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+# Codebase Audit & Stub Completion Design
+
+## Goal
+
+Complete all stubbed/incomplete code in the workflow engine, implement DockerSandbox for secure container execution, and build realistic test scenarios for plugins with zero coverage.
+
+## Audit Summary
+
+### Stubs Found in Core Engine (3 items)
+
+| File | Step Type | Issue |
+|------|-----------|-------|
+| `module/pipeline_step_scan_sast.go` | step.scan_sast | Returns `ErrNotImplemented` |
+| `module/pipeline_step_scan_container.go` | step.scan_container | Returns `ErrNotImplemented` |
+| `module/pipeline_step_scan_deps.go` | step.scan_deps | Returns `ErrNotImplemented` |
+
+**Root cause**: Blocked on `sandbox.DockerSandbox` which doesn't exist. These steps have scanning logic inline in the core engine — wrong architecture. Scanning should be delegated to plugins via a provider interface.
+
+### External Plugins — All Fully Implemented
+
+Deep audits confirmed all plugin code is production-ready:
+- **workflow-plugin-supply-chain**: 4 steps + 6 modules (Trivy, Grype, Snyk, ECR, GCP)
+- **workflow-plugin-data-protection**: 3 steps + 4 modules (regex, GCP DLP, AWS Macie, Presidio)
+- **workflow-plugin-github**: 3 steps + 1 module (41 tests, real GitHub API client)
+- All other plugins: bento, authz, payments, waf, security, sandbox — fully implemented
+
+### Missing: DockerSandbox
+
+`workflow-plugin-sandbox` provides WASM execution + goroutine guards but no Docker container isolation. A `sandbox.docker` module is needed for secure container execution (used by CI/CD steps, scan steps, etc.).
+
+### Scenario Coverage Gaps
+
+8 plugins with zero scenario coverage: authz, payments, github, waf, security, sandbox, supply-chain, data-protection.
+
+## Architecture
+
+### Part 1A: Security Scanner Provider Interface
+
+The core engine defines a `SecurityScannerProvider` interface. Scan steps delegate to whichever plugin registers as provider.
+
+```go
+// In module/scan_provider.go
+type SecurityScannerProvider interface {
+    // ScanSAST runs static analysis on source code.
+    ScanSAST(ctx context.Context, opts SASTScanOpts) (*ScanResult, error)
+    // ScanContainer scans a container image for vulnerabilities.
+    ScanContainer(ctx context.Context, opts ContainerScanOpts) (*ScanResult, error)
+    // ScanDeps scans dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
+    ScanDeps(ctx context.Context, opts DepsScanOpts) (*ScanResult, error)
+}
+
+type ScanResult struct {
+    Passed       bool
+    Findings     []ScanFinding
+    Summary      map[string]int  // severity -> count
+    OutputFormat string          // sarif, json, table
+    RawOutput    string
+}
+
+type ScanFinding struct {
+    ID          string  // CVE-2024-1234
+    Severity    string  // critical, high, medium, low, info
+    Title       string
+    Description string
+    Package     string
+    Version     string
+    FixVersion  string
+    Location    string  // file path or image layer
+}
+```
+
+The 3 scan steps become thin wrappers:
+1. Look up `SecurityScannerProvider` from service registry
+2. Call the appropriate method
+3. Evaluate severity gate (fail_on_severity)
+4. Return structured results
+
+### Part 1B: DockerSandbox Module
+
+Add `sandbox.docker` to the existing `workflow-plugin-sandbox`. Provides secure container execution:
+
+```yaml
+modules:
+  - name: docker-sandbox
+    type: sandbox.docker
+    config:
+      maxCPU: "1.0"           # CPU limit
+      maxMemory: "512m"       # Memory limit
+      networkMode: "none"     # No network by default
+      readOnlyRootfs: true    # Immutable filesystem
+      noPrivileged: true      # Never allow --privileged
+      allowedImages:          # Whitelist of allowed images
+        - "semgrep/semgrep:*"
+        - "aquasec/trivy:*"
+        - "anchore/grype:*"
+      timeout: "5m"           # Max execution time
+```
+
+Interface:
+```go
+type DockerSandbox interface {
+    Run(ctx context.Context, opts DockerRunOpts) (*DockerRunResult, error)
+}
+
+type DockerRunOpts struct {
+    Image      string
+    Command    []string
+    Env        map[string]string
+    Mounts     []Mount          // Read-only bind mounts
+    WorkDir    string
+    NetworkMode string          // "none", "bridge" (not "host")
+}
+```
+
+Uses Docker Engine API client (`github.com/docker/docker/client`), NOT `os/exec` with `docker run` (which can be shell-injected).
