diff --git a/docs/BACKLOG.md b/docs/BACKLOG.md
index 93c7e389..b4d022f3 100644
--- a/docs/BACKLOG.md
+++ b/docs/BACKLOG.md
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ superseded by the #75 browser ops dashboard). Sequencing context for the earlier
 
 ## Ranked backlog — value × difficulty on a ten-level scale (re-scored 2026-08-03)
 
-> **What this pass is, and what it replaces.** Every one of the **92 open items** is re-scored here
+> **What this pass is, and what it replaces.** Every one of the **93 open items** is re-scored here
 > against the code as it stands on 2026-08-03. The 2026-07-10 table below is kept as the record of
 > that pass and is **superseded** by this one: it scored 134 items, ~40 of which have since closed,
 > and its frozen distribution lines were never recomputed. The closed items it ranked now live in
@@ -166,11 +166,11 @@ superseded by the #75 browser ops dashboard). Sequencing context for the earlier
 > the banner wins.
 
 **Distribution.** Recomputed from the table below, not carried forward.
-Value: **1**:3 · **2**:10 · **3**:19 · **4**:15 · **5**:17 · **6**:23 · **7**:4 · **9**:1. Difficulty: **1**:5 · **2**:19 · **3**:35 · **4**:15 · **5**:4 · **6**:9 · **7**:2 · **8**:2 · **9**:1.
-Tiers: **P1** 5 · **P2** 18 · **P3** 17 · **DEMAND-GATE** 52.
-Quadrants: _quick win_ 23 · _big bet_ 5 · _fill-in_ 55 · _money pit_ 9.
+Value: **1**:3 · **2**:10 · **3**:19 · **4**:15 · **5**:17 · **6**:23 · **7**:5 · **9**:1. Difficulty: **1**:5 · **2**:19 · **3**:35 · **4**:16 · **5**:4 · **6**:9 · **7**:2 · **8**:2 · **9**:1.
+Tiers: **P1** 5 · **P2** 19 · **P3** 17 · **DEMAND-GATE** 52.
+Quadrants: _quick win_ 24 · _big bet_ 5 · _fill-in_ 55 · _money pit_ 9.
 
-*All four lines sum to 92, the open-item count. They are recomputed with the table,
+*All four lines sum to 93, the open-item count. They are recomputed with the table,
 never carried forward — a stale census reads exactly like a current one.*
 
