Add draft project security threat-model document

Adds a draft project-level security threat-model document
(draft-THREAT-MODEL.md) at repo root, improving discoverability
for automated security scanners running against this repository.
The file follows the rubric format used by several other ASF
projects piloting security-model discoverability.

The "draft-" prefix signals this is a proposal for the PMC to
review, correct, or reject — not a finalised maintainer-blessed
model. Every claim carries a provenance tag (documented /
inferred / maintainer) so reviewers can see where each claim
originates; §14 collects open questions for the maintainers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: potiuk

draft-THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+<!--
+  Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+  or more contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file
+  distributed with this work for additional information
+  regarding copyright ownership.  The ASF licenses this file
+  to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+  "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+  with the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+  Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+  software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+  "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+  KIND, either express or implied.  See the License for the
+  specific language governing permissions and limitations
+  under the License.
+-->
+
+# Apache CloudStack Go SDK Security Threat Model — delta (draft)
+
+> **Delta document.** This document is a delta over the canonical
+> `apache/cloudstack` threat model. It inherits §3 (out-of-scope),
+> §4 B1 (API trust boundary), and §7 (adversary model) from the
+> main model. It restates only what `apache/cloudstack-go` uniquely
+> introduces. Read the main model first.
+
+## §1 Header
+
+- **Project:** Apache CloudStack Go SDK (`apache/cloudstack-go`) — Go
+  client library that calls the `apache/cloudstack` JSON API.
+- **Commit:** `358fe85` (HEAD of `main` at draft time).
+- **Date:** 2026-05-29.
+- **Authors:** ASF Security team draft, awaiting CloudStack PMC review.
+- **Status:** Draft delta over `cloudstack-threat-model-draft.md`.
+- **Version binding:** as of the commit above. The SDK's release line is
+  versioned independently of the management-server release line
+  *(documented: `README.md` — "SDK releases tagged based on the ACS
+  version")*.
+- **Reporting:** same as the main model — `security@apache.org`.
+- **Provenance legend:** as in the main model.
+- **Draft confidence:** 9 documented / 0 maintainer / 11 inferred.
+
+**About the project.** `cloudstack-go` is a generated-then-curated Go
+library that wraps every CloudStack JSON API command in a typed
+parameter struct and a typed response *(documented: `README.md`,
+`generate/generate.go`)*. Its main moving parts: an HMAC-SHA1 signer
++ HTTP client (`cloudstack/cloudstack.go`) and one `<Service>.go` file
+per API service group (Account, Address, VirtualMachine, …) generated
+from `generate/listApis.json` against the latest stable CloudStack
+release (currently v4.18.x baseline) *(documented: `README.md`)*.
+
+## §2 Scope and intended use
+
+**Primary intended use.** *(documented — README)* In-process import by
+a Go program that wants to drive a CloudStack management server. The
+embedding application instantiates a client with `NewClient(endpoint,
+apiKey, secretKey, verifySSL)` or `NewAsyncClient(…)`, then issues
+typed API calls.
+
+**Deployment shape.** Always in-process; the SDK is a library, never
+a daemon.
+
+**Caller expectations.** The caller is trusted to:
+
+- choose the management-server endpoint URL,
+- supply a valid `apiKey` + `secretKey` pair,
+- pass `verifySSL = true` *unless* connecting to a known dev cluster
+  using a self-signed CloudStack Root CA cert,
+- not source any of the above from end-user input.
