π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path truncation via null byte injection#3524
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path truncation via null byte injection#3524EffortlessSteven wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: The
validate_model_requestfunction inbitnet-serverdid not validate against null bytes (\0). This allowed an attacker to bypass the.ggufextension restriction by providing a path likesecret.txt\0.gguf. Because underlying C APIs (e.g., llama.cpp) terminate strings at the null byte, the server could be tricked into loading an arbitrary file (likesecret.txt) despite the Rust-level validation succeeding.π― Impact: Attackers could potentially read arbitrary files on the system or load malicious data by bypassing the intended file extension restrictions, leading to sensitive data exposure or server compromise.
π§ Fix: Added explicit rejection of the null byte (
\0) in the path validation logic ofvalidate_model_request.β Verification: Run
cargo test -p bitnet-server --lib security::tests::test_model_path_null_byte_rejection.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10483477058716141903 started by @EffortlessSteven