 Ordered by value descending, then difficulty ascending (cheapest first at equal value).
@@ -181,94 +181,95 @@ Ordered by value descending, then difficulty ascending (cheapest first at equal
 | 2 | **#324** | Custom role with `messages:edit` alone reads raw PHI via the `/ui` editor | 7 | 2 | _quick win_ | P1 | A custom role meaning "may resubmit, must not read" is accepted without warning and silently exceeds its stated scope — a HIPAA minimum-necessary failure for the deploying org with no workaround short of abandoning custom roles — bounded by the fact that no shipped configuration reaches it and every read is audited; `CUSTOM_ROLE_FORBIDDEN_PERMISSIONS` is three wide (`auth/permissions.py:178-180`) and the route gates on `require_ui_step_up(Permission.MESSAGES_EDIT)` alone (`messagefoundry_webconsole/routes/core.py:602`), so the change is two gate arguments, a `phi=` thread into `require_ui`, one custom-role regression test, and a `docs/SECURITY.md` edit that must ride the same commit or `tests/test_security_doc_drift.py` reds. |
 | 3 | **#321** | Leak gate is blind to the ported-estate site-code and partner-product token class | 7 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | A required merge context exited 0 on content carrying a real site code and a partner product name, with no compensating control (`scan_forbidden.py:10-12` is explicit that gitleaks finds secrets, not this class) and nothing stopping the next estate-derived identifier landing the same way; `.md` is not in `_SITE_SKIP_SUFFIXES` (`scan_forbidden.py:119`, `{".lock", ".svg"}`) so the file was scanned — the fix is owner-run token data across the private file plus the Actions *and* Dependabot secret stores, a negative test per class, and optionally a structural shape backstop. |
 | 4 | **#1000** | Prove each required merge context can fail: negative controls for the gates that block merge | 7 | 3 | _quick win_ | P1 | Thirteen contexts are the entire merge gate and not one is proven able to go red, a class that has fired at least four times here (#334, #327, #321, #325) with no CI signal and each caught by hand; the build is a negative-control fixture per context plus a job that fails when one has none, no new dependency and no change to what the gates check. |
-| 5 | **#318** | DAST — authenticated dynamic security testing of the running engine | 7 | 6 | _big bet_ | P2 | Increment 1 genuinely closed the §6.1 Dynamic row on the HTTP plane (`scripts/security/dast_auth_sweep.py`, `scripts/security/route_gates.py`, `.github/workflows/dast.yml` all present), but the unauthenticated MLLP/raw-TCP/X12 ingress — the one attacker-reachable surface — has no dynamic coverage and no mutator to extend, and a red nightly still notifies nobody (`.github/workflows/nightly-notice.yml:24` watches only `workflows: ["CI"]`); the remainder is a protocol fuzzer, an OpenAPI security overlay behind a fifth DEP-1 lock, a TLS black-box target and the `/ui` plane — cross-cutting and CI-gated. |
-| 6 | **#325** | Leak gate's home-path detector is case-blind on Windows paths | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | P1 | A structural detector in a required merge context — the one control meant to work in a fork with no token source — fires on one of four spellings of the same Windows home path (`_HOME_PATH` compiles with no flags and matches a literal `Users`, `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:99-106`), against the module's own "fail toward more detection" rule, though the disclosure is an OS account name and the tree holds zero live hits; an inline `(?i:)` on the drive-letter arm only (whole-pattern `re.I` measured 47 false positives), the sibling two-character `_WORKTREE_SLUG:92` edit, and casing fixtures beside the sole canonical-case test at `tests/test_scan_tokens_source.py:559-577`. |
-| 7 | **#327** | No test asserts the private-path `.gitignore` block still ignores anything | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | P1 | Six `.gitignore` rules are the sole control keeping maintainer-internal security material out of a public commit since the publish deny-list was retired, and the repo-wide search for `check-ignore` matches exactly one hand-run script (`scripts/dev/setup-leak-gate.ps1:58`) covering a different file, so the boundary is defended by review attention plus a hook that lives inside the now-ignored `/.claude/` tree and no fresh clone gets; a pinned-literal test with a synthetic probe child, plus dropping `^\.gitignore$` from the `noncode` allowlist at `.github/workflows/ci.yml:658` — without that edit the guard goes green on exactly the PR it exists to catch. |
-| 8 | **#353** | Gate the risk-acceptance register against the scorecard: nothing compares its cell lists to the record | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Build state and gating both check out: `git ls-files docs/security` returns nothing in this checkout, so the gate genuinely lands vault-side, and the DEMAND-GATE tier is correct — the verdict is "file now, build on owner green-light" and the body carries "⛔ Not to be built without the owner's go-ahead", a named trigger that has not fired. Value 8 is the error. The rubric's `8` is "an ASVS L3 Partial on defaults, or a production blind spot with no workaround"; this is neither — it gates a compliance ARTIFACT (a signed risk-acceptance register) against another artifact, touches no shipped default and no production path. A workaround exists and has already been executed once: the manual cross-check of all eight blocks against `asvs-scorecard.toml` is what produced the 29-entry finding in the first place. That is "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6 (awkward because it is manual, unrepeatable and unalarmed). Difficulty 2 stands (~15 stdlib lines, `tomllib` + regex + compare, no new dependency). Value 6 at difficulty 2 would read P1 on the thresholds, but the DEMAND-GATE override is correctly applied and the tier is unchanged; quadrant stays quick win. |
-| 9 | **#95** | Engine-brokered AI assistance — customer-managed subscription or in-house LLM | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | A customer's own Azure OpenAI / Bedrock / in-house endpoint is precisely this item's ask and today fails as an opaque 502 rather than a config error, with BYO the only workaround and one that forfeits the central audit the customer wanted; the broker, audit and egress allow-list already ship, so the remainder is per-provider wire shapes behind `chat()`, a validator that refuses an unserviced `provider`, and the stale `docs/AI.md:22` line. |
-| 10 | **#114** | Directory validation toggle (perform vs suppress startup validation) | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | The remainder is worse than a missing toggle — `File(validate_directory=True)` on an outbound is accepted and silently ignored, so an operator asks for fail-fast and gets neither validation nor an error, with only the on-demand `POST /connections/{name}/test` probe as a workaround; the fix adds a `validate_startup` hook to the `DestinationConnector` contract (`transports/base.py:459`, which today exposes only `send` at `:480`) plus a runner outbound start-path call, mirroring the source seam already at `transports/base.py:436`. |
-| 11 | **#158** | Per-message dynamic FTP host/path/credentials | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real dynamic-destination gap the shipped code closes off at both ends — host/credentials/`remote_dir` freeze at construction (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:626-627`) and `render_filename` is hard-capped to one path component (`messagefoundry/transports/file.py:105-127`), so a data-driven target subdirectory cannot be expressed by a static per-folder connection fan-out nor smuggled through the filename; awkward workaround, not a clean one. Build rides the already-shipped #68 per-message metadata carry (`messagefoundry/pipeline/wiring_runner.py:4526-4531`) plus a multi-component path sanitizer — a setting into one connector. |
-| 12 | **#233** | Steps view move-drop logic implemented twice (model + webview) | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | Silent-divergence class on the three functions that hand line ranges to `lens rewrite` — the drop preview comes from ide/media/stepsWebview.js:68/126/404 and the committed splice from ide/src/stepsModel.ts:1531 with only the model side under fixture test, and the only workaround is reviewing every diff; the fix is a bundled shared module loaded into a `default-src 'none'` webview (ide/src/stepsView.ts:918), with the differential test landing first on its own. |
-| 13 | **#326** | MFA-at-exposure refusal reads `serve_ui` after it is flipped off | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | ASVS 6.3.3's admin-MFA refusal and #189's dual-control warning are both inert in the topology the runbook recommends — the ADR 0143 auto-degrade sets `settings.api.serve_ui = False` in place before `ui_exposed` and `admin_exposed` are derived from it (`messagefoundry/__main__.py`, the flip and the two derivations in one ladder), so the engine calls one instance exposed for 11.7.1 and not exposed for 6.3.3 in a single boot — but `require_mfa` defaults on and `security_loosenings()` still names the explicit opt-out on every boot; re-key `admin_exposed` on the `instance_exposed` predicate already present in the file, fix two `exposure_desc` else-branches, and settle the refuse-on-upgrade fork against `docs/CONFIGURATION.md:1439`. |
-| 14 | **#328** | `audit-verify` cannot detect a truncated audit tail | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | Both shipped verification surfaces call `verify_audit_chain()` bare (`messagefoundry/__main__.py:3596`, `pipeline/engine.py:860`) and the `audit-verify` subparser declares only `--service-config` and `--db` (`__main__.py:571-578`), so a truncated keyed chain — the residue the anchor exists to catch — reports CLEAN with no way for an operator to supply one; the remainder is a new `audit-anchor` subcommand, an `--expected-anchor` flag into the already-present `expected_anchor=` keyword, and an `[integrity]` key for the startup path, with no change to the comparison logic and no store migration. |
-| 15 | **#344** | Fixed wall-clock bounds have drifted out of proportion to the work they bound | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | A mechanical margin check would have flagged windows-2025 at 1.006x before #119 died where the manual alternative was published wrong twice, and the shared Windows budget still admits the three-PRs-each-adding-a-minute death nobody is individually at fault for; `_wait_until` already raises with a full dispatcher/store dump citing proposal 6 (`tests/test_stage_dispatcher.py:485-497`) and no margin script exists under `scripts/ci/`, so the remainder is that script — timing the STEP, keyed on the step's own conclusion, against a right-censored max — plus giving `Web console tests (pytest)` its own cap instead of the shared `matrix.step_timeout` at `ci.yml:442`. |
-| 16 | **#169** | Author-appendable per-message processing history | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Genuine MsgAddHistory parity with only an awkward workaround: `message_events` is NOT author-appendable — its writer is engine-only (`messagefoundry/store/base.py:1039-1062`, reachable from `pipeline/` alone) and its `event` vocabulary is a closed frozenset (`messagefoundry/store/store.py:1004-1020`) — leaving `SetMeta` as the sole transform-callable channel, capped at 32 keys / 4096 bytes with last-writer-wins and no timestamp or ordering, so an unbounded append-only history cannot ride it. Build is an append op on the ADR 0081 exactly-once `transform_handoff` template plus an operator surface across three backends. |
-| 17 | **#179** | Archive-aged-rows to separate store | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real CIEArchive parity gap — `RetentionRunner` deletes and never tiers, and the fallback it names is a whole-store snapshot two backends refuse outright; a copy-then-purge step across the store seam, tested on SQLite, PostgreSQL and SQL Server. |
-| 18 | **#248** | Steps view: reclassify comment-only rows as a non-opaque note row | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Three shipped, reproducible defects on the Add-palette's own Comment step — a comment after the last statement renders nowhere (the partition stops at `node.end_lineno`, `messagefoundry/lens.py:19-21`), an adjacent one is swallowed by `_merge_code_rows` (`lens.py:1245`), and none is editable, contradicting `docs/STEPS-PALETTE.md:71`'s "Everything is editable after insert" — though dropping to the `.py` text remains a real if awkward escape; ADR 0076 Amendment A is already ACCEPTED and in force (`docs/adr/0076-typed-action-vocabulary-action-list-lens.md:3`), so the grammar cost is spent, leaving a `note` kind threaded through the partition, the coalescer, `_EDITABLE_KINDS` (`lens.py:1377`) and the IDE JSON contract. |
-| 19 | **#329** | Five `MEFOR_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS` cells bypass the ADR 0092 clamp | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | The LDAPS bind (`ssl.CERT_NONE` on the authentication substrate for every AD identity), the SFTP host key, the webhook sink and the `[ai].api_key` still cross an enforcing production-PHI posture on one env var, and converting them is what collapses five per-site facts into one repo-wide invariant the ASVS scorecard's regex mechanism can actually express — bounded because setting the variable needs Administrator, who can already do worse; the cheap in-gate half shipped with #323, so what remains is threading an explicit posture into `AuthService`/`create_app`'s three out-of-gate constructors, where `_here()` would otherwise ship green and inert. |
-| 20 | **#331** | Anonymizer's fail-closed leak-check has no structural PHI detectors | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | The function that earns the right to share a de-identified dataset verifies a known-string denylist — `leak_check` is `scan_text` (FORBIDDEN patterns, one routable-IPv4 check, estate substrings; `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:772-795`) plus a field-anchored site code, and a real MRN is not a denylisted string — and on a token-less checkout it degrades to the IPv4 check alone over an HL7 body and still returns clean, a gap `f3c6d348` hit in practice with a hand overlay that was never committed; wiring `token_floor_failure()` into the bridge is small, but the unmapped-field report and detectors scoped to fields no rule matched cross the `anonymize` seam and must be mirrored into `tee/anon/leak.py` for `test_anon_parity`. |
-| 21 | **#333** | Per-connection TLS deviations are invisible to the loosening registry | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Build state confirmed OPEN: `tls_allow_expired` appears in none of `config/settings.py`, `api/app.py`, `checks.py`, `__main__.py`; `config/wiring.py:3271` still carries only `accepted_cleartext_hops`; `security_loosenings` at `settings.py:4062` takes the fifth `alerts` parameter #323 added; `transports/database.py:298` still matches `_ODBC_TLS_HINT_RE` against keys only. Value 6 holds. Difficulty 3 prices a copy of #323's precedent and misses that the remainder is not one connector's setting: step 1 inverts a test (`test_database_transport.py:202-212`) that PINS the current DEBUG branch, step 2 needs an inbound name that `config/models.py` Source does not carry (registry plumbing at the construction site), step 4 adds TWO required parameters to `security_loosenings`, breaking all four caller signatures (`api/app.py`, `checks.py`, `__main__.py` x2), step 5 adds sibling advisory CheckResults, step 7 rewrites five DEPLOYMENT.md assertions that become false the moment step 4 lands, and step 8 extends the completeness floor with a connection-scoped arm. That is the rubric's `4` — "a feature across a seam" — not `3`, "a new setting into one connector". Quadrant and tier are unaffected (value 6, difficulty <=5 = quick win, P2). |
-| 22 | **#340** | Enable a GitHub merge queue: strict + no queue makes every merge a race that fails silently | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Build state confirmed: zero of the 21 files under `.github/workflows/` carries a `merge_group:` trigger, so difficulty 4 and the step-2-is-a-precondition reasoning are right. Value 8 is not. The rubric's `8` is "an ASVS L3 Partial on defaults, or a production blind spot with no workaround" — this is neither. It is a repo-workflow blind spot, and a workaround demonstrably exists and is exercised: `gh pr update-branch` (#74 landed via three merges from main, #119 landed via re-sync), plus a detector the project already BUILT for exactly this condition and which the item itself cites — `scripts/ci/check_stalled_prs.py` + `.github/workflows/stalled-prs.yml`. So the readiness signal is not in fact unfalsifiable from outside: a scheduled job reports the stalled set. That makes it "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6, one rung above the rubric's `4` for DX (the item's own cluster is Developer Experience & CI), and 6 is generous for a cluster the ladder caps at 4. At value 6, difficulty 4: quadrant stays quick win, but tier is P2 (P1 needs value >= 8, or value >= 6 at difficulty <= 2 — and this one is 4). |
-| 23 | **#180** | Cross-backend store migration tool | 6 | 5 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real gap — `open_store` picks a backend but nothing moves rows between them (no such subcommand exists in messagefoundry/__main__.py), so the only path discards retained history and audit; an offline row copy that re-wraps every `mfenc` body and reproduces the staged plus history shapes on all three backends. |
-| 24 | **#332** | Release signing toolchain is unhashed | 6 | 5 | _quick win_ | P2 | Arbitrary code from any of ~30 floating transitives at `.github/workflows/release.yml:255` runs with the OIDC identity that then signs the wheel, writes the SLSA attestation and publishes to PyPI — a backdoored artifact carrying a *valid* Sigstore bundle and valid provenance — and no Dependabot ecosystem parses an inline `pip install X==Y`, so the pin rots with no trigger and no owner (the two siblings at `:104` and `:207`, the latter a `~=` range, float identically); the ADR 0034 hashed-lock mechanism is proven and running for `ci-scanners`/`ci-quality`, but `sigstore` is absent from every lock (`grep -c sigstore uv.lock` → 0), adding a seventh is a six-place lockstep edit, the resolve contamination may force the same excluded-by-decision call semgrep got, and no PR leg ever executes this path. |
-| 25 | **#94** | External BLOB-server offload for embedded documents — stored-object pointer (OBX-5 RP) | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | The strongest store-bloat lever for document-heavy feeds with only awkward workarounds (more disk, purge history), and ADR 0105 already reserved the pointer format and deref seam it plugs into (`messagefoundry/parsing/binary.py:55-62` `DOC_REF_MARKER`, shared-seam note at `:252`, content-address contract at `:264-266`); the remainder is still a pluggable BLOB connector family, a per-connection offload setting across three backends, and an ADR fixing where a write side-effect sits against the at-least-once invariant. |
-| 26 | **#96** | Built-in "setup tester" — self-service capacity estimator | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | An adopter-run pre-cutover capacity number has no substitute but the manual dev-harness-plus-TUNING-BASELINE exercise, so a real gap with an awkward workaround. The reuse premise is measured false — `knee` appears in `harness/` only in TOML profile comments and `__main__.py` has no `capacity`/`setup-test` subcommand — so the knee-finder, the non-filling per-step gate, the `/stats` staleness precondition and the isolated-store guard are net-new across CLI + engine + store + metrics: rubric band 6. It is not a 7: there is no 3-backend migration, and ADR 0074 already exists and needs amending, not writing. Quadrant stays big bet. |
-| 27 | **#141** | TCP connection role selectable independently of direction (act-as-server vs act-as-client) | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real firewall role-inversion gap that an external relay (socat/stunnel) works around awkwardly but genuinely, which is why it stays at moderate severity and P2; the outbound half is not a knob — `DestinationConnector` (`transports/base.py:459`) exposes only `send` (`:480`) and every destination dials (`tcp.py:189`, `mllp.py:849`, `x12.py:158`), so a listening outbound needs an accept loop handing a peer socket to the per-outbound delivery worker and reconciled with retry/backoff and the connection-lifecycle status vocabulary. |
-| 28 | **#3** | Per-key (partition-key) message ordering (long-term, nice-to-have) | 6 | 9 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | The only order-preserving way to push one ordered feed past the ~60 msg/s one-lane-one-core bound; the engine-shard "workaround" is void (shards partition by connection) and the in-engine router-fanout substitute leaves transform serialized, so a real gap with only an awkward workaround. Nothing keyed exists (`partition_key`/`sequence_key`: zero hits in `messagefoundry/`), and keyed lane assignment with single-writer-per-lane over the durable outbox plus the A40 cross-key hazard is multi-week work sitting directly on the strict-FIFO invariant. Quadrant becomes big bet. |
