require IPPCP for mbedtls ML-KEM and add ML-KEM UT/fuzz coverage#3628
require IPPCP for mbedtls ML-KEM and add ML-KEM UT/fuzz coverage#3628czwolak wants to merge 1 commit into
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…rage Implement ML-KEM for the mbedtls backend via IPPCP with fail-closed configuration and add targeted validation coverage for the updated KEM path. Changes: - require IPPCP in CRYPTO=mbedtls ML-KEM configuration and remove optional compile-time toggles for this path - keep ML-DSA and SLH-DSA hard-disabled for this task - add IPPCP-backed ML-KEM context/keygen/encaps/decaps implementation - fix ML-KEM unit-test cleanup to use libspdm_mlkem_free() instead of libspdm_dh_free(), preventing invalid free/segfault - add ML-KEM negative UT coverage for input/size validation paths in unit_test/test_crypt - add dedicated ML-KEM fuzz target (test_mlkem_kem_api), seed corpus, and wire it into fuzzing runners Validation: - no regressions observed in existing cryptographic test flow - ML-KEM fuzz target seed smoke: PASS - ML-KEM fuzz target randomized corpus smoke (41 inputs): PASS (0 failures) Signed-off-by: Cezary Zwolak <cezary.zwolak@intel.com>
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Draft review notes (WIP):\n\n1. Scope\n- Enforces ML-KEM on mbedtls via IPPCP path with explicit fail-closed configure behavior.\n- Removes optional ML-KEM compile-time toggles and keeps ML-DSA/SLH-DSA disabled for this task scope.\n- Adds ML-KEM coverage: existing UT fix (DH -> KEM free), negative-path UT, and dedicated fuzz target + seed wiring.\n\n2. Functional checks\n- Verify CMake behavior when IPPCP is absent/present for CRYPTO=mbedtls.\n- Verify cryptlib_mbedtls links IPPCP correctly in all CI toolchains used by this PR.\n- Verify ML-KEM API behavior for invalid buffer sizes and invalid NID paths.\n\n3. Risk areas to watch\n- CI environments without IPPCP (currently main source of failures in this PR).\n- Hard-coded size assumptions in ML-KEM tests (future-proofing for parameter-set changes).\n- Fuzz target early-return on invalid NID reducing mutation depth.\n\n4. Suggested acceptance criteria\n- CI matrix green for affected jobs.\n- No regression in existing crypto tests.\n- ML-KEM UT and fuzz smoke pass reliably in maintained configs.\n\n5. Follow-ups (optional)\n- Consider a CI-safe fallback strategy for missing IPPCP in generic jobs, while keeping strict behavior where ML-KEM is required.\n- Consider replacing hard-coded ML-KEM expected sizes in UT with helper-derived values where practical. |
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Summary\n- require IPPCP for CRYPTO=mbedtls ML-KEM and fail closed when missing\n- implement ML-KEM via IPPCP in cryptlib_mbedtls\n- fix ML-KEM UT cleanup to use libspdm_mlkem_free instead of libspdm_dh_free\n- add ML-KEM negative UT coverage\n- add ML-KEM fuzz target, seed corpus, and runner integration\n\n## Validation\n- no regressions observed in existing cryptographic test flow\n- ML-KEM fuzz target seed smoke: PASS\n- ML-KEM fuzz target randomized corpus smoke (41 inputs): PASS (0 failures)