feat(ledger): Bittensor on-chain anchor backend — repo-side glue for the off-Worker submitter (#9277)

apps/loopover-ui/content/docs/what-you-can-verify.mdx

@@ -127,11 +127,28 @@ asking LoopOver anything.
 
 <Callout variant="warn">
   **Bittensor on-chain anchoring is optional, separate corroboration — not part of this default
-  check.** A third, Gittensor/SN74-audience-specific backend (tracked, not yet
-  shipped — [#9277](https://github.com/JSONbored/loopover/issues/9277)) publishes the same checkpoint
-  as an on-chain commitment, signed by a dedicated hotkey run on the operator's own infrastructure.
-  It's additive corroboration for that specific audience, never folded into the default two-backend
-  claim every verifier above is told to check.
+  check.** A third, Gittensor/SN74-audience-specific
+  backend ([#9277](https://github.com/JSONbored/loopover/issues/9277)) publishes the same signed
+  checkpoint as an on-chain commitment. A submitter on the operator's own node infrastructure — never
+  this Worker, and its dedicated anchor-only hotkey never leaves that infrastructure — fetches
+  `GET /v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-payload` and commits `sha256(signingInput)` via the
+  commitments pallet's `set_commitment(netuid, Data::Sha256)`, then reports the attempt (success
+  *and* failure, like every other backend) back into the public attempt log, where it appears as
+  `backend: "bittensor"`. It's additive corroboration for that specific audience, never folded into
+  the default two-backend claim every verifier above is told to check.
+</Callout>
+
+<Callout variant="info">
+  **Historical retrieval — read the block, not chain state.** The commitments pallet's
+  `CommitmentOf` map is **overwritten in place**: only the *latest* commitment per (netuid, account)
+  survives in current chain state. To verify an older anchor, use its `backendRef` from the attempt
+  log — `{netuid, blockNumber, blockHash, hotkey}` — and query **archive state at that block**
+  (`state_getStorage` at `blockHash`, or the block's events), not the current tip. Then check the
+  stored commitment's `Sha256` bytes equal `sha256(signingInput)` of the anchor's own
+  `payload_json`, and verify the payload's signature against the published anchor keys exactly as in
+  step (c) above. Any Bittensor archive node can answer this; the operator's own archive is merely
+  the convenient one — the same trust posture as the git backend's "GitHub hosts it, the mirror
+  cross-checks it."
 </Callout>
 
 ### 2. Decision-record authenticity

apps/loopover-ui/public/openapi.json

@@ -20766,7 +20766,8 @@
               "enum": [
                 "rekor",
                 "git",
-                "ots"
+                "ots",
+                "bittensor"
               ]
             },
             "required": false,
@@ -26208,6 +26209,49 @@
           }
         }
       }
+    },
+    "/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-payload": {
+      "get": {
+        "operationId": "getPublicDecisionLedgerAnchorPayload",
+        "tags": [
+          "Public"
+        ],
+        "summary": "The current ledger tip as a freshly signed checkpoint, for an external anchoring submitter to commit",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": {
+            "description": "{ signed: { payload, keyId, signature }, signingInput } — `sha256(signingInput)` is the exact 32 bytes an on-chain commitment holds. Never cached: `payload.at` is minted per call"
+          },
+          "404": {
+            "description": "Anchor signing is not configured, or the ledger is empty — nothing is claimed to be anchorable yet"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "/v1/decision-ledger/anchor-attempts": {
+      "post": {
+        "operationId": "reportDecisionLedgerAnchorAttempt",
+        "tags": [
+          "Public"
+        ],
+        "summary": "Report one off-Worker anchoring attempt (success or failure) into the public attempt log",
+        "responses": {
+          "200": {
+            "description": "{ recorded: true, status: 'ok' | 'failed' }"
+          },
+          "400": {
+            "description": "Unparseable body, or a report whose named field failed validation"
+          },
+          "401": {
+            "description": "Missing or wrong bearer token; also returned when no report token is configured (fails closed)"
+          },
+          "413": {
+            "description": "Body exceeded the ingest ceiling"
+          },
+          "422": {
+            "description": "Authenticated but unverifiable: unknown_key, bad_signature, row_not_found, or row_hash_mismatch — an `ok` report must verify against a published key AND match the live chain row"
+          }
+        }
+      }
     }
   },
   "servers": [