-| 29 | **#334** | semgrep, a required blocking gate, scans a two-directory allow-list | 5 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P2 | `security.yml:413` is still `semgrep --config .semgrep --error --metrics off messagefoundry tee` while bandit next door scans `-r .` at `:359`, and `tests/test_lint_scope_parity.py` — the control cited as stopping exactly this drift — mentions semgrep nowhere, so the project-specific rules directory silently skips the separately-versioned console wheel; bandit and CodeQL cover the sinks today, so this is breadth parity with a live compensating control, and the fix is one argument list mirroring bandit's `--exclude` plus one parity arm modelled on `:119-125`. |
-| 30 | **#81** | Alert escalation tiers + day/time thresholds + content (Action-Point) alerting | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Content-triggered ("Action Point") alerting is genuine Corepoint parity that nothing outside the tests can fire, but the escalation and schedule two-thirds already ship, leaving metadata-only breadth rather than a blocker; the remainder is hoisting `content_match` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/alert_sinks.py:726`) onto the `AlertSink` Protocol (`messagefoundry/pipeline/alerts.py:27`), exporting an emitter a Handler can reach without breaking re-run purity, and surfacing the already-durable `escalation_tier` (`messagefoundry/store/postgres.py:449`) on `AlertInstanceInfo`, which omits it (`messagefoundry/api/models.py:255-275`). |
-| 31 | **#99** | AD/gMSA production-deployment hardening — turnkey enterprise (Windows/AD) install | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Every code half is built — gMSA preflight + logon-right grant (`scripts/service/install-service.ps1:42-46`, `:286-303`), the MFA-claim hook on by default (`config/settings.py:1914`, enforced `:2184`), IIS/ARR and gMSA docs — leaving only (e), a live domain-lab smoke, whose fallback (ship with the caveat, validate at the first deployment) is workable: parity assurance with a clean workaround, value 5. Difficulty is 3, not 6: the residual lands almost no code through ruff/mypy/pytest; its cost is DC + AD CS + gMSA + proxy + joined-client provisioning the project does not own, which this rubric does not price as engineering — and the item's own 2026-07-28 amendment explicitly retires the 6/6 engineering framing. Quadrant becomes fill-in; still DEMAND-GATE behind #275. |
-| 32 | **#125** | Uploaded Logs page - import external message files and browse them offline | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The build-state finding is right (the five routes exist at api/app.py:3685/:3786/:3803/:3889/:3946 and `browse_uploaded_file`'s own docstring says "Returns metadata only — never a decrypted body"), but value 6 rests on the claim that the item's trigger — "inspect a partner-supplied message file without ingesting it" — is "still unserved". It is substantially served: the shipped browse route filters and searches by `content`, `field_path`/`field_value`, `message_type` and `control_id` over the decrypted split, and per-message resend exists, all without live ingest. What is missing is only the body DISPLAY, and for that the workaround is clean, not awkward: the operator personally uploaded the file, so it is already in their hands and readable in any text editor, and `dryrun --show-phi` prints bodies as well. That is rubric 5 — "parity/breadth with a clean workaround" — not 6's "awkward workaround". Difficulty 3 stands (a read-one/download route over the existing encrypted store plus the audited PHI-view treatment and an ADR 0134 amendment). Quadrant becomes fill-in, not quick win; tier is unchanged. |
-| 33 | **#132** | Fixed 'now' test-time override (frozen clock for reproducible transform tests) | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 5 stands (a wall-clock-free transform or a tolerant diff gets regression comparison today — "parity/breadth with a clean workaround"), and the seam claim is verified: `route_message` takes `ingest_time` at dryrun.py:517 and the two internal call sites hardwire `time.time()` at :679 (`_dry_run_raw`) and :753 (`dry_run`). But "a --now flag threaded through two entry points" undercounts the surfaces, and the ones it misses are the ones the item is ABOUT. `checks.py:1058,1126` calls `dry_run(reg, raw, inbound=..., snapshot_on_send=...)` with no ingest_time — and checks.py is the `.expect` fixture comparator, i.e. the repo's actual deterministic-regression gate. `trace_dry_run` is a separate module (`dryrun_trace`, invoked from __main__.py:2926-2931). And the item's own Trigger names the Test Bench: ide/src/testBench.ts shells `dryrun` at five sites (:240, :325, :354, :440) and would need the flag plus an affordance. Engine + CLI + fixture gate + a TypeScript extension is D3 work, not D2's "small additive change on an existing seam". Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
-| 34 | **#172** | Gzip/zip compression codec + file-connector option | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | File-feed parity breadth with a clean code-first workaround: the reusable codec shipped including `zip_compress`/`zip_decompress` (`messagefoundry/parsing/compression.py:40-48`), so a zip-delivering partner is served by a Handler call today. What remains is connector-level — widening `_SUPPORTED_COMPRESSION` (`messagefoundry/transports/file.py:88`), which forces an archive-member-to-message decision, plus REMOTEFILE, which has zero compression to extend. |
-| 35 | **#330** | The IDE's `ai:assist` gate can never fire | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P2 | ADR 0035's SEC-022 `ai:assist` half was never wired — `resolveAiPolicy` omits `getJson`'s token argument (`ide/src/aiPolicy.ts:78`, against the header-when-present at `ide/src/engineClient.ts:141`) so the engine can only ever answer `null` and `docs/AI.md:188` publishes a deny row no code path produces — but no PHI is at risk, the brokered path is server-gated, and the `mode` half still covers the central-off case; TypeScript in one module, ordered so the unconditional cache write at `aiPolicy.ts:79` is guarded before the bearer lands, with the status-bar reader left tokenless or the CWE-613 idle clock becomes unreachable. |
-| 36 | **#336** | Dependabot auto-merge shields review with a deny-list | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Auto-merge still keys only on `update-type == 'version-update:semver-patch'` behind a 16-name Python deny-list with no ecosystem filter, so npm and `github-actions` — artifacts that execute inside CI holding the job's token — have zero shield coverage, and `tests/test_dependabot_automerge_guardrails.py:107-108` still asserts a cooldown for the `uv` ecosystem alone; the remainder is a deny-to-allow inversion in one workflow, a workflow-side release-age check for the cooldown-bypassing security track, and broadening one test. |
-| 37 | **#236** | Test-this-step and test-up-to-step with pinned upstream values | 5 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Real debug breadth — whole-handler traced values already fold onto rows (`mergeLiveValues`, ide/src/stepsModel.ts:544) so partial runs are a convenience, but pinning an expensive `db_lookup`/`fhir_lookup` has no equivalent at all; largely a stop condition plus state dump on ADR 0072's shipped trace, with the lookup mock and keeping `buildLensTraceArgs` (:674) incapable of emitting `--show-phi` the real work. |
-| 38 | **#165** | DB schema browser + ad-hoc query runner | 5 | 5 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity authoring aid whose external-SQL-client workaround is fully clean — the only DB reach today is the `SELECT 1` reachability probe (`messagefoundry/transports/database.py:484-501`) and dry-run refuses `db_lookup` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/dryrun.py:570`); the build is a net-new API surface plus per-dialect introspection, read-only statement gating, a permission, audit and a console pane. |
-| 39 | **#232** | Steps view for routers | 5 | 5 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Real Steps-view breadth gap exactly where destination selection is decided, with a workaround — read a five-line guard-and-return — clean enough to hold it off the top; a `route` row kind widens the ADR 0076 §3 grammar, so an amendment lands first, then `return []` disambiguation in a lens that skips routers outright today (messagefoundry/lens.py:306, :344-347), a router palette, and byte-stable rewrite parity. |
-| 40 | **#78** | Custom message-definition data model + conformance validator; NCPDP codec | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity persisted-definition model plus a report-only validator and an additive NCPDP codec, all cleanly worked around today by a code-first Handler, so useful breadth rather than a blocker; the whole scope is still remainder — NCPDP appears nowhere in `messagefoundry/` and `profile` is merely "reserved for a conformance-profile" (`messagefoundry/parsing/validate.py:56`) — spanning a new stored model the code reads, a validator, and a new codec class. |
-| 41 | **#85** | Cloud object-store + generic message-bus destinations | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity transport breadth with a clean workaround — the pluggable destination registry lets an adopter write the connector code-first — and nothing exists today (`transports/` carries no object-store or bus driver; `pyproject.toml` names no boto3/azure/google-cloud/kafka dependency). But the scored remainder is the whole scope: four-plus drivers, four vetted dependencies through the hash-locked lock file, plus credential sourcing and egress allow-listing on each, which exceeds the single-connector band 5. Quadrant becomes money pit. |
-| 42 | **#127** | Web-proxy credential types (Basic / Digest / NTLM / Windows) | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Breadth with a clean, ADR-ratified workaround — `cntlm` in front of the engine covers the enterprise NTLM proxy, and Basic already tunnels through `CONNECT`; the remainder is not a knob but a keep-alive HTTP client under `transports/rest.py`, because `urllib.request` opens a new connection per `open()` and the NTLM type1/2/3 handshake is connection-bound — the refusal is asserted at `messagefoundry/transports/rest.py:993-997` for the same reason #65 scoped it out (`transports/http_auth.py:27-31`), across four connector factories plus an ADR 0126 amendment. |
-| 43 | **#342** | Sandbox worker kill does not reap a grandchild holding the response pipe | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | P2 | Build state confirmed open: `pipeline/sandbox.py:327` is a bare `proc.kill()` and the module contains no `creationflags` and no `start_new_session`. Value 5 holds — #339's per-dispatch `secrets.token_hex(16)` really does bound this to availability and orphan accumulation on an opt-in posture. Difficulty 5 is the error, and the scorer's own why states the disqualifying fact: the fix "wants verifying on the Windows CI leg". The rubric prices `6` as "cross-cutting ... or Windows-CI-gated", and `5` as "a new connector/codec behind the transport registry" — which this is not. On top of the CI gate, the Windows half has no stdlib API (a kill-on-close job object means ctypes against `CreateJobObject`/`SetInformationJobObject` or a vetted new dependency), and the POSIX half is a different mechanism (`start_new_session` + `killpg`), so it is two platform implementations plus a platform-gated test. At value 5 / difficulty 6 the quadrant is money pit, not fill-in; tier stays P2 (value >= 5). |
-| 44 | **#62** | Binary body carriage — store ciphertext / raw bodies as `VARBINARY`/`BLOB`/`bytea` instead of base64-in-`NVARCHAR` | 5 | 7 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-class ~60% at-rest win on SQL Server where the only workaround is a bigger disk, but it is measure-gated and never load-bearing on correctness; a carriage format change that re-opens ADR 0028's NUL-safe str/TEXT decision, needs its own ADR, and drags a dual-read migration over three backends and two live `mfenc:` versions. |
-| 45 | **#130** | Message queues shared by name across connections + shared-name delete protection | 5 | 8 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Parity breadth with a clean workaround — the name-wired graph already fans a router across handlers and a handler across outbounds, and nothing (zero `shared_queue`/`queue_name` hits in `messagefoundry/`) suggests a named queue is needed to express a real feed; building it adds a store seam keyed by name rather than connection, competing consumers claiming under per-lane FIFO, and reference-counted delete, on all three backends without letting the abstraction become the "channel" element CLAUDE.md forbids. |
-| 46 | **#137** | Configurable server display name in the operator console | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 4 is right (console polish; the URL/port already disambiguate, and monitoring.py:508 already renders a "Node id" row, so nobody is blocked), and the stale-module finding is right — there is no messagefoundry/console/, and the live title is `el("title", f"{title} — MessageFoundry")` at _html.py:171. But D2→3 rests on a false premise: "the console never imports the engine, so the label has to ride an API status response rather than being read from settings in-process". The console does not import the engine, yet the engine INJECTS a typed bundle into it at mount time — `mount_ui(app: FastAPI, deps: UiDeps)` (messagefoundry_webconsole/mount.py:69), and `UiDeps` (messagefoundry/api/_ui_seam.py:199) already carries settings-derived display values of exactly this shape, e.g. `organization_domains` (:224) and `oidc_authorization_host` (:231-234), the latter documented as "Derived from settings, never from request input". A server display name is one more UiDeps field plus a read in `page()` — no HTTP boundary crossing, no status-response plumbing. That is D2, "small additive change on an existing seam". Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
-| 47 | **#167** | Test Bench metadata seeding | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | IDE Test Bench DX input to seed the per-message metadata bag for transform tests; nobody is blocked, and the seam is small — a `--meta` flag threaded through `dry_run`/`route_message` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/dryrun.py:512-521`, `:702-709`) into the Test Bench's CLI-only channel (`ide/src/testBench.ts:240`). The bag itself already shipped (#150/ADR 0081, `messagefoundry/config/wiring.py:2604`) but write-only — no `meta_get` on `Message` — which is a clause of this item's OWN trigger, so it holds the tier at DEMAND-GATE without discounting worth-if-built. |
-| 48 | **#171** | Runtime log-verbosity control + in-product log viewer | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Ops convenience whose live-incident use case the built API half already answers — `set_runtime_level`/`current_log_level` (`messagefoundry/logging_setup.py:429`, `:452`) behind `GET`/`PATCH /logging/level` and `GET /logs/tail` (`messagefoundry/api/app.py:4566`, `:4580`, `:4609`); the remainder is pure wiring, since the console JS is already written (`messagefoundry_webconsole/static/app.js:1252`, `:1294`) and only needs a page builder to emit its attributes plus the two absent `/ui` routes and a golden-surface update. |
-| 49 | **#177** | Effective-permission inspector for a user | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The endpoint shipped (`GET /users/{user_id}/permissions`, `messagefoundry/api/auth_routes.py:610`), so the manual `/users`×`/roles` cross-ref the 5 priced is already gone and the remainder is console polish over a built surface; an apiclient wrapper plus a card on the existing `/ui/users/{user_id}` page — whose builder renders only profile/roles/scope/actions (`messagefoundry_webconsole/pages/admin.py:152-158`) — and a golden-surface update. |
-| 50 | **#228** | Steps / config search finds handlers, routers, and transforms by name (not just connections) | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish on an index that already ships — a hit opens source instead of the Steps view and send targets stay unindexed; both are small additive edits, (a) a `contextValue` on rows that already carry `elementKind`/`elementName`. |
-| 51 | **#124** | Batch-export message bodies from a connection log to a file | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Console polish now that the capability itself ships — a scripted operator exports today through the audited step-up route, leaving only the save-selected affordance; the JS is already written (`messagefoundry_webconsole/static/app.js:1380`), so the cost is emitting the `data-mf-*` attributes and row checkboxes in `pages/messages.py` and registering `/ui/messages/export` ahead of `/ui/messages/{message_id}` (`routes/core.py:468`) so the path parameter cannot swallow it. |
-| 52 | **#133** | User-chosen display colour on configuration objects | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 4 ("DX or console polish") is right and the stale-citation finding is right (no messagefoundry/console/ package; the live chrome is _html.py's page() head). But D3→2 rests on "a colour is that same shape [as `flagged`] plus a render", and that is false in a way this codebase enforces. `flagged` is a bool with no rendering sink; a colour is an operator-supplied STRING rendered into console markup, and the /ui CSP is `style-src 'self'` with no 'unsafe-inline' (_security.py:205, _auth.py:141, and app.css:2 states the constraint outright). An inline `style="…"` colour would simply not render, so the build must either bind a fixed palette to CSS classes shipped in app.css or add a nonce'd style mechanism the CSP does not currently grant for styles — a design decision plus value validation on untrusted config input, on top of the config-model → TOML → API → console thread. That is D3 ("a new setting into one connector"-scale work), not D2's "default flip or doc edit"-adjacent band. Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
-| 53 | **#234** | Steps view projection refreshes on save only | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | UX latency on an opt-in authoring surface, not a correctness gap — the rows merely lag the buffer while live values stay correctly save-gated (ide/src/stepsView.ts:327); the debounce already exists at :89, but relaxing a deliberate ADR 0076 §5 guardrail means an amendment plus proving `EditLoopGuard` holds when projection races an in-flight `lens rewrite`. |
-| 54 | **#335** | Control-char scrub misses `exc_text`/`stack_info` | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `ControlCharScrubFilter.filter` still translates only `record.getMessage()` while `RedactionFilter` is the sole toucher of `exc_text`/`stack_info` (`logging_setup.py:124-131`), so a CR/LF traceback can forge a record on the text sink — but `JsonFormatter` escapes C0 regardless, the off-box forwarder defaults to json, and the message-path `exc_info` sites are a handful of non-peer-derived guards, so it is log-record integrity on one sink; the filter already runs last, so the cost is the readability call ADR 0034:146 defers plus tests and an ADR amendment. |
-| 55 | **#343** | Sandbox child stderr is inherited unframed into the engine log stream | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The worker is still spawned `stderr=None` (`pipeline/sandbox.py:266`), so a sandboxed Handler's bytes land in the engine's own log stream unattributed and a `print()` of a body writes PHI at whatever level the operator runs — but the same `print()` under the default `mode=off` reaches the same stream, so the sandbox-specific loss is attribution and the fd-1 framing that survives on luck rather than design; a `stderr=subprocess.PIPE` relay thread through the stdlib logger (inheriting the existing PHI filters) plus a bootstrap redirect of the child's `sys.stdout`, all inside one module. |
-| 56 | **#346** | The sandbox import boundary is enforced only at runtime, under an off-by-default flag | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scorer verified the item's own measurement (`FORBIDDEN_MODULES` appears nowhere under `tests/`, confirmed) and inherited its conclusion — but the conclusion is the part that is false. The item's load-bearing claim is that "a re-violation is invisible to a green suite" because the guard runs only in the child under a non-default flag. `tests/test_sandbox.py` runs REAL `mode=SUBPROCESS` sessions across roughly a dozen tests (`test_subprocess_parity_router_and_handler`, `test_subprocess_marshals_live_store_run_context`, `test_generator_router_routes_under_mode_subprocess`, `test_setstate_tuple_and_nonfinite_values_survive_mode_subprocess`, ...) — the child is genuinely spawned, since the OFF test asserts `off._proc is None` as the distinguishing property. Decisively, `test_response_view_reaches_a_sandboxed_handler` (~:617-645) drives a `CapturedResponse` through a live subprocess round-trip, i.e. the exact violation instance the item is built on would now be caught red by CI. So the compensating control is a live test file, not absent, and the residual narrows to a FUTURE codec type added without an accompanying subprocess-mode test. That is test-coverage hardening = value 4, not "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6. Difficulty 3 stands (an `ast` walker anchored on the constant, falsified against a planted import). At value 4 the tier is P3 (P2 needs value >= 5) and the quadrant is fill-in. |
