diff --git a/fc-crashes.md b/fc-crashes.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a257e7966ba --- /dev/null +++ b/fc-crashes.md @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +# Force-close fuzzer LDK crashes + +Minimized crash sequences found by the chanmon_consistency fuzzer with +force-close support. All crashes are `debug_assert` or `panic!` inside +LDK, not in the fuzzer harness. Byte 0 encodes monitor styles (bits +0-2) and channel type (bits 3-4: 0=Legacy, 1=KeyedAnchors). + +## 1. channelmonitor.rs:2727 - HTLC input not found in transaction + +``` +debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some()); +``` + +When resolving an HTLC spend, the monitor searches for the HTLC +outpoint in the spending transaction's inputs but doesn't find it. +Falls back to index 0 in release mode, which would produce incorrect +tracking. + +Minimized (17 bytes): +``` +0x40 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xdc 0xde 0xff +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x40: Legacy channels, no async monitors. The sequence is +mostly 0xff (settlement) repeated, with height advances (0xdc, 0xde) +near the end. This suggests the crash happens during settlement when +processing on-chain HTLC spends after repeated settlement attempts. + +## 2. onchaintx.rs:913 - Duplicate claim ID in pending requests + +``` +debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none()); +``` + +The OnchainTxHandler registers a claim event with a claim_id that +already exists in the pending_claim_requests map. + +Minimized (10 bytes): +``` +0x08 0xd2 0x70 0x70 0x71 0x70 0x10 0x19 0xde 0xff +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x08: KeyedAnchors channels, no async monitors. +- 0xd2: B force-closes the A-B channel +- 0x70/0x71: disconnect/reconnect peers +- 0x10, 0x19: process messages on nodes A and B +- 0xde: advance chain 200 blocks +- 0xff: settle + +B force-closes, peers disconnect and reconnect, messages are exchanged, +then height advances and settlement triggers the duplicate claim. + +## 3. onchaintx.rs:1025 - Inconsistent internal maps + +``` +panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map"); +``` + +The OnchainTxHandler detects that its `pending_claim_requests` and +`claimable_outpoints` maps are out of sync. + +Minimized (14 bytes): +``` +0x00 0x3c 0x11 0x19 0xd0 0xde 0xff 0xff 0x19 0x21 0x19 0xde 0x26 0xff +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x00: Legacy channels, all monitors completed. +- 0x3c: send hop payment A->B->C (1M msat) +- 0x11, 0x19: process messages to commit HTLC on A-B +- 0xd0: A force-closes A-B +- 0xde: advance 200 blocks +- 0xff: settle (first round) +- 0xff: settle again (second round, processes more messages) +- 0x19, 0x21, 0x19: continue processing B and C messages +- 0xde: advance 200 more blocks +- 0x26: process events on node C +- 0xff: settle (third round) + +A hop payment partially committed, then A force-closes. Multiple +settlement rounds with continued message processing in between triggers +the internal map inconsistency. + +## 4. test_channel_signer.rs:395 - Signing revoked commitment + +``` +panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={}") +``` + +The test channel signer is asked to sign an HTLC transaction for a +commitment number that has already been revoked. + +Minimized (18 bytes): +``` +0x22 0x71 0x71 0x71 0x71 0x71 0x71 0x71 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xff 0xde 0xde 0xb5 0xff +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x22: Legacy channels, async monitors on node B. +- 0x71: disconnect B-C peers (repeated, only first effective) +- 0xff: settle (repeated 6 times) +- 0xde 0xde: advance 400 blocks +- 0xb5: restart node B with alternate monitor state +- 0xff: settle + +Async monitors on B with peer disconnection, repeated settlements, +height advances, and a node restart with a different monitor state. +The stale monitor combined with the restart puts B's signer in a state +where it's asked to sign for an already-revoked commitment. + +## 5. channelmanager.rs:9836 - Payment blocker not found + +``` +debug_assert!(found_blocker); +``` + +During payment processing, the ChannelManager expects to find a +specific blocker entry for an in-flight payment but it's missing. + +Minimized (13 bytes): +``` +0x00 0x3c 0x11 0x19 0x11 0x1f 0x19 0x21 0x19 0x27 0x27 0xde 0xff +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x00: Legacy channels, all monitors completed. +- 0x3c: send hop A->B->C (1M msat) +- 0x11, 0x19, 0x11: commit HTLC on A-B +- 0x1f: B processes events (forwards HTLC to C) +- 0x19, 0x21, 0x19: commit HTLC on B-C +- 0x27, 0x27: C processes events (claims payment) +- 0xde: advance 200 blocks +- 0xff: settle + +A straightforward A->B->C hop payment that completes normally (C +claims), followed by a height advance and settlement. No force-close +in this sequence, so the height advance before settlement may cause +HTLC timeout processing that conflicts with the claim path. + +## 6. channelmanager.rs:19484 - Monitor update ID ordering violation + +``` +debug_assert!(update.update_id >= pending_update.update_id); +``` + +A ChannelMonitorUpdate has an update_id that is less than a pending +update's id, violating the expected monotonic ordering. + +Minimized (10 bytes): +``` +0x84 0x70 0x11 0x19 0x11 0x1f 0xd0 0x11 0x1f 0xba +``` + +Byte 0 = 0x84: Legacy channels, no async monitors, high bits set +(bits 3-4 = 0, bits 7 and 2 set). +- 0x70: disconnect A-B peers +- 0x11, 0x19, 0x11: process messages (likely reestablish after setup) +- 0x1f: process B events +- 0xd0: A force-closes A-B channel +- 0x11: process A messages +- 0x1f: process B events +- 0xba: restart node B with alternate monitor state + +A force-close followed by continued message/event processing and a +node B restart triggers a monitor update with an out-of-order ID. diff --git a/fuzz/.gitignore b/fuzz/.gitignore index e8dc6b6e08b..cc3f5f53040 100644 --- a/fuzz/.gitignore +++ b/fuzz/.gitignore @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ hfuzz_target target hfuzz_workspace corpus +artifacts \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/FC-INFO.md b/fuzz/FC-INFO.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1293fcdcedb --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/FC-INFO.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# Force-Close Fuzzing Notes + +This file records the current contract for `chanmon_consistency` force-close +coverage. It is intentionally short. Keep branch history and one-off debugging +notes elsewhere. + +## Goal + +Force-close fuzzing here should: + +- exercise realistic off-chain to on-chain transitions +- keep force-close from changing the eventual outcome of claimed payments +- only allow claimed-payment sender failures when force-close dust touched a + used payment path +- allow unclaimed HTLCs to resolve by CLTV timeout +- drive the harness far enough that it observes real terminal outcomes +- avoid manufacturing timeout wins by starving message delivery or claim + propagation + +## Hard-Mode Invariant + +The current hard mode is: + +- once the harness calls `claim_funds`, that HTLC must eventually produce + `PaymentClaimed` at the receiver +- after that claim, the sender must eventually produce a terminal outcome, + `PaymentSent` or `PaymentFailed` +- if the sender produces `PaymentFailed` for a claimed payment, some used + force-close path for that payment must have been dust-trimmed +- force-close dust on a used path is not, by itself, enough to require + `PaymentFailed`; the payment may still end in `PaymentSent` +- if no used force-close path for the claimed payment was dust-trimmed, the + sender must eventually produce `PaymentSent` +- going on-chain does not create any broader exception than that dust case +- unclaimed HTLCs may still fail by CLTV expiry +- CSV waits on force-close outputs are normal and expected; they are not + payment outcome changes +- a payment disappearing from `list_recent_payments()` is not enough, the + harness must observe or drive the terminal outcome directly + +In this mode, the following are harness failures: + +- `HTLCHandlingFailed::Receive` after we already chose to claim the HTLC +- a receiver-side claim without the receiver later getting `PaymentClaimed` +- a claimed HTLC without any sender-side terminal event +- a claimed HTLC getting `PaymentFailed` without any dust-trimmed used + force-close path +- a claimed HTLC that should fulfill resolving by CLTV timeout instead +- cleanup stopping while live balances or other pending work still show that + more progress is possible + +## Timeouts + +Do not conflate CSV and CLTV: + +- CSV is normal force-close settlement latency +- CLTV expiry changes the HTLC outcome + +The harness should keep driving through CSV waits. It should only protect +claimed HTLCs that should still fulfill from CLTV-expiry resolution. + +## Harness Rules + +The main rules for preserving the invariant are: + +- advance large height jumps one block at a time, with bounded draining before + and after each block +- process queued messages and events before confirming newly broadcast + transactions, so preimages can propagate before timeout paths win +- keep sender-side payment bookkeeping independent of + `list_recent_payments()` +- track which channels each payment actually used, and when force-closing, + snapshot which used payment paths become dust-blocked on the closer's + commitment +- keep driving while `ClaimableOnChannelClose`, HTLC-related claimable balances, + queued messages, pending monitor updates, or pending broadcasts still show + unresolved work +- only stop before a CLTV boundary when crossing it would let a claimed HTLC + that has not yet reached a sender terminal event expire instead +- do not hide pending-payment state behind unrelated auto-driving before an + explicit force-close opcode; a bounded pre-close drain is acceptable when it + is only making already-queued work visible + +## Review Checklist + +When changing this harness, verify: + +- claimed HTLCs still require `PaymentClaimed` +- claimed HTLCs still require a sender-side terminal event +- claimed HTLCs only allow `PaymentFailed` when some used force-close path was + dust-trimmed +- claimed HTLCs without dust-trimmed used force-close paths still require + `PaymentSent` +- unclaimed HTLCs may still time out on-chain +- force-close opcodes still act on the currently pending state +- large synthetic height jumps do not become blind timeout buttons again +- sender-side obligations are not reconciled away through local caches + +## Verification + +The standard check is: + +```bash +~/repo/rl-tools/run_fuzz_runner.sh --timeout-secs 20 +``` + +Re-run the full corpus after any meaningful force-close harness change. diff --git a/fuzz/ONCHAINTX-BUGS.md b/fuzz/ONCHAINTX-BUGS.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0cb1b397bbe --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/ONCHAINTX-BUGS.md @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +# Recent `OnchainTxHandler` Bugs And Fixes + +This note records the three `OnchainTxHandler` bugs that were fixed while +hardening the `chanmon_consistency` force-close corpus. + +Both bugs lived in `lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs`. Both were real +logic issues, not harness-only artifacts. Both now pass in targeted +reruns and in the full `chanmon_consistency` corpus sweep. + +Current green reference runs: + +- Targeted duplicate-claim rerun: + `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776537725/summary.txt` +- Targeted contentious-claim rerun: + `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776538115/summary.txt` +- Targeted duplicate pending-claim-event rerun: + `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776586956/summary.txt` +- Full corpus rerun: + `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776587008/summary.txt` + +Full-corpus result: + +- `392 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out / 0 spawn_errors` + +## 1. Duplicate pending claim request after force-close + +### Repro cases + +- `fc_duplicate_pending_claim_request_after_force_close_39b47f` + - bytes: `0fd37373d0b2ffd3` +- `fc_duplicate_pending_claim_request_after_force_close_ed278d` + - bytes: `08d37373d0b2ffd3` + +### What went wrong + +The failing shape was: + +1. A force-close created two single-outpoint claim requests. +2. Those requests were merged into one delayed package because their + timelock was still in the future. +3. A later replay of `update_claims_view_from_requests` at the same + logical state recreated the same two single-outpoint requests. +4. The old dedupe logic only rejected a duplicate delayed claim if the + outpoint sets were exactly equal. +5. Because the existing delayed claim had already been merged into a + two-outpoint package, the new single-outpoint requests were not seen + as duplicates. +6. At the timelock height, the same aggregated delayed package was + restored twice and tried to register the same `ClaimId` twice. + +The crash was the debug assertion in `OnchainTxHandler`: + +- `assertion failed: self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none()` + +Representative evidence from +`fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776537612/logs/fc_duplicate_pending_claim_request_after_force_close_ed278d.log`: + +- line `1829`: `Updating claims view at height 61 with 2 claim requests` +- line `1830`: delayed until timelock `361` +- line `2077`: the same `2 claim requests` appear again +- line `17163`: delayed package restored at timelock `361` +- lines `17164` and `17167`: the same two-outpoint event is yielded twice +- line `17169`: assertion failure + +The same pattern appears in the sibling repro +`fc_duplicate_pending_claim_request_after_force_close_39b47f`. + +### Why the old logic was wrong + +Before the fix, delayed-claim dedupe effectively asked: + +- "Do I already have a delayed package with exactly the same outpoint + set as this new request?" + +That was too strict. Once two single-outpoint requests had already been +merged into one delayed package, replaying either single-outpoint +request should have been considered duplicate as well. + +The correct question is: + +- "Is every outpoint in this new request already covered by an existing + delayed package?" + +### The fix + +In `OnchainTxHandler::update_claims_view_from_requests`, the delayed +claim dedupe was changed from exact package equality to covering-package +detection. + +Relevant code: + +- `lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs`, `timelocked_covering_package` +- log line for this path: + `Ignoring second claim for outpoint ..., we already have one which + we're waiting on a timelock at ...