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Fix shell injection vulnerability and preserve command substitution syntax #26
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EdNutting:ednutting/fix-shell-injection
Jan 26, 2026
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842e360
Fix shell injection vulnerability in LocalScheduler
EdNutting 86be306
Fix expandvars stripping command substitution syntax from job args
EdNutting a11045d
Add quote-aware parsing to command substitution detection
EdNutting 75cdaac
Warn users when command substitutions are detected in non-shell commands
EdNutting ea9aabe
Upgrade to new expandvars package version
EdNutting 057fd88
Merge branch 'main' into ednutting/fix-shell-injection
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Having re-read the asyncio documentation, I can see why an LLM check may have flagged this as a security vulnerability as it says create_subprocess_shell is at risk of injection vulnerabilities
However...
Given that the whole point of gator is that you can submit any arbitrary command through a job - I'd argue this is not a "security fix".
I'm in agreement with the change as there's still a benefit here in that a sub-shell is not invoked, which makes it slightly lighter on resources.
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I'd mostly agree - I had the same initial view - and then I realised this subprocess invocation isn't supposed to be causing user-provided commands/args to be interpreted at this point on the host that runs this invocation. So, whether you think it's a security issue or not, it's a genuine problem that commands may end up running on a different machine / in a different place than the user may have intended or expected.