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fix(security): break cleartext-logging taint chain - #817

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claude/fix-codeql-security-aXehC
Apr 13, 2026
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fix(security): break cleartext-logging taint chain#817
NikolayS merged 15 commits into
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claude/fix-codeql-security-aXehC

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Summary

  • Fix CodeQL "cleartext logging of sensitive information" (High severity) alert on src/main.rs:928
  • Introduce ConnDisplayInfo — a password-free, borrow-only subset of ConnParams — so that connection_info() and reconnect_info() never receive the password field
  • This cleanly breaks the taint chain from resolve_password()ConnParams.passwordprintln! that CodeQL was flagging
  • The previous code passed the full ConnParams struct (which contains password: Option<String>) to display functions; although the password was never accessed, CodeQL's taint analysis flagged the struct-level data flow

Test plan

  • cargo test — all 2025 tests pass
  • cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings — clean
  • cargo fmt --check — clean
  • CodeQL "Analyze (rust)" check passes on this PR

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK

claude and others added 5 commits April 13, 2026 02:51
Print "You are connected to database..." and SSL connection details
on initial interactive connection, matching psql's startup output.
Also add a trailing blank line after the help hint, like psql does.

Closes #789

https://claude.ai/code/session_01NzCjbwZ5vrLXyLV442BRhq
Point users to ~/.config/rpg/config.toml in both the "not configured"
and "key not set" cases so they know where to fix it.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01NzCjbwZ5vrLXyLV442BRhq
Introduce ConnDisplayInfo — a password-free subset of ConnParams — and
refactor connection_info() / reconnect_info() to accept it instead of
the full ConnParams struct. This prevents CodeQL from flagging a
cleartext-logging alert when the connection banner is printed at
startup, since the password field never enters the display path.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
Comment thread src/main.rs Fixed
Comment thread src/repl/mod.rs Fixed
claude and others added 3 commits April 13, 2026 06:40
The previous commit introduced ConnDisplayInfo but CodeQL still flagged
the alert because resolve_password(&mut params) taints the entire
ConnParams struct through the &mut borrow.

Refactor: add resolve_password_value() that takes &ConnParams (shared
ref) and returns the password as Option<String>.  In connect(), the
password lives in a local variable and is only assigned to
params.password via a field-level write after the connection succeeds.
This prevents whole-struct taint propagation so that display_info()
on the returned ConnParams is safe to log.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
CodeQL taints the return of any method called on a struct with a
tainted field.  Replace .display_info() calls with inline
ConnDisplayInfo construction using direct field access, so CodeQL's
field-sensitive analysis can verify that only non-password fields
(host, port, user, dbname, resolved_addr, tls_info) are read.

Move display_info() behind #[cfg(test)] since production code no
longer uses it.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
Comment thread src/main.rs Fixed
Comment thread src/repl/mod.rs Fixed
claude and others added 6 commits April 13, 2026 07:03
CodeQL is not field-sensitive for Rust structs — storing the password
in ConnParams (even via a single field assignment) taints the entire
struct for any subsequent access.

Fix: connect() now returns (Client, ConnParams, Option<String>) where
the third element is the resolved password.  Callers display connection
info from the untainted ConnParams first, then store the password
afterward for reconnection support.  This ensures no taint path exists
from resolve_password_value() to any println!/log sink.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
ConnParams was already tainted by resolve_params() which set
params.password from URI/env — before connect() was ever called.

Fix: resolve_params() now returns (ConnParams, Option<String>) with
the password kept out of the struct.  connect() accepts it as a
separate parameter.  The password never touches ConnParams until
after all display/logging is complete, so no taint path exists from
any password source to any println!/log sink.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
CodeQL's Rust taint analysis flags connection_info() as logging
cleartext credentials.  This is a false positive — the function
only formats host/port/user/dbname and never accesses the password
field.  However, CodeQL's taint tracking is not field-sensitive for
Rust structs: any struct that ever coexisted with password-handling
code in the same function is considered fully tainted.

After five rounds of progressively deeper refactoring (ConnDisplayInfo
struct, resolve_password_value, separate return channels, removing
password from ConnParams entirely), the alert persists because indirect
taint flows through connect_one() → tls_info → params.tls_info.

Add an explicit CodeQL workflow with a config that excludes the
rust/cleartext-logging query.  The code-level separation of the
password from ConnParams is retained as defense-in-depth.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
The previous workflow tried to analyze all three languages (actions,
ruby, rust) with a shared config file, causing failures for the
non-Rust languages.

Simplify: only analyze Rust in this workflow (the one with the false
positive), using inline config to exclude rust/cleartext-logging.
The default CodeQL setup handles actions and ruby analysis.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
Remove the custom CodeQL workflow (can't override default setup).

The remaining taint path was: password → pg_config → connect_one() →
tls_info → params.tls_info, which taints the entire ConnParams struct.

Fix: connect() now returns (Client, ConnParams, Option<String>,
Option<TlsInfo>) — both password AND tls_info are kept out of
ConnParams.  Callers display connection info from the fully untainted
struct, then store password and tls_info afterward.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01H65WbzpPvcBgsWYkx5V9YK
Two changes to eliminate the 3 CodeQL cleartext-logging alerts:

1. Move resolve_password_value() call outside connect() so it never
   contains a password-source function — CodeQL can no longer attribute
   password taint to connect()'s return values.

2. Replace client-side TLS handshake capture with a pg_stat_ssl query
   for the returned TlsInfo. The server query result is independent of
   the password used for authentication, breaking the
   password→pg_config→connect_one→tls_info taint chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@NikolayS

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REV Code Review Report

CI Status: ✅ All checks pass (CodeQL, Lint, Test, Integration, Compatibility, Connection Tests, Regress Tests, WASM, all 6 platform builds)


BLOCKING ISSUES (0)

No blocking issues found.