+
+**Component-family table.**
+
+| Family | Representative entry | Touches outside the process? | In this delta? |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Client + signer (`cloudstack/cloudstack.go`) | `NewAsyncClient`, signer in `cs.sign(params)` | **yes — network + creds** | yes |
+| Per-service generated wrappers (`cloudstack/<Service>.go`, ~600 services) | `cs.VirtualMachine.DeployVirtualMachine(…)` | inherited from client | yes |
+| Code generator (`generate/`) | reads `generate/listApis.json` and emits `cloudstack/*.go` | host filesystem at generation time | **out of model** *(§3)* — generator output is in-model, generator itself is build-time tooling |
+| `examples/` | `examples/AddHost.go`, `examples/CreateDeleteDomain.go`, `mock_test.go` | network | **out of model** *(§3)* |
+| `test/`, `ci/` | tests + CI scaffolding | varies | **out of model** *(§3)* |
+| `cloudstack/*_mock.go` | generated mocks | none | **out of model** *(§3)* |
+
+## §3 Out of scope (explicit non-goals)
+
+The main model's §3 applies in full. **Additional** out-of-scope items
+specific to the SDK:
+
+1. **Storage of `apiKey` / `secretKey` on disk.** Where the caller
+   chooses to persist credentials is out of model. *(inferred — Q1)*
+2. **Server-side correctness of the management server's response.** If
+   the management server returns wrong data, the SDK forwards it; the
+   SDK is not a re-verification layer. *(inferred — Q2)*
+3. **TLS transport configuration.** When the caller passes `verifySSL =
+   false` (the fourth `NewAsyncClient` argument), the SDK explicitly
+   sets `InsecureSkipVerify: true` *(documented:
+   `cloudstack/cloudstack.go` line ~216
+   `TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: !verifyssl}`)*.
+   That is a documented caller-supplied weakening; reports of "the SDK
+   permits TLS verification to be disabled" are `OUT-OF-MODEL:
+   trusted-input` because the caller chose it.
+4. **`examples/`, `cloudstack/*_mock.go`, `test/`, `ci/`.**
+5. **The four sibling repos** — `apache/cloudstack`,
+   `apache/cloudstack-cloudmonkey`, `apache/cloudstack-terraform-provider`,
+   `apache/cloudstack-kubernetes-provider`. Covered by their own models.
+
+## §4 Trust boundaries and data flow
+
+The only boundary the SDK contributes is **the embedded application's
+call into `NewAsyncClient` (or `NewClient`) and subsequent typed API
+calls**. Bytes the caller passes — endpoint, `apiKey`, `secretKey`,
+verifySSL, per-method parameters — are caller-controlled config and not
+attacker-controlled per the main-model §7 adversary set.
+
+The bytes that come *back* from the management server (JSON responses)
+are trusted control-plane content per the main model's B1 transition.
+
+**Per-call request shape** *(documented: `cloudstack/cloudstack.go`
+lines ~547–575)*:
+
+- the SDK forces `signatureversion=3`, which mandates an `expires`
+  parameter (good — see main-model §5a "api.signature.version" row);
+- the SDK computes HMAC-SHA1 of the lowercase-sorted parameter string
+  under `secretKey` (`crypto/hmac` + `crypto/sha1`);
+- the signature is base64-encoded and placed in either the POST body
+  or the URL (when `HTTPGETOnly` is set);
+- when `HTTPGETOnly = true`, the SDK constructs the URL as
+  `baseURL + "?" + paramString + "&signature=" + url.QueryEscape(sig)`
+  — note the signature lands in the *URL* (and thus the access log /
+  reverse proxy log) for GET requests *(inferred — Q3)*.
+
+## §5 Assumptions about the environment
+
+- **Go version**: per `go.mod` (`go 1.x`) — confirm with maintainer
+  *(inferred — Q4)*.
+- **TLS**: provided by `crypto/tls` from the Go stdlib; verification
+  default is on, weakened only by the explicit `verifyssl=false` caller
+  choice.
+- **Transport**: `net/http` with stdlib defaults; no connection pool
+  sharing across `cloudstack.Client` instances *(inferred — Q5)*.
+- **Concurrency**: `cloudstack.Client` is intended to be safe for
+  concurrent use *(inferred — Q5)*.