-| 57 | **#351** | SQL Server failover test asserts on a 0.35s wall-clock margin across a real DB round-trip | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | One observation on one leg, with the 2022 leg passing the same commit and a sibling PR passing both, bounds this to a marginal test whose red misattributes to whichever PR it fires on — the residual worth is settling whether #348's work at the `_acquire` chokepoint merely spent latency the test had no headroom for or tipped a real delay-predicate regression; the edit is confined to one test file, but it cannot be validated locally by default (the SQL Server leg silently skips) and must not be landed as a wider margin before the question is answered. |
-| 58 | **#166** | Server-side per-user console preferences | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Roaming console settings stay polish nobody is blocked on; the cost the 6 priced is gone — the Qt half is retired and #151 already shipped the owner-keyed per-user store + route template (`messagefoundry/store/store.py:1667-1681`), so the remainder is a second additive table across three backends plus web-console wiring, no pipeline. |
-| 59 | **#235** | Generate Steps view parameter forms from Python type hints | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish — the recognized row set is unchanged and only the widgets get richer over the literal-only slots the lens marks today (messagefoundry/lens.py:255); a stdlib `inspect` schema emitter beside the 315-line `actions.py` plus replacing the hand-rolled per-op rendering in a 2,328-line model (`ADD_MENU_CATALOG`, ide/src/stepsModel.ts:886). |
-| 60 | **#237** | Per-argument input modes (static templated dynamic) in the Steps view | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish that renames "not editable" honestly without unlocking a new edit class — dynamic mode stays read-only in v1 by its own sketch; the value classifier is net-new in `lens.py`, then a mode selector on the same form surface #235 rewrites, sequenced behind #233. |
-| 61 | **#108** | Receiver-side 'Prefer BOM if present' encoding auto-detect | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | A configured per-connection `encoding` already covers any single-encoding feed cleanly — it is plumbed through to `normalize(raw, *, encoding=…)` on the hot path (`messagefoundry/parsing/peek.py:152-162`) and accepts `utf-8-sig`/`utf-16-le`/`utf-16-be` — leaving only the niche mixed-BOM override, a niche interop knob; the remainder is a small additive sniff on the decode path, since no UTF-16 byte-order mark is detected anywhere today. |
-| 62 | **#148** | X12 TA1 interchange-acknowledgement generation | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche X12 knob most partners never need — the pyx12 walk yields a conforming 997/999 free (`parsing/x12/validate.py:18`, `:69`), covering the common ack, and only a contract that specifically mandates interchange-level accept/reject reaches for TA1; the build is a pure codec addition beside the existing splitter and delimiters in `messagefoundry/parsing/x12/`, which today contains no TA1 generator at all — only the outbound classifies a partner's returned TA1 (`transports/x12.py:73-74`). |
-| 63 | **#184** | Serve own endpoint WSDL | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche SOAP interop knob with a clean out-of-band-WSDL workaround; a configured document served off the listener's existing GET/HEAD health short-circuit (messagefoundry/transports/http_listener.py:796-797), which already returns before any ingress row. |
-| 64 | **#249** | `lens graph`: mermaid and dot export formats | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `graph --json` already ships (`messagefoundry/__main__.py:156-159`), so a mermaid/dot emitter is convenience over an already-complete surface rather than a capability anyone lacks; two pure-string emitters over the existing graph model, no new dependency and no seam crossed. |
-| 65 | **#338** | TLS key-exchange groups are inherited, not pinned | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `harden_kex_groups` still returns `None` when `set_groups` is absent, and all three restatements survive the 2026-07-29 sweep — `CONTAINER-EXPOSURE-EVALUATION.md` still says "hardened KEX groups" under a *verification* heading, `BACKLOG.md:6422` still lists 11.6.2 in #200's Closes line against PHI.md's PARTIAL, and `ASVS-L2-PHASE0-CHANGES.md:254` still presupposes a pin — but every group that gets in is forward-secret and the floor plus `harden_cipher_suites` admit nothing static, so this is documentation accuracy plus observability; three doc edits and one additive report-only `SecurityPosture` field beside `fips_attestation()`, with the two tripwire tests left alone as the 3.15 trigger. |
-| 66 | **#83** | Rich file-output disposition + FTPS / SFTP variants | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche file/FTP interop knobs most partners never need, and the ones that bite are transport-side where no Handler can substitute; all of it is per-driver additive on two connectors — `FileDestination` still has no append, dated-subfolder archive or header/trailer framing knob, and `remotefile` is explicit-`FTP_TLS` only with no implicit/passive toggle or keyboard-interactive auth (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:13`, `:256-262`). |
-| 67 | **#98** | Kerberos SSO channel-binding (EPA) opt-in + acceptor-enforcement spike | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Narrow EPA hardening on an opt-in in-process-TLS SSO mode nobody is blocked on, and structurally void behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so a niche interop knob at best; the acceptors are still constructed with no bindings at all (`spnego.server(service=…)` / `spnego.server()` at `messagefoundry/auth/ldap.py:300-302`, `:360-362`, with no `channel_bindings` argument or CBT knob anywhere), so the work is a spike plus one conditional per-mode flag — but the answer needs the same domain lab #99(e) is blocked on. |
-| 68 | **#159** | TCP stream-until-close (no-framing) mode | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche close-framed TCP interop knob: `codec_for` requires both delimiter bytes and `FrameCodec` rejects `start == end` (`messagefoundry/transports/framing.py:62-63`, `:167-170`), so connection-close framing is inexpressible today; a `framing=none` path bypasses the shared codec on the Tcp read loop (`messagefoundry/transports/tcp.py:508-515`) and the destination's write-then-close. |
-| 69 | **#163** | Static-string inbound ACK | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Canned-ACK interop knob most partners never need — `AckMode` offers only original/enhanced/none (`messagefoundry/config/models.py:98-103`) and `build_ack` always assembles MSH+MSA (`messagefoundry/transports/mllp.py:329-350`); a new mode plus a literal setting through wiring into the one MLLP listener, with the synchronous NAK path decided. |
-| 70 | **#178** | SFTP cipher / KEX / MAC allow-lists | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche knob a FIPS-restricted partner needs — `client.connect` passes no `disabled_algorithms` (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:396-405`), so only host-key posture is operator-configurable. Cost is a new validated operator setting into one connector, and the Scope's second clause (preferred-ordering on the SSH Transport) is not reachable through `SSHClient.connect` — it must be set on the Transport before negotiation, so `_make_client` restructures rather than gaining one kwarg. |
-| 71 | **#181** | Multipart/form-data outbound encoder | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche multipart upload most REST/SOAP partners never ask for and a hand-built Handler body covers; a boundary encoder plus a per-request Content-Type on a connector whose type is fixed at construction (messagefoundry/transports/rest.py:1355), with the collision-checked boundary idiom already written at messagefoundry/transports/dicomweb.py:262-290 to copy. |
-| 72 | **#183** | SOAP MTOM/XOP binary packaging | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche IHE packaging format that base64-inline already serves for any accepting partner; XOP framing is spec-fiddly but confined to one connector's string-concatenated envelope (messagefoundry/transports/soap.py:643-702), with no body signature to disturb and the DICOMweb boundary generator to borrow. |
-| 73 | **#320** | windows-2025 is the slowest CI leg (1.8x-3.5x), but that does not explain the 60/s failures | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The item retracts its own product premise — the CI symptom is absorbed by #115 and a 36-run sweep shows a 1.8x-3.5x latency gap rather than a capacity cliff, leaving only an unexplained red at `rate_start = 60.0` (`tests/test_load_runner.py:150`, `pool_size = 4` at `:120`) and an unverified near-breach of the `read >= sent // 2` floor; the honest next experiment is a concurrent-load arm on the dispatch-only probe that already exists (`harness/load/ingress_probe.py`, `.github/workflows/ingress-rate-probe.yml`), not the self-hosted rig, which `ci.yml:49` records as retired. |
-| 74 | **#337** | handler-security lint: `getattr` indirection and the undecorated helper | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `_AMBIENT_BARE_NAMES` (`checks.py:476`) still matches a literal name chain and `checks.py` contains no `getattr` resolution at all, and the rule loop still bails on `_message_fn_decorator(node) is None` (`:937`) so the `_<feed>_transforms.py` helper CONNECTIONS.md steers PHI handling into is never opened — but the lint is advisory unless an adopter opts into `--strict-handler-security`, and evading it reaches neither the DEK nor the audit chain in either sandbox posture; ~15 lines splicing a constant into `_dotted_call_name` plus a `phi-to-log` widening that must be recalibrated against the two shipped sample helpers before it lands. |
-| 75 | **#110** | DICOM Study/Series Instance UID de-duplication on the C-STORE SCP | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche DICOM-only study collapse most partners never need, and the SR→HL7 case can already filter to SR objects code-first because `DicomPeek` exposes both UIDs (`messagefoundry/parsing/dicom/peek.py:105-106`), though no pure Router can hold the cross-message state; the remainder is a connector-side seen-UID ledger modelled on the existing durable `processed_files` precedent (`messagefoundry/store/base.py:844`, `prune_processed_files` at `:857`) plus an explicit FILTERED disposition on the suppressed 2..N objects at `_on_c_store`/`_commit` (`messagefoundry/transports/dicom.py:273`, `:368`), tested on all three backends. |
-| 76 | **#113** | Outbound source-IP binding for sender connections | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche interop knob only a source-IP-allowlisting partner on a multi-homed host needs, and OS routing already settles egress selection for everyone else; the bind must reach five dial sites — `transports/tcp.py:189`, `mllp.py:849`, `x12.py:158` via `asyncio.open_connection`, `remotefile.py:259` ftplib and `:396` paramiko, which takes a pre-bound `sock=` rather than a kwarg — plus the TOML/edit allowlists. |
-| 77 | **#182** | Per-message base-address override for web-service senders | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche sender-control knob with a clean one-connection-per-address fan-out, and its own severity note rates it minor; the difficulty is a per-message carry key on the ALREADY-SHIPPED ADR 0081 metadata channel — a reserved `http.url`-style key read where `outbound_headers_from_metadata` is read today (rest.py:1373) — plus wiring `consumes_metadata` onto SOAP and a delivery-time SSRF/egress re-check across three HTTP clients. No new store column and no 3-backend change. |
-| 78 | **#131** | Object flagging - mark objects of interest + a Flagged Objects filter | 3 | 7 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Difficulty 7 is right — ADR 0007's amendment declines the universal flag precisely because it needs a name-keyed annotation table across all three store backends, which is literally D7 ("a new ADR plus a 3-backend migration"). Value 2 is not: it rests on "connections are the objects an operator actually lists and filters, leaving only a marker on Routers/Handlers", and that understates the remainder. I read the write path: `Engine.set_connection_flag` (pipeline/engine.py:1401) raises WiringError when the connection is not in connections.toml — "a CODE-FIRST connection has no TOML home, so the console flag is refused there" — and api/app.py:1969-1972 maps that to 409. So the shipped half serves only TOML-managed connections, while this project's default authoring mode for connections is code-first Python, and this item's own Trigger names "an adopter with a LARGE CONFIG REPOSITORY" — exactly the case the shipped half refuses. The remainder is therefore a console-settable flag for code-first connections AND Routers/Handlers, not a cosmetic residue, so it is not "already substantially covered" (=2); it is reduced-scope console polish with partial coverage. Quadrant stays money pit; tier stays DEMAND-GATE per the verdict line. |
-| 79 | **#214** | Intra-message concurrent transform of a message's routed rows | 3 | 8 | _money pit_ | P3 | Marginal residual on a lever an Accepted ADR closed — the transform-overlap half is merged and tested (`_process_routed_batch`, wiring_runner.py:5311), and ADR 0107 (Accepted 2026-07-13, 'authorizes no build. Do not build F2 or F3') bounds the ENTIRE `2H` transaction term this residual removes: arm E measured a ×2.95 swing in committed txn/msg moving throughput −11.7%, elasticity d(ln throughput)/d(ln txn) = −0.115, capping the residual's absolute best case at +13.2% at H=8; the remainder is still a batched multi-row `transform_handoff` on the stage handoff itself, ADR-gated, preserving claim→produce→complete atomicity on three backends. |
-| 80 | **#155** | Server-to-server migration runbook | 2 | 1 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Every constituent step already ships documented — install, backup/restore/DR, decommission at `docs/EARLY-ADOPTER-GUIDE.md` §4/§10/§16 — so the gap is prose stitching, not capability; one new doc that orders them end-to-end, no code. |
-| 81 | **#322** | Synthetic leak-gate placeholders can collide with the real gate's own guards | 2 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scanner ALREADY emits the diagnostic this item asks for. `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:846-856` prints a three-state banner to stderr on every run, before any refusal: `[STRUCTURAL-ONLY: no token source configured]`, `[SYNTHETIC EXAMPLE TOKENS — blind to real customer tokens; CI is authoritative]` (when `is_synthetic_token_set()`), or nothing — alongside `loaded_token_counts()`. `scan-tokens.local.txt.example:23-25` documents that label as the intended discriminator in the very header the item quotes: "The scanner LABELS this set on every run … the label is what does." So the scorer's load-bearing premise — a synthetic-set contributor is hard-blocked "with no diagnostic" — is false at HEAD, and the second half of the item's Proposed ("optionally have the scanner's hit message name the loaded set, so a synthetic false positive is self-diagnosing") is substantially already covered; only its placement (load banner vs. per-hit reason) differs. What genuinely remains is a guidance paragraph in `scan-tokens.local.txt.example` telling a contributor not to build a tracked placeholder from any `[site_prefix]` value in either token set. That is value 2 ("marginal, already substantially covered") and difficulty 1 ("a default flip or doc edit"). Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays P3, so the ranking impact is ordering within P3, not scheduling. |
-| 82 | **#116** | File-size integrity re-check before disposition | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Marginal additive hardening — the `min_age_seconds` quiescence window (`transports/file.py:728`) plus the single-shot whole-file read already close the partial-write hole this guards; a re-stat before move/delete in FileSource and RemoteFile is a small additive change on an existing seam. |
-| 83 | **#135** | Configurable statistics push / refresh interval | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Marginal tuning knob with no interop dimension — the fixed cadence serves live monitoring fine and no deployment has reported console bandwidth as material; the build is a validated settings field read by the push loop, where the cadence is a single `await asyncio.sleep(1.0)` at `messagefoundry/api/app.py:4945` and `config/settings.py:701` already carries the sibling `ws_allowed_origins`. |
-| 84 | **#173** | Segment/segment-group subtree-copy helper | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | One-call sugar over an API that already does the hard part — `groups()` hands back the span view (`messagefoundry/parsing/message.py:470`) and `add_segment` grafts lines (`:377`), so the 'find the group boundary' boilerplate the item cites is mostly already solved; a small additive helper whose only subtlety is re-encoding across two messages' MSH separators. |
-| 85 | **#174** | Scheduled automatic statistics reset | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Manual re-snapshot ships (`Engine.reset_stats`, `messagefoundry/pipeline/engine.py:1772-1792`, behind `POST /statistics/reset` at `messagefoundry/api/app.py:2208`) and OTel covers daily volume, so a timer is convenience only; it assembles two shipped primitives — the ADR 0095 timezone-aware `Schedule` and the #160 stdlib cron evaluator — against an existing call. |
-| 86 | **#84** | Diagnostic panes — hex body view + HL7-aware before/after diff + profiling/coverage | 2 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Substantially covered — hex, HL7-aware diff and coverage/profiling panes all ship, so what is left is a true-binary dump nobody is blocked on; the remainder is no longer client-side-only, since the dry-run read path must first surface the wire bytes the pure pane deliberately cannot recover (`ide/src/hexdump.ts:5-10`). |
-| 87 | **#156** | Alert hysteresis (separate fire/clear thresholds) | 2 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Anti-flap refinement the shipped `realert_seconds` / per-rule `cooldown_seconds` throttle already damps (`messagefoundry/config/settings.py:2678`, `:2823`), with single-sided `min_depth`/`min_oldest_seconds` matching confirmed at `messagefoundry/pipeline/alert_sinks.py:617-623`; two new AlertRule fields plus clear-edge state in the sink, no store or migration. |
-| 88 | **#105** | Deterministic Corepoint-import tooling — Action-List → code-first scaffold | 2 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The adopter already hand-ported and the AI `/migrate` covers the rest, with no named demand, so it ships little worth even if finished; the mapper and CLI are built, leaving reconciliation of the emitted mapping against a real Corepoint export and the deferred `ide/` wrapper — behind #313's multi-message Handler model, which this item cannot buy. |
-| 89 | **#122** | Corrupted application-log detection, rollover, and connection-stop | 2 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 2 stands — stdout + NSSM rotation, the RFC 5425 TLS syslog forwarder (`_TlsSysLogHandler`, logging_setup.py:281) and #50's disk metering already carry log durability and visibility, so this is marginal and substantially covered. But difficulty 5 prices the wrong shape of work. D5 is "a new connector/codec behind the transport registry" — this is not a connector. logging_setup.py's module docstring (lines 3-13) records that the engine "deliberately do[es] not add file handlers here" because NSSM owns rotation, and `grep FileHandler |
-| 90 | **#64** | Throughput parity with Corepoint — measure-first performance roadmap (group-commit + lean-writes) | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | An index over levers that live in #62/#63/#47/#34, so it ships nothing runnable of its own, and the remainder is reconciling roadmap prose against a measurement that has already run and a lever already abandoned — a doc edit. But the gate this item was demand-gated ON has FIRED (ADR 0051 measure-first complete 2026-07-12; ADR 0099 → ABANDON; ADR 0107 closes Phase 4), so the DEMAND-GATE override no longer applies and the tier derives from the score: P3, fill-in. |
-| 91 | **#238** | OpenFlow step-attribute completeness pass over the engine vocabulary | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Ships nothing runnable — the output is a findings note, and the item itself concedes most attributes are already covered engine-side under other names (retry/timeout in connector and delivery semantics), with OpenFlow compatibility explicitly declined under ADR 0076 §7 and #26; a read of seven attributes against the vocabulary and a short write-up. |
