Report a suspected vulnerability through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability. If you cannot use that, email security@autarchy.ai with the subject env-packs security report. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

This is a single-maintainer project, so there is no response-time SLA; reports are read and triaged privately.

Environment packs can contain synthetic credentials, flags, service defaults, and participant-facing artifacts. Those are training content, not production secrets. Never commit real credentials, customer data, private keys, or operator tokens to this repository — keep local development secrets in .env, which is gitignored.

Release tags (vX.Y.Z) are signed with keyless Sigstore via gitsign — the release workflow's short-lived GitHub Actions OIDC identity, no stored signing key (ADR 0017). Because the signature is Sigstore keyless rather than GPG, GitHub does not render its Verified badge; the identity-bound gitsign verify-tag check below — not the web UI — is the authentication signal.

Install gitsign 0.15.0 or newer (earlier versions are affected by CVE-2026-44310, a verification bypass) per the upstream instructions, then:

git fetch --tags origin
gitsign verify-tag \
  --certificate-identity=https://github.com/OpenRAE/env-packs/.github/workflows/release-please.yml@refs/heads/main \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  vX.Y.Z

Tags signed before the repository moved to OpenRAE/env-packs carry the signer identity of its previous path. The signing certificate records the repository the workflow ran in at the time, and that is not rewritten by a transfer, so verifying an older tag needs the older identity:

--certificate-identity=https://github.com/Brad-Edwards/aces-scenario-packs/.github/workflows/release-please.yml@refs/heads/main

Both identities are legitimate for their respective release ranges. Neither is a fallback for the other: verification must assert one exact identity, so pick the one matching the tag's date rather than trying both to see which passes.

A pass reports a valid Git signature, a Rekor transparency-log entry, and the expected certificate identity. Verify against the exact identity above, not merely any certificate Sigstore accepts; git verify-tag alone does not enforce the signer identity. The release workflow runs the same check before publishing.

Tag provenance is one of several independent supply-chain records: build artifacts (wheel/sdist) additionally carry SLSA build-provenance attestations verifiable with gh attestation verify (ADR 0015), a CycloneDX SBOM (ADR 0004), and PyPI publication attestations. None substitutes for another.