diff --git a/packages/gatekeeper-cloudflare/src/cloudflare.ts b/packages/gatekeeper-cloudflare/src/cloudflare.ts
index cdfd03dd..b3bc3b14 100644
--- a/packages/gatekeeper-cloudflare/src/cloudflare.ts
+++ b/packages/gatekeeper-cloudflare/src/cloudflare.ts
@@ -123,7 +123,10 @@ export default {
     } else if (relPath === "/oauth") {
       const error = url.searchParams.get("error");
       if (error) {
-        return new Response(`${error}: ${url.searchParams.get("error_description")}`);
+        // Security fix: Set Content-Type to text/plain to prevent XSS via reflected parameters
+        return new Response(`${error}: ${url.searchParams.get("error_description")}`, {
+          headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" },
+        });
       }
       const state = url.searchParams.get("state");
       if (!state) return new Response("Error: no 'state' provided");
diff --git a/packages/mcp-shared/src/endpoint.ts b/packages/mcp-shared/src/endpoint.ts
index 94b705f7..4fa8e642 100644
--- a/packages/mcp-shared/src/endpoint.ts
+++ b/packages/mcp-shared/src/endpoint.ts
@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ const BLOCKED_HOST_PATTERNS = [
 // spellings of the same address: `http://2130706433/` and `http://0x7f000001/` are both 127.0.0.1,
 // and `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` is its IPv4-mapped IPv6 form. Each becomes dotted-quad.
 function normalizeHost(hostname: string): string {
+  // Security fix: Strip IPv6 zone IDs and handle IPv4-compatible IPv6 to prevent SSRF bypass
+  hostname = hostname.replace(/(%25|%)[^\]]+\]$/, "]");
+  const compat = /^\[::([^\]]+)\]$/i.exec(hostname);
+  if (compat && compat[1].includes(".")) {
+    hostname = compat[1];
+  }
+
   // `URL` rewrites an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address into hex groups, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` arrives as
   // `[::ffff:7f00:1]` and the dotted-quad spelling is never what we see.
   const mapped = /^\[::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})\]$/i.exec(hostname);
@@ -41,6 +48,20 @@ function normalizeHost(hostname: string): string {
     return [high >>> 8, high & 0xff, low >>> 8, low & 0xff].join(".");
   }
 
+  // Security fix: Parse each octet individually to handle mixed/hex/octal dotted notation
+  const octets = hostname.split(".");
+  if (octets.length === 4) {
+    const parsedOctets = octets.map(octet => {
+      if (/^0[xX][0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(octet)) return parseInt(octet, 16);
+      if (/^0[0-7]+$/.test(octet)) return parseInt(octet, 8);
+      if (/^(0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/.test(octet)) return parseInt(octet, 10);
+      return NaN;
+    });
+    if (parsedOctets.every(o => Number.isInteger(o) && o >= 0 && o <= 255)) {
+      return parsedOctets.join(".");
+    }
+  }
+
   // A bare integer (decimal, hex, or octal) is a valid IPv4 address to most resolvers.
   const asInteger = /^(?:0[xX][0-9a-fA-F]+|0[0-7]*|[1-9][0-9]*)$/.test(hostname)
     ? Number(hostname)
diff --git a/packages/mcp-shared/src/tools.ts b/packages/mcp-shared/src/tools.ts
index 6895d185..7143a679 100644
--- a/packages/mcp-shared/src/tools.ts
+++ b/packages/mcp-shared/src/tools.ts
@@ -159,9 +159,14 @@ function defuseFences(text: string): string {
 // and headings are neutralized, the text is capped, and the rest is block-quoted.
 function quoteUntrusted(text: string, max: number): string {
   const cleaned = defuseFences(text)
+    // Security fix: strip HTML tags and bidirectional control chars to prevent injection/spoofing
+    .replace(/<[^>]*>/g, "")
+    .replace(/[\u200E-\u200F\u202A-\u202E\u2066-\u2069\u061C]/g, "")
     // Repeated, since one strip leaves `##` as `#` -- still a heading, at heading weight, in the
-    // prompt the approver reads.
+    // prompt the approver reads. Also strip horizontal rules and strikethrough.
     .replace(/^[ \t]*[#>]+[ \t]*/gm, "")
+    .replace(/^[ \t]*(?:-{3,}|\*{3,})[ \t]*/gm, "")
+    .replace(/~~/g, "")
     .trim();
   const clipped = cleaned.length > max ? `${cleaned.slice(0, max)}\u2026` : cleaned;
   return clipped.split("\n").map(line => `> ${line}`).join("\n");