fix(orb): correct stale "#6480 blocked on #6477" comments — federated import shipped

src/orb/federated-bundle.ts

@@ -162,11 +162,12 @@ export function canonicalizeFederatedBundleBody(body: FederatedSignalBundleBody)
 /**
  * HMAC-sign a bundle body so a receiving instance can verify it was not tampered with in transit.
  *
- * TODO(#6477): the KEY-TRUST scheme (how a peer establishes/rotates the key it verifies against) is #6477's
- * design decision and is deliberately NOT invented here. Until it lands, the signing key is this instance's
- * existing dedicated anonymization secret (getOrCreateAnonSecret) as a placeholder: it makes the bundle
- * tamper-evident to anyone who already holds the key, but it does NOT yet establish peer trust. #6480 (the
- * import side) is explicitly blocked on #6477 for exactly that reason.
+ * KEY-TRUST (#6477, ratified as an allowlist design — NOT a PKI/reputation system): the signing key is this
+ * instance's dedicated anonymization secret (getOrCreateAnonSecret), which makes the bundle tamper-evident to
+ * anyone holding that key. Peer trust itself is established on the RECEIVING side, where #6480 has SHIPPED
+ * (src/orb/federated-import.ts): an importing operator explicitly adds a peer's verification key to
+ * `federatedIntelligence.peerKeys` (fail-closed when unset), and only an allowlisted key can verify a bundle.
+ * So this signature is the tamper-evidence layer; the receiver's allowlist is what turns it into peer trust.
  */
 export function signFederatedBundle(body: FederatedSignalBundleBody, key: string): string {
   return createHmac("sha256", key).update(canonicalizeFederatedBundleBody(body)).digest("hex");

src/orb/federated-collector.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@
 //   pull — GET peer bundles from it.
 //
 // SCOPE — deliberately NOT the import side. A pulled bundle is fetched, shape-checked and RETURNED; it is
-// never signature-verified, never trust-gated, and never persisted. That is #6480's job, and #6480 is blocked
-// on #6477 (the key-trust/anti-poisoning design). Verifying here would not merely be out of scope, it would be
-// WRONG: there is no trust anchor to verify against yet, and inventing one is exactly what #6477 exists to
-// prevent (see the TODO(#6477) note on signFederatedBundle in ./federated-bundle.ts).
+// never signature-verified, never trust-gated, and never persisted. That is #6480's job, which SHIPPED
+// separately in ./federated-import.ts: it trust-gates each bundle against the operator's
+// `federatedIntelligence.peerKeys` allowlist per #6477's ratified key-trust/anti-poisoning design. Verifying
+// HERE would still be wrong — the trust anchor lives with the importer that decides what to fold in, not with
+// the transport client that only fetches (see the KEY-TRUST note on signFederatedBundle in ./federated-bundle.ts).
 //
 // NO DEFAULT COLLECTOR, BY DESIGN. The client only ever talks to an endpoint the operator configured in
 // `.loopover.yml`. There is no hardcoded fallback and no auto-discovery — this codebase's self-host posture
@@ -164,8 +165,9 @@ export async function pushFederatedBundle(manifest: ManifestSlice, db: D1Databas
  *
  * Returns [] — having touched nothing — unless the operator opted in AND configured a pull-armed collector.
  * Bundles are shape-checked and returned; unrecognized entries are dropped. They are deliberately NOT
- * signature-verified or trust-gated — that is #6480, blocked on #6477. Returns [] rather than throwing on any
- * failure, so an unreachable or hostile collector is indistinguishable from "no peers yet" to every caller.
+ * signature-verified or trust-gated — that is #6480's job, shipped in ./federated-import.ts (the peerKeys
+ * allowlist). Returns [] rather than throwing on any failure, so an unreachable or hostile collector is
+ * indistinguishable from "no peers yet" to every caller.
  */
 export async function pullPeerBundles(manifest: ManifestSlice, opts: CollectorOpts = {}): Promise<FederatedSignalBundle[]> {
   const endpoint = resolveCollectorEndpoint(manifest, "pull");