` + +In practical terms: + +- a fresh single-outpoint request is now ignored if a delayed package + already contains that outpoint +- replaying the same logical claim state no longer creates duplicate + delayed packages +- the delayed package is restored only once at the timelock height + +### Why this fix is correct + +This does not suppress any legitimate new claim. It only rejects a +request whose entire outpoint set is already represented in pending +delayed state. If a request introduces a truly new outpoint, it still +passes through. + +### Verification + +Targeted rerun: + +- `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776537725/summary.txt` +- result: `2 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out` + +## 2. Contentious claim reused an already resolved outpoint + +### Repro cases + +- `fc_contentious_claim_stuck_after_force_close_218996` + - bytes: `89ffde3d3dc0d3ff` +- `fc_contentious_claim_stuck_after_force_close_36a22e` + - bytes: `2cffde3d3dc0d3ff` +- `fc_contentious_claim_stuck_after_force_close_d7793e` + - bytes: `76ffde3d3dc0d1ff` + +### What went wrong + +The failing shape was: + +1. An HTLC output was claimed on-chain by a single-outpoint claim. +2. That claim matured past `ANTI_REORG_DELAY`. +3. `OnchainTxHandler` removed the pending claim tracking for that + outpoint. +4. A later preimage update arrived and built a fresh two-outpoint claim + that included the already-resolved outpoint again. +5. That new claim could never confirm, because one of its inputs had + already been definitively spent. +6. The handler kept RBF-bumping that impossible claim forever, leaving a + claimed payment stuck pending in the harness. + +Representative evidence from +`fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776537816/logs/fc_contentious_claim_stuck_after_force_close_d7793e.log`: + +- line `3173`: `Updating claims view at height 60 with 1 claim requests` +- line `3175`: registers claim for + `cc0e...:2` +- line `3282`: removes tracking for `cc0e...:2` after the claim package + matured +- line `3424`: `Updating claims view at height 66 with 2 claim requests` +- line `3425`: yields a new event spending + `cc0e...:1` and `cc0e...:2` +- lines `3426` and `3427`: registers both outpoints again +- lines `4438`, `5380`, `6322`, and many later lines: keeps yielding + RBF-bumped events for that same impossible two-input claim +- line `21640`: final harness failure, + `Node 2 has 1 stuck pending payments after settling all state` + +The same family reproduced in the other two named cases. + +### Why the old logic was wrong + +Removing an outpoint from `claimable_outpoints` after its claim matured +was not enough. That only said: + +- "we no longer need to actively track this pending request" + +It did not preserve the stronger fact: + +- "this outpoint is definitively spent and must never be re-claimed" + +Without that second fact, a later preimage could cause +`update_claims_view_from_requests` to resurrect an already-resolved +outpoint into a new claim package. + +### The fix + +`OnchainTxHandler` now maintains a restart-safe +`irrevocably_spent_outpoints: HashSet`. + +Relevant code paths: + +- field definition: + `lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs` +- serialization and deserialization: + the new optional TLV field in `write` and `read` +- request filtering: + `Ignoring claim for outpoint ..., it was already irrevocably spent by + a confirmed claim transaction` +- maturation handling: + outpoints are inserted into `irrevocably_spent_outpoints` when a claim + or contentious outpoint reaches the anti-reorg threshold + +This matters for restarts as well. The spent-outpoint memory is part of +the serialized `OnchainTxHandler` state, so a monitor reload does not +forget that the output was already definitively resolved. + +### Why this fix is correct + +Once a claim tx for an outpoint has reached `ANTI_REORG_DELAY`, the +handler should never generate a new claim for that same outpoint unless +the chain reorgs deep enough to invalidate the confirmation. That is +exactly the invariant the new set captures. + +The fix is intentionally narrow: + +- it does not suppress still-live outpoints +- it does not interfere with normal package splitting or merging +- it only blocks claim generation for outpoints that were already + irreversibly resolved + +### Verification + +Targeted rerun: + +- `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776538115/summary.txt` +- result: `3 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out` + +## 3. Duplicate pending claim event after force-close + +### Repro cases + +- `fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close` + - bytes: `2934ff3dc0d1b6ff` +- `fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close_zero_fee_commitments` + - bytes: `3f34ff3dc0d1b6ff` + +### What went wrong + +The failing shape was: + +1. A force-close path yielded an `OnchainClaim::Event`. +2. `OnchainTxHandler` inserted that event into `pending_claim_events` + under its `ClaimId`. +3. Before the original pending event was drained, the same logical claim + was rebuilt and yielded again. +4. The initial insertion path still assumed that duplicate `ClaimId` + entries could never happen there. +5. That path pushed a second entry with the same `ClaimId` and hit the + debug assertion that the count had to be zero. + +The crash was the debug assertion in `OnchainTxHandler`: + +- `debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(), 0);` + +Representative evidence from +`fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776584834/logs/crash-4b5e6aabf5bc0467bcd2163cced7d60241d24f17.log`: + +- line `3544`: yields an on-chain event spending the commitment output +- line `3545`: registers the associated claim request +- line `3679`: later rebuilds claims view with one fresh claim request +- line `3680`: yields another on-chain event for HTLC output + `513872...:2` +- line `3681`: assertion failure while inserting the second event with + the same `ClaimId` + +The sibling zero-fee-commitments repro follows the same shape in +`crash-a83289388ca2b4f52279218f3a70e0f1f0661a92.log`, with the same +panic at `onchaintx.rs:944`. + +### Why the old logic was wrong + +`pending_claim_events` was already being treated like a keyed queue in +other parts of `OnchainTxHandler`: + +- rebroadcast logic replaced existing entries by `ClaimId` +- bump logic replaced existing entries by `ClaimId` +- reorg logic replaced existing entries by `ClaimId` + +Only the initial insertion path still assumed uniqueness and pushed +blindly. That left the structure with inconsistent semantics depending +on which path happened to enqueue the event. + +The correct invariant is: + +- there is at most one pending event per `ClaimId` +- re-enqueuing the same logical claim should replace the older entry, + not panic + +### The fix + +In `OnchainTxHandler::update_claims_view_from_requests`, the initial +`OnchainClaim::Event` insertion now matches the other paths: + +- under debug builds it asserts the existing count is `0` or `1` +- it removes any existing `pending_claim_events` entry for that + `ClaimId` +- it then pushes the newest event + +This preserves insertion order for distinct claim ids while making +duplicate requeues idempotent. + +### Why this fix is correct + +This does not hide a real conflict between distinct claims. Two +different claim packages should not share a `ClaimId`. If they do, they +represent the same logical event as far as the queue is concerned, and +the newest version should replace the old one. + +This also makes the queue semantics internally consistent. Every path +that mutates `pending_claim_events` now treats it as keyed by +`ClaimId`, rather than having one path act like a multimap. + +### Verification + +Targeted rerun: + +- `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776586956/summary.txt` +- result: `2 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out` + +## Final verification + +After all three fixes landed, the default corpus sweep passed: + +- `fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776587008/summary.txt` +- result: `392 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out / 0 spawn_errors` + +This is the reference run showing that: + +- the duplicate delayed-claim family is fixed +- the contentious reused-outpoint family is fixed +- the duplicate pending-claim-event family is fixed +- neither change regressed the previously fixed dust, restart, or + sender-terminal-event invariants diff --git a/fuzz/OPEN-ISSUES.md b/fuzz/OPEN-ISSUES.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e20c8e82390 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/OPEN-ISSUES.md @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +# Open Issues + +There are no currently open `chanmon_consistency` crash families in this +branch. + +Latest green reference run: + +- Full corpus rerun: + [run-1776587008 summary](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776587008/summary.txt) + with `392 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out / 0 spawn_errors` + +Recently resolved: + +- Manager reload failed with `DangerousValue`. + Fixed in + [fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs) + by retiring every pending monitor blob at `<= completed_update_id` + once a later monitor update is acknowledged complete. + This prevents restart selectors from reloading a stale older monitor + after the serialized `ChannelManager` has already dropped the + corresponding blocked updates. + Targeted verification is clean in + [run-1776585235 summary](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776585235/summary.txt) + with `8 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out`. + +- `OnchainTxHandler` could enqueue the same pending claim event twice. + Fixed in + [lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs) + by making the initial `pending_claim_events` insertion path replace an + existing entry with the same `ClaimId`, matching the keyed behavior + already used in the rebroadcast, bump, and reorg paths. + Representative repro cases are: + [fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close) + with bytes `2934ff3dc0d1b6ff`, and + [fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close_zero_fee_commitments](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/fc_duplicate_pending_claim_event_after_force_close_zero_fee_commitments) + with bytes `3f34ff3dc0d1b6ff`. + Targeted verification is clean in + [run-1776586956 summary](/Users/joost/repo/rust-lightning-fuzz-force-close/fuzz/artifacts/chanmon_runner/run-1776586956/summary.txt) + with `2 ok / 0 failed / 0 timed_out`. diff --git a/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs b/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs index 8a90dc93e97..8731e336eec 100644 --- a/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs +++ b/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or -//! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a -//! channel being force-closed. +//! send-side handling is correct, other peers. The fuzzer also exercises user-initiated +//! force-closes with on-chain commitment transaction confirmation. use bitcoin::amount::Amount; use bitcoin::constants::genesis_block; @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ use bitcoin::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf}; use bitcoin::transaction::Version; use bitcoin::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut}; use bitcoin::FeeRate; +use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint; use bitcoin::block::Header; use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid; @@ -41,16 +42,15 @@ use lightning::chain; use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{ BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, TransactionType, }; -use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent}; -use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint; +use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{Balance, ChannelMonitor}; use lightning::chain::{ chainmonitor, channelmonitor, BlockLocator, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Watch, }; -use lightning::events; +use lightning::events::{self, EventsProvider}; use lightning::ln::channel::{ FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS, }; -use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails; +use lightning::ln::channel_state::{ChannelDetails, InboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails}; use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, TrustedChannelFeatures, @@ -84,10 +84,11 @@ use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{EnforcementState, SignerOp, TestChann use lightning::util::test_utils::TestWalletSource; use lightning::util::wallet_utils::{WalletSourceSync, WalletSync}; +use lightning::events::bump_transaction::sync::BumpTransactionEventHandlerSync; + use lightning_invoice::RawBolt11Invoice; use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output}; -use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister; use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature}; @@ -104,6 +105,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000; + struct FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32, } @@ -188,6 +190,11 @@ struct ChainState { /// Unconfirmed transactions (e.g., splice txs). Conflicting RBF candidates may coexist; /// `confirm_pending_txs` determines which one confirms. pending_txs: Vec<(Txid, Transaction)>, + /// Tracks unspent outputs created by confirmed transactions. Only + /// transactions that spend existing UTXOs can be confirmed, which + /// prevents fuzz hash collisions from creating phantom spends of + /// outputs that were never actually created. + utxos: HashSet, } impl ChainState { @@ -198,6 +205,7 @@ impl ChainState { blocks: vec![(genesis_header, Vec::new())], confirmed_txids: HashSet::new(), pending_txs: Vec::new(), + utxos: HashSet::new(), } } @@ -205,21 +213,57 @@ impl ChainState { (self.blocks.len() - 1) as u32 } - fn is_outpoint_spent(&self, outpoint: &bitcoin::OutPoint) -> bool { - self.blocks.iter().any(|(_, txs)| { - txs.iter().any(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|input| input.previous_output == *outpoint)) - }) + fn can_confirm_tx( + &self, tx: &Transaction, txid: Txid, utxos: &HashSet, + ) -> bool { + if self.confirmed_txids.contains(&txid) { + return false; + } + // Reject timelocked transactions before their lock_time, matching + // consensus rules. Commitment txs encode an obscured commitment + // number with bit 29 set, which is not a real timelock. + let lock_time = tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(); + if lock_time > 0 + && lock_time < 500_000_000 + && lock_time & (1 << 29) == 0 + && self.tip_height() < lock_time + { + return false; + } + // Validate that all inputs spend existing, unspent outputs. This + // rejects both double-spends and spends of outputs that were never + // created (e.g. due to fuzz txid hash collisions where a different + // transaction was confirmed under the same txid). + let is_coinbase = tx.is_coinbase(); + if !is_coinbase { + for input in &tx.input { + if !utxos.contains(&input.previous_output) { + return false; + } + } + } + true + } + + fn apply_tx_to_utxos(txid: Txid, tx: &Transaction, utxos: &mut HashSet) { + let is_coinbase = tx.is_coinbase(); + if !is_coinbase { + for input in &tx.input { + utxos.remove(&input.previous_output); + } + } + for idx in 0..tx.output.len() { + utxos.insert(BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: idx as u32 }); + } } fn confirm_tx(&mut self, tx: Transaction) -> bool { let txid = tx.compute_txid(); - if self.confirmed_txids.contains(&txid) { - return false; - } - if tx.input.iter().any(|input| self.is_outpoint_spent(&input.previous_output)) { + if !self.can_confirm_tx(&tx, txid, &self.utxos) { return