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chore: add 1 brand new jwt advisory
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gems/jwt/CVE-2026-45363.yml

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---
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gem: jwt
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cve: 2026-45363
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ghsa: c32j-vqhx-rx3x
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url: https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x
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title: 'ruby-jwt: Empty-key HMAC bypass; cross-language sibling of CVE-2026-44351'
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date: 2026-05-18
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description: |
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`JWT.decode(token, '', true, algorithm: 'HS256')` accepts an attacker-forged token.
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`OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', '', payload)` returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no `raise
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InvalidKeyError if key.empty?` precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.
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```
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JWT.decode(token, "", true, algorithm: 'HS256')
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-> JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
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-> OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('SHA256', "", signing_input) == signature
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```
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The same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns "", nil, or an
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array containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty
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arrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to "" (signing_key ||= '') before signing.
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```
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JWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: ['HS256']) { |_h| "" }
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-> find_key returns "" # "" && !Array("").empty? == true
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-> JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: "", ...)
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-> verifies
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```
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Common application patterns that produce the unsafe value: `redis.get("kid:#{kid}").to_s`, ORM string columns with `default: ''`, `ENV['SECRET'] || '', Hash.new('')` lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.
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The existing `enforce_hmac_key_length` option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL ≥ 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.
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Affects HS256/HS384/HS512 via both JWT.decode (positional key and block keyfinder) and
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`JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!(key_finder:)`
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cvss_v3: 7.4
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patched_versions:
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- ">= 3.2.0"
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related:
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url:
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- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x
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- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/commit/db560b769a07bd9724e77ff505011ac01872106f
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- https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/releases/tag/v3.2.0
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- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x

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