Targeted: 0.5.0. Baseline: release/0.3.0.
Scope decision (maintainer, 2026-08-13): the structured-only enforcement mode is dropped, not deferred. Survey of current practice found no precedent or requirement for "source edits must go through the structured tool": Codex CLI's workspace-write sandbox keeps the whole workspace shell-writable (only .git/.codex metadata stays read-only, an escalation control), Claude Code's sandbox enforces the workspace/host boundary and temp dirs, and "no-shell" MCP servers simply do not expose exec at all. The industry-enforced boundary — workspace vs host — is already enforced here by Landlock. A structured-only workspace would break git commit, __pycache__, and every toolchain's build outputs (Landlock's path-beneath model cannot express "writable directory except these files", nor bind rules to paths that do not exist yet) for a guarantee nobody mandates.
What remains in scope (zero risk):
server_info reports workspace_mutation_policy and workspace_mutation_enforcement honestly (today: unrestricted, enforcement = workspace-boundary via Landlock where available).
check_exec_environment warns on non-Linux platforms that static command scanning cannot prove side effects of arbitrary programs.
- Project instructions steer models to prefer
apply_changes / apply_patch for source edits (guidance, not enforcement).
- Remove the
write_generated_or_ignored enum value from the exec schema: never implemented, never raised; keeping it advertises a negotiation model that does not exist.
Noted for the future, out of scope: Codex-style protected metadata (read-only .git/hooks within a writable workspace) is a real escalation control worth considering separately — orthogonal to structured-only.
Targeted: 0.5.0. Baseline:
release/0.3.0.Scope decision (maintainer, 2026-08-13): the structured-only enforcement mode is dropped, not deferred. Survey of current practice found no precedent or requirement for "source edits must go through the structured tool": Codex CLI's
workspace-writesandbox keeps the whole workspace shell-writable (only.git/.codexmetadata stays read-only, an escalation control), Claude Code's sandbox enforces the workspace/host boundary and temp dirs, and "no-shell" MCP servers simply do not expose exec at all. The industry-enforced boundary — workspace vs host — is already enforced here by Landlock. A structured-only workspace would breakgit commit,__pycache__, and every toolchain's build outputs (Landlock's path-beneath model cannot express "writable directory except these files", nor bind rules to paths that do not exist yet) for a guarantee nobody mandates.What remains in scope (zero risk):
server_inforeportsworkspace_mutation_policyandworkspace_mutation_enforcementhonestly (today:unrestricted, enforcement = workspace-boundary via Landlock where available).check_exec_environmentwarns on non-Linux platforms that static command scanning cannot prove side effects of arbitrary programs.apply_changes/apply_patchfor source edits (guidance, not enforcement).write_generated_or_ignoredenum value from the exec schema: never implemented, never raised; keeping it advertises a negotiation model that does not exist.Noted for the future, out of scope: Codex-style protected metadata (read-only
.git/hookswithin a writable workspace) is a real escalation control worth considering separately — orthogonal to structured-only.