false; } self.confirmed_txids.insert(txid); + Self::apply_tx_to_utxos(txid, &tx, &mut self.utxos); let prev_hash = self.blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(); let header = create_dummy_header(prev_hash, 42); @@ -242,42 +286,45 @@ impl ChainState { /// Confirm pending transactions in a single block, selecting deterministically among /// conflicting RBF candidates. Sorting by txid ensures the winner is determined by fuzz input /// content. Transactions that double-spend an already-confirmed outpoint are skipped. - fn confirm_pending_txs(&mut self) { + fn confirm_pending_txs(&mut self) -> Vec { let mut txs = std::mem::take(&mut self.pending_txs); txs.sort_by_key(|(txid, _)| *txid); let mut confirmed = Vec::new(); - let mut spent_outpoints = Vec::new(); + let mut next_utxos = self.utxos.clone(); for (txid, tx) in txs { - if self.confirmed_txids.contains(&txid) { - continue; - } - if tx.input.iter().any(|input| { - self.is_outpoint_spent(&input.previous_output) - || spent_outpoints.contains(&input.previous_output) - }) { + if !self.can_confirm_tx(&tx, txid, &next_utxos) { continue; } self.confirmed_txids.insert(txid); - for input in &tx.input { - spent_outpoints.push(input.previous_output); - } + Self::apply_tx_to_utxos(txid, &tx, &mut next_utxos); confirmed.push(tx); } if confirmed.is_empty() { - return; + return Vec::new(); } let prev_hash = self.blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(); let header = create_dummy_header(prev_hash, 42); + let confirmed_txs = confirmed.clone(); self.blocks.push((header, confirmed)); + self.utxos = next_utxos; for _ in 0..5 { let prev_hash = self.blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(); let header = create_dummy_header(prev_hash, 42); self.blocks.push((header, Vec::new())); } + confirmed_txs + } + + fn advance_height(&mut self, num_blocks: u32) { + for _ in 0..num_blocks { + let prev_hash = self.blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(); + let header = create_dummy_header(prev_hash, 42); + self.blocks.push((header, Vec::new())); + } } fn block_at(&self, height: u32) -> &(Header, Vec) { @@ -293,6 +340,12 @@ impl Writer for VecWriter { } } +fn serialize_monitor(monitor: &ChannelMonitor) -> Vec { + let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new()); + monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap(); + ser.0 +} + /// The LDK API requires that any time we tell it we're done persisting a `ChannelMonitor[Update]` /// we never pass it in as the "latest" `ChannelMonitor` on startup. However, we can pass /// out-of-date monitors as long as we never told LDK we finished persisting them, which we do by @@ -314,120 +367,154 @@ struct LatestMonitorState { pending_monitors: Vec<(u64, Vec)>, } +struct HarnessPersister { + pub update_ret: Mutex, + pub latest_monitors: Arc>>, +} +impl HarnessPersister { + fn track_monitor_update( + &self, channel_id: ChannelId, monitor_id: u64, serialized_monitor: Vec, + status: chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, + ) { + let mut latest_monitors = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(state) = latest_monitors.get_mut(&channel_id) { + match status { + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { + // Completing update N makes any older in-flight monitor blobs unusable on + // restart. A newer ChannelManager serialization will no longer advertise those + // earlier updates as blocked, so reloading them would violate the Watch API. + state.pending_monitors.retain(|(id, _)| *id > monitor_id); + state.persisted_monitor_id = monitor_id; + state.persisted_monitor = serialized_monitor; + }, + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { + if let Some((_, pending_monitor)) = + state.pending_monitors.iter_mut().find(|(id, _)| *id == monitor_id) + { + *pending_monitor = serialized_monitor; + } else { + state.pending_monitors.push((monitor_id, serialized_monitor)); + state.pending_monitors.sort_by_key(|(id, _)| *id); + } + }, + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {}, + } + } else { + let state = match status { + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => LatestMonitorState { + persisted_monitor_id: monitor_id, + persisted_monitor: serialized_monitor, + pending_monitors: Vec::new(), + }, + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => LatestMonitorState { + persisted_monitor_id: monitor_id, + persisted_monitor: Vec::new(), + pending_monitors: vec![(monitor_id, serialized_monitor)], + }, + chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => return, + }; + assert!( + latest_monitors.insert(channel_id, state).is_none(), + "Already had monitor state pre-persist" + ); + } + } + + fn mark_update_completed( + &self, channel_id: ChannelId, monitor_id: u64, serialized_monitor: Vec, + ) { + if let Some(state) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get_mut(&channel_id) { + // Once LDK acknowledges update N as completed, any older pending monitor blob is fully + // superseded and must not be offered back on restart. + state.pending_monitors.retain(|(id, _)| *id > monitor_id); + if monitor_id >= state.persisted_monitor_id { + state.persisted_monitor_id = monitor_id; + state.persisted_monitor = serialized_monitor; + } + } + } +} +impl chainmonitor::Persist for HarnessPersister { + fn persist_new_channel( + &self, _monitor_name: lightning::util::persist::MonitorName, + data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor, + ) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus { + let status = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone(); + let monitor_id = data.get_latest_update_id(); + let serialized_monitor = serialize_monitor(data); + self.track_monitor_update(data.channel_id(), monitor_id, serialized_monitor, status); + status + } + + fn update_persisted_channel( + &self, _monitor_name: lightning::util::persist::MonitorName, + update: Option<&channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate>, + data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor, + ) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus { + let status = self.update_ret.lock().unwrap().clone(); + let monitor_id = update.map_or_else(|| data.get_latest_update_id(), |upd| upd.update_id); + let serialized_monitor = serialize_monitor(data); + self.track_monitor_update(data.channel_id(), monitor_id, serialized_monitor, status); + status + } + + fn archive_persisted_channel(&self, _monitor_name: lightning::util::persist::MonitorName) {} +} + +type InnerChainMonitor = chainmonitor::ChainMonitor< + TestChannelSigner, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, + Arc, +>; + struct TestChainMonitor { - pub logger: Arc, - pub keys: Arc, - pub persister: Arc, - pub chain_monitor: Arc< - chainmonitor::ChainMonitor< - TestChannelSigner, - Arc, - Arc, - Arc, - Arc, - Arc, - Arc, - >, - >, - pub latest_monitors: Mutex>, + pub persister: Arc, + pub chain_monitor: Arc, + pub latest_monitors: Arc>>, } + impl TestChainMonitor { pub fn new( broadcaster: Arc, logger: Arc, feeest: Arc, - persister: Arc, keys: Arc, + initial_update_ret: ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, keys: Arc, ) -> Self { + let latest_monitors = Arc::new(Mutex::new(new_hash_map())); + let persister = Arc::new(HarnessPersister { + update_ret: Mutex::new(initial_update_ret), + latest_monitors: Arc::clone(&latest_monitors), + }); Self { chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new( None, broadcaster, - logger.clone(), + logger, feeest, Arc::clone(&persister), Arc::clone(&keys), keys.get_peer_storage_key(), false, )), - logger, - keys, persister, - latest_monitors: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()), - } - } -} -impl chain::Watch for TestChainMonitor { - fn watch_channel( - &self, channel_id: ChannelId, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor, - ) -> Result { - let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new()); - monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap(); - let monitor_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id(); - let res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(channel_id, monitor); - let state = match res { - Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) => LatestMonitorState { - persisted_monitor_id: monitor_id, - persisted_monitor: ser.0, - pending_monitors: Vec::new(), - }, - Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress) => LatestMonitorState { - persisted_monitor_id: monitor_id, - persisted_monitor: Vec::new(), - pending_monitors: vec![(monitor_id, ser.0)], - }, - Ok(chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError) => panic!(), - Err(()) => panic!(), - }; - if self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(channel_id, state).is_some() { - panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel"); + latest_monitors, } - res } - fn update_channel( - &self, channel_id: ChannelId, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate, - ) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus { - let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap(); - let map_entry = map_lock.get_mut(&channel_id).expect("Didn't have monitor on update call"); - let latest_monitor_data = map_entry - .pending_monitors - .last() - .as_ref() - .map(|(_, data)| data) - .unwrap_or(&map_entry.persisted_monitor); - let deserialized_monitor = - <(BlockLocator, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor)>::read( - &mut &latest_monitor_data[..], - (&*self.keys, &*self.keys), - ) - .unwrap() - .1; - deserialized_monitor - .update_monitor( - update, - &&TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: RefCell::new(Vec::new()) }, - &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, - &self.logger, - ) - .unwrap(); - let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new()); - deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap(); - let res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_id, update); - match res { - chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => { - map_entry.persisted_monitor_id = update.update_id; - map_entry.persisted_monitor = ser.0; - }, - chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => { - map_entry.pending_monitors.push((update.update_id, ser.0)); - }, - chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => panic!(), - } - res + fn mark_update_completed( + &self, channel_id: ChannelId, monitor_id: u64, serialized_monitor: Vec, + ) { + self.persister.mark_update_completed(channel_id, monitor_id, serialized_monitor); } +} - fn release_pending_monitor_events( - &self, - ) -> Vec<(OutPoint, ChannelId, Vec, PublicKey)> { - return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events(); +impl std::ops::Deref for TestChainMonitor { + type Target = InnerChainMonitor; + + fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { + self.chain_monitor.as_ref() } } @@ -562,12 +649,12 @@ impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider { } } -// Since this fuzzer is only concerned with live-channel operations, we don't need to worry about -// any signer operations that come after a force close. -const SUPPORTED_SIGNER_OPS: [SignerOp; 3] = [ +const SUPPORTED_SIGNER_OPS: [SignerOp; 5] = [ SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment, SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint, SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret, + SignerOp::SignHolderCommitment, + SignerOp::SignHolderHtlcTransaction, ]; impl KeyProvider { @@ -614,18 +701,17 @@ type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager< #[inline] fn assert_action_timeout_awaiting_response(action: &msgs::ErrorAction) { - // Since sending/receiving messages may be delayed, `timer_tick_occurred` may cause a node to - // disconnect their counterparty if they're expecting a timely response. - assert!( - matches!( - action, - msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { msg } + // Since sending or receiving messages may be delayed, `timer_tick_occurred` may cause a node + // to disconnect their counterparty if they're expecting a timely response. We may also deliver + // the paired `error` message when one was generated alongside the disconnect. + match action { + msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { msg } if msg.data.contains("Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response") - || msg.data.contains("already sent splice_locked, cannot RBF") - ), - "Expected timeout disconnect, got: {:?}", - action, - ); + || msg.data.contains("already sent splice_locked, cannot RBF") => {}, + msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. } => {}, + msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected HandleError action {:?}", action), + } } #[derive(Copy, Clone)] @@ -692,7 +778,7 @@ impl<'a> HarnessNode<'a> { Arc::clone(broadcaster), logger_for_monitor, Arc::clone(fee_estimator), - Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(persistence_style) }), + persistence_style, Arc::clone(keys_manager), )) } @@ -757,64 +843,73 @@ impl<'a> HarnessNode<'a> { self.persistence_style = style; } - fn complete_all_monitor_updates(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId) { - if let Some(state) = self.monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get_mut(chan_id) { - assert!( - state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0), - "updates should be sorted by id" - ); - for (id, data) in state.pending_monitors.drain(..) { - self.monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_id, id).unwrap(); - if id > state.persisted_monitor_id { - state.persisted_monitor_id = id; - state.persisted_monitor = data; - } + fn complete_all_monitor_updates(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId) -> bool { + let completed_updates = { + let mut latest_monitors = self.monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(state) = latest_monitors.get_mut(chan_id) { + assert!( + state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0), + "updates should be sorted by id" + ); + state.pending_monitors.drain(..).collect::>() + } else { + Vec::new() } + }; + let mut completed_any = false; + for (monitor_id, data) in completed_updates { + completed_any = true; + self.monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_id, monitor_id).unwrap(); + self.monitor.mark_update_completed(*chan_id, monitor_id, data); } + completed_any } fn complete_all_pending_monitor_updates(&self) { + let mut completed_updates = Vec::new(); for (channel_id, state) in self.monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() { - for (id, data) in state.pending_monitors.drain(..) { - self.monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*channel_id, id).unwrap(); - if id >= state.persisted_monitor_id { - state.persisted_monitor_id = id; - state.persisted_monitor = data; - } + for (monitor_id, data) in state.pending_monitors.drain(..) { + completed_updates.push((*channel_id, monitor_id, data)); } } + for (channel_id, monitor_id, data) in completed_updates { + self.monitor.channel_monitor_updated(channel_id, monitor_id).unwrap(); + self.monitor.mark_update_completed(channel_id, monitor_id, data); + } } fn complete_monitor_update(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, selector: MonitorUpdateSelector) { - if let Some(state) = self.monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get_mut(chan_id) { - assert!