diff --git a/tests/api/test_dsa.c b/tests/api/test_dsa.c
index b645a57f45..cc56d78a03 100644
--- a/tests/api/test_dsa.c
+++ b/tests/api/test_dsa.c
@@ -426,9 +426,11 @@ int test_wc_DsaImportParamsRawCheck(void)
     /* null param pointers */
     ExpectIntEQ(wc_DsaImportParamsRawCheck(&key, NULL, NULL, NULL, trusted,
         NULL), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
-    /* illegal p length */
+    /* illegal p length: the checked path now preserves the specific
+     * primality failure from p validation instead of overwriting it with
+     * BAD_FUNC_ARG during the later (L,N) size check. */
     ExpectIntEQ(wc_DsaImportParamsRawCheck(&key, invalidP, q, g, trusted, NULL),
-        WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
+        WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(DH_CHECK_PUB_E));
     /* illegal q length */
     ExpectIntEQ(wc_DsaImportParamsRawCheck(&key, p, invalidQ, g, trusted, NULL),
         WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
@@ -731,4 +733,3 @@ int test_wc_DsaCheckPubKey(void)
 #endif
     return EXPECT_RESULT();
 } /* END test_wc_DsaCheckPubKey */
-
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/curve25519.c b/wolfcrypt/src/curve25519.c
index 12efe361f9..8e7afec540 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/curve25519.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/curve25519.c
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ int wc_curve25519_check_public(const byte* pub, word32 pubSz, int endian)
         /* Check for order-1 or higher. */
         if (pub[0] == 0x7f) {
             for (i = 1; i < CURVE25519_KEYSIZE - 1; i++) {
-                if (pub[i] != 0)
+                if (pub[i] != 0xff)
                     break;
             }
             if (i == CURVE25519_KEYSIZE - 1 && (pub[i] >= 0xec))
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/dh.c b/wolfcrypt/src/dh.c
index 7da2173ac0..5a6daa9853 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/dh.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/dh.c
@@ -1013,6 +1013,13 @@ int wc_FreeDhKey(DhKey* key)
     #ifdef WOLFSSL_KCAPI_DH
         KcapiDh_Free(key);
     #endif
+    #ifdef WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO
+        /* Deregister any mem-zero entries covering this key (e.g. key->priv
+         * registered by wc_DhImportKeyPair) now that its fields are zeroed.
+         * Mirrors wc_FreeRsaKey(); mp_forcezero() alone does not remove the
+         * registration, so without this the entry leaks into later checks. */
+        wc_MemZero_Check(key, sizeof(*key));
+    #endif
     }
     return 0;
 }
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/dsa.c b/wolfcrypt/src/dsa.c
index 3ee03876fe..c9caf21306 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/dsa.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/dsa.c
@@ -546,13 +546,17 @@ static int _DsaImportParamsRaw(DsaKey* dsa, const char* p, const char* q,
     if (err == MP_OKAY)
         err = mp_read_radix(&dsa->g, g, MP_RADIX_HEX);
 
-    /* verify (L,N) pair bit lengths */
-    pSz = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dsa->p);
-    qSz = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dsa->q);
+    /* verify (L,N) pair bit lengths - only when the reads above succeeded, so
+     * a more specific earlier error (e.g. DH_CHECK_PUB_E from the primality
+     * check) is not overwritten and qSz is not read from an unset q. */
+    if (err == MP_OKAY) {
+        pSz = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dsa->p);
+        qSz = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&dsa->q);
 
-    if (CheckDsaLN(pSz * WOLFSSL_BIT_SIZE, qSz * WOLFSSL_BIT_SIZE) != 0) {
-        WOLFSSL_MSG("Invalid DSA p or q parameter size");
-        err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
+        if (CheckDsaLN(pSz * WOLFSSL_BIT_SIZE, qSz * WOLFSSL_BIT_SIZE) != 0) {
+            WOLFSSL_MSG("Invalid DSA p or q parameter size");
+            err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
+        }
     }
 
     if (err != MP_OKAY) {
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/random.c b/wolfcrypt/src/random.c
index 5ca8ce20a1..daa7daef0c 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/random.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/random.c
@@ -2234,7 +2234,7 @@ int wc_InitRngNonce_ex(WC_RNG* rng, byte* nonce, word32 nonceSz,
     return _InitRng(rng, nonce, nonceSz, heap, devId);
 }
 