-| 92 | **#352** | Consult on enterprise AV coverage for SFTP- and file-connector ingest from outside the domain (ASVS 5.4.3 premise check) | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scan seam is real — `set_scan_hook` at `transports/file.py:802`, `scan_inbound_file` at `:828`, called via `asyncio.to_thread` from `transports/remotefile.py:901` — so the citations hold. The scoring does not. The rubric's value floor is written for exactly this item: `1` ships nothing runnable. The scorer's own why closes with "the deliverable is one conversation and its recorded answer, no code", which is self-refuting against a value of 6 ("real gap, awkward workaround" — there is no gap being closed here and nothing to work around; there is a question being asked). Worth-if-built for a consult item is the answer, and the answer alone changes no shipped behaviour; if it comes back "no", the WORK that follows (reopening 5.4.3, or shipping an ICAP-backed scan control) is a different, unfiled item that would carry its own score. Difficulty 1 is right. At value 1 the quadrant is fill-in and the tier is P3; the verdict "consult, then decide" is not one of the three DEMAND-GATE verdicts, so no override applies. |
+| 5 | **#1003** | Validate the lab and discharge the four hardware-gated residuals | 7 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Four items (#99, #98, #320, #351) are parked on one missing multi-VM lab and each asserts a premise that expires when it lands, so the alternative to running them is four items telling every planning pass they are unreachable; the runs are already specified by the items they discharge and need no new design, but the lab itself has to be stood up and proven against what each residual actually requires. |
+| 6 | **#318** | DAST — authenticated dynamic security testing of the running engine | 7 | 6 | _big bet_ | P2 | Increment 1 genuinely closed the §6.1 Dynamic row on the HTTP plane (`scripts/security/dast_auth_sweep.py`, `scripts/security/route_gates.py`, `.github/workflows/dast.yml` all present), but the unauthenticated MLLP/raw-TCP/X12 ingress — the one attacker-reachable surface — has no dynamic coverage and no mutator to extend, and a red nightly still notifies nobody (`.github/workflows/nightly-notice.yml:24` watches only `workflows: ["CI"]`); the remainder is a protocol fuzzer, an OpenAPI security overlay behind a fifth DEP-1 lock, a TLS black-box target and the `/ui` plane — cross-cutting and CI-gated. |
+| 7 | **#325** | Leak gate's home-path detector is case-blind on Windows paths | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | P1 | A structural detector in a required merge context — the one control meant to work in a fork with no token source — fires on one of four spellings of the same Windows home path (`_HOME_PATH` compiles with no flags and matches a literal `Users`, `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:99-106`), against the module's own "fail toward more detection" rule, though the disclosure is an OS account name and the tree holds zero live hits; an inline `(?i:)` on the drive-letter arm only (whole-pattern `re.I` measured 47 false positives), the sibling two-character `_WORKTREE_SLUG:92` edit, and casing fixtures beside the sole canonical-case test at `tests/test_scan_tokens_source.py:559-577`. |
+| 8 | **#327** | No test asserts the private-path `.gitignore` block still ignores anything | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | P1 | Six `.gitignore` rules are the sole control keeping maintainer-internal security material out of a public commit since the publish deny-list was retired, and the repo-wide search for `check-ignore` matches exactly one hand-run script (`scripts/dev/setup-leak-gate.ps1:58`) covering a different file, so the boundary is defended by review attention plus a hook that lives inside the now-ignored `/.claude/` tree and no fresh clone gets; a pinned-literal test with a synthetic probe child, plus dropping `^\.gitignore$` from the `noncode` allowlist at `.github/workflows/ci.yml:658` — without that edit the guard goes green on exactly the PR it exists to catch. |
+| 9 | **#353** | Gate the risk-acceptance register against the scorecard: nothing compares its cell lists to the record | 6 | 2 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Build state and gating both check out: `git ls-files docs/security` returns nothing in this checkout, so the gate genuinely lands vault-side, and the DEMAND-GATE tier is correct — the verdict is "file now, build on owner green-light" and the body carries "⛔ Not to be built without the owner's go-ahead", a named trigger that has not fired. Value 8 is the error. The rubric's `8` is "an ASVS L3 Partial on defaults, or a production blind spot with no workaround"; this is neither — it gates a compliance ARTIFACT (a signed risk-acceptance register) against another artifact, touches no shipped default and no production path. A workaround exists and has already been executed once: the manual cross-check of all eight blocks against `asvs-scorecard.toml` is what produced the 29-entry finding in the first place. That is "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6 (awkward because it is manual, unrepeatable and unalarmed). Difficulty 2 stands (~15 stdlib lines, `tomllib` + regex + compare, no new dependency). Value 6 at difficulty 2 would read P1 on the thresholds, but the DEMAND-GATE override is correctly applied and the tier is unchanged; quadrant stays quick win. |
+| 10 | **#95** | Engine-brokered AI assistance — customer-managed subscription or in-house LLM | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | A customer's own Azure OpenAI / Bedrock / in-house endpoint is precisely this item's ask and today fails as an opaque 502 rather than a config error, with BYO the only workaround and one that forfeits the central audit the customer wanted; the broker, audit and egress allow-list already ship, so the remainder is per-provider wire shapes behind `chat()`, a validator that refuses an unserviced `provider`, and the stale `docs/AI.md:22` line. |
+| 11 | **#114** | Directory validation toggle (perform vs suppress startup validation) | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | The remainder is worse than a missing toggle — `File(validate_directory=True)` on an outbound is accepted and silently ignored, so an operator asks for fail-fast and gets neither validation nor an error, with only the on-demand `POST /connections/{name}/test` probe as a workaround; the fix adds a `validate_startup` hook to the `DestinationConnector` contract (`transports/base.py:459`, which today exposes only `send` at `:480`) plus a runner outbound start-path call, mirroring the source seam already at `transports/base.py:436`. |
+| 12 | **#158** | Per-message dynamic FTP host/path/credentials | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real dynamic-destination gap the shipped code closes off at both ends — host/credentials/`remote_dir` freeze at construction (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:626-627`) and `render_filename` is hard-capped to one path component (`messagefoundry/transports/file.py:105-127`), so a data-driven target subdirectory cannot be expressed by a static per-folder connection fan-out nor smuggled through the filename; awkward workaround, not a clean one. Build rides the already-shipped #68 per-message metadata carry (`messagefoundry/pipeline/wiring_runner.py:4526-4531`) plus a multi-component path sanitizer — a setting into one connector. |
+| 13 | **#233** | Steps view move-drop logic implemented twice (model + webview) | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | Silent-divergence class on the three functions that hand line ranges to `lens rewrite` — the drop preview comes from ide/media/stepsWebview.js:68/126/404 and the committed splice from ide/src/stepsModel.ts:1531 with only the model side under fixture test, and the only workaround is reviewing every diff; the fix is a bundled shared module loaded into a `default-src 'none'` webview (ide/src/stepsView.ts:918), with the differential test landing first on its own. |
+| 14 | **#326** | MFA-at-exposure refusal reads `serve_ui` after it is flipped off | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | ASVS 6.3.3's admin-MFA refusal and #189's dual-control warning are both inert in the topology the runbook recommends — the ADR 0143 auto-degrade sets `settings.api.serve_ui = False` in place before `ui_exposed` and `admin_exposed` are derived from it (`messagefoundry/__main__.py`, the flip and the two derivations in one ladder), so the engine calls one instance exposed for 11.7.1 and not exposed for 6.3.3 in a single boot — but `require_mfa` defaults on and `security_loosenings()` still names the explicit opt-out on every boot; re-key `admin_exposed` on the `instance_exposed` predicate already present in the file, fix two `exposure_desc` else-branches, and settle the refuse-on-upgrade fork against `docs/CONFIGURATION.md:1439`. |
+| 15 | **#328** | `audit-verify` cannot detect a truncated audit tail | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | Both shipped verification surfaces call `verify_audit_chain()` bare (`messagefoundry/__main__.py:3596`, `pipeline/engine.py:860`) and the `audit-verify` subparser declares only `--service-config` and `--db` (`__main__.py:571-578`), so a truncated keyed chain — the residue the anchor exists to catch — reports CLEAN with no way for an operator to supply one; the remainder is a new `audit-anchor` subcommand, an `--expected-anchor` flag into the already-present `expected_anchor=` keyword, and an `[integrity]` key for the startup path, with no change to the comparison logic and no store migration. |
+| 16 | **#344** | Fixed wall-clock bounds have drifted out of proportion to the work they bound | 6 | 3 | _quick win_ | P2 | A mechanical margin check would have flagged windows-2025 at 1.006x before #119 died where the manual alternative was published wrong twice, and the shared Windows budget still admits the three-PRs-each-adding-a-minute death nobody is individually at fault for; `_wait_until` already raises with a full dispatcher/store dump citing proposal 6 (`tests/test_stage_dispatcher.py:485-497`) and no margin script exists under `scripts/ci/`, so the remainder is that script — timing the STEP, keyed on the step's own conclusion, against a right-censored max — plus giving `Web console tests (pytest)` its own cap instead of the shared `matrix.step_timeout` at `ci.yml:442`. |
+| 17 | **#169** | Author-appendable per-message processing history | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Genuine MsgAddHistory parity with only an awkward workaround: `message_events` is NOT author-appendable — its writer is engine-only (`messagefoundry/store/base.py:1039-1062`, reachable from `pipeline/` alone) and its `event` vocabulary is a closed frozenset (`messagefoundry/store/store.py:1004-1020`) — leaving `SetMeta` as the sole transform-callable channel, capped at 32 keys / 4096 bytes with last-writer-wins and no timestamp or ordering, so an unbounded append-only history cannot ride it. Build is an append op on the ADR 0081 exactly-once `transform_handoff` template plus an operator surface across three backends. |
+| 18 | **#179** | Archive-aged-rows to separate store | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real CIEArchive parity gap — `RetentionRunner` deletes and never tiers, and the fallback it names is a whole-store snapshot two backends refuse outright; a copy-then-purge step across the store seam, tested on SQLite, PostgreSQL and SQL Server. |
+| 19 | **#248** | Steps view: reclassify comment-only rows as a non-opaque note row | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Three shipped, reproducible defects on the Add-palette's own Comment step — a comment after the last statement renders nowhere (the partition stops at `node.end_lineno`, `messagefoundry/lens.py:19-21`), an adjacent one is swallowed by `_merge_code_rows` (`lens.py:1245`), and none is editable, contradicting `docs/STEPS-PALETTE.md:71`'s "Everything is editable after insert" — though dropping to the `.py` text remains a real if awkward escape; ADR 0076 Amendment A is already ACCEPTED and in force (`docs/adr/0076-typed-action-vocabulary-action-list-lens.md:3`), so the grammar cost is spent, leaving a `note` kind threaded through the partition, the coalescer, `_EDITABLE_KINDS` (`lens.py:1377`) and the IDE JSON contract. |
+| 20 | **#329** | Five `MEFOR_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS` cells bypass the ADR 0092 clamp | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | The LDAPS bind (`ssl.CERT_NONE` on the authentication substrate for every AD identity), the SFTP host key, the webhook sink and the `[ai].api_key` still cross an enforcing production-PHI posture on one env var, and converting them is what collapses five per-site facts into one repo-wide invariant the ASVS scorecard's regex mechanism can actually express — bounded because setting the variable needs Administrator, who can already do worse; the cheap in-gate half shipped with #323, so what remains is threading an explicit posture into `AuthService`/`create_app`'s three out-of-gate constructors, where `_here()` would otherwise ship green and inert. |
+| 21 | **#331** | Anonymizer's fail-closed leak-check has no structural PHI detectors | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | The function that earns the right to share a de-identified dataset verifies a known-string denylist — `leak_check` is `scan_text` (FORBIDDEN patterns, one routable-IPv4 check, estate substrings; `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:772-795`) plus a field-anchored site code, and a real MRN is not a denylisted string — and on a token-less checkout it degrades to the IPv4 check alone over an HL7 body and still returns clean, a gap `f3c6d348` hit in practice with a hand overlay that was never committed; wiring `token_floor_failure()` into the bridge is small, but the unmapped-field report and detectors scoped to fields no rule matched cross the `anonymize` seam and must be mirrored into `tee/anon/leak.py` for `test_anon_parity`. |
+| 22 | **#333** | Per-connection TLS deviations are invisible to the loosening registry | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Build state confirmed OPEN: `tls_allow_expired` appears in none of `config/settings.py`, `api/app.py`, `checks.py`, `__main__.py`; `config/wiring.py:3271` still carries only `accepted_cleartext_hops`; `security_loosenings` at `settings.py:4062` takes the fifth `alerts` parameter #323 added; `transports/database.py:298` still matches `_ODBC_TLS_HINT_RE` against keys only. Value 6 holds. Difficulty 3 prices a copy of #323's precedent and misses that the remainder is not one connector's setting: step 1 inverts a test (`test_database_transport.py:202-212`) that PINS the current DEBUG branch, step 2 needs an inbound name that `config/models.py` Source does not carry (registry plumbing at the construction site), step 4 adds TWO required parameters to `security_loosenings`, breaking all four caller signatures (`api/app.py`, `checks.py`, `__main__.py` x2), step 5 adds sibling advisory CheckResults, step 7 rewrites five DEPLOYMENT.md assertions that become false the moment step 4 lands, and step 8 extends the completeness floor with a connection-scoped arm. That is the rubric's `4` — "a feature across a seam" — not `3`, "a new setting into one connector". Quadrant and tier are unaffected (value 6, difficulty <=5 = quick win, P2). |
+| 23 | **#340** | Enable a GitHub merge queue: strict + no queue makes every merge a race that fails silently | 6 | 4 | _quick win_ | P2 | Build state confirmed: zero of the 21 files under `.github/workflows/` carries a `merge_group:` trigger, so difficulty 4 and the step-2-is-a-precondition reasoning are right. Value 8 is not. The rubric's `8` is "an ASVS L3 Partial on defaults, or a production blind spot with no workaround" — this is neither. It is a repo-workflow blind spot, and a workaround demonstrably exists and is exercised: `gh pr update-branch` (#74 landed via three merges from main, #119 landed via re-sync), plus a detector the project already BUILT for exactly this condition and which the item itself cites — `scripts/ci/check_stalled_prs.py` + `.github/workflows/stalled-prs.yml`. So the readiness signal is not in fact unfalsifiable from outside: a scheduled job reports the stalled set. That makes it "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6, one rung above the rubric's `4` for DX (the item's own cluster is Developer Experience & CI), and 6 is generous for a cluster the ladder caps at 4. At value 6, difficulty 4: quadrant stays quick win, but tier is P2 (P1 needs value >= 8, or value >= 6 at difficulty <= 2 — and this one is 4). |
+| 24 | **#180** | Cross-backend store migration tool | 6 | 5 | _quick win_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real gap — `open_store` picks a backend but nothing moves rows between them (no such subcommand exists in messagefoundry/__main__.py), so the only path discards retained history and audit; an offline row copy that re-wraps every `mfenc` body and reproduces the staged plus history shapes on all three backends. |
+| 25 | **#332** | Release signing toolchain is unhashed | 6 | 5 | _quick win_ | P2 | Arbitrary code from any of ~30 floating transitives at `.github/workflows/release.yml:255` runs with the OIDC identity that then signs the wheel, writes the SLSA attestation and publishes to PyPI — a backdoored artifact carrying a *valid* Sigstore bundle and valid provenance — and no Dependabot ecosystem parses an inline `pip install X==Y`, so the pin rots with no trigger and no owner (the two siblings at `:104` and `:207`, the latter a `~=` range, float identically); the ADR 0034 hashed-lock mechanism is proven and running for `ci-scanners`/`ci-quality`, but `sigstore` is absent from every lock (`grep -c sigstore uv.lock` → 0), adding a seventh is a six-place lockstep edit, the resolve contamination may force the same excluded-by-decision call semgrep got, and no PR leg ever executes this path. |
+| 26 | **#94** | External BLOB-server offload for embedded documents — stored-object pointer (OBX-5 RP) | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | The strongest store-bloat lever for document-heavy feeds with only awkward workarounds (more disk, purge history), and ADR 0105 already reserved the pointer format and deref seam it plugs into (`messagefoundry/parsing/binary.py:55-62` `DOC_REF_MARKER`, shared-seam note at `:252`, content-address contract at `:264-266`); the remainder is still a pluggable BLOB connector family, a per-connection offload setting across three backends, and an ADR fixing where a write side-effect sits against the at-least-once invariant. |
+| 27 | **#96** | Built-in "setup tester" — self-service capacity estimator | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | An adopter-run pre-cutover capacity number has no substitute but the manual dev-harness-plus-TUNING-BASELINE exercise, so a real gap with an awkward workaround. The reuse premise is measured false — `knee` appears in `harness/` only in TOML profile comments and `__main__.py` has no `capacity`/`setup-test` subcommand — so the knee-finder, the non-filling per-step gate, the `/stats` staleness precondition and the isolated-store guard are net-new across CLI + engine + store + metrics: rubric band 6. It is not a 7: there is no 3-backend migration, and ADR 0074 already exists and needs amending, not writing. Quadrant stays big bet. |
+| 28 | **#141** | TCP connection role selectable independently of direction (act-as-server vs act-as-client) | 6 | 6 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | Real firewall role-inversion gap that an external relay (socat/stunnel) works around awkwardly but genuinely, which is why it stays at moderate severity and P2; the outbound half is not a knob — `DestinationConnector` (`transports/base.py:459`) exposes only `send` (`:480`) and every destination dials (`tcp.py:189`, `mllp.py:849`, `x12.py:158`), so a listening outbound needs an accept loop handing a peer socket to the per-outbound delivery worker and reconciled with retry/backoff and the connection-lifecycle status vocabulary. |
+| 29 | **#3** | Per-key (partition-key) message ordering (long-term, nice-to-have) | 6 | 9 | _big bet_ | DEMAND-GATE | The only order-preserving way to push one ordered feed past the ~60 msg/s one-lane-one-core bound; the engine-shard "workaround" is void (shards partition by connection) and the in-engine router-fanout substitute leaves transform serialized, so a real gap with only an awkward workaround. Nothing keyed exists (`partition_key`/`sequence_key`: zero hits in `messagefoundry/`), and keyed lane assignment with single-writer-per-lane over the durable outbox plus the A40 cross-key hazard is multi-week work sitting directly on the strict-FIFO invariant. Quadrant becomes big bet. |
+| 30 | **#334** | semgrep, a required blocking gate, scans a two-directory allow-list | 5 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P2 | `security.yml:413` is still `semgrep --config .semgrep --error --metrics off messagefoundry tee` while bandit next door scans `-r .` at `:359`, and `tests/test_lint_scope_parity.py` — the control cited as stopping exactly this drift — mentions semgrep nowhere, so the project-specific rules directory silently skips the separately-versioned console wheel; bandit and CodeQL cover the sinks today, so this is breadth parity with a live compensating control, and the fix is one argument list mirroring bandit's `--exclude` plus one parity arm modelled on `:119-125`. |