( - state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0), - "updates should be sorted by id" - ); - let update = match selector { - MonitorUpdateSelector::First => { - if state.pending_monitors.is_empty() { - None - } else { - Some(state.pending_monitors.remove(0)) - } - }, - MonitorUpdateSelector::Second => { - if state.pending_monitors.len() > 1 { - Some(state.pending_monitors.remove(1)) - } else { - None - } - }, - MonitorUpdateSelector::Last => state.pending_monitors.pop(), - }; - if let Some((id, data)) = update { - self.monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_id, id).unwrap(); - if id > state.persisted_monitor_id { - state.persisted_monitor_id = id; - state.persisted_monitor = data; + let completed_update = { + let mut latest_monitors = self.monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + if let Some(state) = latest_monitors.get_mut(chan_id) { + assert!( + state.pending_monitors.windows(2).all(|pair| pair[0].0 < pair[1].0), + "updates should be sorted by id" + ); + match selector { + MonitorUpdateSelector::First => { + if state.pending_monitors.is_empty() { + None + } else { + Some(state.pending_monitors.remove(0)) + } + }, + MonitorUpdateSelector::Second => { + if state.pending_monitors.len() > 1 { + Some(state.pending_monitors.remove(1)) + } else { + None + } + }, + MonitorUpdateSelector::Last => state.pending_monitors.pop(), } + } else { + None } + }; + if let Some((monitor_id, data)) = completed_update { + self.monitor.channel_monitor_updated(*chan_id, monitor_id).unwrap(); + self.monitor.mark_update_completed(*chan_id, monitor_id, data); } } @@ -826,12 +921,31 @@ impl<'a> HarnessNode<'a> { }; while self.height < target_height { - self.height += 1; + let mut next_height = self.height + 1; + while next_height <= target_height && chain_state.block_at(next_height).1.is_empty() { + next_height += 1; + } + if next_height > target_height { + self.height = target_height; + let (header, _) = chain_state.block_at(self.height); + self.monitor.best_block_updated(header, self.height); + self.node.best_block_updated(header, self.height); + break; + } + if next_height > self.height + 1 { + self.height = next_height - 1; + let (header, _) = chain_state.block_at(self.height); + self.monitor.best_block_updated(header, self.height); + self.node.best_block_updated(header, self.height); + } + self.height = next_height; let (header, txn) = chain_state.block_at(self.height); let txdata: Vec<_> = txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect(); if !txdata.is_empty() { + self.monitor.transactions_confirmed(header, &txdata, self.height); self.node.transactions_confirmed(header, &txdata, self.height); } + self.monitor.best_block_updated(header, self.height); self.node.best_block_updated(header, self.height); } } @@ -858,6 +972,12 @@ impl<'a> HarnessNode<'a> { self.node.timer_tick_occurred(); } + fn enable_holder_signer_ops(&self) { + self.keys_manager.enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::SignHolderCommitment); + self.keys_manager.enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::SignHolderHtlcTransaction); + self.node.signer_unblocked(None); + } + fn current_feerate_sat_per_kw(&self) -> FeeRate { self.fee_estimator.feerate_sat_per_kw() } @@ -1009,19 +1129,27 @@ impl<'a> HarnessNode<'a> { let manager = <(BlockLocator, ChanMan)>::read(&mut &self.serialized_manager[..], read_args) .expect("Failed to read manager"); + let expected_status = self.persistence_style; + *chain_monitor.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = expected_status; for (channel_id, mon) in monitors.drain() { - assert_eq!( - chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(channel_id, mon), - Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) - ); + assert_eq!(chain_monitor.watch_channel(channel_id, mon), Ok(expected_status)); } - *chain_monitor.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = self.persistence_style; self.node = manager.1; self.monitor = chain_monitor; self.logger = logger; } } +#[inline] +fn inbound_dust_blocks_path(htlc: &InboundHTLCDetails) -> bool { + htlc.is_dust +} + +#[inline] +fn outbound_dust_blocks_path(htlc: &OutboundHTLCDetails) -> bool { + htlc.is_dust +} + #[derive(Copy, Clone)] enum MonitorUpdateSelector { First, @@ -1138,7 +1266,9 @@ impl EventQueues { }, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } | MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } - | MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => continue, + | MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } + | MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } + | MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => continue, _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event), }; if push_a { @@ -1175,6 +1305,8 @@ impl EventQueues { MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } => { assert_action_timeout_awaiting_response(action); @@ -1194,6 +1326,8 @@ impl EventQueues { MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } => { assert_action_timeout_awaiting_response(action); @@ -1316,34 +1450,104 @@ impl PeerLink { } } -struct NodePayments { - pending: Vec, - resolved: HashMap>, -} - -impl NodePayments { - fn new() -> Self { - Self { pending: Vec::new(), resolved: new_hash_map() } - } -} - struct PaymentTracker { - nodes: [NodePayments; 3], - claimed_payment_hashes: HashSet, - payment_preimages: HashMap, payment_ctr: u64, + pending_payments: RefCell<[Vec; 3]>, + resolved_payment_ids: RefCell<[HashSet; 3]>, + claimed_payment_hashes: RefCell>, + receiver_claimed_payment_hashes: RefCell>, + sender_sent_payment_hashes: RefCell>, + sender_failed_payment_hashes: RefCell>, + payment_hashes_by_id: RefCell>, + payment_paths_by_hash: RefCell>>>, + blocked_dust_paths_by_hash: RefCell>>, + payment_preimages: RefCell>, + closed_channels: RefCell>, } impl PaymentTracker { fn new() -> Self { Self { - nodes: [NodePayments::new(), NodePayments::new(), NodePayments::new()], - claimed_payment_hashes: HashSet::new(), - payment_preimages: new_hash_map(), payment_ctr: 0, + pending_payments: RefCell::new([Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new()]), + resolved_payment_ids: RefCell::new([HashSet::new(), HashSet::new(), HashSet::new()]), + claimed_payment_hashes: RefCell::new(HashSet::new()), + receiver_claimed_payment_hashes: RefCell::new(HashSet::new()), + sender_sent_payment_hashes: RefCell::new(HashSet::new()), + sender_failed_payment_hashes: RefCell::new(HashSet::new()), + payment_hashes_by_id: RefCell::new(new_hash_map()), + payment_paths_by_hash: RefCell::new(new_hash_map()), + blocked_dust_paths_by_hash: RefCell::new(new_hash_map()), + payment_preimages: RefCell::new(new_hash_map()), + closed_channels: RefCell::new(HashSet::new()), } } + fn register_payment( + &self, source_idx: usize, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_hash: PaymentHash, + payment_paths: Vec>, + ) { + assert!( + self.payment_hashes_by_id.borrow_mut().insert(payment_id, payment_hash).is_none(), + "duplicate payment_id {:?}", + payment_id + ); + assert!( + self.payment_paths_by_hash.borrow_mut().insert(payment_hash, payment_paths).is_none(), + "duplicate payment_hash {:?}", + payment_hash + ); + self.pending_payments.borrow_mut()[source_idx].push(payment_id); + } + + fn claim_allows_sender_failure(&self, hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool { + self.blocked_dust_paths_by_hash + .borrow() + .get(hash) + .is_some_and(|blocked_paths| !blocked_paths.is_empty()) + } + + fn summarize_claim_tracking(&self) -> String { + let claim_requested = self.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let receiver_claimed = self.receiver_claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_sent = self.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_failed = self.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let failure_allowed_count = + claim_requested.iter().filter(|hash| self.claim_allows_sender_failure(hash)).count(); + let missing_receiver = + claim_requested.iter().filter(|hash| !receiver_claimed.contains(*hash)).count(); + let missing_sender = claim_requested + .iter() + .filter(|hash| !sender_sent.contains(*hash) && !sender_failed.contains(*hash)) + .count(); + format!( + "claims requested={} receiver_claimed={} sender_sent={} sender_failed={} failure_allowed={} missing_receiver={} missing_sender={}", + claim_requested.len(), + receiver_claimed.len(), + sender_sent.len(), + sender_failed.len(), + failure_allowed_count, + missing_receiver, + missing_sender, + ) + } + + fn has_unfinished_claims(&self) -> bool { + let claim_requested = self.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let receiver_claimed = self.receiver_claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_sent = self.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_failed = self.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + claim_requested.iter().any(|hash| { + !receiver_claimed.contains(hash) + || (!sender_sent.contains(hash) && !sender_failed.contains(hash)) + }) + } + + fn has_live_payment_work(&self) -> bool { + self.pending_payments.borrow().iter().any(|payments| !payments.is_empty()) + || self.has_unfinished_claims() + } + // Returns a bool indicating whether the payment failed. fn check_payment_send_events(source: &ChanMan, sent_payment_id: PaymentId) -> bool { for payment in source.list_recent_payments() { @@ -1372,7 +1576,7 @@ impl PaymentTracker { let secret = dest .create_inbound_payment_for_hash(hash, None, 3600, None) .expect("create_inbound_payment_for_hash failed"); - assert!(self.payment_preimages.insert(hash, payment_preimage).is_none()); + assert!(self.payment_preimages.borrow_mut().insert(hash, payment_preimage).is_none()); let mut id = PaymentId([0; 32]); id.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&self.payment_ctr.to_ne_bytes()); (secret, hash, id) @@ -1382,6 +1586,9 @@ impl PaymentTracker { &mut self, nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3], source_idx: usize, dest_idx: usize, dest_chan_id: ChannelId, amt: u64, ) -> bool { + if self.closed_channels.borrow().contains(&dest_chan_id) { + return false; + } let source = &nodes[source_idx]; let dest = &nodes[dest_idx]; let (secret, hash, id) = self.next_payment(dest); @@ -1430,7 +1637,7 @@ impl PaymentTracker { }, }; if succeeded { - self.nodes[source_idx].pending.push(id); + self.register_payment(source_idx, id, hash, vec![vec![(dest_chan_id, amt)]]); } succeeded } @@ -1439,6 +1646,11 @@ impl PaymentTracker { &mut self, nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3], source_idx: usize, middle_idx: usize, middle_chan_id: ChannelId, dest_idx: usize, dest_chan_id: ChannelId, amt: u64, ) { + let closed_channels = self.closed_channels.borrow(); + if closed_channels.contains(&middle_chan_id) || closed_channels.contains(&dest_chan_id) { + return; + } + drop(closed_channels); let source = &nodes[source_idx]; let middle = &nodes[middle_idx]; let dest = &nodes[dest_idx]; @@ -1455,12 +1667,14 @@ impl PaymentTracker { ) }) .unwrap_or((0, 0, 0)); - let dest_scid = dest + let Some(dest_scid) = dest .list_channels() .iter() .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == dest_chan_id) .and_then(|chan| chan.short_channel_id) - .unwrap_or(0); + else { + return; + }; let first_hop_fee = 50_000; let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::from_node_id(source.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), @@ -1507,7 +1721,12 @@ impl PaymentTracker { }, }; if succeeded { - self.nodes[source_idx].pending.push(id); + self.register_payment( + source_idx, + id, + hash, + vec![vec![(middle_chan_id, amt + first_hop_fee), (dest_chan_id, amt)]], + ); } } @@ -1523,38 +1742,48 @@ impl PaymentTracker { &mut self, nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3], source_idx: usize, dest_idx: usize, dest_chan_ids: &[ChannelId], amt: u64, ) { + let live_dest_chan_ids = { + let closed_channels = self.closed_channels.borrow(); + dest_chan_ids + .iter() + .copied() + .filter(|chan_id| !closed_channels.contains(chan_id)) + .collect::>() + }; + if live_dest_chan_ids.is_empty() { + return; + } let source = &nodes[source_idx]; let dest = &nodes[dest_idx]; let (secret, hash, id) = self.next_payment(dest); - let num_paths = dest_chan_ids.len(); + let mut paths = Vec::new(); + let dest_chans = dest.list_channels(); + let dest_scids: Vec<_> = live_dest_chan_ids + .iter() + .filter_map(|chan_id| { + dest_chans + .iter() + .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == *chan_id) + .and_then(|chan| chan.short_channel_id) + .map(|scid| (*chan_id, scid)) + }) + .collect(); + let num_paths = dest_scids.len(); if num_paths == 0 { return; } - let amt_per_path = amt / num_paths as u64; - let mut paths = Vec::with_capacity(num_paths); - - let dest_chans = dest.list_channels(); - let dest_scids = dest_chan_ids.iter().map(|chan_id| { - dest_chans - .iter() - .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == *chan_id) - .and_then(|chan| chan.short_channel_id) - .unwrap() - }); - - for (i, dest_scid) in dest_scids.enumerate() { + for (i, (_, dest_scid)) in dest_scids.iter().enumerate() { let path_amt = if i == num_paths - 1 { amt - amt_per_path * (num_paths as u64 - 1) } else { amt_per_path }; - paths.push(Path { hops: vec![RouteHop { pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(), node_features: dest.node_features(), - short_channel_id: dest_scid, + short_channel_id: *dest_scid, channel_features: dest.channel_features(), fee_msat: path_amt, cltv_expiry_delta: 200, @@ -1563,7 +1792,6 @@ impl PaymentTracker { blinded_tail: None, }); } - let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dest.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), amt, @@ -1576,7 +1804,19 @@ impl PaymentTracker { Ok(()) => Self::check_payment_send_events(source, id), }; if succeeded { - self.nodes[source_idx].pending.push(id); + let payment_paths = dest_scids + .iter() + .enumerate() + .map(|(i, (chan_id, _))| { + let path_amt = if i == num_paths - 1 { + amt - amt_per_path * (num_paths as u64 - 1) + } else { + amt_per_path + }; + vec![(*chan_id, path_amt)] + }) + .collect(); + self.register_payment(source_idx, id, hash, payment_paths); } } @@ -1585,49 +1825,61 @@ impl PaymentTracker { &mut self, nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3], source_idx: usize, middle_idx: usize, middle_chan_ids: &[ChannelId], dest_idx: usize, dest_chan_ids: &[ChannelId], amt: u64, ) { + let (live_middle_chan_ids, live_dest_chan_ids) = { + let closed_channels = self.closed_channels.borrow(); + ( + middle_chan_ids + .iter() + .copied() + .filter(|chan_id| !closed_channels.contains(chan_id)) + .collect::>(), + dest_chan_ids + .iter() + .copied() + .filter(|chan_id| !closed_channels.contains(chan_id)) + .collect::>(), + ) + }; + if live_middle_chan_ids.is_empty() || live_dest_chan_ids.is_empty() { + return; + } let source = &nodes[source_idx]; let middle = &nodes[middle_idx]; let dest = &nodes[dest_idx]; let (secret, hash, id) = self.next_payment(dest); - // Create paths by pairing middle_scids with dest_scids. - let num_paths = middle_chan_ids.len().max(dest_chan_ids.len()); - if num_paths == 0 { - return; - } - - let first_hop_fee = 50_000; - let amt_per_path = amt / num_paths as u64; - let fee_per_path = first_hop_fee / num_paths as u64; - let mut paths = Vec::with_capacity(num_paths); - let middle_chans = middle.list_channels(); - let middle_scids: Vec<_> = middle_chan_ids + let middle_scids: Vec<_> = live_middle_chan_ids .iter() - .map(|chan_id| { + .filter_map(|chan_id| { middle_chans .iter() .