diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index d85cb02..c0bd84a 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ interface HeaderFinding {
 | Header | Max Points | Key Checks |
 |---|---|---|
 | Strict-Transport-Security | 20 | max-age ≥ 1 year, includeSubDomains, preload |
-| Content-Security-Policy | 30 | presence, no unsafe-inline/eval, no wildcards, form-action set |
+| Content-Security-Policy | 30 | presence, no unsafe-inline/eval, no wildcards, form-action/base-uri/object-src fallback set |
 | X-Frame-Options | 15 | DENY or SAMEORIGIN (or CSP frame-ancestors) |
 | X-Content-Type-Options | 10 | nosniff |
 | Referrer-Policy | 10 | strict values only |
diff --git a/src/rules.ts b/src/rules.ts
index 779cf09..009c433 100644
--- a/src/rules.ts
+++ b/src/rules.ts
@@ -138,6 +138,16 @@ export function checkCSP(headers: RawHeaders): HeaderFinding {
     findings.push("No base-uri directive — <base> injection can redirect relative nonce sources (base-uri does not inherit from default-src)");
     recommendations.push("Add base-uri 'self' or base-uri 'none' to prevent <base> injection");
   }
+  // object-src DOES inherit from default-src, but only when default-src is
+  // actually set. If neither is present, <object>/<embed> plugin content is
+  // completely unrestricted — a legacy but still-audited XSS vector — and every
+  // other fetch directive not explicitly listed (img-src, media-src, connect-src,
+  // etc.) also silently defaults to allow-all with no default-src to fall back to.
+  if (extractCspDirective(raw, 'default-src') === undefined && extractCspDirective(raw, 'object-src') === undefined) {
+    score -= 2;
+    findings.push('No default-src or object-src directive — plugin content (<object>/<embed>) is unrestricted, and any other fetch directive not explicitly listed defaults to allow-all');
+    recommendations.push("Add object-src 'none' (or set default-src as a fallback that covers it)");
+  }
   score = Math.max(5, score); // at least 5 for having any CSP
 
   return { header: 'Content-Security-Policy', score, maxScore: 30, status: findings.length === 0 ? 'good' : 'warning', raw, findings, recommendations };
diff --git a/test/analyzer.test.ts b/test/analyzer.test.ts
index ed22923..af16d05 100644
--- a/test/analyzer.test.ts
+++ b/test/analyzer.test.ts
@@ -165,9 +165,10 @@ describe('checkCSP', () => {
   });
 
   it("does not penalize 'unsafe-inline' when 'strict-dynamic' + nonce present", () => {
+    // 20 - 2 (no default-src or object-src) = 18
     const r = checkCSP({ 'content-security-policy': "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-abc123' 'unsafe-inline' https://example.com; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'none'" });
     expect(r.findings.some(f => f.includes('unsafe-inline'))).toBe(false);
-    expect(r.score).toBe(20);
+    expect(r.score).toBe(18);
   });
 
   it("still penalizes 'unsafe-inline' when 'strict-dynamic' present without nonce/hash", () => {
@@ -263,6 +264,24 @@ describe('checkCSP', () => {
     expect(r.findings.some(f => /base-uri/i.test(f))).toBe(false);
     expect(r.score).toBe(20);
   });
+
+  it('flags a policy with neither default-src nor object-src', () => {
+    const r = checkCSP({ 'content-security-policy': "script-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'self'" });
+    expect(r.findings.some(f => /object-src/i.test(f))).toBe(true);
+    expect(r.status).toBe('warning');
+    expect(r.score).toBe(18);
+  });
+
+  it('default-src alone satisfies the object-src fallback check', () => {
+    const r = checkCSP({ 'content-security-policy': "default-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'self'" });
+    expect(r.findings.some(f => /object-src/i.test(f))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("object-src 'none' satisfies the check even without default-src", () => {
+    const r = checkCSP({ 'content-security-policy': "script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; form-action 'self'; base-uri 'self'" });
+    expect(r.findings.some(f => /object-src/i.test(f))).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.score).toBe(20);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('checkXFrameOptions', () => {