INDIANA/CITATION.cff at master · Chair-for-Security-Engineering/INDIANA · GitHub

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# This CITATION.cff file was generated with cffinit.
# Visit https://bit.ly/cffinit to generate yours today!

cff-version: 1.2.0
title: INDIANA
message: >-
  Verifying (Random) Probing Security through
  Indistinguishability Analysis
type: software
authors:
  - given-names: Jan
    family-names: Richter-Brockmann
    email: jan.richter-brockmann@rub.de
    affiliation: Ruhr University Bochum
    orcid: 'https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8454-4755'
  - given-names: Pascal
    family-names: Sasdrich
    email: pascal.sasdrich@rub.de
    affiliation: Ruhr University Bochum
    orcid: 'https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5443-626X'
identifiers:
  - type: url
    value: 'https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/833.pdf'
    description: Extended version of the paper.
repository-code: >-
  https://github.com/Chair-for-Security-Engineering/INDIANA/tree/master
abstract: >-
  While masking is a widely used defense against passive
  side-channel attacks, its secure implementation in
  hardware continues to be a manual, complex, and
  error-prone process.

  This paper introduces INDIANA, a comprehensive security
  verification methodology for hardware masking. Our results
  include a hardware verification tool, enabling a complete
  analysis of simulation-based security in the
  glitch-extended probing model and intra-cycle estimations
  for leakage probabilities in the random probing model.
  Notably, INDIANA is the first framework to analyze
  arbitrary masked circuits in both models, even at the
  scale of full SPN cipher rounds (e.g., AES), while
  delivering exact verification results. To achieve accurate
  and comprehensive verification, we propose a partitionable
  probing distinguisher that allows for fast validation of
  probe tuples, surpassing current methods that rely on
  statistical independence. Furthermore, our approach
  naturally supports extensions to the random probing model
  by utilizing Fast Fourier-Hadamard Transformations (FHTs).

  Benchmark results show that INDIANA competes effectively
  with leading probing model verification tools, such as
  ironMask, maskVerif, and VERICA. INDIANA is also the first
  tool that is capable to provide intracycle estimations of
  random probing leakage probabilities for large-scale
  masked circuits.
keywords:
  - Indistinguishability Analysis
  - Side-Channel Analysis
  - Probing Security
  - Random Probing Security
  - Security Verification