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == *chan_id) .and_then(|chan| chan.short_channel_id) - .unwrap() + .map(|scid| (*chan_id, scid)) }) .collect(); - let dest_chans = dest.list_channels(); - let dest_scids: Vec<_> = dest_chan_ids + let dest_scids: Vec<_> = live_dest_chan_ids .iter() - .map(|chan_id| { + .filter_map(|chan_id| { dest_chans .iter() .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == *chan_id) .and_then(|chan| chan.short_channel_id) - .unwrap() + .map(|scid| (*chan_id, scid)) }) .collect(); - + let num_paths = middle_scids.len().max(dest_scids.len()); + if middle_scids.is_empty() || dest_scids.is_empty() { + return; + } + let first_hop_fee = 50_000; + let amt_per_path = amt / num_paths as u64; + let fee_per_path = first_hop_fee / num_paths as u64; + let mut paths = Vec::with_capacity(num_paths); for i in 0..num_paths { - let middle_scid = middle_scids[i % middle_scids.len()]; - let dest_scid = dest_scids[i % dest_scids.len()]; - + let (_, middle_scid) = middle_scids[i % middle_scids.len()]; + let (_, dest_scid) = dest_scids[i % dest_scids.len()]; let path_amt = if i == num_paths - 1 { amt - amt_per_path * (num_paths as u64 - 1) } else { @@ -1638,7 +1890,6 @@ impl PaymentTracker { } else { fee_per_path }; - paths.push(Path { hops: vec![ RouteHop { @@ -1663,7 +1914,6 @@ impl PaymentTracker { blinded_tail: None, }); } - let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value( PaymentParameters::from_node_id(dest.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV), amt, @@ -1676,7 +1926,24 @@ impl PaymentTracker { Ok(()) => Self::check_payment_send_events(source, id), }; if succeeded { - self.nodes[source_idx].pending.push(id); + let payment_paths = (0..num_paths) + .map(|i| { + let (middle_chan_id, _) = middle_scids[i % middle_scids.len()]; + let (dest_chan_id, _) = dest_scids[i % dest_scids.len()]; + let path_amt = if i == num_paths - 1 { + amt - amt_per_path * (num_paths as u64 - 1) + } else { + amt_per_path + }; + let path_fee = if i == num_paths - 1 { + first_hop_fee - fee_per_path * (num_paths as u64 - 1) + } else { + fee_per_path + }; + vec![(middle_chan_id, path_amt + path_fee), (dest_chan_id, path_amt)] + }) + .collect(); + self.register_payment(source_idx, id, hash, payment_paths); } } @@ -1686,70 +1953,55 @@ impl PaymentTracker { } else { let payment_preimage = *self .payment_preimages + .borrow() .get(&payment_hash) .expect("PaymentClaimable for unknown payment hash"); node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); - self.claimed_payment_hashes.insert(payment_hash); + self.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow_mut().insert(payment_hash); } } fn mark_sent(&mut self, node_idx: usize, sent_id: PaymentId, payment_hash: PaymentHash) { - let node = &mut self.nodes[node_idx]; - let idx_opt = node.pending.iter().position(|id| *id == sent_id); - if let Some(idx) = idx_opt { - node.pending.remove(idx); - node.resolved.insert(sent_id, Some(payment_hash)); - } else { - assert!(node.resolved.contains_key(&sent_id)); + self.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow_mut().insert(payment_hash); + self.mark_resolved_payment(node_idx, sent_id, true); + } + + fn mark_failed( + &mut self, node_idx: usize, payment_id: PaymentId, payment_hash: Option, + ) { + let payment_hash = + payment_hash.or_else(|| self.payment_hashes_by_id.borrow().get(&payment_id).copied()); + if let Some(payment_hash) = payment_hash { + self.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow_mut().insert(payment_hash); } + self.mark_resolved_payment(node_idx, payment_id, false); } fn mark_resolved_without_hash(&mut self, node_idx: usize, payment_id: PaymentId) { - let node = &mut self.nodes[node_idx]; - let idx_opt = node.pending.iter().position(|id| *id == payment_id); - if let Some(idx) = idx_opt { - node.pending.remove(idx); - node.resolved.insert(payment_id, None); - } else if !node.resolved.contains_key(&payment_id) { - // Some resolutions can arrive immediately, before the send helper records - // the payment as pending. Track them so later duplicate events are accepted. - node.resolved.insert(payment_id, None); - } + self.mark_resolved_payment(node_idx, payment_id, false); } - fn mark_successful_probe(&mut self, node_idx: usize, payment_id: PaymentId) { - let node = &mut self.nodes[node_idx]; - let idx_opt = node.pending.iter().position(|id| *id == payment_id); - if let Some(idx) = idx_opt { - node.pending.remove(idx); - node.resolved.insert(payment_id, None); - } else { - assert!(node.resolved.contains_key(&payment_id)); - } + fn mark_receiver_claimed(&mut self, payment_hash: PaymentHash) { + self.receiver_claimed_payment_hashes.borrow_mut().insert(payment_hash); } - fn assert_all_resolved(&self) { - for (idx, node) in self.nodes.iter().enumerate() { - assert!( - node.pending.is_empty(), - "Node {} has {} stuck pending payments after settling all state", - idx, - node.pending.len() - ); - } + fn mark_channel_closed(&mut self, channel_id: ChannelId) { + self.closed_channels.borrow_mut().insert(channel_id); } - fn assert_claims_reported(&self) { - for hash in self.claimed_payment_hashes.iter() { - let found = self - .nodes - .iter() - .any(|node| node.resolved.values().any(|h| h.as_ref() == Some(hash))); - assert!( - found, - "Payment {:?} was claimed by receiver but sender never got PaymentSent", - hash - ); + fn mark_resolved_payment( + &self, node_idx: usize, payment_id: PaymentId, assert_already_resolved: bool, + ) { + let mut pending_payments = self.pending_payments.borrow_mut(); + let mut resolved_payment_ids = self.resolved_payment_ids.borrow_mut(); + let idx_opt = pending_payments[node_idx].iter().position(|id| *id == payment_id); + if let Some(idx) = idx_opt { + pending_payments[node_idx].remove(idx); + resolved_payment_ids[node_idx].insert(payment_id); + } else if assert_already_resolved { + assert!(resolved_payment_ids[node_idx].contains(&payment_id)); + } else if !resolved_payment_ids[node_idx].contains(&payment_id) { + resolved_payment_ids[node_idx].insert(payment_id); } } } @@ -1769,6 +2021,7 @@ fn build_node_config(chan_type: ChanType) -> UserConfig { let mut config = UserConfig::default(); config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0; config.channel_handshake_config.announce_for_forwarding = true; + config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; config.reject_inbound_splices = false; match chan_type { ChanType::Legacy => { @@ -1788,14 +2041,12 @@ fn build_node_config(chan_type: ChanType) -> UserConfig { } fn assert_test_invariants(nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3]) { - assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 3); - assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 6); - assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 3); - - // All broadcasters should be empty. Broadcast transactions are handled explicitly. - assert!(nodes[0].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().is_empty()); - assert!(nodes[1].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().is_empty()); - assert!(nodes[2].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().is_empty()); + assert!(nodes[0].list_channels().len() <= 3); + assert!(nodes[1].list_channels().len() <= 6); + assert!(nodes[2].list_channels().len() <= 3); + for node in nodes { + node.broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().clear(); + } } fn connect_peers(source: &ChanMan<'_>, dest: &ChanMan<'_>) { @@ -1974,7 +2225,7 @@ fn lock_fundings(nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3]) { } } } else { - panic!("Wrong event type"); + panic!("Wrong event type in first lock_fundings pass: {:?}", event); } } } @@ -1982,9 +2233,18 @@ fn lock_fundings(nodes: &[HarnessNode<'_>; 3]) { for node in nodes.iter() { let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); for event in events { - if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event { - } else { - panic!("Wrong event type"); + match event { + MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {}, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + for dest_node in nodes.iter() { + if dest_node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id { + dest_node.handle_channel_update(node.get_our_node_id(), msg); + } + } + }, + _ => { + panic!("Wrong event type in second lock_fundings pass: {:?}", event); + }, } } } @@ -2019,20 +2279,24 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { let wallet_b = TestWalletSource::new(SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap()); let wallet_c = TestWalletSource::new(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap()); let wallets = [&wallet_a, &wallet_b, &wallet_c]; - let coinbase_tx = bitcoin::Transaction { - version: bitcoin::transaction::Version::TWO, - lock_time: bitcoin::absolute::LockTime::ZERO, - input: vec![bitcoin::TxIn { ..Default::default() }], - output: wallets - .iter() - .map(|wallet| TxOut { - value: Amount::from_sat(100_000), - script_pubkey: wallet.get_change_script().unwrap(), - }) - .collect(), - }; + let mut chain_state = ChainState::new(); + let num_wallet_utxos = 50; for (idx, wallet) in wallets.iter().enumerate() { - wallet.add_utxo(coinbase_tx.clone(), idx as u32); + let coinbase_tx = bitcoin::Transaction { + version: bitcoin::transaction::Version(idx as i32 + 100), + lock_time: bitcoin::absolute::LockTime::ZERO, + input: vec![bitcoin::TxIn { ..Default::default() }], + output: (0..num_wallet_utxos) + .map(|_| TxOut { + value: Amount::from_sat(100_000), + script_pubkey: wallet.get_change_script().unwrap(), + }) + .collect(), + }; + for vout in 0..num_wallet_utxos { + wallet.add_utxo(coinbase_tx.clone(), vout); + } + chain_state.confirm_tx(coinbase_tx); } let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }); @@ -2076,7 +2340,6 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { chan_type, ), ]; - let mut chain_state = ChainState::new(); // Connect peers first, then create channels. connect_peers(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); @@ -2097,16 +2360,12 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { make_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], 5, true, false, &mut chain_state); make_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], 6, false, false, &mut chain_state); - // Wipe the transactions-broadcasted set to make sure we don't broadcast - // any transactions during normal operation after setup. - nodes[0].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().clear(); - nodes[1].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().clear(); - nodes[2].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().clear(); - - // Sync all nodes to tip to lock the funding. - nodes[0].sync_with_chain_state(&chain_state, None); - nodes[1].sync_with_chain_state(&chain_state, None); - nodes[2].sync_with_chain_state(&chain_state, None); + for node in &nodes { + node.broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().clear(); + } + for node in &mut nodes { + node.sync_with_chain_state(&chain_state, None); + } lock_fundings(&nodes); @@ -2399,6 +2658,11 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { None }, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 + && msg.next_remote_commitment_number == 0 + { + return None; + } let dest_idx = log_peer_message(node_idx, node_id, nodes, out, "channel_reestablish"); nodes[dest_idx].handle_channel_reestablish(source_node_id, msg); @@ -2471,21 +2735,34 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { nodes[dest_idx].handle_splice_locked(source_node_id, msg); None }, - MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } => { + MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, ref node_id } => { assert_action_timeout_awaiting_response(action); + if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } = action { + let dest_idx = find_destination_node(nodes, node_id); + nodes[dest_idx].handle_error(source_node_id, msg); + } None }, - MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } - | MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } - | MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => { - // Can be generated as a reestablish response. + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + let dest_idx = log_peer_message(node_idx, node_id, nodes, out, "channel_ready"); + nodes[dest_idx].handle_channel_ready(source_node_id, msg); None }, - MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => { - // Can be generated as a result of calling `timer_tick_occurred` enough - // times while peers are disconnected. + MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + let dest_idx = + log_peer_message(node_idx, node_id, nodes, out, "announcement_signatures"); + nodes[dest_idx].handle_announcement_signatures(source_node_id, msg); + None + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => { + let dest_idx = + log_peer_message(node_idx, node_id, nodes, out, "channel_update"); + nodes[dest_idx].handle_channel_update(source_node_id, msg); None }, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => None, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => None, + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => None, _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event), } } @@ -2557,17 +2834,31 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { // hashing the payment hash+preimage, it is rather trivial for the fuzzer to build // payments that accidentally end up looking like probes. events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { payment_id, .. } => { - payments.mark_successful_probe(node_idx, payment_id); + payments.mark_resolved_without_hash(node_idx, payment_id); + }, + events::Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, payment_hash, .. } => { + payments.mark_failed(node_idx, payment_id, payment_hash); }, - events::Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } - | events::Event::ProbeFailed { payment_id, .. } => { + events::Event::ProbeFailed { payment_id, .. } => { payments.mark_resolved_without_hash(node_idx, payment_id); }, - events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {}, + events::Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, .. } => { + payments.mark_receiver_claimed(payment_hash); + }, events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {}, events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {}, events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if node_idx == 1 => {}, events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {}, + events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { + failure_type: events::HTLCHandlingFailureType::Receive { payment_hash }, + .. + } => { + assert!( + !payments.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow().contains(&payment_hash), + "Payment {:?} hit HTLCHandlingFailed::Receive after claim_funds", + payment_hash, + ); + }, events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {}, events::Event::FundingTransactionReadyForSigning { channel_id, @@ -2581,18 +2872,23 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { .unwrap(); }, events::Event::SpliceNegotiated { new_funding_txo, .. } => { - let mut txs = nodes[node_idx].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut(); - assert!