+| 31 | **#81** | Alert escalation tiers + day/time thresholds + content (Action-Point) alerting | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Content-triggered ("Action Point") alerting is genuine Corepoint parity that nothing outside the tests can fire, but the escalation and schedule two-thirds already ship, leaving metadata-only breadth rather than a blocker; the remainder is hoisting `content_match` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/alert_sinks.py:726`) onto the `AlertSink` Protocol (`messagefoundry/pipeline/alerts.py:27`), exporting an emitter a Handler can reach without breaking re-run purity, and surfacing the already-durable `escalation_tier` (`messagefoundry/store/postgres.py:449`) on `AlertInstanceInfo`, which omits it (`messagefoundry/api/models.py:255-275`). |
+| 32 | **#99** | AD/gMSA production-deployment hardening — turnkey enterprise (Windows/AD) install | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Every code half is built — gMSA preflight + logon-right grant (`scripts/service/install-service.ps1:42-46`, `:286-303`), the MFA-claim hook on by default (`config/settings.py:1914`, enforced `:2184`), IIS/ARR and gMSA docs — leaving only (e), a live domain-lab smoke, whose fallback (ship with the caveat, validate at the first deployment) is workable: parity assurance with a clean workaround, value 5. Difficulty is 3, not 6: the residual lands almost no code through ruff/mypy/pytest; its cost is DC + AD CS + gMSA + proxy + joined-client provisioning the project does not own, which this rubric does not price as engineering — and the item's own 2026-07-28 amendment explicitly retires the 6/6 engineering framing. Quadrant becomes fill-in; still DEMAND-GATE behind #275. |
+| 33 | **#125** | Uploaded Logs page - import external message files and browse them offline | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The build-state finding is right (the five routes exist at api/app.py:3685/:3786/:3803/:3889/:3946 and `browse_uploaded_file`'s own docstring says "Returns metadata only — never a decrypted body"), but value 6 rests on the claim that the item's trigger — "inspect a partner-supplied message file without ingesting it" — is "still unserved". It is substantially served: the shipped browse route filters and searches by `content`, `field_path`/`field_value`, `message_type` and `control_id` over the decrypted split, and per-message resend exists, all without live ingest. What is missing is only the body DISPLAY, and for that the workaround is clean, not awkward: the operator personally uploaded the file, so it is already in their hands and readable in any text editor, and `dryrun --show-phi` prints bodies as well. That is rubric 5 — "parity/breadth with a clean workaround" — not 6's "awkward workaround". Difficulty 3 stands (a read-one/download route over the existing encrypted store plus the audited PHI-view treatment and an ADR 0134 amendment). Quadrant becomes fill-in, not quick win; tier is unchanged. |
+| 34 | **#132** | Fixed 'now' test-time override (frozen clock for reproducible transform tests) | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 5 stands (a wall-clock-free transform or a tolerant diff gets regression comparison today — "parity/breadth with a clean workaround"), and the seam claim is verified: `route_message` takes `ingest_time` at dryrun.py:517 and the two internal call sites hardwire `time.time()` at :679 (`_dry_run_raw`) and :753 (`dry_run`). But "a --now flag threaded through two entry points" undercounts the surfaces, and the ones it misses are the ones the item is ABOUT. `checks.py:1058,1126` calls `dry_run(reg, raw, inbound=..., snapshot_on_send=...)` with no ingest_time — and checks.py is the `.expect` fixture comparator, i.e. the repo's actual deterministic-regression gate. `trace_dry_run` is a separate module (`dryrun_trace`, invoked from __main__.py:2926-2931). And the item's own Trigger names the Test Bench: ide/src/testBench.ts shells `dryrun` at five sites (:240, :325, :354, :440) and would need the flag plus an affordance. Engine + CLI + fixture gate + a TypeScript extension is D3 work, not D2's "small additive change on an existing seam". Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
+| 35 | **#172** | Gzip/zip compression codec + file-connector option | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | File-feed parity breadth with a clean code-first workaround: the reusable codec shipped including `zip_compress`/`zip_decompress` (`messagefoundry/parsing/compression.py:40-48`), so a zip-delivering partner is served by a Handler call today. What remains is connector-level — widening `_SUPPORTED_COMPRESSION` (`messagefoundry/transports/file.py:88`), which forces an archive-member-to-message decision, plus REMOTEFILE, which has zero compression to extend. |
+| 36 | **#330** | The IDE's `ai:assist` gate can never fire | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P2 | ADR 0035's SEC-022 `ai:assist` half was never wired — `resolveAiPolicy` omits `getJson`'s token argument (`ide/src/aiPolicy.ts:78`, against the header-when-present at `ide/src/engineClient.ts:141`) so the engine can only ever answer `null` and `docs/AI.md:188` publishes a deny row no code path produces — but no PHI is at risk, the brokered path is server-gated, and the `mode` half still covers the central-off case; TypeScript in one module, ordered so the unconditional cache write at `aiPolicy.ts:79` is guarded before the bearer lands, with the status-bar reader left tokenless or the CWE-613 idle clock becomes unreachable. |
+| 37 | **#336** | Dependabot auto-merge shields review with a deny-list | 5 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Auto-merge still keys only on `update-type == 'version-update:semver-patch'` behind a 16-name Python deny-list with no ecosystem filter, so npm and `github-actions` — artifacts that execute inside CI holding the job's token — have zero shield coverage, and `tests/test_dependabot_automerge_guardrails.py:107-108` still asserts a cooldown for the `uv` ecosystem alone; the remainder is a deny-to-allow inversion in one workflow, a workflow-side release-age check for the cooldown-bypassing security track, and broadening one test. |
+| 38 | **#236** | Test-this-step and test-up-to-step with pinned upstream values | 5 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Real debug breadth — whole-handler traced values already fold onto rows (`mergeLiveValues`, ide/src/stepsModel.ts:544) so partial runs are a convenience, but pinning an expensive `db_lookup`/`fhir_lookup` has no equivalent at all; largely a stop condition plus state dump on ADR 0072's shipped trace, with the lookup mock and keeping `buildLensTraceArgs` (:674) incapable of emitting `--show-phi` the real work. |
+| 39 | **#165** | DB schema browser + ad-hoc query runner | 5 | 5 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity authoring aid whose external-SQL-client workaround is fully clean — the only DB reach today is the `SELECT 1` reachability probe (`messagefoundry/transports/database.py:484-501`) and dry-run refuses `db_lookup` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/dryrun.py:570`); the build is a net-new API surface plus per-dialect introspection, read-only statement gating, a permission, audit and a console pane. |
+| 40 | **#232** | Steps view for routers | 5 | 5 | _fill-in_ | P2 | Real Steps-view breadth gap exactly where destination selection is decided, with a workaround — read a five-line guard-and-return — clean enough to hold it off the top; a `route` row kind widens the ADR 0076 §3 grammar, so an amendment lands first, then `return []` disambiguation in a lens that skips routers outright today (messagefoundry/lens.py:306, :344-347), a router palette, and byte-stable rewrite parity. |
+| 41 | **#78** | Custom message-definition data model + conformance validator; NCPDP codec | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity persisted-definition model plus a report-only validator and an additive NCPDP codec, all cleanly worked around today by a code-first Handler, so useful breadth rather than a blocker; the whole scope is still remainder — NCPDP appears nowhere in `messagefoundry/` and `profile` is merely "reserved for a conformance-profile" (`messagefoundry/parsing/validate.py:56`) — spanning a new stored model the code reads, a validator, and a new codec class. |
+| 42 | **#85** | Cloud object-store + generic message-bus destinations | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-parity transport breadth with a clean workaround — the pluggable destination registry lets an adopter write the connector code-first — and nothing exists today (`transports/` carries no object-store or bus driver; `pyproject.toml` names no boto3/azure/google-cloud/kafka dependency). But the scored remainder is the whole scope: four-plus drivers, four vetted dependencies through the hash-locked lock file, plus credential sourcing and egress allow-listing on each, which exceeds the single-connector band 5. Quadrant becomes money pit. |
+| 43 | **#127** | Web-proxy credential types (Basic / Digest / NTLM / Windows) | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Breadth with a clean, ADR-ratified workaround — `cntlm` in front of the engine covers the enterprise NTLM proxy, and Basic already tunnels through `CONNECT`; the remainder is not a knob but a keep-alive HTTP client under `transports/rest.py`, because `urllib.request` opens a new connection per `open()` and the NTLM type1/2/3 handshake is connection-bound — the refusal is asserted at `messagefoundry/transports/rest.py:993-997` for the same reason #65 scoped it out (`transports/http_auth.py:27-31`), across four connector factories plus an ADR 0126 amendment. |
+| 44 | **#342** | Sandbox worker kill does not reap a grandchild holding the response pipe | 5 | 6 | _money pit_ | P2 | Build state confirmed open: `pipeline/sandbox.py:327` is a bare `proc.kill()` and the module contains no `creationflags` and no `start_new_session`. Value 5 holds — #339's per-dispatch `secrets.token_hex(16)` really does bound this to availability and orphan accumulation on an opt-in posture. Difficulty 5 is the error, and the scorer's own why states the disqualifying fact: the fix "wants verifying on the Windows CI leg". The rubric prices `6` as "cross-cutting ... or Windows-CI-gated", and `5` as "a new connector/codec behind the transport registry" — which this is not. On top of the CI gate, the Windows half has no stdlib API (a kill-on-close job object means ctypes against `CreateJobObject`/`SetInformationJobObject` or a vetted new dependency), and the POSIX half is a different mechanism (`start_new_session` + `killpg`), so it is two platform implementations plus a platform-gated test. At value 5 / difficulty 6 the quadrant is money pit, not fill-in; tier stays P2 (value >= 5). |
+| 45 | **#62** | Binary body carriage — store ciphertext / raw bodies as `VARBINARY`/`BLOB`/`bytea` instead of base64-in-`NVARCHAR` | 5 | 7 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Corepoint-class ~60% at-rest win on SQL Server where the only workaround is a bigger disk, but it is measure-gated and never load-bearing on correctness; a carriage format change that re-opens ADR 0028's NUL-safe str/TEXT decision, needs its own ADR, and drags a dual-read migration over three backends and two live `mfenc:` versions. |
+| 46 | **#130** | Message queues shared by name across connections + shared-name delete protection | 5 | 8 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Parity breadth with a clean workaround — the name-wired graph already fans a router across handlers and a handler across outbounds, and nothing (zero `shared_queue`/`queue_name` hits in `messagefoundry/`) suggests a named queue is needed to express a real feed; building it adds a store seam keyed by name rather than connection, competing consumers claiming under per-lane FIFO, and reference-counted delete, on all three backends without letting the abstraction become the "channel" element CLAUDE.md forbids. |
+| 47 | **#137** | Configurable server display name in the operator console | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 4 is right (console polish; the URL/port already disambiguate, and monitoring.py:508 already renders a "Node id" row, so nobody is blocked), and the stale-module finding is right — there is no messagefoundry/console/, and the live title is `el("title", f"{title} — MessageFoundry")` at _html.py:171. But D2→3 rests on a false premise: "the console never imports the engine, so the label has to ride an API status response rather than being read from settings in-process". The console does not import the engine, yet the engine INJECTS a typed bundle into it at mount time — `mount_ui(app: FastAPI, deps: UiDeps)` (messagefoundry_webconsole/mount.py:69), and `UiDeps` (messagefoundry/api/_ui_seam.py:199) already carries settings-derived display values of exactly this shape, e.g. `organization_domains` (:224) and `oidc_authorization_host` (:231-234), the latter documented as "Derived from settings, never from request input". A server display name is one more UiDeps field plus a read in `page()` — no HTTP boundary crossing, no status-response plumbing. That is D2, "small additive change on an existing seam". Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
+| 48 | **#167** | Test Bench metadata seeding | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | IDE Test Bench DX input to seed the per-message metadata bag for transform tests; nobody is blocked, and the seam is small — a `--meta` flag threaded through `dry_run`/`route_message` (`messagefoundry/pipeline/dryrun.py:512-521`, `:702-709`) into the Test Bench's CLI-only channel (`ide/src/testBench.ts:240`). The bag itself already shipped (#150/ADR 0081, `messagefoundry/config/wiring.py:2604`) but write-only — no `meta_get` on `Message` — which is a clause of this item's OWN trigger, so it holds the tier at DEMAND-GATE without discounting worth-if-built. |
+| 49 | **#171** | Runtime log-verbosity control + in-product log viewer | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Ops convenience whose live-incident use case the built API half already answers — `set_runtime_level`/`current_log_level` (`messagefoundry/logging_setup.py:429`, `:452`) behind `GET`/`PATCH /logging/level` and `GET /logs/tail` (`messagefoundry/api/app.py:4566`, `:4580`, `:4609`); the remainder is pure wiring, since the console JS is already written (`messagefoundry_webconsole/static/app.js:1252`, `:1294`) and only needs a page builder to emit its attributes plus the two absent `/ui` routes and a golden-surface update. |
+| 50 | **#177** | Effective-permission inspector for a user | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The endpoint shipped (`GET /users/{user_id}/permissions`, `messagefoundry/api/auth_routes.py:610`), so the manual `/users`×`/roles` cross-ref the 5 priced is already gone and the remainder is console polish over a built surface; an apiclient wrapper plus a card on the existing `/ui/users/{user_id}` page — whose builder renders only profile/roles/scope/actions (`messagefoundry_webconsole/pages/admin.py:152-158`) — and a golden-surface update. |
+| 51 | **#228** | Steps / config search finds handlers, routers, and transforms by name (not just connections) | 4 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish on an index that already ships — a hit opens source instead of the Steps view and send targets stay unindexed; both are small additive edits, (a) a `contextValue` on rows that already carry `elementKind`/`elementName`. |
+| 52 | **#124** | Batch-export message bodies from a connection log to a file | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Console polish now that the capability itself ships — a scripted operator exports today through the audited step-up route, leaving only the save-selected affordance; the JS is already written (`messagefoundry_webconsole/static/app.js:1380`), so the cost is emitting the `data-mf-*` attributes and row checkboxes in `pages/messages.py` and registering `/ui/messages/export` ahead of `/ui/messages/{message_id}` (`routes/core.py:468`) so the path parameter cannot swallow it. |
+| 53 | **#133** | User-chosen display colour on configuration objects | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 4 ("DX or console polish") is right and the stale-citation finding is right (no messagefoundry/console/ package; the live chrome is _html.py's page() head). But D3→2 rests on "a colour is that same shape [as `flagged`] plus a render", and that is false in a way this codebase enforces. `flagged` is a bool with no rendering sink; a colour is an operator-supplied STRING rendered into console markup, and the /ui CSP is `style-src 'self'` with no 'unsafe-inline' (_security.py:205, _auth.py:141, and app.css:2 states the constraint outright). An inline `style="…"` colour would simply not render, so the build must either bind a fixed palette to CSS classes shipped in app.css or add a nonce'd style mechanism the CSP does not currently grant for styles — a design decision plus value validation on untrusted config input, on top of the config-model → TOML → API → console thread. That is D3 ("a new setting into one connector"-scale work), not D2's "default flip or doc edit"-adjacent band. Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays DEMAND-GATE. |
+| 54 | **#234** | Steps view projection refreshes on save only | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | UX latency on an opt-in authoring surface, not a correctness gap — the rows merely lag the buffer while live values stay correctly save-gated (ide/src/stepsView.ts:327); the debounce already exists at :89, but relaxing a deliberate ADR 0076 §5 guardrail means an amendment plus proving `EditLoopGuard` holds when projection races an in-flight `lens rewrite`. |
+| 55 | **#335** | Control-char scrub misses `exc_text`/`stack_info` | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `ControlCharScrubFilter.filter` still translates only `record.getMessage()` while `RedactionFilter` is the sole toucher of `exc_text`/`stack_info` (`logging_setup.py:124-131`), so a CR/LF traceback can forge a record on the text sink — but `JsonFormatter` escapes C0 regardless, the off-box forwarder defaults to json, and the message-path `exc_info` sites are a handful of non-peer-derived guards, so it is log-record integrity on one sink; the filter already runs last, so the cost is the readability call ADR 0034:146 defers plus tests and an ADR amendment. |
+| 56 | **#343** | Sandbox child stderr is inherited unframed into the engine log stream | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The worker is still spawned `stderr=None` (`pipeline/sandbox.py:266`), so a sandboxed Handler's bytes land in the engine's own log stream unattributed and a `print()` of a body writes PHI at whatever level the operator runs — but the same `print()` under the default `mode=off` reaches the same stream, so the sandbox-specific loss is attribution and the fd-1 framing that survives on luck rather than design; a `stderr=subprocess.PIPE` relay thread through the stdlib logger (inheriting the existing PHI filters) plus a bootstrap redirect of the child's `sys.stdout`, all inside one module. |
+| 57 | **#346** | The sandbox import boundary is enforced only at runtime, under an off-by-default flag | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scorer verified the item's own measurement (`FORBIDDEN_MODULES` appears nowhere under `tests/`, confirmed) and inherited its conclusion — but the conclusion is the part that is false. The item's load-bearing claim is that "a re-violation is invisible to a green suite" because the guard runs only in the child under a non-default flag. `tests/test_sandbox.py` runs REAL `mode=SUBPROCESS` sessions across roughly a dozen tests (`test_subprocess_parity_router_and_handler`, `test_subprocess_marshals_live_store_run_context`, `test_generator_router_routes_under_mode_subprocess`, `test_setstate_tuple_and_nonfinite_values_survive_mode_subprocess`, ...) — the child is genuinely spawned, since the OFF test asserts `off._proc is None` as the distinguishing property. Decisively, `test_response_view_reaches_a_sandboxed_handler` (~:617-645) drives a `CapturedResponse` through a live subprocess round-trip, i.e. the exact violation instance the item is built on would now be caught red by CI. So the compensating control is a live test file, not absent, and the residual narrows to a FUTURE codec type added without an accompanying subprocess-mode test. That is test-coverage hardening = value 4, not "real gap, awkward workaround" = 6. Difficulty 3 stands (an `ast` walker anchored on the constant, falsified against a planted import). At value 4 the tier is P3 (P2 needs value >= 5) and the quadrant is fill-in. |
+| 58 | **#351** | SQL Server failover test asserts on a 0.35s wall-clock margin across a real DB round-trip | 4 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | One observation on one leg, with the 2022 leg passing the same commit and a sibling PR passing both, bounds this to a marginal test whose red misattributes to whichever PR it fires on — the residual worth is settling whether #348's work at the `_acquire` chokepoint merely spent latency the test had no headroom for or tipped a real delay-predicate regression; the edit is confined to one test file, but it cannot be validated locally by default (the SQL Server leg silently skips) and must not be landed as a wider margin before the question is answered. |
