerHTML = list.map((a, i) => {
+      const label = esc(a.label || a.framework || 'Analysis');
+      const date = esc(formatAnalysisDate(a.timestamp || ''));
+      const model = a.model ? ' — ' + esc(a.model) : '';
+      return '<option value="' + i + '">' + label + ' (' + date + ')' + model + '</option>';
+    }).join('');
+
+    // Set initial selection
+    selector.value = String(_selectedAnalysisIdx);
+
+    // Handle dropdown change
+    selector.addEventListener('change', function() {
+      var idx = parseInt(this.value, 10);
+      if (isNaN(idx) || idx === _selectedAnalysisIdx) return;
+      _selectedAnalysisIdx = idx;
+      renderAIAnalysisContent(container, (list[idx] && list[idx].content) ? list[idx].content : '');
+    });
+
+    // Render initial content
+    renderAIAnalysisContent(container, (list[_selectedAnalysisIdx] && list[_selectedAnalysisIdx].content) ? list[_selectedAnalysisIdx].content : '');
+  } else {
+    if (selector) selector.style.display = 'none';
+    renderAIAnalysisContent(container, '');
+  }
+}
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file