-#ifdef HAVE_HASHDRBG
+#if defined(HAVE_HASHDRBG) && !defined(CUSTOM_RAND_GENERATE_BLOCK)
 static int PollAndReSeed(WC_RNG* rng)
 {
     int ret   = DRBG_NEED_RESEED;
@@ -5320,7 +5320,10 @@ int wc_GenerateSeed(OS_Seed* os, byte* output, word32 sz)
     {
         int ret = 0;
 
-        if (os == NULL) {
+        /* Validate output before any entropy backend dereferences it: some
+         * (e.g. glibc's vDSO getrandom()) fault on a NULL buffer rather than
+         * returning an error. Mirrors wc_RNG_GenerateBlock's NULL check. */
+        if (os == NULL || output == NULL) {
             return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
         }
 
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c b/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c
index cd66eab2ef..80b33c2075 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c
@@ -5402,6 +5402,23 @@ int wc_MakeRsaKey(RsaKey* key, int size, long e, WC_RNG* rng)
 #endif /* !WOLFSSL_CRYPTOCELL && !WOLFSSL_SE050 */
     int err;
 
+#if !defined(WOLFSSL_CRYPTOCELL) && \
+    (!defined(WOLFSSL_SE050) || defined(WOLFSSL_SE050_NO_RSA)) && \
+    !defined(WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_RSA) && \
+    !defined(WOLFSSL_MICROCHIP_TA100) && \
+    !defined(WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK) && defined(WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO)
+    /* Zero the stack temporaries so the mp_memzero_check() in the 'out'
+     * cleanup is safe even when an early argument/size check leaves via
+     * 'goto out' before these are mp_init'd - an uninitialized mp_int's size
+     * field would otherwise make the check scan an arbitrary stack range.
+     * Done here, after all declarations, to satisfy C89. */
+    XMEMSET(&p_buf, 0, sizeof(p_buf));
+    XMEMSET(&q_buf, 0, sizeof(q_buf));
+    XMEMSET(&tmp1_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp1_buf));
+    XMEMSET(&tmp2_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp2_buf));
+    XMEMSET(&tmp3_buf, 0, sizeof(tmp3_buf));
+#endif
+
     if (key == NULL || rng == NULL) {
         err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
         goto out;
diff --git a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fe_operations.h b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fe_operations.h
index 65d0e1c904..88c785f2c3 100644
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fe_operations.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/fe_operations.h
@@ -40,6 +40,20 @@
     #define CURVED25519_ASM_64BIT
     #define CURVED25519_ASM
 #endif
+
+/* The small (reduced-C) curve25519/ed25519 code and the Intel x64 assembly
+ * both provide the same fe_, sc_ and curve25519 symbols, so selecting both
+ * (for example a user_settings.h that keeps CURVE25519_SMALL/ED25519_SMALL
+ * while USE_INTEL_SPEEDUP enables the x64 assembly) produces duplicate-symbol
+ * link errors that are hard to diagnose. Detect the incompatible combination
+ * at compile time with a clear message instead. To keep the small
+ * implementation define NO_CURVED25519_X64; to use the assembly drop
+ * CURVE25519_SMALL / ED25519_SMALL. */
+#if defined(CURVED25519_X64) && \
+    (defined(CURVE25519_SMALL) || defined(ED25519_SMALL))
+    #error "CURVE25519_SMALL/ED25519_SMALL are incompatible with the Intel x64 curve25519/ed25519 assembly (CURVED25519_X64); define NO_CURVED25519_X64 to keep the small implementation, or remove the SMALL settings to use the assembly"
+#endif
+
 #if defined(WOLFSSL_ARMASM)
     #ifdef __aarch64__
         #define CURVED25519_ASM_64BIT
@@ -112,6 +126,13 @@ WOLFSSL_LOCAL int curve25519_nb(byte * q, const byte * n, const byte * p,
 WOLFSSL_LOCAL void fe_init(void);
 
 WOLFSSL_LOCAL int curve25519(byte * q, const byte * n, const byte * p);
+#if defined(CURVED25519_X64) || (defined(WOLFSSL_ARMASM) && defined(__aarch64__))
+/* Fixed-base scalar multiply provided by the x64/aarch64 assembly
+ * (fe_x25519_asm.S, armv8-curve25519); declared here as no other header
+ * prototypes it, which otherwise breaks a strict C (implicit-declaration)
+ * build of curve25519.c. */
+WOLFSSL_LOCAL int curve25519_base(byte * q, const byte * n);
+#endif
 #ifdef WOLFSSL_CURVE25519_BLINDING
 WOLFSSL_LOCAL int curve25519_blind(byte* q, const byte* n, const byte* mask,
     const byte* p, const byte* rz);