+
+### Part 1C: Security Scanner Plugin
+
+Create `workflow-plugin-security-scanner` (public, Apache-2.0) that:
+1. Implements `SecurityScannerProvider` interface
+2. Provides `security.scanner` module type
+3. Supports backends: semgrep (SAST), trivy (container + deps), grype (deps)
+4. Optionally uses DockerSandbox for isolated execution when available
+5. Falls back to direct CLI execution when DockerSandbox isn't configured
+6. Includes `mock` mode for testing without real tools
+
+### Part 2: Public Scenarios (workflow-scenarios)
+
+| # | Scenario | Plugin | Tests | Verification |
+|---|----------|--------|-------|-------------|
+| 46 | github-cicd | workflow-plugin-github | Webhook HMAC validation, action trigger/status, check runs | Verify payload parsing, signature validation, event filtering |
+| 47 | authz-rbac | workflow-plugin-authz | Casbin policy CRUD, role enforcement, deny access | Verify policy creates, role assigns, access denied returns 403 |
+| 48 | payment-processing | workflow-plugin-payments | Charge, capture, refund, subscription lifecycle | Verify amounts, status transitions, webhook handling |
+| 49 | security-scanning | Core + scanner plugin | SAST, container scan, dependency scan | Verify findings count, severity filtering, pass/fail gate |
+
+### Part 3: Private Scenarios (workflow-scenarios-private)
+
+| # | Scenario | Plugin | Tests | Verification |
+|---|----------|--------|-------|-------------|
+| 01 | waf-protection | workflow-plugin-waf | Input sanitization, IP check, WAF evaluate | Verify blocked requests return 403, clean requests pass |
+| 02 | mfa-encryption | workflow-plugin-security | TOTP enroll/verify, AES encrypt/decrypt | Verify TOTP codes validate, encrypted != plaintext, decrypt == original |
+| 03 | wasm-sandbox | workflow-plugin-sandbox | WASM exec, goroutine guards | Verify WASM output, resource limits enforced |
+| 04 | data-protection | workflow-plugin-data-protection | PII detect, data mask, classify | Verify PII found in test data, masked values differ, classifications correct |
+| 05 | supply-chain | workflow-plugin-supply-chain | Signature verify, vuln scan, SBOM | Verify signature validation, finding counts, SBOM component counts |
+
+### Scenario Design Principles
+
+Every test script uses `jq` for JSON validation:
+```bash
+# Good: verify specific field values
+RESULT=$(curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/scan" -d '{"target":"test-image:v1"}')
+PASSED=$(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.passed')
+SEVERITY=$(echo "$RESULT" | jq -r '.summary.critical')
+[ "$PASSED" = "false" ] && [ "$SEVERITY" -gt 0 ] && echo "PASS: scan detected critical vulns" || echo "FAIL: expected critical findings"
+
+# Bad: just check HTTP status
+curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$BASE_URL/api/scan" | grep -q "200" && echo "PASS"
+```
+
+Tests must verify:
+1. **Data transforms** — output values match expected transformations
+2. **State changes** — persistence confirmed by reading back after writing
+3. **Enforcement** — denied/blocked requests fail with proper error codes (403, 400)
+4. **Error paths** — invalid inputs return descriptive error messages
+
+## Implementation Order
+
+1. **Part 1A**: SecurityScannerProvider interface in core engine
+2. **Part 1B**: DockerSandbox module in workflow-plugin-sandbox
+3. **Part 1C**: Security scanner plugin implementing the provider
+4. **Part 1 wiring**: Update core scan steps to delegate to provider
+5. **Part 2**: Public scenarios 46-49
+6. **Part 3**: Private scenarios repo + scenarios 01-05
+
+## Out of Scope
+
+- Real cloud API integration tests (need credentials)
+- `cache.modular` interface gap (needs modular framework changes)
+- Phase 5 architecture refactoring (separate effort)
+- Documentation updates (separate effort)