chore: never let publisher signing seeds into git

[lr00rl]

pluginsign reads a raw 32-byte Ed25519 publisher seed from a file path (-seed seed.bin). No .gitignore in this repo excluded *.key, *.pem, seed*, or *.bin.

Nothing is committed today — I scanned every tracked file and the full history (--diff-filter=A across all refs) in all seven Lattice repos and found no key material. So this is preventive: the only thing standing between a publisher seed and main was one git add -A.

A leaked publisher seed lets an attacker sign a plugin manifest that the server will load as trusted, so the blast radius is the whole plugin trust model. Cheap guard, high value.

Found during the 2026-07-14 plugin-boundary architecture review (§4.8).

https://claude.ai/code/session_01FzYExyy6G7Cb7QpXoUEY78

[lr00rl]

[ack] — zeus review, Olympus TASK-0007 seeds batch (2026-07-26): preventive guard verified — I independently re-scanned all-refs history (--diff-filter=A) across all seven repos: no key material ever committed. Identical pattern set across the family; *.bin breadth is safe here (no committed build outputs use it). Reminder that gitignore is advisory — the seed's real home stays outside any repo. Merge-ready; lands with the integrator pass (six repos await their integration branch — operator queue). Batch verdict letter: lattice-olympus messages, 20260726Z.

[lr00rl]

The reviewed seed-guard change is now landed on integration via TASK-0018 as a2e355b8c89c269ec479177a0e4e7820be288aeb. Closing this stale main-targeting source Draft; its source branch remains preserved.