(txs.len() >= 1); - let splice_tx = txs.remove(0); - assert_eq!(new_funding_txo.txid, splice_tx.compute_txid()); - chain_state.add_pending_tx(splice_tx); + if !chain_state.confirmed_txids.contains(&new_funding_txo.txid) { + let mut txs = nodes[node_idx].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut(); + if let Some(pos) = + txs.iter().position(|tx| new_funding_txo.txid == tx.compute_txid()) + { + let splice_tx = txs.remove(pos); + chain_state.add_pending_tx(splice_tx); + } + } }, events::Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed { .. } => {}, - events::Event::DiscardFunding { - funding_info: - events::FundingInfo::Contribution { .. } | events::FundingInfo::Tx { .. }, - .. - } => {}, + events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => { + payments.mark_channel_closed(channel_id); + }, + events::Event::DiscardFunding { .. } => {}, + events::Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {}, + events::Event::BumpTransaction(..) => {}, _ => panic!("Unhandled event: {:?}", event), } } @@ -2613,54 +2909,41 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { } fn process_all_events(&mut self) { + let mut settled = false; let mut last_pass_no_updates = false; - for i in 0..std::usize::MAX { - if i == 100 { - panic!( - "It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever" - ); - } - // Next, make sure no monitor updates are pending. - self.ab_link.complete_all_monitor_updates(&self.nodes); - self.bc_link.complete_all_monitor_updates(&self.nodes); - // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination. - if self.process_msg_events(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { - last_pass_no_updates = false; - continue; - } - if self.process_msg_events(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { - last_pass_no_updates = false; - continue; - } - if self.process_msg_events(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { - last_pass_no_updates = false; - continue; - } - // ...making sure any payments are claimed. - if self.process_events(0, false) { - last_pass_no_updates = false; - continue; + for settle_iter in 0..100 { + let completed_monitor_update = self.complete_pending_monitor_updates(); + let mut had_msg_or_ev = false; + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_msg_events(node_idx, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } } - if self.process_events(1, false) { - last_pass_no_updates = false; - continue; + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_events(node_idx, false) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } } - if self.process_events(2, false) { + let had_pending_txs = self.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); + self.sync_all_nodes_with_chain_state(); + self.process_monitor_pending_events(); + let had_new_txs = self + .drain_and_confirm_broadcast_transactions("process_all_events", Some(settle_iter)); + if completed_monitor_update || had_new_txs || had_msg_or_ev || had_pending_txs { last_pass_no_updates = false; continue; } if last_pass_no_updates { - // In some cases, we may generate a message to send in - // `process_msg_events`, but block sending until - // `complete_all_monitor_updates` gets called on the next - // iteration. - // - // Thus, we only exit if we manage two iterations with no messages - // or events to process. + settled = true; break; } last_pass_no_updates = true; } + assert!( + settled, + "process_all_events exceeded settle budget: {}", + self.pending_work_summary(), + ); } fn disconnect_ab(&mut self) { @@ -2710,6 +2993,18 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { self.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(None); self.nodes[2].signer_unblocked(None); + let has_stale_raw_monitors = self.nodes.iter().any(|node| { + node.monitor.list_monitors().into_iter().any(|chan_id| { + node.monitor + .get_monitor(chan_id) + .map(|mon| mon.current_best_block().height < node.height) + .unwrap_or(false) + }) + }); + if has_stale_raw_monitors { + self.process_messages_and_events_only(); + self.catch_up_raw_monitors(); + } self.process_all_events(); // Since MPP payments are supported, we wait until we fully settle the state of all @@ -2720,26 +3015,156 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { } self.process_all_events(); - // Verify no payments are stuck - all should have resolved - self.payments.assert_all_resolved(); - // Verify that every payment claimed by a receiver resulted in a - // PaymentSent event at the sender. - self.payments.assert_claims_reported(); + if !self.payments.closed_channels.borrow().is_empty() { + for _ in 0..4096 { + self.flush_progress(32); + for node in self.nodes.iter() { + node.timer_tick_occurred(); + } + self.flush_progress(32); + let open_channels = self.open_channels(); + let open_refs: Vec<_> = open_channels.iter().collect(); + let balances_a = self.nodes[0].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let balances_b = self.nodes[1].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let balances_c = self.nodes[2].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let needs_payment_completion = self.payments.has_live_payment_work(); + let has_cleanup_balances = + !balances_a.is_empty() || !balances_b.is_empty() || !balances_c.is_empty(); + let can_drive_more_cleanup = has_cleanup_balances || self.has_pending_work(); + let next_claimed_htlc_boundary = { + let claimed_hashes = self.payments.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_sent = self.payments.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_failed = self.payments.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + balances_a + .iter() + .chain(balances_b.iter()) + .chain(balances_c.iter()) + .filter_map(|balance| match balance { + Balance::ContentiousClaimable { + timeout_height, payment_hash, .. + } if claimed_hashes.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_sent.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_failed.contains(payment_hash) => + { + Some(*timeout_height) + }, + Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { + claimable_height, + payment_hash, + .. + } if claimed_hashes.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_sent.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_failed.contains(payment_hash) => + { + Some(*claimable_height) + }, + Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { + expiry_height, + payment_hash, + .. + } if claimed_hashes.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_sent.contains(payment_hash) + && !sender_failed.contains(payment_hash) => + { + Some(*expiry_height) + }, + _ => None, + }) + .min() + }; + let can_advance_without_claimed_expiry = next_claimed_htlc_boundary + .map_or(true, |boundary| { + self.chain_state.tip_height().saturating_add(1) < boundary + }); + if !needs_payment_completion || !can_drive_more_cleanup { + break; + } + if self.payments.has_unfinished_claims() && !can_advance_without_claimed_expiry { + break; + } + self.chain_state.advance_height(1); + self.flush_progress(32); + } + } + + { + let payment_hashes = self.payments.payment_hashes_by_id.borrow(); + let claimed = self.payments.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let receiver_claimed = self.payments.receiver_claimed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_sent = self.payments.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let sender_failed = self.payments.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow(); + let mut pending = self.payments.pending_payments.borrow_mut(); + let mut resolved = self.payments.resolved_payment_ids.borrow_mut(); + for (node_idx, payment_ids) in pending.iter_mut().enumerate() { + payment_ids.retain(|payment_id| { + let payment_hash = *payment_hashes + .get(payment_id) + .expect("pending payment missing payment hash"); + let keep = claimed.contains(&payment_hash) + || receiver_claimed.contains(&payment_hash) + || sender_sent.contains(&payment_hash) + || sender_failed.contains(&payment_hash); + if !keep { + resolved[node_idx].insert(*payment_id); + } + keep + }); + } + } - // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment. - let chan_ab_ids = self.ab_link.channel_ids().clone(); - let chan_bc_ids = self.bc_link.channel_ids().clone(); - for chan_id in chan_ab_ids { + for (idx, pending) in self.payments.pending_payments.borrow().iter().enumerate() { assert!( - self.send_on_channel(0, 1, chan_id, 10_000_000) - || self.send_on_channel(1, 0, chan_id, 10_000_000) + pending.is_empty(), + "Node {} has {} stuck pending payments after settling all state: ids={:?}; {}", + idx, + pending.len(), + pending, + self.pending_work_summary(), ); } - for chan_id in chan_bc_ids { + + let claimed_hashes = + self.payments.claimed_payment_hashes.borrow().iter().copied().collect::>(); + for hash in claimed_hashes { + let receiver_saw_claim = + self.payments.receiver_claimed_payment_hashes.borrow().contains(&hash); assert!( - self.send_on_channel(1, 2, chan_id, 10_000_000) - || self.send_on_channel(2, 1, chan_id, 10_000_000) + receiver_saw_claim, + "Payment {:?} was claimed with claim_funds but receiver never got PaymentClaimed", + hash, ); + let sender_saw_sent = self.payments.sender_sent_payment_hashes.borrow().contains(&hash); + let sender_saw_failed = + self.payments.sender_failed_payment_hashes.borrow().contains(&hash); + assert!(!(sender_saw_sent && sender_saw_failed)); + assert!(sender_saw_sent || sender_saw_failed); + if sender_saw_failed { + assert!(self.payments.claim_allows_sender_failure(&hash)); + } + } + + self.ab_link.complete_all_monitor_updates(&self.nodes); + self.bc_link.complete_all_monitor_updates(&self.nodes); + + for chan_id in *self.ab_link.channel_ids() { + if self.payments.closed_channels.borrow().contains(&chan_id) { + continue; + } + if self.probe_amount_for_direction(0, chan_id).is_some() { + assert!(self.can_send_after_settle(0, 1, chan_id)); + } else if self.probe_amount_for_direction(1, chan_id).is_some() { + assert!(self.can_send_after_settle(1, 0, chan_id)); + } + } + for chan_id in *self.bc_link.channel_ids() { + if self.payments.closed_channels.borrow().contains(&chan_id) { + continue; + } + if self.probe_amount_for_direction(1, chan_id).is_some() { + assert!(self.can_send_after_settle(1, 2, chan_id)); + } else if self.probe_amount_for_direction(2, chan_id).is_some() { + assert!(self.can_send_after_settle(2, 1, chan_id)); + } } self.nodes[0].record_last_htlc_clear_fee(); @@ -2752,6 +3177,515 @@ impl<'a, Out: Output + MaybeSend + MaybeSync> Harness<'a, Out> { node.refresh_serialized_manager(); } } + + fn confirm_broadcasts_for_node(&mut self, node_idx: usize) { + let txs = self.nodes[node_idx] + .broadcaster + .txn_broadcasted + .borrow_mut() + .drain(..) + .collect::>(); + for tx in txs { + self.confirm_tx_and_sync_wallets(tx); + } + } + + fn confirm_tx_and_sync_wallets(&mut self, tx: Transaction) -> bool { + confirm_tx_and_sync_wallets( + &mut self.chain_state, + [&self.nodes[0].wallet, &self.nodes[1].wallet, &self.nodes[2].wallet].as_slice(), + tx, + ) + } + + fn confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(&mut self) -> bool { + let confirmed_txs = self.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + for tx in &confirmed_txs { + sync_wallets_with_confirmed_tx( + [&self.nodes[0].wallet, &self.nodes[1].wallet, &self.nodes[2].wallet].as_slice(), + tx, + ); + } + !confirmed_txs.is_empty() + } + + fn open_channels(&self) -> Vec { + self.nodes[0] + .node + .list_channels() + .iter() + .chain(self.nodes[1].node.list_channels().iter()) + .chain(self.nodes[2].node.list_channels().iter()) + .cloned() + .collect::>() + } + + fn has_pending_monitor_updates(&self) -> bool { + self.nodes.iter().any(|node| { + node.monitor + .latest_monitors + .lock() + .unwrap() + .values() + .any(|state| !state.pending_monitors.is_empty()) + }) + } + + fn has_time_dependent_work(&self) -> bool { + let open_channels = self.open_channels(); + let open_refs: Vec<_> = open_channels.iter().collect(); + self.nodes.iter().any(|node| { + node.monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs).iter().any(|balance| { + matches!( + balance, + Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { .. } + | Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } + | Balance::ContentiousClaimable { .. } + | Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. } + | Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. } + | Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { .. } + ) + }) + }) + } + + fn has_pending_work(&self) -> bool { + !self.queues.ab.is_empty() + || !self.queues.ba.is_empty() + || !self.queues.bc.is_empty() + || !self.queues.cb.is_empty() + || !self.chain_state.pending_txs.is_empty() + || self.nodes.iter().any(|node| !node.broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().is_empty()) + || self.has_pending_monitor_updates() + || self.has_time_dependent_work() + } + + fn pending_work_summary(&self) -> String { + let open_channels = self.open_channels(); + let open_refs: Vec<_> = open_channels.iter().collect(); + let balances_a = self.nodes[0].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let balances_b = self.nodes[1].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let balances_c = self.nodes[2].monitor.get_claimable_balances(&open_refs); + let pending_payments = self.payments.pending_payments.borrow(); + format!( + "queues ab={} ba={} bc={} cb={} pending_txs={} bcast=({},{},{}) pending=({},{},{}) monitor_updates={} timed_work={} heights=({},{},{}) tip={} {} balances_a=[{}] balances_b=[{}] balances_c=[{}]", + self.queues.ab.len(), + self.queues.ba.len(), + self.queues.bc.len(), + self.queues.cb.len(), + self.chain_state.pending_txs.len(), + self.nodes[0].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().len(), + self.nodes[1].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().len(), + self.nodes[2].