migrations/0201_ledger_anchor_bittensor.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+-- #9277 (epic #9267): widen decision_ledger_anchors' backend CHECK to admit 'bittensor' — the optional,
+-- Gittensor/SN74-audience on-chain commitment backend. The submission itself runs on the operator's own node
+-- infrastructure (never this Worker); this table records its reported attempts, success AND failure, exactly
+-- like the Rekor/git rows (#9271's whole design: a backend that can fail silently is a backend an operator
+-- can silently disable). SQLite cannot ALTER a CHECK constraint, so this is the standard rebuild-and-rename.
+CREATE TABLE decision_ledger_anchors_new (
+  id            TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+  seq           INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  row_hash      TEXT NOT NULL,
+  payload_json  TEXT NOT NULL,
+  signature     TEXT NOT NULL,
+  key_id        TEXT NOT NULL,
+  backend       TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (backend IN ('rekor', 'git', 'ots', 'bittensor')),
+  -- For bittensor: {netuid, blockNumber, blockHash, hotkey} — deliberately the FULL historical-retrieval
+  -- reference: CommitmentOf is overwritten in place on-chain, so a verifier needs the block, not chain state.
+  backend_ref   TEXT,
+  proof_r2_key  TEXT,
+  status        TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('ok', 'failed')),
+  error         TEXT,
+  created_at    TEXT NOT NULL
+);
+INSERT INTO decision_ledger_anchors_new SELECT * FROM decision_ledger_anchors;
+DROP TABLE decision_ledger_anchors;
+ALTER TABLE decision_ledger_anchors_new RENAME TO decision_ledger_anchors;
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS decision_ledger_anchors_created_at ON decision_ledger_anchors (created_at DESC);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS decision_ledger_anchors_backend_created_at ON decision_ledger_anchors (backend, created_at DESC);

src/api/routes.ts

@@ -305,9 +305,10 @@ import { getContributorTrustProfile } from "../review/contributor-trust-profile"
 import { backfillContributorGateHistory } from "../review/contributor-gate-history-backfill";
 import { isFairnessAnalyticsEnabled, resolveFairnessAnalyticsManifestOverride } from "../review/contributor-trust-profile-wire";
 import { isRagEnabled } from "../review/rag-wire";
-import { loadPublicDecisionRecord, loadPublicLedgerRow, verifyDecisionLedger } from "../review/decision-record";
+import { loadDecisionLedgerTip, loadPublicDecisionRecord, loadPublicLedgerRow, verifyDecisionLedger } from "../review/decision-record";
 import { buildEvalScoreRecordsFromRulePrecision, filterEvalScoreRecords } from "../review/eval-score-records";
-import { currentAnchorKey, parseAnchorPublicKeys } from "../review/ledger-anchor";
+import { anchorSigningInput, buildLedgerAnchorPayload, currentAnchorKey, parseAnchorPublicKeys, signLedgerAnchorPayload } from "../review/ledger-anchor";
+import { ingestBittensorAnchorReport, parseBittensorAnchorReport } from "../review/ledger-anchor-bittensor";
 import { loadPublicLedgerAnchors } from "../review/ledger-anchor-persistence";
 import { getPublicStats, isPublicStatsEnabled, resolvePublicStatsManifestOverride } from "../review/public-stats";
 import { loadPublicAccuracyTrend } from "../services/public-accuracy-trend";
@@ -1339,7 +1340,7 @@ export function createApp() {
     // Built with spreads, not literal undefined-valued keys: exactOptionalPropertyTypes means an optional
     // filter field must be OMITTED to mean "no filter", not present-with-value-undefined.
     const backendParam = c.req.query("backend");
-    const backend = backendParam === "rekor" || backendParam === "git" || backendParam === "ots" ? backendParam : undefined;
+    const backend = backendParam === "rekor" || backendParam === "git" || backendParam === "ots" || backendParam === "bittensor" ? backendParam : undefined;
     const before = c.req.query("before");
     const limit = Number(c.req.query("limit")) || undefined;
     const result = await loadPublicLedgerAnchors(c.env, {
@@ -1351,6 +1352,48 @@ export function createApp() {
     return c.json(result);
   });
 
