[Security] mcp server HTTP transport exposes local file read and SSRF when bound to a routable interface

[CharmingGroot]

Follow-up from @rng1995's review on #36:
#36 (review)

"the streamable-HTTP transport is unauthenticated … If an operator binds it to a routable interface, an unauthenticated caller could request file:///… or a local path and get file contents reflected back in findings/report (local file disclosure), or use it to drive outbound fetches (SSRF)."

The skillspector mcp --transport http command ships without authentication. The README advertises it for "remote / A2A callers" via --host, but any unauthenticated caller that reaches the endpoint can:

• Pass file:///etc/passwd or an arbitrary local path as target and get file contents reflected back in findings / report (local file disclosure)
• Pass an internal URL as target to drive outbound fetches from the host (SSRF)

Over stdio or 127.0.0.1 this is the same trust boundary as the CLI and is safe. Binding to a routable interface without an authenticating proxy in front is where the risk materializes.

Proposed Fix

1. Add a trust-model warning to the docs: HTTP transport ships without auth; sit it behind an authenticating proxy before any public exposure.
2. When running over HTTP, reject file:// and bare local paths in target, or gate them behind an explicit --allow-local-paths flag.