Publish Advisories

GHSA-c2c9-mfw7-p8hw
GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg

Author: advisory-database[bot]

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-c2c9-mfw7-p8hw/GHSA-c2c9-mfw7-p8hw.json

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-c2c9-mfw7-p8hw",
-  "modified": "2026-05-20T15:45:19Z",
+  "modified": "2026-06-22T22:21:47Z",
   "published": "2026-05-20T15:45:19Z",
-  "aliases": [],
+  "aliases": [
+    "CVE-2026-56268"
+  ],
   "summary": "Flowise: Cross-Workspace Chatflow Disclosure via chatflows/apikey Endpoint Returns All Unprotected Chatflows",
   "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey` endpoint (whitelisted, accessible with API key auth only) returns all chatflows bound to the provided API key AND all chatflows across the entire system that have no API key assigned. This crosses workspace boundaries, allowing a user in Workspace A who has a valid API key to read the full configuration (including flowData, chatbotConfig, system prompts, and node configurations) of chatflows from Workspace B, Workspace C, and all other workspaces, as long as those chatflows have no API key assigned.\n\n## Details\n\nThe controller at `packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts:90-107` validates the API key and calls the service:\n\n```typescript\nconst getChatflowByApiKey = async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {\n    try {\n        const apikey = await apiKeyService.getApiKey(req.params.apikey)\n        if (\\!apikey) {\n            return res.status(401).send(\"Unauthorized\")\n        }\n        const apiResponse = await chatflowsService.getChatflowByApiKey(apikey.id, req.query.keyonly)\n        return res.json(apiResponse)  // Returns full chatflow objects with flowData\n    } catch (error) {\n        next(error)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe service at `packages/server/src/services/chatflows/index.ts:223-245` builds the database query:\n\n```typescript\nconst getChatflowByApiKey = async (apiKeyId: string, keyonly?: unknown): Promise<any> => {\n    const appServer = getRunningExpressApp()\n    let query = appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(ChatFlow)\n        .createQueryBuilder(\"cf\")\n        .where(\"cf.apikeyid = :apikeyid\", { apikeyid: apiKeyId })\n    if (keyonly === undefined) {\n        // When keyonly is not set (default), also return ALL chatflows with no API key\n        query = query.orWhere(\"cf.apikeyid IS NULL\").orWhere(\"cf.apikeyid = ''\")\n    }\n    const dbResponse = await query.orderBy(\"cf.name\", \"ASC\").getMany()\n    return dbResponse  // Returns full ChatFlow entities including flowData\n}\n```\n\nWhen `keyonly` is not provided as a query parameter (which is the default case), the query expands to include:\n- All chatflows bound to the provided API key (same workspace, expected behavior)\n- ALL chatflows with `apikeyid IS NULL` (any workspace, no workspace filter)\n- ALL chatflows with empty `apikeyid` (any workspace, no workspace filter)\n\nThere is NO `workspaceId` filter in this query. The response includes the full `ChatFlow` entity, which contains:\n- `flowData` - the complete workflow graph including system prompts, model names, internal URLs, custom code\n- `chatbotConfig` - chatbot configuration including allowed origins\n- `apiConfig` - API configuration and override settings\n- `textToSpeech` / `speechToText` - TTS/STT configuration including credential IDs\n- `analytic` - analytics configuration\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Attacker has a valid API key for Workspace A\nAPI_KEY=\"<attacker-workspace-a-api-key>\"\n\n# Step 2: Query the chatflows/apikey endpoint WITHOUT keyonly parameter\n# Returns the attacker chatflows PLUS all chatflows without API keys from ALL workspaces\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/\" | jq \".[].workspaceId\"\n\n# Step 3: With keyonly parameter, only chatflows bound to the API key are returned\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/?keyonly=true\" | jq \".[].workspaceId\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cross-Workspace Information Disclosure**: A user in any workspace can read the full configuration of chatflows from all other workspaces that do not have an API key assigned. This breaks workspace isolation.\n- **Intellectual Property Exposure**: System prompts, custom function code, and workflow architecture of chatflows from other workspaces/organizations are exposed.\n- **Credential Reference Leakage**: The `textToSpeech` and `speechToText` fields include credential IDs, which can be abused via the TTS generate endpoint.\n- **Amplified by Default**: Most chatflows are created without an API key assigned (API keys are opt-in), so the majority of chatflows in a multi-workspace deployment are affected.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd workspace scoping to the `getChatflowByApiKey` query by passing the API key workspace ID and filtering the OR clause:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/services/chatflows/index.ts\nconst getChatflowByApiKey = async (apiKeyId: string, keyonly?: unknown, workspaceId?: string): Promise<any> => {\n    const appServer = getRunningExpressApp()\n    let query = appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(ChatFlow)\n        .createQueryBuilder(\"cf\")\n        .where(\"cf.apikeyid = :apikeyid\", { apikeyid: apiKeyId })\n    if (keyonly === undefined && workspaceId) {\n        // Only include unprotected chatflows from the SAME workspace\n        query = query.orWhere(\n            \"(cf.apikeyid IS NULL OR cf.apikeyid = :empty) AND cf.workspaceId = :workspaceId\",\n            { empty: \"\", workspaceId }\n        )\n    }\n    const dbResponse = await query.orderBy(\"cf.name\", \"ASC\").getMany()\n    return dbResponse\n}\n```",
   "severity": [

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg.json

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg",
-  "modified": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
+  "modified": "2026-06-22T22:21:14Z",
   "published": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
-  "aliases": [],
+  "aliases": [
+    "CVE-2026-56266"
+  ],
   "summary": "Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass, XSS, JS Execution",
   "details": "### Summary\n\nMultiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.\n\n### Vulnerabilities\n\n#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)\n\nThe `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.\n\n#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nWebhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.\n\n#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)\n\nThe monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.\n\n**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket `/monitor/ws` endpoint.\n\n#### 4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)\n\nURLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via `innerHTML` without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.\n\n**Fix:** Server-side `html.escape()` on URL and error storage. Client-side `escapeHtml()` wrapper on all `innerHTML` template injections.\n\n#### 5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)\n\nThe `/execute_js` endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server's browser with `--disable-web-security` enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.\n\n**Fix:** Disabled by default via `CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED` env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed `--disable-web-security` from default browser args.\n\n#### 6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)\n\nThe JWT signing key defaults to `\"mysecret\"` in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.\n\n**Fix:** Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.\n\n#### 7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nThe primary crawl entry points (`/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/md`, `/llm`) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.\n\n**Fix:** Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. `raw://` URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)\n2. Set `CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN` to enable authentication\n3. Set a strong `SECRET_KEY` (min 32 chars) if using JWT\n4. Restrict network access to the Docker API\n\n### Credits\n\n- Jeongbean Jeon - file write, SSRF, monitor auth bypass, stored XSS\n- wulonchia - file write via output_path (independent report)\n- by111 ([August829](https://github.com/August829)) - hardcoded JWT, eval in /config/dump, /execute_js, hook sandbox escape\n- secsys_codex - SSRF via /md, /crawl, /llm endpoints + IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass (URL destination validation)\n- Velayutham Selvaraj ([LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/velayuthamselvaraj)) - SSRF via missing host validation in validate_url_scheme (independent report)\n- IcySun & Yashon - SSRF, arbitrary file write, missing-auth-by-default, hook sandbox bypass via asyncio (independent report)",
   "severity": [