Sanitization 1.2.5

[eldryoth]

Release 1.2.5

• Added BoundedSecretString<MAX> for UTF-8 secrets with an application-defined
  public byte limit across construction, append, replacement, and serde
  ingestion.
• Added a 1 MiB default serde byte ceiling for ordinary SecretString, matching
  the existing bounded-by-default SecretVec ingestion policy.
• Added allocation-preserving conversions between SecretVec and
  SecretString; invalid UTF-8 inputs are cleared before returning an error.
• Added LockedSecretString, a UTF-8-safe wrapper over LockedSecretVec that
  preserves memory locking, dump/fork policy, canaries, clearing, and mapped
  storage without introducing a second mapping.
• Added GuardedSecretString, a UTF-8-safe wrapper over GuardedSecretVec that
  preserves guard pages, optional memory locking, canaries, and clearing.
• Added checked locked/guarded text exposure through
  SecretTextIntegrityError, distinguishing canary corruption from invalid
  UTF-8.
• Added owned String ingestion helpers that clear the original global
  allocator storage after copying into locked or guarded mappings.
• Extended native constant-time traits and optional zeroize/subtle
  interoperability to the new text containers.
• Updated README guidance for direct secret-aware JSON ingestion, including the
  remaining limits around parser input and scratch-buffer copies.
• Clarified that UTF-8 validation and length rejection are not data-oblivious,
  that serde limits begin at visitor control, and that Miri/Kani do not provide
  native syscall or real-concurrency coverage.
• Updated all workspace crates and crates.io-facing version references for the
  1.2.5 patch release.

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This discussion was created from the release Sanitization 1.2.5.