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Security: riyaneel/Tachyon

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.4.x
0.3.5
< 0.3

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories.

Include:

  • A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
  • Steps to reproduce or a minimal proof of concept
  • Affected versions

You will receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours. We aim to release a fix within 14 days for critical issues.

Scope

Tachyon is a same-machine IPC library. The threat model assumes that both the producer and consumer processes are trusted and run under the same user or a cooperating user on the same host. Cross-machine transport and multi-tenant isolation are explicitly out of scope.

Known limitations:

  • No encryption. The shared memory region is readable by any process with access to the memfd file descriptor. Do not use Tachyon to communicate sensitive data between mutually untrusting processes.
  • No authentication. The UDS handshake does not authenticate the connecting process beyond filesystem permissions on the socket path.

Artifact verification

All release artifacts are signed with cosign and carry a SLSA Build Level 2 provenance attestation.

Syscall containment

Tachyon's post-handshake hot path emits a single syscall type (futex on Linux, __ulock on macOS). The full syscall footprint per phase is documented in SYSCALLS.md.

For C++ and Rust deployments that require seccomp-BPF containment, pre-built allowlist generators are available in contrib/seccomp/. Do not apply them from within a polyglot runtime (Go, Python, Java, Node.js).

There aren't any published security advisories