Only the latest state of the main branch receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main (latest) |
✅ |
| older tags/commits | ❌ |
Please do NOT open a public issue or pull request for security vulnerabilities. Public PRs disclose the vulnerability to everyone before a fix is deployed.
Instead, use one of these private channels:
- GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (preferred): Report a vulnerability
- Email: support@opensin.delqhi.com — please include steps to reproduce, affected endpoint/file, and impact.
We aim to acknowledge reports within 72 hours and to ship a fix or mitigation for confirmed CRITICAL/HIGH findings within 14 days.
OpenSIN Chat is a self-hosted fork of AnythingLLM. Vulnerabilities in unmodified upstream code should additionally be reported upstream so the whole ecosystem benefits.
- Real
.envfiles must never be committed (enforced by CI:ceo-audit.yml,secrets-scan.yml). JWT_SECRET,SIG_KEY,SIG_SALTand all provider API keys must be generated per deployment (e.g.openssl rand -base64 32) and rotated whenever they may have been exposed.- Demo or onboarding credentials must never ship in the frontend bundle or README. If a credential has ever been published, treat it as compromised and rotate it immediately.
The following are intentional design decisions inherited from upstream and will be closed without action:
The collector is intentionally able to reach internal hosts so that
VPC-internal deployments can scrape internal services
(see collector/utils/url/index.js).
Note: this exception applies to the collector only. The research module's
ContentExtractorblocks private/link-local targets by default; setRESEARCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORKS=trueto opt in to internal access. Reports that bypass this guard are valid reports.
Valid XSS reports must be zero-action (triggered on page or image load). Self-inflicted, single-victim paste scenarios are not accepted.
OpenSIN Chat supports running without authentication for trusted, isolated environments. Operators choose between: no auth, single password, or multi-user mode during onboarding. A missing password setup is not a vulnerability — bypassing configured authentication absolutely is, and such reports are welcome.