+  // #9277 (epic #9267): the current tip's SIGNED checkpoint, for the operator's off-Worker Bittensor
+  // commitment submitter to fetch and commit on-chain (sha256 of `signingInput` is the exact 32 bytes
+  // `Data::Sha256` holds). Unauthenticated like every /v1/public/* sibling: it is the same payload the
+  // Rekor/git backends already publish externally on every checkpoint — hashes, a seq, a timestamp and a
+  // key id, nothing else. `no-store`: `at` is minted per call, so a cached copy would just make two
+  // submitters commit two different payload hashes for the same tip for no reason.
+  app.get("/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-payload", async (c) => {
+    const keys = parseAnchorPublicKeys(c.env.LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_KEYS);
+    const current = currentAnchorKey(keys);
+    if (!current || !c.env.LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_PRIVATE_KEY) return c.json({ error: "anchor_signing_unconfigured" }, 404);
+    const tip = await loadDecisionLedgerTip(c.env);
+    if (tip.seq === 0) return c.json({ error: "empty_ledger" }, 404);
+    const payload = buildLedgerAnchorPayload(tip, nowIso());
+    const signed = await signLedgerAnchorPayload(payload, c.env.LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_PRIVATE_KEY, current.keyId);
+    c.header("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+    return c.json({ signed, signingInput: anchorSigningInput(payload) });
+  });
+
+  // #9277 (epic #9267): the operator's off-Worker Bittensor submitter reports each on-chain anchor attempt
+  // (success AND failure) back into #9271's public attempt log. Bearer-gated, FAILS CLOSED when the token is
+  // unset (isAuthorizedIngest, same posture as /v1/orb/ingest). Authentication alone is deliberately not
+  // enough for an `ok` row: the report's signed payload must verify against a PUBLISHED anchor key and its
+  // (seq, rowHash) must match the LIVE chain row — the public log asserting on-chain corroboration that a
+  // buggy submitter never actually anchored would be worse than no log at all. A `failed` report skips those
+  // checks: "the submitter is broken" is exactly what the attempt log exists to make publicly visible.
+  app.post("/v1/decision-ledger/anchor-attempts", async (c) => {
+    if (!(await isAuthorizedIngest(c.env.LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_REPORT_TOKEN, extractBearerToken(c.req.header("authorization"))))) return c.json({ error: "unauthorized" }, 401);
+    const body = await readOrbIngestBody(c.req.raw, c.req.header("content-length"));
+    if (body === null) return c.json({ error: "payload_too_large" }, 413);
+    let raw: unknown;
+    try {
+      raw = JSON.parse(body || "");
+    } catch {
+      return c.json({ error: "invalid_json" }, 400);
+    }
+    const parsed = parseBittensorAnchorReport(raw);
+    if ("error" in parsed) return c.json({ error: "invalid_report", detail: parsed.error }, 400);
+    const outcome = await ingestBittensorAnchorReport(c.env, parsed.report);
+    if (!outcome.recorded) return c.json({ error: outcome.reason }, 422);
+    return c.json({ recorded: true, status: outcome.status }, 200);
+  });
+
   // #9123: the decision record itself was persisted (decision_records) but never published anywhere a
   // contributor or a third party could fetch the full body — the only prior public surface was
   // renderDecisionRecordSection's bounded review-comment summary (12-char digest prefixes, and it omits

src/auth/route-auth.ts

@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ export function requiresApiToken(path: string): boolean {
   if (path === "/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-key") return false;
   // #9271: the public anchor-attempt listing, added in the SAME PR as its route.
   if (path === "/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchors") return false;
+  // #9277: the current tip's signed checkpoint, for the operator's off-Worker Bittensor submitter (and
+  // anyone else — it is the same payload the Rekor/git backends already publish externally). Added in the
+  // SAME PR as its route, per the #9120 lesson.
+  if (path === "/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-payload") return false;
+  // #9277: the submitter's report route carries its OWN bearer gate (isAuthorizedIngest against
+  // LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_REPORT_TOKEN, fails closed when unset) — same posture as /v1/orb/ingest below.
+  if (path === "/v1/decision-ledger/anchor-attempts") return false;
   // #9123: the new public decision-record read route — same unauthenticated posture as its ledger-verify
   // sibling immediately above, added in the SAME PR so the two can never drift apart the way #9120 did. The
   // pull segment matches any non-slash text (not just digits): an invalid pull number is the ROUTE's 400 to