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow().len(), + pending_payments[0].len(), + pending_payments[1].len(), + pending_payments[2].len(), + self.has_pending_monitor_updates(), + self.has_time_dependent_work(), + self.nodes[0].height, + self.nodes[1].height, + self.nodes[2].height, + self.chain_state.tip_height(), + self.payments.summarize_claim_tracking(), + summarize_balances(&balances_a), + summarize_balances(&balances_b), + summarize_balances(&balances_c), + ) + } + + fn complete_pending_monitor_updates(&self) -> bool { + let mut completed_monitor_update = false; + for id in self.ab_link.channel_ids() { + completed_monitor_update |= self.nodes[0].complete_all_monitor_updates(id); + completed_monitor_update |= self.nodes[1].complete_all_monitor_updates(id); + } + for id in self.bc_link.channel_ids() { + completed_monitor_update |= self.nodes[1].complete_all_monitor_updates(id); + completed_monitor_update |= self.nodes[2].complete_all_monitor_updates(id); + } + completed_monitor_update + } + + fn sync_all_nodes_with_chain_state(&mut self) { + let chain_state = &self.chain_state; + for node in &mut self.nodes { + node.sync_with_chain_state(chain_state, None); + } + } + + fn process_monitor_pending_events(&self) { + for node in &self.nodes { + let logger = Arc::clone(&node.logger); + let wallet = WalletSync::new(&node.wallet, Arc::clone(&logger)); + let handler = BumpTransactionEventHandlerSync::new( + node.broadcaster.as_ref(), + &wallet, + node.keys_manager.as_ref(), + Arc::clone(&logger), + ); + let broadcaster = &node.broadcaster; + node.monitor.process_pending_events(&|event: events::Event| { + if let events::Event::BumpTransaction(ref bump) = event { + match bump { + events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { + commitment_tx, + channel_id, + counterparty_node_id, + .. + } => { + broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[( + commitment_tx, + lightning::chain::chaininterface::TransactionType::UnilateralClose { + counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id, + channel_id: *channel_id, + }, + )]); + }, + events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { + .. + } => { + handler.handle_event(bump); + }, + } + } + Ok(()) + }); + } + } + + fn drain_and_confirm_broadcast_transactions( + &mut self, context: &str, settle_iter: Option, + ) -> bool { + let mut had_new_txs = false; + for confirm_iter in 0..32 { + let mut found = false; + let mut pending_txs = Vec::new(); + for node in &self.nodes { + for tx in node.broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().drain(..) { + pending_txs.push(tx); + } + } + pending_txs.sort_by_key(|tx| tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32()); + let mut deferred_txs = pending_txs; + loop { + let mut next_deferred_txs = Vec::new(); + let mut progressed = false; + for tx in deferred_txs { + if self.confirm_tx_and_sync_wallets(tx.clone()) { + found = true; + progressed = true; + } else { + next_deferred_txs.push(tx); + } + } + if !progressed { + deferred_txs = next_deferred_txs + .into_iter() + .filter(|tx| should_retry_confirm_later(&self.chain_state, tx)) + .collect(); + break; + } + deferred_txs = next_deferred_txs; + } + if !deferred_txs.is_empty() { + self.nodes[0].broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.borrow_mut().extend(deferred_txs); + } + if !found { + break; + } + let quiesce_context = match settle_iter { + Some(iter) => format!( + "{context} tx confirmation loop failed to quiesce at settle iter {iter}: {}", + self.pending_work_summary(), + ), + None => format!( + "{context} tx confirmation loop failed to quiesce: {}", + self.pending_work_summary(), + ), + }; + assert!(confirm_iter < 31, "{quiesce_context}"); + had_new_txs = true; + self.sync_all_nodes_with_chain_state(); + } + had_new_txs + } + + fn progress_round(&mut self) -> bool { + let completed_monitor_update = self.complete_pending_monitor_updates(); + let mut had_msg_or_ev = false; + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_msg_events(node_idx, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } + } + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_events(node_idx, false) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } + } + let had_pending_txs = self.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); + self.sync_all_nodes_with_chain_state(); + self.process_monitor_pending_events(); + let had_new_txs = self.drain_and_confirm_broadcast_transactions("flush_progress", None); + completed_monitor_update || had_new_txs || had_msg_or_ev || had_pending_txs + } + + fn flush_progress(&mut self, max_iters: usize) { + let mut last_pass_no_updates = false; + for _ in 0..max_iters { + if self.progress_round() { + last_pass_no_updates = false; + continue; + } + if last_pass_no_updates { + break; + } + last_pass_no_updates = true; + } + let pending_work = self.has_pending_work(); + let summary = self.pending_work_summary(); + assert!( + !pending_work || last_pass_no_updates, + "flush_progress exhausted {max_iters} iterations without quiescing: {summary}", + ); + assert!( + !pending_work || !last_pass_no_updates || max_iters > 0, + "flush_progress made no progress: {summary}", + ); + } + + fn advance_chain_carefully(&mut self, num_blocks: u32) { + if self.payments.has_live_payment_work() { + self.flush_progress(32); + } else { + for _ in 0..num_blocks { + self.flush_progress(32); + if !self.has_pending_work() { + break; + } + self.chain_state.advance_height(1); + self.flush_progress(32); + if !self.has_pending_work() { + break; + } + } + } + } + + fn catch_up_raw_monitors(&self) { + for node in &self.nodes { + let mut min_monitor_height = node.height; + for chan_id in node.monitor.list_monitors() { + if let Ok(mon) = node.monitor.get_monitor(chan_id) { + min_monitor_height = + std::cmp::min(min_monitor_height, mon.current_best_block().height); + } + } + let mut h = min_monitor_height; + while h < node.height { + let mut next_height = h + 1; + while next_height <= node.height + && self.chain_state.block_at(next_height).1.is_empty() + { + next_height += 1; + } + if next_height > node.height { + h = node.height; + let (header, _) = self.chain_state.block_at(h); + node.monitor.best_block_updated(header, h); + break; + } + if next_height > h + 1 { + h = next_height - 1; + let (header, _) = self.chain_state.block_at(h); + node.monitor.best_block_updated(header, h); + } + h = next_height; + let (header, txn) = self.chain_state.block_at(h); + let txdata: Vec<_> = txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect(); + if !txdata.is_empty() { + node.monitor.transactions_confirmed(header, &txdata, h); + } + node.monitor.best_block_updated(header, h); + } + } + } + + fn process_messages_and_events_only(&mut self) { + let mut settled = false; + let mut last_pass_no_updates = false; + for _ in 0..100 { + let completed_monitor_update = self.complete_pending_monitor_updates(); + let mut had_msg_or_ev = false; + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_msg_events(node_idx, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } + } + for node_idx in 0..3 { + if self.process_events(node_idx, false) { + had_msg_or_ev = true; + } + } + if completed_monitor_update || had_msg_or_ev { + last_pass_no_updates = false; + continue; + } + if last_pass_no_updates { + settled = true; + break; + } + last_pass_no_updates = true; + } + assert!(settled, "message-only settle exceeded budget: {}", self.pending_work_summary(),); + } + + fn record_force_close_dust(&self, closer_idx: usize, channel_id: ChannelId) { + if let Some(channel) = self.nodes[closer_idx] + .node + .list_channels() + .into_iter() + .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == channel_id) + { + let mut dust_parts = channel + .pending_inbound_htlcs + .iter() + .filter(|htlc| inbound_dust_blocks_path(htlc)) + .map(|htlc| (htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat)) + .chain( + channel + .pending_outbound_htlcs + .iter() + .filter(|htlc| outbound_dust_blocks_path(htlc)) + .map(|htlc| (htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat)), + ) + .collect::>(); + let payment_paths = self.payments.payment_paths_by_hash.borrow(); + let mut blocked_paths = self.payments.blocked_dust_paths_by_hash.borrow_mut(); + for (payment_hash, amount_msat) in dust_parts.drain(..) { + let Some(paths) = payment_paths.get(&payment_hash) else { + continue; + }; + let blocked_for_hash = + blocked_paths.entry(payment_hash).or_insert_with(HashSet::new); + if let Some((path_idx, _)) = paths.iter().enumerate().find(|(path_idx, path)| { + !blocked_for_hash.contains(path_idx) + && path.iter().any(|(chan_id, part_amt)| { + *chan_id == channel_id && *part_amt == amount_msat + }) + }) { + blocked_for_hash.insert(path_idx); + } + } + } + } + + fn force_close( + &mut self, closer_idx: usize, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_idx: usize, reason: &str, + ) { + self.flush_progress(32); + self.record_force_close_dust(closer_idx, channel_id); + if self.nodes[closer_idx] + .node + .force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn( + &channel_id, + &self.nodes[counterparty_idx].get_our_node_id(), + reason.to_string(), + ) + .is_ok() + { + self.payments.closed_channels.borrow_mut().insert(channel_id); + self.flush_progress(32); + } + } + + fn probe_amount_for_direction( + &self, source_idx: usize, dest_chan_id: ChannelId, + ) -> Option { + self.nodes[source_idx] + .node + .list_usable_channels() + .iter() + .find(|chan| chan.channel_id == dest_chan_id) + .and_then(|chan| { + let probe_amt = cmp::max( + cmp::min(10_000_000, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat), + chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, + ); + if probe_amt == 0 || probe_amt > chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat { + None + } else { + Some(probe_amt) + } + }) + } + + fn can_send_after_settle( + &mut self, source_idx: usize, dest_idx: usize, dest_chan_id: ChannelId, + ) -> bool { + if self.payments.closed_channels.borrow().contains(&dest_chan_id) { + return false; + } + let Some(amt) = self.probe_amount_for_direction(source_idx, dest_chan_id) else { + return false; + }; + self.send_on_channel(source_idx, dest_idx, dest_chan_id, amt) + } +} + +fn sync_wallets_with_confirmed_tx(wallets: &[&TestWalletSource], tx: &Transaction) { + for wallet in wallets { + let change_script = wallet.get_change_script().unwrap(); + for input in &tx.input { + wallet.remove_utxo(input.previous_output); + } + for (vout, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { + if output.script_pubkey == change_script { + wallet.add_utxo(tx.clone(), vout as u32); + } + } + } +} + +fn confirm_tx_and_sync_wallets( + chain_state: &mut ChainState, wallets: &[&TestWalletSource], tx: Transaction, +) -> bool { + if chain_state.confirm_tx(tx.clone()) { + sync_wallets_with_confirmed_tx(wallets, &tx); + true + } else { + false + } +} + +fn summarize_balances(balances: &[Balance]) -> String { + let mut on_close = 0; + let mut awaiting = 0; + let mut contentious = 0; + let mut maybe_timeout = 0; + let mut maybe_preimage = 0; + let mut revoked = 0; + for balance in balances { + match balance { + Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { .. } => on_close += 1, + Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } => awaiting += 1, + Balance::ContentiousClaimable { .. } => contentious += 1, + Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. } => maybe_timeout += 1, + Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. } => maybe_preimage += 1, + Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { .. } => revoked += 1, + } + } + format!( + "on_close={on_close} awaiting={awaiting} contentious={contentious} maybe_timeout={maybe_timeout} maybe_preimage={maybe_preimage} revoked={revoked}" + ) +} + +fn should_retry_confirm_later(chain_state: &ChainState, tx: &Transaction) -> bool { + let lock_time = tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(); + lock_time > 0 + && lock_time < 500_000_000 + && lock_time & (1 << 29) == 0 + && chain_state.tip_height() < lock_time } #[inline] @@ -2944,7 +3878,6 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], out: Out) { let cp_node_id = harness.nodes[1].get_our_node_id(); harness.nodes[2].splice_in(&cp_node_id, &harness.chan_b_id()); }, - 0xa4 => { if !cfg!(splicing) { break 'fuzz_loop; @@ -2973,31 +3906,30 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], out: Out) { let cp_node_id = harness.nodes[1].get_our_node_id(); harness.nodes[2].splice_out(&cp_node_id, &harness.chan_b_id()); }, - // Sync node by 1 block to cover confirmation of a transaction. 0xa8 => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[0].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, Some(1)); }, 0xa9 => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[1].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, Some(1)); }, 0xaa => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[2].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, Some(1)); }, // Sync node to chain tip to cover confirmation of a transaction post-reorg-risk. 0xab => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[0].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, None); }, 0xac => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[1].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, None); }, 0xad => { - harness.chain_state.confirm_pending_txs(); + harness.confirm_pending_txs_and_sync_wallets(); harness.nodes[2].sync_with_chain_state(&harness.chain_state, None); }, @@ -3030,74 +3962,71 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], out: Out) { harness.nodes[1] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_a_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); + harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(None); }, 0xc5 => { - harness.nodes[1] - .keys_manager - .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_b_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); - }, - 0xc6 => { harness.nodes[2] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment); harness.nodes[2].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xc7 => { + 0xc6 => { harness.nodes[0] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint); harness.nodes[0].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xc8 => { - harness.nodes[1] - .keys_manager - .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_a_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); - }, - 0xc9 => { + 0xc7 => { harness.nodes[1] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_b_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); + harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xca => { + 0xc8 => { harness.nodes[2] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint); harness.nodes[2].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xcb => { + 0xc9 => { harness.nodes[0] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret); harness.nodes[0].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xcc => { - harness.nodes[1] - .keys_manager - .