docs(spec): the validator-facing eval interface, as a reviewable mechanism - #10088
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…anism #9215's remaining deliverable. The decision records for all six numbered items are recorded on the issue; this is the draft page they resolve to. DELIBERATELY UNPUBLISHED. It lives in the repo-root docs/ tree rather than apps/loopover-ui/content/docs/, so it is not served on the site -- the issue holds publication until the mechanism conversation with the subnet team concludes. The header says so, so a later reader does not mistake its location for an oversight. Mechanism only: no emissions, pricing or weight economics, per the issue's hard constraint. Most of what it describes already ships, which is the point -- "adopt LoopOver as the eval provider" becomes a thing a validator team can check line by line rather than a claim. The artifact, the pull transport, the trust tiers, the scoring-rule versioning and the one-command verifier all exist today. The one gap is stated rather than glossed: EvalScoreRecords are DIGEST-COMMITTED BUT NOT SIGNED. `recordDigest` proves internal consistency and detects tampering in a copy you already trust; it does not prove origin. Only the ledger anchor checkpoint is signed today. So a validator can verify a score is self-consistent and that its corpus rehashes, and still not know we issued it. A validator team finds that in ten minutes, so it belongs in the proposal as a line item -- which is what transport option B closes, using the existing anchor key rather than any new cryptography or trust anchor. The "not scored" list is included for the same reason. Live-gate execution, private-repo contents, and general agent capability are named as things this does NOT measure, because a proposal that only lists what it can do is not reviewable. On-chain commitment is recorded as out of scope for v1 and left as the named upgrade path. Closes #9215
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Superagent didn't find any vulnerabilities or security issues in this PR. |
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Warning ⏸️ LoopOver review result - manual review recommendedReview updated: 2026-07-31 06:46:04 UTC
Review summary Nits — 3 non-blocking
Decision drivers
Context & advisory signals — never blocks the verdict
Review context
Contributor next steps
Signal definitions
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#9215's remaining deliverable. The decision records for all six numbered items are on the issue; this is the draft page they resolve to.
Deliberately unpublished
It lives in the repo-root
docs/tree, notapps/loopover-ui/content/docs/, so it is not served on the site — the issue holds publication until the mechanism conversation with the subnet team concludes. The header says so explicitly, so a later reader does not mistake the location for an oversight. There is precedent for internal docs there (decision-audit-rubric.md,load-test-worker.md).Mechanism only — no emissions, pricing or weight economics, per the issue's hard constraint.
Decisions it encodes
EvalScoreRecordas the artifact, committing to corpus / window / scoring-rule versionoutcome_confirmed_precisionnow,benchmark_runlater, with an explicit not-scored listtrust.tierper artifact, omitted rather than published at a tier it cannot supportnpx -p @loopover/mcp loopover-verify— recomputes locally, never asks us whether we passedThe gap it does not gloss
EvalScoreRecords are digest-committed but not signed.recordDigestproves internal consistency and detects tampering in a copy you already trust — it does not prove origin. Only the ledger anchor checkpoint is signed today.So a validator can verify a score is self-consistent and that its corpus rehashes, and still not know we issued it. A validator team finds that in ten minutes, so it belongs in the proposal as a line item rather than as a surprise. That is exactly what transport option B closes, using the existing anchor key — no new cryptography, no new trust anchor.
The not-scored list is in for the same reason: live-gate execution, private-repo contents, and general agent capability are named as things this does not measure. A proposal that only lists what it can do is not reviewable.
Verification
docs:drift-check,branding-drift:check,git diff --checkgreen. No code, no published surface, no behaviour change.Closes #9215