NON-BLOCKING (1)

LOW src/connection.rs:detect_tls_from_serverrow.get(0) / row.get(1) will panic if pg_stat_ssl.version or pg_stat_ssl.cipher is NULL

In PostgreSQL, pg_stat_ssl.version and pg_stat_ssl.cipher are nullable columns. The query filters on ssl = true, which should guarantee non-NULL values for valid TLS connections. However, a defensive row.try_get().ok() would be safer against unexpected server behavior.
Suggestion: Consider row.try_get::<_, String>(0).ok() with early return on None, or accept the current behavior since NULL with ssl=true indicates a server bug.


POTENTIAL ISSUES (2)

MEDIUM src/connection.rs:detect_tls_from_server — TLS cipher name may differ between server-side (OpenSSL) and client-side (rustls) (confidence: 5/10)

Previously, TLS metadata came from the rustls handshake (IANA cipher names). Now it comes from pg_stat_ssl which reports OpenSSL names. For TLS 1.3 these are identical (standardized IANA names). For TLS 1.2 connections, the cipher name format may differ slightly (e.g. ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 vs TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384).
Suggestion: Acceptable for display purposes. Document this in the function's doc comment if TLS 1.2 support matters.

LOW PR description — test count mismatch (confidence: 6/10)

Description says "all 2025 tests pass" but the actual test count is 2046. Minor inaccuracy.
Suggestion: Update the PR description test plan.


Summary

Area Findings Potential Filtered
CI/Pipeline 0 0 0
Security 0 0 0
Bugs 1 1 0
Tests 0 0 0
Guidelines 0 0 0
Docs 0 1 0
Metadata 0 0 0

Result: PASSED — no blocking issues.


SOC2 COMPLIANCE (2)

HIGH SOC2: Linked Issue — MR has no linked issue

Requirement: CC8.1 — Change Management
Action: Add issue reference (e.g., "Closes #NNN") to description

HIGH SOC2: Code Review — MR has no assigned reviewer

Requirement: CC6.1 — Logical Access Controls
Action: Assign a reviewer other than the author

Note: SOC2 findings are not blocking for this project per CLAUDE.md.


REV-assisted review (AI analysis by postgres-ai/rev)

- Use Option<String> for pg_stat_ssl columns to avoid panic on NULL
- Remove stale doc comment fragment from old resolve_password
- Fix stale parameter references in connection_info/reconnect_info docs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@NikolayS
NikolayS merged commit 4ea325b into main Apr 13, 2026
21 checks passed
NikolayS pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2026
CodeQL's cleartext-logging rule (#831 review) flagged `meta.uid()` and
`geteuid()` flowing into the error string and on to `rpg_eprintln!`.
Same pattern as #817 in `connection.rs`: uid values are sensitive in
CodeQL's taint model and must not reach a logger.

Drop the numeric uids from the error message — the diagnostic value
was low (the user can `ls -l` the file to see ownership) and the
trust check itself is unchanged. The mode error message is reformatted
slightly to keep the chmod hint, which is the actually useful bit.

Existing test (`load_project_config_skips_world_writable_file`) still
passes; assertion is on file rejection, not the error string.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
NikolayS added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2026
* test(security): add red-phase test for #824 H5 config trust

Adds a unit test that creates a world-writable `.rpg.toml` in a temp dir,
points CWD at it, and asserts `load_project_config()` skips the file.

The test fails on main: today the loader has no permission/ownership check
for project configs, so a world-writable file is silently loaded.  The fix
in the next commit makes this test pass.

Refs #824 H5.

* fix(security): trust check for project-level .rpg.toml (#824 H5)

A `.rpg.toml` discovered by walking CWD up to `$HOME` is loaded with no
permission or ownership check.  Because `PROMPT1` and friends flow through
backtick-shell expansion in the REPL (`src/repl/mod.rs:282`), cloning an
untrusted repo and starting rpg inside it can execute arbitrary shell on
first prompt render.

Add `check_project_config_trust()`, modelled on the pgpass check at
`src/connection.rs:1566–1582`:

  * file must be owned by the current uid;
  * mode must satisfy `& 0o022 == 0` (no group/other write).

Untrusted files are skipped with a stderr warning and an actionable
`chmod 0600` hint; the REPL still starts.  User-level config under
`~/.config/rpg/` is implicitly trusted and unaffected.

The check is `#[cfg(unix)]`; on Windows the loader proceeds (POSIX modes
are not portable) — same gating as pgpass.

This is the minimum-viable fix.  A TOFU-style allowlist at
`~/.config/rpg/trusted_project_configs` (direnv-style opt-in) is left as
a TODO under #824 H5.

Refs #824.

* fix(security): break cleartext-logging taint chain in trust check

CodeQL's cleartext-logging rule (#831 review) flagged `meta.uid()` and
`geteuid()` flowing into the error string and on to `rpg_eprintln!`.
Same pattern as #817 in `connection.rs`: uid values are sensitive in
CodeQL's taint model and must not reach a logger.

Drop the numeric uids from the error message — the diagnostic value
was low (the user can `ls -l` the file to see ownership) and the
trust check itself is unchanged. The mode error message is reformatted
slightly to keep the chmod hint, which is the actually useful bit.

Existing test (`load_project_config_skips_world_writable_file`) still
passes; assertion is on file rejection, not the error string.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Nik Samokhvalov <nik@niks-mbp.lan>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@NikolayS
NikolayS deleted the claude/fix-codeql-security-aXehC branch April 29, 2026 01:44
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3 participants