🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix path truncation vulnerability via null byte injection#3511
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix path truncation vulnerability via null byte injection#3511EffortlessSteven wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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The model loading logic used `.ends_with` to validate model file extensions, which could be bypassed via a null byte (e.g., `model.bin\0.gguf`). When passed to underlying C APIs (like `llama.cpp`), this would truncate the path to `model.bin`, allowing arbitrary file loading. Added an explicit check to reject any `model_path` containing a null byte (`\0`).
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✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The model loading logic used
.ends_withto validate model file extensions, which could be bypassed via a null byte (e.g.,model.bin\0.gguf). When passed to underlying C APIs (likellama.cpp), this would truncate the path tomodel.bin, allowing arbitrary file loading.🎯 Impact: An attacker could potentially load unauthorized files or probe for file existence on the server by bypassing the file extension allowlist.
🔧 Fix: Added an explicit check to reject any
model_pathcontaining a null byte (\0) invalidate_model_request.✅ Verification: Run
cargo test -p bitnet-server test_model_path_null_byte_rejectedto verify the newly added unit test passes successfully.PR created automatically by Jules for task 1989785203982242833 started by @EffortlessSteven