Some things to work on in the near future: - Encryption preconditions are syntactically burdensome. Try to have only 1 inductive? - abstractions: - [x] "Weaken" auth_safe to allow an eqwhp rewrite. Prove that these versions are just as useful as the old versions. - [x] A helper function with interaction which outputs the set of old indices with respect to n, so that we can talk about terms being old wrt n. Prove: - [x] The set of old indices is monotonic in n - [x] Any index in (interaction n) is old wrt n - [x] The indices generated by interaction at time (n + 1) are new wrt n - Our formulation of public-key encryption has some confusion about nonces. Resolve this after getting a good idea of symmetric-key encryption down. - n-step protocols to work on: - [ ] "kerberos" - trusted 3rd party which shares sym. keys with everyone; repeatedly negotiates a shared key between 2 people who use the shared key - build up towards TLS-like protocol: - [ ] "PGP" - regularly sign encryption keys; people check the signatures and send you messages - [ ] session keys (cf Hugo Krawczyk, SIGMA) - [ ] multiple clients - [ ] KEM/PKE/DH - [ ] auth/confidentiality/both - [ ] preshared keys (similar to ratcheting) - [ ] key derivation - [ ] ratcheting - each round, send a message and new encryption+mac keys * could even show ratcheting property * probably will have the most problems. not even really handled well by computational models - [ ] server which takes adv message, prepends with "adv said: ", signs; wts all messages begin with "adv said: " * more or less superseded by "PGP" - [ ] compositionality of indist: if e, e' are independent from context C, then e ≈ e' -> C[e] ≈ C[e'] - [ ] prove no_nonce_reuse - [ ] x <> y -> whp $x != $y
Some things to work on in the near future:
everyone; repeatedly negotiates a shared key between 2 people
who use the shared key
signatures and send you messages
handled well by computational models
wts all messages begin with "adv said: "
if e, e' are independent from context C, then
e ≈ e' -> C[e] ≈ C[e']