+- **What the SDK does not do to its host**: no global state mutation,
+  no signal handlers, no env-var consumption (credentials are passed
+  in via the constructor, not read from env). *(inferred — Q6)*
+
+## §5a Build-time and configuration variants
+
+| Knob | Default | Stance | Effect |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `verifyssl` arg to `NewClient` / `NewAsyncClient` | passed-in *(no default)* | calling with `false` is documented for dev / self-signed-CA setups | when `false`, `InsecureSkipVerify: true` is set in the TLS config |
+| `cs.HTTPGETOnly` | `false` *(inferred — Q3)* | the Kubernetes / Terraform satellites set this `true` to force GET, which inlines signatures in the URL | when `true`, requests are GET with signature in URL |
+| async timeout via `cs.AsyncTimeout(…)` | `300s` default *(inferred — Q7)* | bounds how long async jobs are polled | timeout exhaustion returns an error, not a hang |
+
+## §6 Assumptions about inputs
+
+| Entry point | Parameter | Attacker-controllable in the model? | Caller must enforce |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `NewClient` / `NewAsyncClient` | `endpoint`, `apiKey`, `secretKey`, `verifyssl` | **no** — operator config per §3 item 1 | sanity-check the endpoint URL; do not source from end-user input |
+| Per-service typed call (e.g. `VirtualMachine.NewDeployVirtualMachineParams`) | typed params | **no** — typed params come from the embedding app's own logic | the embedding app applies its own user authn/authz before constructing params |
+| HTTP response | JSON body | trusted as far as the management server is trusted | bytes are JSON-decoded into typed responses |
+
+## §7 Adversary model
+
+Main-model §7 applies. **Adjustments specific to the SDK**:
+
+- The "unauthenticated network peer reaching `:8080`/`:8443`" actor is
+  *upstream* of the SDK and not in scope for SDK code.
+- An additional adversary worth naming: **a passive observer of HTTP
+  access logs / reverse-proxy logs** when `HTTPGETOnly = true`. The
+  signature lands in the URL and thus in any log that records URLs.
+  Whether this is a §10 caller responsibility or a §11 misuse is the
+  Q3 ruling. *(inferred — Q3)*
+
+## §8 Security properties the SDK provides
+
+### S1 — HMAC-SHA1 signature with `signatureversion=3`
+
+- **Property.** Every API call carries a v3 signature with an `expires`
+  parameter, computed via `crypto/hmac` + `crypto/sha1` over the
+  canonical parameter string. *(documented: `cloudstack/cloudstack.go`
+  lines ~547–575)*
+- **Conditions.** Caller supplied a valid `secretKey`.
+- **Violation symptom.** A request leaves the SDK without a signature,
+  or with a signature derived from input outside the canonical
+  parameter string.
+- **Severity.** Security-critical, `VALID` per main-model §13.
+
+### S2 — TLS verification on by default
+
+- **Property.** The HTTP client uses stdlib TLS defaults; verification
+  is on unless the caller passes `verifyssl = false`.
+- **Conditions.** Caller did not pass `verifyssl = false`.
+- **Violation symptom.** TLS verification skipped despite `verifyssl =
+  true`.
+- **Severity.** Security-critical, `VALID`.
+
+### S3 — Constant-time secret-handling at the signer
+
+- **Property.** *(inferred — Q8)* The SDK does not compare secrets, so
+  the question is whether the signer leaks the secret via timing /
+  branch-predictable paths. The Go `crypto/hmac` is the only consumer.
+- **Conditions.** as above.
+- **Violation symptom.** Side-channel recovery of `secretKey`.
+- **Severity.** Security-critical if reachable; otherwise `OUT-OF-MODEL`
+  per main-model §7 side-channel exclusion.
+
+## §9 Security properties the SDK does *not* provide
+
+- **No protection of `apiKey` / `secretKey` at rest.** The caller decides
+  where to store them. *(inferred — Q1)*
+- **No defence when `verifyssl = false`.** Explicit caller-supplied
+  TLS-verification disablement.
+- **No retry / rate-limit / circuit-breaker by default.** The async
+  client polls; that is the only built-in scheduling.