+| 59 | **#166** | Server-side per-user console preferences | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Roaming console settings stay polish nobody is blocked on; the cost the 6 priced is gone — the Qt half is retired and #151 already shipped the owner-keyed per-user store + route template (`messagefoundry/store/store.py:1667-1681`), so the remainder is a second additive table across three backends plus web-console wiring, no pipeline. |
+| 60 | **#235** | Generate Steps view parameter forms from Python type hints | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish — the recognized row set is unchanged and only the widgets get richer over the literal-only slots the lens marks today (messagefoundry/lens.py:255); a stdlib `inspect` schema emitter beside the 315-line `actions.py` plus replacing the hand-rolled per-op rendering in a 2,328-line model (`ADD_MENU_CATALOG`, ide/src/stepsModel.ts:886). |
+| 61 | **#237** | Per-argument input modes (static templated dynamic) in the Steps view | 4 | 4 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Authoring polish that renames "not editable" honestly without unlocking a new edit class — dynamic mode stays read-only in v1 by its own sketch; the value classifier is net-new in `lens.py`, then a mode selector on the same form surface #235 rewrites, sequenced behind #233. |
+| 62 | **#108** | Receiver-side 'Prefer BOM if present' encoding auto-detect | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | A configured per-connection `encoding` already covers any single-encoding feed cleanly — it is plumbed through to `normalize(raw, *, encoding=…)` on the hot path (`messagefoundry/parsing/peek.py:152-162`) and accepts `utf-8-sig`/`utf-16-le`/`utf-16-be` — leaving only the niche mixed-BOM override, a niche interop knob; the remainder is a small additive sniff on the decode path, since no UTF-16 byte-order mark is detected anywhere today. |
+| 63 | **#148** | X12 TA1 interchange-acknowledgement generation | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche X12 knob most partners never need — the pyx12 walk yields a conforming 997/999 free (`parsing/x12/validate.py:18`, `:69`), covering the common ack, and only a contract that specifically mandates interchange-level accept/reject reaches for TA1; the build is a pure codec addition beside the existing splitter and delimiters in `messagefoundry/parsing/x12/`, which today contains no TA1 generator at all — only the outbound classifies a partner's returned TA1 (`transports/x12.py:73-74`). |
+| 64 | **#184** | Serve own endpoint WSDL | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche SOAP interop knob with a clean out-of-band-WSDL workaround; a configured document served off the listener's existing GET/HEAD health short-circuit (messagefoundry/transports/http_listener.py:796-797), which already returns before any ingress row. |
+| 65 | **#249** | `lens graph`: mermaid and dot export formats | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `graph --json` already ships (`messagefoundry/__main__.py:156-159`), so a mermaid/dot emitter is convenience over an already-complete surface rather than a capability anyone lacks; two pure-string emitters over the existing graph model, no new dependency and no seam crossed. |
+| 66 | **#338** | TLS key-exchange groups are inherited, not pinned | 3 | 2 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `harden_kex_groups` still returns `None` when `set_groups` is absent, and all three restatements survive the 2026-07-29 sweep — `CONTAINER-EXPOSURE-EVALUATION.md` still says "hardened KEX groups" under a *verification* heading, `BACKLOG.md:6422` still lists 11.6.2 in #200's Closes line against PHI.md's PARTIAL, and `ASVS-L2-PHASE0-CHANGES.md:254` still presupposes a pin — but every group that gets in is forward-secret and the floor plus `harden_cipher_suites` admit nothing static, so this is documentation accuracy plus observability; three doc edits and one additive report-only `SecurityPosture` field beside `fips_attestation()`, with the two tripwire tests left alone as the 3.15 trigger. |
+| 67 | **#83** | Rich file-output disposition + FTPS / SFTP variants | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche file/FTP interop knobs most partners never need, and the ones that bite are transport-side where no Handler can substitute; all of it is per-driver additive on two connectors — `FileDestination` still has no append, dated-subfolder archive or header/trailer framing knob, and `remotefile` is explicit-`FTP_TLS` only with no implicit/passive toggle or keyboard-interactive auth (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:13`, `:256-262`). |
+| 68 | **#98** | Kerberos SSO channel-binding (EPA) opt-in + acceptor-enforcement spike | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Narrow EPA hardening on an opt-in in-process-TLS SSO mode nobody is blocked on, and structurally void behind a TLS-terminating proxy, so a niche interop knob at best; the acceptors are still constructed with no bindings at all (`spnego.server(service=…)` / `spnego.server()` at `messagefoundry/auth/ldap.py:300-302`, `:360-362`, with no `channel_bindings` argument or CBT knob anywhere), so the work is a spike plus one conditional per-mode flag — but the answer needs the same domain lab #99(e) is blocked on. |
+| 69 | **#159** | TCP stream-until-close (no-framing) mode | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche close-framed TCP interop knob: `codec_for` requires both delimiter bytes and `FrameCodec` rejects `start == end` (`messagefoundry/transports/framing.py:62-63`, `:167-170`), so connection-close framing is inexpressible today; a `framing=none` path bypasses the shared codec on the Tcp read loop (`messagefoundry/transports/tcp.py:508-515`) and the destination's write-then-close. |
+| 70 | **#163** | Static-string inbound ACK | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Canned-ACK interop knob most partners never need — `AckMode` offers only original/enhanced/none (`messagefoundry/config/models.py:98-103`) and `build_ack` always assembles MSH+MSA (`messagefoundry/transports/mllp.py:329-350`); a new mode plus a literal setting through wiring into the one MLLP listener, with the synchronous NAK path decided. |
+| 71 | **#178** | SFTP cipher / KEX / MAC allow-lists | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche knob a FIPS-restricted partner needs — `client.connect` passes no `disabled_algorithms` (`messagefoundry/transports/remotefile.py:396-405`), so only host-key posture is operator-configurable. Cost is a new validated operator setting into one connector, and the Scope's second clause (preferred-ordering on the SSH Transport) is not reachable through `SSHClient.connect` — it must be set on the Transport before negotiation, so `_make_client` restructures rather than gaining one kwarg. |
+| 72 | **#181** | Multipart/form-data outbound encoder | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche multipart upload most REST/SOAP partners never ask for and a hand-built Handler body covers; a boundary encoder plus a per-request Content-Type on a connector whose type is fixed at construction (messagefoundry/transports/rest.py:1355), with the collision-checked boundary idiom already written at messagefoundry/transports/dicomweb.py:262-290 to copy. |
+| 73 | **#183** | SOAP MTOM/XOP binary packaging | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche IHE packaging format that base64-inline already serves for any accepting partner; XOP framing is spec-fiddly but confined to one connector's string-concatenated envelope (messagefoundry/transports/soap.py:643-702), with no body signature to disturb and the DICOMweb boundary generator to borrow. |
+| 74 | **#320** | windows-2025 is the slowest CI leg (1.8x-3.5x), but that does not explain the 60/s failures | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The item retracts its own product premise — the CI symptom is absorbed by #115 and a 36-run sweep shows a 1.8x-3.5x latency gap rather than a capacity cliff, leaving only an unexplained red at `rate_start = 60.0` (`tests/test_load_runner.py:150`, `pool_size = 4` at `:120`) and an unverified near-breach of the `read >= sent // 2` floor; the honest next experiment is a concurrent-load arm on the dispatch-only probe that already exists (`harness/load/ingress_probe.py`, `.github/workflows/ingress-rate-probe.yml`), not the self-hosted rig, which `ci.yml:49` records as retired. |
+| 75 | **#337** | handler-security lint: `getattr` indirection and the undecorated helper | 3 | 3 | _fill-in_ | P3 | `_AMBIENT_BARE_NAMES` (`checks.py:476`) still matches a literal name chain and `checks.py` contains no `getattr` resolution at all, and the rule loop still bails on `_message_fn_decorator(node) is None` (`:937`) so the `_<feed>_transforms.py` helper CONNECTIONS.md steers PHI handling into is never opened — but the lint is advisory unless an adopter opts into `--strict-handler-security`, and evading it reaches neither the DEK nor the audit chain in either sandbox posture; ~15 lines splicing a constant into `_dotted_call_name` plus a `phi-to-log` widening that must be recalibrated against the two shipped sample helpers before it lands. |
+| 76 | **#110** | DICOM Study/Series Instance UID de-duplication on the C-STORE SCP | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche DICOM-only study collapse most partners never need, and the SR→HL7 case can already filter to SR objects code-first because `DicomPeek` exposes both UIDs (`messagefoundry/parsing/dicom/peek.py:105-106`), though no pure Router can hold the cross-message state; the remainder is a connector-side seen-UID ledger modelled on the existing durable `processed_files` precedent (`messagefoundry/store/base.py:844`, `prune_processed_files` at `:857`) plus an explicit FILTERED disposition on the suppressed 2..N objects at `_on_c_store`/`_commit` (`messagefoundry/transports/dicom.py:273`, `:368`), tested on all three backends. |
+| 77 | **#113** | Outbound source-IP binding for sender connections | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche interop knob only a source-IP-allowlisting partner on a multi-homed host needs, and OS routing already settles egress selection for everyone else; the bind must reach five dial sites — `transports/tcp.py:189`, `mllp.py:849`, `x12.py:158` via `asyncio.open_connection`, `remotefile.py:259` ftplib and `:396` paramiko, which takes a pre-bound `sock=` rather than a kwarg — plus the TOML/edit allowlists. |
+| 78 | **#182** | Per-message base-address override for web-service senders | 3 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Niche sender-control knob with a clean one-connection-per-address fan-out, and its own severity note rates it minor; the difficulty is a per-message carry key on the ALREADY-SHIPPED ADR 0081 metadata channel — a reserved `http.url`-style key read where `outbound_headers_from_metadata` is read today (rest.py:1373) — plus wiring `consumes_metadata` onto SOAP and a delivery-time SSRF/egress re-check across three HTTP clients. No new store column and no 3-backend change. |
+| 79 | **#131** | Object flagging - mark objects of interest + a Flagged Objects filter | 3 | 7 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Difficulty 7 is right — ADR 0007's amendment declines the universal flag precisely because it needs a name-keyed annotation table across all three store backends, which is literally D7 ("a new ADR plus a 3-backend migration"). Value 2 is not: it rests on "connections are the objects an operator actually lists and filters, leaving only a marker on Routers/Handlers", and that understates the remainder. I read the write path: `Engine.set_connection_flag` (pipeline/engine.py:1401) raises WiringError when the connection is not in connections.toml — "a CODE-FIRST connection has no TOML home, so the console flag is refused there" — and api/app.py:1969-1972 maps that to 409. So the shipped half serves only TOML-managed connections, while this project's default authoring mode for connections is code-first Python, and this item's own Trigger names "an adopter with a LARGE CONFIG REPOSITORY" — exactly the case the shipped half refuses. The remainder is therefore a console-settable flag for code-first connections AND Routers/Handlers, not a cosmetic residue, so it is not "already substantially covered" (=2); it is reduced-scope console polish with partial coverage. Quadrant stays money pit; tier stays DEMAND-GATE per the verdict line. |
+| 80 | **#214** | Intra-message concurrent transform of a message's routed rows | 3 | 8 | _money pit_ | P3 | Marginal residual on a lever an Accepted ADR closed — the transform-overlap half is merged and tested (`_process_routed_batch`, wiring_runner.py:5311), and ADR 0107 (Accepted 2026-07-13, 'authorizes no build. Do not build F2 or F3') bounds the ENTIRE `2H` transaction term this residual removes: arm E measured a ×2.95 swing in committed txn/msg moving throughput −11.7%, elasticity d(ln throughput)/d(ln txn) = −0.115, capping the residual's absolute best case at +13.2% at H=8; the remainder is still a batched multi-row `transform_handoff` on the stage handoff itself, ADR-gated, preserving claim→produce→complete atomicity on three backends. |
+| 81 | **#155** | Server-to-server migration runbook | 2 | 1 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Every constituent step already ships documented — install, backup/restore/DR, decommission at `docs/EARLY-ADOPTER-GUIDE.md` §4/§10/§16 — so the gap is prose stitching, not capability; one new doc that orders them end-to-end, no code. |
+| 82 | **#322** | Synthetic leak-gate placeholders can collide with the real gate's own guards | 2 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scanner ALREADY emits the diagnostic this item asks for. `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:846-856` prints a three-state banner to stderr on every run, before any refusal: `[STRUCTURAL-ONLY: no token source configured]`, `[SYNTHETIC EXAMPLE TOKENS — blind to real customer tokens; CI is authoritative]` (when `is_synthetic_token_set()`), or nothing — alongside `loaded_token_counts()`. `scan-tokens.local.txt.example:23-25` documents that label as the intended discriminator in the very header the item quotes: "The scanner LABELS this set on every run … the label is what does." So the scorer's load-bearing premise — a synthetic-set contributor is hard-blocked "with no diagnostic" — is false at HEAD, and the second half of the item's Proposed ("optionally have the scanner's hit message name the loaded set, so a synthetic false positive is self-diagnosing") is substantially already covered; only its placement (load banner vs. per-hit reason) differs. What genuinely remains is a guidance paragraph in `scan-tokens.local.txt.example` telling a contributor not to build a tracked placeholder from any `[site_prefix]` value in either token set. That is value 2 ("marginal, already substantially covered") and difficulty 1 ("a default flip or doc edit"). Quadrant stays fill-in; tier stays P3, so the ranking impact is ordering within P3, not scheduling. |
+| 83 | **#116** | File-size integrity re-check before disposition | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Marginal additive hardening — the `min_age_seconds` quiescence window (`transports/file.py:728`) plus the single-shot whole-file read already close the partial-write hole this guards; a re-stat before move/delete in FileSource and RemoteFile is a small additive change on an existing seam. |
+| 84 | **#135** | Configurable statistics push / refresh interval | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Marginal tuning knob with no interop dimension — the fixed cadence serves live monitoring fine and no deployment has reported console bandwidth as material; the build is a validated settings field read by the push loop, where the cadence is a single `await asyncio.sleep(1.0)` at `messagefoundry/api/app.py:4945` and `config/settings.py:701` already carries the sibling `ws_allowed_origins`. |
+| 85 | **#173** | Segment/segment-group subtree-copy helper | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | One-call sugar over an API that already does the hard part — `groups()` hands back the span view (`messagefoundry/parsing/message.py:470`) and `add_segment` grafts lines (`:377`), so the 'find the group boundary' boilerplate the item cites is mostly already solved; a small additive helper whose only subtlety is re-encoding across two messages' MSH separators. |
+| 86 | **#174** | Scheduled automatic statistics reset | 2 | 2 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Manual re-snapshot ships (`Engine.reset_stats`, `messagefoundry/pipeline/engine.py:1772-1792`, behind `POST /statistics/reset` at `messagefoundry/api/app.py:2208`) and OTel covers daily volume, so a timer is convenience only; it assembles two shipped primitives — the ADR 0095 timezone-aware `Schedule` and the #160 stdlib cron evaluator — against an existing call. |
+| 87 | **#84** | Diagnostic panes — hex body view + HL7-aware before/after diff + profiling/coverage | 2 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Substantially covered — hex, HL7-aware diff and coverage/profiling panes all ship, so what is left is a true-binary dump nobody is blocked on; the remainder is no longer client-side-only, since the dry-run read path must first surface the wire bytes the pure pane deliberately cannot recover (`ide/src/hexdump.ts:5-10`). |
+| 88 | **#156** | Alert hysteresis (separate fire/clear thresholds) | 2 | 3 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | Anti-flap refinement the shipped `realert_seconds` / per-rule `cooldown_seconds` throttle already damps (`messagefoundry/config/settings.py:2678`, `:2823`), with single-sided `min_depth`/`min_oldest_seconds` matching confirmed at `messagefoundry/pipeline/alert_sinks.py:617-623`; two new AlertRule fields plus clear-edge state in the sink, no store or migration. |
+| 89 | **#105** | Deterministic Corepoint-import tooling — Action-List → code-first scaffold | 2 | 4 | _fill-in_ | DEMAND-GATE | The adopter already hand-ported and the AI `/migrate` covers the rest, with no named demand, so it ships little worth even if finished; the mapper and CLI are built, leaving reconciliation of the emitted mapping against a real Corepoint export and the deferred `ide/` wrapper — behind #313's multi-message Handler model, which this item cannot buy. |
+| 90 | **#122** | Corrupted application-log detection, rollover, and connection-stop | 2 | 6 | _money pit_ | DEMAND-GATE | Value 2 stands — stdout + NSSM rotation, the RFC 5425 TLS syslog forwarder (`_TlsSysLogHandler`, logging_setup.py:281) and #50's disk metering already carry log durability and visibility, so this is marginal and substantially covered. But difficulty 5 prices the wrong shape of work. D5 is "a new connector/codec behind the transport registry" — this is not a connector. logging_setup.py's module docstring (lines 3-13) records that the engine "deliberately do[es] not add file handlers here" because NSSM owns rotation, and `grep FileHandler |
+| 91 | **#64** | Throughput parity with Corepoint — measure-first performance roadmap (group-commit + lean-writes) | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | An index over levers that live in #62/#63/#47/#34, so it ships nothing runnable of its own, and the remainder is reconciling roadmap prose against a measurement that has already run and a lever already abandoned — a doc edit. But the gate this item was demand-gated ON has FIRED (ADR 0051 measure-first complete 2026-07-12; ADR 0099 → ABANDON; ADR 0107 closes Phase 4), so the DEMAND-GATE override no longer applies and the tier derives from the score: P3, fill-in. |
+| 92 | **#238** | OpenFlow step-attribute completeness pass over the engine vocabulary | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | Ships nothing runnable — the output is a findings note, and the item itself concedes most attributes are already covered engine-side under other names (retry/timeout in connector and delivery semantics), with OpenFlow compatibility explicitly declined under ADR 0076 §7 and #26; a read of seven attributes against the vocabulary and a short write-up. |
+| 93 | **#352** | Consult on enterprise AV coverage for SFTP- and file-connector ingest from outside the domain (ASVS 5.4.3 premise check) | 1 | 1 | _fill-in_ | P3 | The scan seam is real — `set_scan_hook` at `transports/file.py:802`, `scan_inbound_file` at `:828`, called via `asyncio.to_thread` from `transports/remotefile.py:901` — so the citations hold. The scoring does not. The rubric's value floor is written for exactly this item: `1` ships nothing runnable. The scorer's own why closes with "the deliverable is one conversation and its recorded answer, no code", which is self-refuting against a value of 6 ("real gap, awkward workaround" — there is no gap being closed here and nothing to work around; there is a question being asked). Worth-if-built for a consult item is the answer, and the answer alone changes no shipped behaviour; if it comes back "no", the WORK that follows (reopening 5.4.3, or shipping an ICAP-backed scan control) is a different, unfiled item that would carry its own score. Difficulty 1 is right. At value 1 the quadrant is fill-in and the tier is P3; the verdict "consult, then decide" is not one of the three DEMAND-GATE verdicts, so no override applies. |
 
