diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 6723b06..d45c92c 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
           persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Install cargo-binstall
-        uses: cargo-bins/cargo-binstall@732870f031d2fb36309d0deaf36abcc704a7be65 # v1.20.1
+        uses: cargo-bins/cargo-binstall@ead08b90bd7b2e6d81963fb9cf0b7239f66d5db4 # v1.21.0
 
       # Pin to match CARGO_DENY_VERSION in scripts/install-dev-tools.sh so CI and
       # local installs run the same version.
@@ -102,6 +102,6 @@ jobs:
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@192e21d79ab29983730a13d1382995c2307fbcaa # v0.5.7
+      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@6599ee8b7a49aef6a770f63d261d214911a7ce02 # v0.6.0
         with:
           advanced-security: false
diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
index 210774b..471d4c3 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
           gh pr comment "$PR" --repo "$REPO" --body '⚠️ **@claude is about to review a PR from an outside contributor.**
           The diff, commit messages, and comments here are **untrusted input** and may contain prompt-injection attempting to make the review agent read or leak CI secrets. The agent is instructed to treat all of it as data, never as instructions — but that is a mitigation, not a guarantee. **Review the diff yourself for injection before relying on the agent'\''s output, and do not merge on the agent'\''s say-so alone.**'
 
-      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@e58dfa55559035499a4982426bb73605e8b5ad8e # v1.0.105
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@1298632ce7736903d02a1435002705aa2a594a6c # v1.0.175
         with:
           anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
           track_progress: true