LLT-6230: Introduce upper memory bound for async http code path#3
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tomaszklak merged 3 commits intomasterfrom Apr 7, 2026
Merged
LLT-6230: Introduce upper memory bound for async http code path#3tomaszklak merged 3 commits intomasterfrom
tomaszklak merged 3 commits intomasterfrom
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sfraczek
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Apr 2, 2026
Add upper bound on the possible memory usage for http traffic, hardcoded to 256KB.
macOS 15 introduced Local Network Access privacy restrictions that block multicast/broadcast network access for unsigned, non-entitled processes (like your test binary). For more details see: - github: actions/runner-images#10924 - apple: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/770473
sfraczek
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Apr 7, 2026
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Before this change, it was possible for the malicious upnp gateway to trigger arbitrary large memory allocations on the client. This change caps the memory usage for both the HTTP headers and body.