src/env.d.ts

@@ -652,6 +652,12 @@ declare global {
      *  chokepoint every other GitHub write in this engine goes through). Unset (alongside the owner/repo
      *  pair above) means the git backend does not run this tick; Rekor is unaffected. */
     LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_GIT_INSTALLATION_ID?: string;
+    /** External ledger anchoring (#9277, epic #9267): bearer token the operator's OFF-Worker Bittensor
+     *  commitment submitter presents to `POST /v1/decision-ledger/anchor-attempts` when reporting an
+     *  on-chain anchor attempt back into the public attempt log. FAILS CLOSED when unset (the route
+     *  rejects everything, same isAuthorizedIngest posture as ORB_INGEST_TOKEN) — the submitter itself and
+     *  its hotkey live entirely on the operator's node infrastructure, never in this repo or this Worker. */
+    LOOPOVER_LEDGER_ANCHOR_REPORT_TOKEN?: string;
     /** Convergence (port): public OAuth draft-submission flow ported from reviewbot. When truthy, the
      *  /v1/drafts endpoints accept a contributor draft -> GitHub OAuth -> fork PR against the content repo.
      *  Default OFF — unset/false makes every draft endpoint 404 and writes nothing (byte-identical worker). */

src/openapi/spec.ts

@@ -1901,11 +1901,36 @@ export function buildOpenApiSpec() {
     operationId: "listPublicDecisionLedgerAnchors",
     tags: ["Public"],
     summary: "Every external anchoring attempt, success and failure, paginated newest-first — anchoring's own health as a public fact",
-    request: { query: z.object({ backend: z.enum(["rekor", "git", "ots"]).optional(), before: z.string().optional(), limit: z.string().optional() }) },
+    request: { query: z.object({ backend: z.enum(["rekor", "git", "ots", "bittensor"]).optional(), before: z.string().optional(), limit: z.string().optional() }) },
     responses: {
       200: { description: "{ anchors: [{ id, seq, rowHash, keyId, backend, backendRef, status, error, createdAt }], nextBefore } — a failed attempt is returned identically to a successful one, never filtered out or reshaped" },
     },
   });
+  registry.registerPath({
+    method: "get",
+    path: "/v1/public/decision-ledger/anchor-payload",
+    operationId: "getPublicDecisionLedgerAnchorPayload",
+    tags: ["Public"],
+    summary: "The current ledger tip as a freshly signed checkpoint, for an external anchoring submitter to commit",
+    responses: {
+      200: { description: "{ signed: { payload, keyId, signature }, signingInput } — `sha256(signingInput)` is the exact 32 bytes an on-chain commitment holds. Never cached: `payload.at` is minted per call" },
+      404: { description: "Anchor signing is not configured, or the ledger is empty — nothing is claimed to be anchorable yet" },
+    },
+  });
+  registry.registerPath({
+    method: "post",
+    path: "/v1/decision-ledger/anchor-attempts",
+    operationId: "reportDecisionLedgerAnchorAttempt",
+    tags: ["Public"],
+    summary: "Report one off-Worker anchoring attempt (success or failure) into the public attempt log",
+    responses: {
+      200: { description: "{ recorded: true, status: 'ok' | 'failed' }" },
+      400: { description: "Unparseable body, or a report whose named field failed validation" },
+      401: { description: "Missing or wrong bearer token; also returned when no report token is configured (fails closed)" },
+      413: { description: "Body exceeded the ingest ceiling" },
+      422: { description: "Authenticated but unverifiable: unknown_key, bad_signature, row_not_found, or row_hash_mismatch — an `ok` report must verify against a published key AND match the live chain row" },
+    },
+  });
   registry.registerPath({
     method: "get",
     path: "/v1/public/decision-records/{owner}/{repo}/{pull}",