 ---
 
@@ -1540,6 +1541,20 @@ lane; demand-gated on a first enterprise Windows/AD deployment.
 
 > **On-trigger / demand-gate.** Numbered for tracking only — build when the trigger below fires (“demand-gate, don’t schedule”).
 
+> ⚠️ **AMENDED 2026-08-04 — the hardware blocker has an EXPIRY DATE now.** This item is gated on a
+> controlled multi-VM lab that the project did not own; one is ~2 weeks out as of 2026-08-04, so any
+> sentence below saying the rig is unavailable, unregistered or not the project's to provide is
+> **true today and scheduled to become false**. Do not read it as a permanent block. Tracked by
+> **[#1003](#1003-validate-the-lab-and-discharge-the-four-hardware-gated-residuals)**, which fires on
+> *lab available for validation* and carries this item's run: its residual is the live domain-lab gMSA / SSO / reverse-proxy smoke, and that is the ONLY thing left on this item.
+
+> ⚠️ **AMENDED 2026-08-04 — the hardware blocker has an EXPIRY DATE now.** This item is gated on a
+> controlled multi-VM lab that the project did not own; one is ~2 weeks out as of 2026-08-04, so any
+> sentence below saying the rig is unavailable, unregistered or not the project's to provide is
+> **true today and scheduled to become false**. Do not read it as a permanent block. Tracked by
+> **[#1003](#1003-validate-the-lab-and-discharge-the-four-hardware-gated-residuals)**, which fires on
+> *lab available for validation* and carries this item's run: it needs the same real DC + AD CS the #99 smoke does.
+
 **Cluster:** Connections & Transports. **Priority:** P3. **Verdict:** demand-gate. **Severity (vs Corepoint):** minor.
 
 **Scope:** A receiver-side option where a byte-order mark detected on the incoming file overrides the connection's configured encoding (notably UTF-16 LE/BE).
@@ -2659,6 +2674,13 @@ Wall time (the cleaner signal — all three still ingest everything up to 300/s)
 > ⚠️ **AMENDED 2026-08-03 — the "no negative test" premise is false; the detector-coverage half of Proposed 2 is already in the tree.** The item says "Today no test asserts the detectors can see a site code at all, which is why the hole was invisible", but `tests/test_scan_forbidden.py` carries per-class hit tests for at least the site code (`:126`), a customer name (`:83`), a case-sensitive code (`:91`) and a routable IP (`:107`), plus the boundary and skip-suffix controls at `:136` and `:152`, with the structural classes covered separately in `tests/test_scan_tokens_source.py` (`:539`, `:559`). ⚠️ **What those tests cannot prove is exactly what this item is about.** They monkeypatch a **synthetic** site-code pattern over `SITE_CODE_RE` / `_SITE_CODE_FILE` (`:50-52`, `:66-67`), so they exercise the machinery and never the loaded token set — and with no prefix loaded both detectors fall back to the always-failing sentinel `_NEVER` (`scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py:111`, `:453-454`). **Both remaining halves stand untouched:** the owner-run token data (Proposed 1) and the prefix-free estate-identifier shape backstop (Proposed 3) — the committed structural detectors are at least the routable-IPv4 pattern, `_WORKTREE_SLUG` (`:92`) and `_HOME_PATH` (`:99`), none of which match that shape. The item's own two anchors still resolve exactly (`scan_forbidden.py:10-12`, `:119`).
 
 
+> ⚠️ **AMENDED 2026-08-04 — the hardware blocker has an EXPIRY DATE now.** This item is gated on a
+> controlled multi-VM lab that the project did not own; one is ~2 weeks out as of 2026-08-04, so any
+> sentence below saying the rig is unavailable, unregistered or not the project's to provide is
+> **true today and scheduled to become false**. Do not read it as a permanent block. Tracked by
+> **[#1003](#1003-validate-the-lab-and-discharge-the-four-hardware-gated-residuals)**, which fires on
+> *lab available for validation* and carries this item's run: its decisive experiment needs a registered self-hosted WS2025 runner, which the lab supplies.
+
 **Cluster:** Security / Supply chain. **Priority:** P1. **Verdict:** build. **Severity:** medium.
 
 **What:** `scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py` does **not** detect the estate tokens that were sitting in `docs/BACKLOG.md` items #226/#228 until `f3c6d348` removed them — a six-digit ported-estate site code embedded in a feed-module identifier (`IB_FILE_HR_Materials_<site>_MFN.py`, `xform_<site>_to_erp_mfn`) and a partner ECG product name. Measured 2026-08-01 against the **real** token set (`loaded names=7, estate=13, estate_file_scanned=12, site_prefixes=1` — the CI-authoritative load, not the synthetic example):
@@ -3746,6 +3768,13 @@ The distinction matters because these two paths do not look like the case AV cov
 
 > 🚧 **Status OPEN (filed 2026-08-02).** Value **4/10** · Difficulty **3/10** · _fill-in_. `tests/test_cluster_failover_sqlserver.py::test_preferred_delay0_wins_expired_lease_race_over_delayed_node` sleeps `_TTL + 0.15` so the lease is expired by ~0.15s, then requires a node carrying a **0.5s** acquire handicap to be rejected. Correctness therefore rests on **less than 0.35s of wall clock** elapsing between the sleep and `dr._maintain_leadership()` — across a real SQL Server round-trip, on a shared CI runner. Observed failing as `assert dr.is_leader() is False → assert True is False`.
 
+> ⚠️ **AMENDED 2026-08-04 — the hardware blocker has an EXPIRY DATE now.** This item is gated on a
+> controlled multi-VM lab that the project did not own; one is ~2 weeks out as of 2026-08-04, so any
+> sentence below saying the rig is unavailable, unregistered or not the project's to provide is
+> **true today and scheduled to become false**. Do not read it as a permanent block. Tracked by
+> **[#1003](#1003-validate-the-lab-and-discharge-the-four-hardware-gated-residuals)**, which fires on
+> *lab available for validation* and carries this item's run: its patch has never been executed against a real SQL Server, and the `_acquire` latency question it reserves needs a benchmark rather than a lease-election test.
+
 **Cluster:** Testing & CI. **Priority:** P3. **Verdict:** triage — **do not "fix" by widening the margin until the question below is answered.** **Severity:** medium (a red that reads as the PR's own defect), unknown (likelihood: one observation).
 
 **The discriminating evidence.** On the **same commit**, the `sql server (store + connector) 2022` leg PASSED while `2025` FAILED. A genuinely broken delay predicate would fail on both — that logic is backend-version independent. The job log also states `Command failed with exit 1 (not a native crash) — not retrying`, so this is **not** the pyodbc 3.14 segfault and its retry mitigation is not involved. Across the last 12 runs it was the **only** sql-server-leg failure, and a sibling PR on the same `main` passed both legs — so it is **not** repo-wide either.
@@ -3791,3 +3820,33 @@ Each was filed as its own defect, which is right. What none of them establishes
 **Related:** #334, #327, #325, #321 (instances of the class); #322 (a synthetic control colliding with the real gate's own detectors — the trap this work must avoid creating); #353 (an ungated compliance artifact, same "nothing compares it to the record" shape).
 
 **Source:** the two-dot `backlog-hygiene.yml` defect found 2026-08-03 while making the number-space gates span an archive, and escalated by the coordinator session on the ground that it outlives the PR that fixed it — *"it was a required gate, not an advisory one."*
+
+## 1003. Validate the lab and discharge the four hardware-gated residuals
+
+> 🔢 **Filed 2026-08-04 — not started.** Value **7/10** · Difficulty **4/10** · _quick win_. Four open items are blocked on the same missing thing — a controlled multi-VM environment — and each currently asserts a premise that expires when it arrives; the work is the validation runs themselves, which are bounded, already specified by the items they discharge, and need no new design.
+
+**Cluster:** Testing & CI. **Priority:** P2. **Verdict:** build when the trigger fires. **Severity:** medium (four items are parked on a blocker that is about to stop existing, and their own text will keep saying otherwise).
+
+**Trigger:** the lab is **available for validation** — reachable, with VMs provisionable. **Not** "lab validated": proving the lab does what these items need is this item's own first deliverable, so gating on validation would mean the trigger can never fire.
+
+**Scope.** Two halves, in order.
+
+1. **Validate the lab against what the residuals actually require** — a real Domain Controller, AD CS, a gMSA, a registered self-hosted Windows runner, and a real SQL Server instance. Each is a precondition of a specific item below; an environment that is merely *up* is not one that can discharge them. Record what was stood up and what was verified, because "the lab exists" and "the lab can answer question X" are different claims and only the second unblocks anything.
+2. **Run the four residuals** and record their results.
+
+**What it discharges** (each already fully specified in its own item — this item adds no new design):
+
+| Item | The run | What it needs |
+|---|---|---|
+| **#99** | the live domain-lab gMSA / SSO / reverse-proxy smoke — the **only** residual left on that item | real DC + AD CS + gMSA |
+| **#98** | Kerberos SSO channel-binding (EPA) opt-in + acceptor-enforcement spike | same gate as #99 |
+| **#320** | the decisive windows-2025 capacity sweep, currently blocked because the runner is unregistered (`actions/runners` → `total_count: 0`) | a registered self-hosted WS2025 runner |
+| **#351** | execute the failover patch against a real SQL Server, **and** measure ADR 0159's `_acquire` cost — the question that item reserves | a real SQL Server |
+
+⚠️ **#351's measurement is the one that is easy to lose.** Its patch makes the test deterministic, which removes the only thing currently raising the latency question. The item says plainly that a lease-election test is the wrong instrument for discovering latency — so the measurement belongs here, as a benchmark or an explicit budget assertion, not there. Landing the patch without doing this drops the question rather than answering it.
+
+**Why this is not a roadmap umbrella.** Its deliverables are runs with recorded outcomes, not an index of other work — the distinction that scored #64 a 1/10. It ships something: a validated lab, four discharged residuals, and the corrected trigger text below.
+
+**Also, and it is the part that rots if nobody does it:** four items assert a premise that becomes false the moment the lab lands. #99 says its residual is *"rig/provisioning the project does not own"*; #320 says its experiment is blocked on an unregistered runner. Left alone, those sentences keep telling every future planning pass that the work is unreachable — the same stale-premise rot the 2026-07-28 reconcile found on five items and the 2026-08-03 re-score found on twenty-four. Each of the four gets its trigger line amended in this item's first commit, whether or not the runs have started.
+
+**Source:** owner, 2026-08-04 — a server for multi-VM testing is ~2 weeks out.
diff --git a/docs/releases/SCHEDULABLE-BACKLOG-MULTISESSION-PLAN.md b/docs/releases/SCHEDULABLE-BACKLOG-MULTISESSION-PLAN.md
index e62d2bb6..cbb0cf9b 100644
--- a/docs/releases/SCHEDULABLE-BACKLOG-MULTISESSION-PLAN.md
+++ b/docs/releases/SCHEDULABLE-BACKLOG-MULTISESSION-PLAN.md
@@ -172,6 +172,16 @@ Every hotspot is held to **one owner per wave**. Banner positions verified on di
 - **One worktree / branch / `.venv` per session:** `scripts/worktree/new.ps1 -Name plan-<lane>` ([docs/WORKTREES.md](../WORKTREES.md)), branched off **`origin/main` @ `1cf04732`** (`git fetch` first — this worktree's HEAD is `857a70d4`). **Never branch off a sibling session's branch**, even when its work looks like a prerequisite: the only hard dependency in this plan (#233 → #237) is satisfied by #233 being **merged to `origin/main`**, not by branching from it. Re-check in-flight ownership before starting: `git worktree list`, `gh pr list --state all`, `git log origin/main`.
 - **Every session updates its own item's BANNER in `docs/BACKLOG.md` — and nothing else in that file.** Write the 🚧 in-progress claim naming the lane **before** writing code, in its own commit; flip to ✅/⛔/🪦 when the work lands. Edits are **line-disjoint per banner** (positions in §C) and the **owner serialises the merges within a wave**. **One `> <glyph>` banner per item; CLOSED must never coexist with OPEN.** The 🚧 claim is the *only* signal that stops a sibling worktree double-building the same item — neither the worktree gate nor the ledger gate catches duplicated work.
 
+- ⬆️ **§D RULE 1 AMENDED 2026-08-04 BY OWNER RULING — the ranked table and the four census lines are NOT owner-only.** They are recomputed by **whoever writes the ledger last**, from **open-bannered headings** (see the unit correction below), never carried forward and never delta-adjusted. The ownership clause in RULE 1 below is superseded; everything else in it stands.
+
+  **Superseded on the owner's decision, not on an inter-session agreement.** That distinction is the whole reason this amendment is legitimate and an earlier attempt at the same edit was not: a previous branch reversed this clause on the strength of a working agreement between sessions that existed in no committed document, and was rightly refused — a commit behind an uncommitted agreement makes a contested rule *look* settled, and this is a dispatch document, so every lane inherits whatever it says. The argument did not change. The authority did.
+
+  ⚠️ **This is only safe because two other corrections landed first, and it should not be applied without them.** Sessions recomputing was the *weaker* option before them:
+  - the unit is **open-bannered headings**, not rows — rows over- and under-count in opposite directions and can cancel, so a total that adds up proves nothing;
+  - the re-derivation is **one operation with the stale-banner sweep** — otherwise a session publishes a false-open as a measured count.
+
+  Owner-only was never the safer alternative on correctness. It leaves the census knowingly stale whenever the owner is away, and it does not fix the laundering problem either — an owner re-deriving from stale banners publishes exactly the same false-open.
+
 - **RULE 1 — the live ranked table (`docs/BACKLOG.md:180-272`) and the Distribution census (`:169-171`) are OWNER-ONLY. No session touches either, in any wave, for any reason.** The table holds **93** rows — one per open item, contiguous and one line each — and the plan's 41 schedulable items are **interleaved among them**, so wave-mates land inside git's 3-line merge context (W1 alone: `:180`/`:182`, `:191`/`:192`, `:208`/`:209`, `:233`/`:234`); the census is a single 4-line hunk every session would rewrite, and two sessions each re-deriving it from a tree the other already decremented **merge clean and publish a wrong count**. Both surfaces are *derived*: `:165` states it outright — **"the banner is the live record. This table is a view of it, and where the two disagree the banner wins."** So sessions move the record, and **the owner runs ONE reconcile pass per wave, after that wave's merges**, re-deriving the affected rows and recomputing all four census lines in a single commit. A session that believes its row is now false says so **in its PR body**; it does not edit the row.
 
   **When the owner is absent and a session must recompute the census itself: RE-DERIVE all four lines from the table as it stands, never apply a delta.** Two sequential recomputes-from-source cannot disagree, whatever order they land in. Two sessions each applying their own delta can — and the result merges clean and reads as current, which is the exact failure the file's own *"recomputed with the table, never carried forward"* rule exists to prevent. Do not hand another session a delta to carry, and do not accept one: carrying a number instead of deriving it reintroduces the carried-forward census under a different name. (Recorded because it was tried on 2026-08-03. One session offered a delta so the two passes would agree; the other refused it and was right.)