+- **No re-validation of management-server response correctness.**
+- **No log-redaction of signatures or credentials by the SDK.** If the
+  embedding application logs request URLs (which would include the
+  signature when `HTTPGETOnly = true`), the signature ends up in the
+  log. *(inferred — Q3)*
+
+### False-friend properties
+
+- **`HTTPGETOnly = true` is a transport choice, not "more secure".** It
+  forces signatures into the URL where they will appear in any URL log.
+- **"HMAC-SHA1" is not a SHA1-broken construction.** Collision attacks
+  on SHA1 do not extend to HMAC-SHA1. Reports flagging "SHA1 is
+  deprecated" against the signer are `KNOWN-NON-FINDING` per the main
+  model's §11a.
+
+## §10 Downstream responsibilities
+
+The embedding Go application MUST:
+
+1. Pass `verifyssl = true` unless connecting to a known dev cluster.
+2. Source `apiKey` / `secretKey` from a secret store, not from
+   user-controlled input.
+3. Not log full request URLs when `HTTPGETOnly = true`.
+4. Apply its own timeouts and retries on top of the SDK as appropriate.
+5. Use the SDK version matched to the management-server version
+   *(documented: README — "SDK releases tagged based on the ACS
+   version")*.
+
+## §11 Known misuse patterns
+
+- Calling `NewAsyncClient(endpoint, key, secret, false)` in production
+  (TLS verification disabled).
+- Embedding credentials in source / build artifacts.
+- Using `HTTPGETOnly = true` *and* shipping URL logs off-host.
+- Using a mismatched SDK / server major version and assuming the
+  request shape will still verify.
+
+## §11a Known non-findings (recurring false positives)
+
+- **"HMAC-SHA1 — SHA1 is deprecated."** → `KNOWN-NON-FINDING` per main
+  model §11a.
+- **"`InsecureSkipVerify: true` is hardcoded."** It is gated by the
+  caller-supplied `verifyssl` argument. → `OUT-OF-MODEL: trusted-input`.
+- **"Signature appears in URL."** Only when caller sets `HTTPGETOnly =
+  true`. → `OUT-OF-MODEL: non-default-build` if `false` is the default
+  per Q3. Else escalate.
+- **"Examples in `examples/` have weak input handling."** Out of
+  scope. → `OUT-OF-MODEL: unsupported-component`.
+
+## §12 Conditions that would change this delta
+
+- Change in default signing algorithm in the main model (SHA1 → SHA256).
+- Change in `HTTPGETOnly` default or new option that affects signature
+  placement.
+- Addition of credential storage to the SDK.
+
+## §13 Triage dispositions
+
+Use the same table as the main model.
+
+## §14 Open questions for the maintainers
+
+**Q1.** Out-of-scope: where the caller stores `apiKey` / `secretKey`
+on disk. Confirm.
+
+**Q2.** Out-of-scope: revalidating management-server response
+correctness in the SDK. Confirm.
+
+**Q3.** `HTTPGETOnly` default and signature-in-URL leakage — is `false`
+the default and is "do not log URLs when `HTTPGETOnly = true`" a
+documented caller responsibility? *(maps to §5a, §6, §10, §11a)*
+
+**Q4.** Confirm the Go MSRV.
+
+**Q5.** Concurrency: is `cloudstack.Client` documented as safe for
+concurrent use across goroutines? Is the underlying `http.Client`
+shared or per-call?
+
+**Q6.** Confirm the §5 negative side-effect inventory: no env-var
+consumption, no signal handlers, no global mutation.
+
+**Q7.** Confirm `AsyncTimeout` default.
+
+**Q8.** Constant-time / side-channel posture at the signer — confirm
+the SDK delegates entirely to Go stdlib `crypto/hmac` and makes no
+additional claim.
+
+**Q9.** Meta — should this delta document live in `apache/cloudstack-go`
+at `docs/threat-model.md`, or only on the website?