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_a_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); - }, - 0xcd => { + 0xca => { harness.nodes[1] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret); - let filter = Some((harness.nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), harness.chan_b_id())); - harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(filter); + harness.nodes[1].signer_unblocked(None); }, - 0xce => { + 0xcb => { harness.nodes[2] .keys_manager .enable_op_for_all_signers(SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret); harness.nodes[2].signer_unblocked(None); }, + 0xcc => harness.nodes[0].enable_holder_signer_ops(), + 0xcd => harness.nodes[1].enable_holder_signer_ops(), + 0xce => harness.nodes[2].enable_holder_signer_ops(), + 0xcf => { + harness.nodes[0].enable_holder_signer_ops(); + harness.nodes[1].enable_holder_signer_ops(); + harness.nodes[2].enable_holder_signer_ops(); + }, + + 0xd0 => harness.force_close(0, harness.chan_a_id(), 1, "]]]]]]]]]"), + 0xd1 => harness.force_close(1, harness.chan_b_id(), 2, "]]]]]]]]"), + 0xd2 => harness.force_close(1, harness.chan_a_id(), 0, "]]]]]]]"), + 0xd3 => harness.force_close(2, harness.chan_b_id(), 1, "]]]]]"), + + 0xd8 => harness.confirm_broadcasts_for_node(0), + 0xd9 => harness.confirm_broadcasts_for_node(1), + 0xda => harness.confirm_broadcasts_for_node(2), + + 0xdc => harness.advance_chain_carefully(50), + 0xdd => harness.advance_chain_carefully(100), + 0xde => harness.advance_chain_carefully(200), 0xf0 => harness.ab_link.complete_monitor_updates_for_node( 0, @@ -3162,7 +4091,6 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], out: Out) { &harness.nodes, MonitorUpdateSelector::Last, ), - 0xff => { // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even // after we resolve all pending events. diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/base32/smoke b/fuzz/test_cases/base32/smoke deleted file mode 100644 index 573541ac970..00000000000 --- a/fuzz/test_cases/base32/smoke +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -0 diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/bech32_parse/smoke b/fuzz/test_cases/bech32_parse/smoke deleted file mode 100644 index 573541ac970..00000000000 --- a/fuzz/test_cases/bech32_parse/smoke +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -0 diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-02830a6ff7757f3570924b0c0fd9118a7cdd9770 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-02830a6ff7757f3570924b0c0fd9118a7cdd9770 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..57c626b8597 Binary files /dev/null and b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-02830a6ff7757f3570924b0c0fd9118a7cdd9770 differ diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0473b0e767d9a98de62538ce5afcbbc2e6ec5af2 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0473b0e767d9a98de62538ce5afcbbc2e6ec5af2 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ba413134fbb --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0473b0e767d9a98de62538ce5afcbbc2e6ec5af2 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +pppppp0ppp0ÀÞÚÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-05e175d40f60b823f730fa874d98dc10dd2bb6ad b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-05e175d40f60b823f730fa874d98dc10dd2bb6ad new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cabed892750 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-05e175d40f60b823f730fa874d98dc10dd2bb6ad @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +lls²ÿÿÿÿÝÝÝÝÝÿÿÿÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-07bdc4e56ee67bd2ffa409f76529199d748ab2d8 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-07bdc4e56ee67bd2ffa409f76529199d748ab2d8 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eb3ac3716d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-07bdc4e56ee67bd2ffa409f76529199d748ab2d8 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +pppppp0ÀÐ%ÞÞÏØÙÚÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-096cc3008264dccaefb945f5a4b7a2d3c9f8e90c b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-096cc3008264dccaefb945f5a4b7a2d3c9f8e90c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f00662619a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-096cc3008264dccaefb945f5a4b7a2d3c9f8e90c @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +<!''ÐØ¥!ÙÚÞºÿ³ÑºÓÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09a17e06913dea74dba796940cec86cb4e2dd597 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09a17e06913dea74dba796940cec86cb4e2dd597 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..30543451915 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09a17e06913dea74dba796940cec86cb4e2dd597 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +<!ÑØÙÚÞÞÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09f5a41270b07f70a031884cbdfd081e8600923e b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09f5a41270b07f70a031884cbdfd081e8600923e new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e0ff1832a4f Binary files /dev/null and b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-09f5a41270b07f70a031884cbdfd081e8600923e differ diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0b87d8b430697fe9d1781a38f41a68ebcf7b18c1 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0b87d8b430697fe9d1781a38f41a68ebcf7b18c1 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6fa6375a31f --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0b87d8b430697fe9d1781a38f41a68ebcf7b18c1 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +p0pÀÞÞÏbÿ`ÙÚÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0c3334736f5c55e44088d6140580354827026732 b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0c3334736f5c55e44088d6140580354827026732 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..13cce60bcd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0c3334736f5c55e44088d6140580354827026732 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +<!ÒÑØÙÚÞÞÿ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0dcddb7aa2b729fa8de829e5ea82c38b5918acfa b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-0dcddb7aa2b729fa8de829e5ea82c38b5918acfa new file mode 100644 index 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b/fuzz/test_cases/chanmon_consistency/crash-d5124444b5e39d9a67c395e6325d340fff97a159 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +<ˆ0"ts { #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] claimable_outpoints: HashMap, + // Tracks outpoints whose claim tx has already reached [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations. + // Later claim requests for these outputs must be ignored, even if they arrive from newly + // learned preimages after the original claim tracking has been cleaned up. + irrevocably_spent_outpoints: HashSet, + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] pub(crate) locktimed_packages: BTreeMap>, #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))] @@ -297,6 +302,7 @@ impl PartialEq for OnchainTxHandler OnchainTxHandler { entry.write(writer)?; } - write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}); + let irrevocably_spent_outpoints = Some(self.irrevocably_spent_outpoints.clone()); + write_tlv_fields!(writer, { + (0, irrevocably_spent_outpoints, option), + }); Ok(()) } @@ -441,7 +450,10 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP } } - read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}); + let mut irrevocably_spent_outpoints = None; + read_tlv_fields!(reader, { + (0, irrevocably_spent_outpoints, option), + }); // `ChannelMonitor`s already track the `channel_id` and `counterparty_node_id`, however, due // to the deserialization order there we can't make use of `ReadableArgs` to hand them in @@ -465,6 +477,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP signer, channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters, claimable_outpoints, + irrevocably_spent_outpoints: irrevocably_spent_outpoints.unwrap_or_else(new_hash_set), locktimed_packages, pending_claim_requests, onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf, @@ -493,6 +506,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters, pending_claim_requests: new_hash_map(), claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(), + irrevocably_spent_outpoints: new_hash_set(), locktimed_packages: BTreeMap::new(), onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(), pending_claim_events: Vec::new(), @@ -806,6 +820,14 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { 1, "Claims passed to `update_claims_view_from_requests` should not be aggregated" ); + if req.outpoints() + .iter() + .any(|outpoint| self.irrevocably_spent_outpoints.contains(*outpoint)) + { + log_info!(logger, "Ignoring claim for outpoint {}:{}, it was already irrevocably spent by a confirmed claim transaction", + req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout); + false + } else { let mut all_outpoints_claiming = true; for outpoint in req.outpoints() { if self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint).is_none() { @@ -817,9 +839,16 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout); false } else { - let timelocked_equivalent_package = self.locktimed_packages.iter().map(|v| v.1.iter()).flatten() - .find(|locked_package| locked_package.outpoints() == req.outpoints()); - if let Some(package) = timelocked_equivalent_package { + let timelocked_covering_package = self + .locktimed_packages + .values() + .flat_map(|packages| packages.iter()) + .find(|locked_package| { + req.outpoints().iter().all(|outpoint| { + locked_package.outpoints().contains(outpoint) + }) + }); + if let Some(package) = timelocked_covering_package { log_info!(logger, "Ignoring second claim for outpoint {}:{}, we already have one which we're waiting on a timelock at {} for.", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout, package.package_locktime(cur_height)); false @@ -827,6 +856,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { true } } + } }); // Then try to maximally aggregate `requests`. @@ -895,26 +925,31 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { } ClaimId(tx.0.compute_txid().to_byte_array()) }, - OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => { - log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints()); - let claim_id = match claim_event { + OnchainClaim::Event(claim_event) => { + log_info!(logger, "Yielding onchain event to spend inputs {:?}", req.outpoints()); + let claim_id = match claim_event { ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment { ref commitment_tx, .. } => // For commitment claims, we can just use their txid as it should // already be unique. ClaimId(commitment_tx.compute_txid().to_byte_array()), - ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => { - // For HTLC claims, commit to the entire set of HTLC outputs to - // claim, which will always be unique per request. Once a claim ID - // is generated, it is assigned and remains unchanged, even if the - // underlying set of HTLCs changes. - ClaimId::from_htlcs(htlcs) - }, - }; - debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none()); - debug_assert_eq!(self.pending_claim_events.iter().filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(), 0); - self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, claim_event)); - claim_id - }, + ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC { ref htlcs, .. } => { + // For HTLC claims, commit to the entire set of HTLC outputs to + // claim, which will always be unique per request. Once a claim ID + // is generated, it is assigned and remains unchanged, even if the + // underlying set of HTLCs changes. + ClaimId::from_htlcs(htlcs) + }, + }; + debug_assert!(self.pending_claim_requests.get(&claim_id).is_none()); + #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { + let num_existing = self.pending_claim_events.iter() + .filter(|entry| entry.0 == claim_id).count(); + assert!(num_existing == 0 || num_existing == 1); + } + self.pending_claim_events.retain(|entry| entry.0 != claim_id); + self.pending_claim_events.push((claim_id, claim_event)); + claim_id + }, }; // Because fuzzing can cause hash collisions, we can end up with conflicting claim // ids here, so we only assert when not fuzzing. @@ -1064,6 +1099,7 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { for outpoint in request.outpoints() { log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking for {} due to maturation of claim package {}.", outpoint, log_bytes!(claim_id.0)); + self.irrevocably_spent_outpoints.insert(*outpoint); self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint); } #[cfg(debug_assertions)] { @@ -1077,7 +1113,10 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => { log_debug!(logger, "Removing claim tracking due to maturation of claim tx for outpoints:"); log_debug!(logger, " {:?}", package.outpoints()); - self.claimable_outpoints.remove(package.outpoints()[0]); + for outpoint in package.outpoints() { + self.irrevocably_spent_outpoints.insert(*outpoint); + self.claimable_outpoints.remove(outpoint); + } } } } else { diff --git a/lightning/src/crypto/utils.rs b/lightning/src/crypto/utils.rs index 88911b0baf8..8b2737fa8e9 100644 --- a/lightning/src/crypto/utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/crypto/utils.rs @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ pub fn hkdf_extract_expand_7x( #[inline] pub fn sign(ctx: &Secp256k1, msg: &Message, sk: &SecretKey) -> Signature { #[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")] - let sig = ctx.sign_ecdsa_low_r(msg, sk); + let sig = if cfg!(fuzzing) { ctx.sign_ecdsa(msg, sk) } else { ctx.sign_ecdsa_low_r(msg, sk) }; #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))] let sig = ctx.sign_ecdsa(msg, sk); sig @@ -79,10 +79,16 @@ pub fn sign_with_aux_rand( ctx: &Secp256k1, msg: &Message, sk: &SecretKey, entropy_source: &ES, ) -> Signature { #[cfg(feature = "grind_signatures")] - let sig = loop { - let sig = ctx.sign_ecdsa_with_noncedata(msg, sk, &entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); - if sig.serialize_compact()[0] < 0x80 { - break sig; + let sig = { + if cfg!(fuzzing) { + return sign(ctx, msg, sk); + } + loop { + let sig = + ctx.sign_ecdsa_with_noncedata(msg, sk, &entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()); + if sig.serialize_compact()[0] < 0x80 { + break sig; + } } }; #[cfg(all(not(feature = "grind_signatures"), not(ldk_test_vectors)))] diff --git a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs index 6a5e9948653..22c70fd4d61 100644 --- a/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs +++ b/lightning/src/events/bump_transaction/mod.rs @@ -480,11 +480,15 @@ impl= signed_tx_weight); + // When fuzzing, signatures are trivially small so the actual weight can be + // significantly less than estimated. Skip the lower-bound check. + #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] assert!(expected_signed_tx_weight * 99 / 100 <= signed_tx_weight); let expected_package_fee = Amount::from_sat(fee_for_weight( @@ -629,10 +633,10 @@ impl(); - #[cfg(debug_assertions)] + #[cfg(all(debug_assertions, not(fuzzing)))] let must_spend_amount = must_spend.iter().map(|input| input.previous_utxo.value.to_sat()).sum::(); @@ -663,13 +667,13 @@ impl= signed_tx_weight); + // When fuzzing, signatures are trivially small so the actual weight can be + // significantly less than estimated. Skip the lower-bound check. assert!(expected_signed_tx_weight * 98 / 100 <= signed_tx_weight); let expected_signed_tx_fee = diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs index 9633800db08..b822020b950 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ fn test_monitor_and_persister_update_fail() { let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]); - let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let node_a_id = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let node_b_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); @@ -4609,7 +4609,7 @@ fn test_claim_to_closed_channel_blocks_claimed_event() { let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); let legacy_cfg = test_legacy_channel_config(); let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(legacy_cfg), None]); - let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let node_a_id = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let node_b_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); diff --git a/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs b/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs index 374ad38b2ce..b7eb445aade 100644 --- a/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs +++ b/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ pub mod tx_builder; pub(crate) const COMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE: usize = bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE; +// Standard low-S ECDSA signatures fit in the secp256k1 DER bound; the appended sighash byte +// replaces the extra DER padding byte that a high-S signature could require. pub(crate) const MAX_STANDARD_SIGNATURE_SIZE: usize = bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE;