test(middleware): add unit tests for AgentMiddleware helper functions

libs/uniharness/tests/unit_tests/middleware/test_middleware.py

@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+"""Unit tests for middleware helper functions.
+
+Focuses on ``_supports_tool_images``, ``_extract_tool_images``,
+``_detect_skill_call``, and ``AgentMiddleware.awrap_tool_call`` —
+the permission-gating entry point.
+
+These tests are intentionally lightweight and target public-accessible
+helpers that have no coverage elsewhere.
+"""
+
+# ruff: noqa: PLR2004, ANN401
+# mypy: disable-error-code="arg-type"
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+from langchain_core.messages import (
+    AIMessage,
+    HumanMessage,
+    ToolMessage,
+)
+
+from uniharness.harness.permission import PermissionDecision, PermissionGate, PermissionResult, SafetyRule
+from uniharness.langchain.middleware import (
+    _IMAGE_EXTRACTED,
+    AgentMiddleware,
+    _detect_skill_call,
+    _extract_tool_images,
+    _supports_tool_images,
+)
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _make_gate_with_rule(rule: SafetyRule) -> PermissionGate:
+    gate = PermissionGate()
+    gate.register_rule(rule)
+    return gate
+
+
+def _make_request(tool_name: str = "bash", tool_id: str = "tc_1") -> Any:
+    return type("R", (), {"tool_call": {"id": tool_id, "name": tool_name, "args": {}}})()
+
+
+def _make_middleware(
+    gate: PermissionGate | None = None,
+    approval_callback: Any = None,
+) -> AgentMiddleware:
+    from tests.unit_tests.conftest import core_tools
+    from uniharness.harness.model import ModelProfile
+    from uniharness.types import AgentContext
+
+    profile = ModelProfile(model=MagicMock(), compaction_threshold=100_000)
+    ctx = AgentContext(model=profile, tools=list(core_tools()))
+    return AgentMiddleware(
+        context=ctx,
+        system_prompt="You are a test agent.",
+        permission_gate=gate or PermissionGate(),
+        approval_callback=approval_callback,
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _supports_tool_images
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestSupportsToolImages:
+    """``_supports_tool_images`` returns True only for ChatAnthropic instances."""
+
+    def test_returns_false_for_magic_mock(self) -> None:
+        """MagicMock is not a ChatAnthropic instance."""
+        assert _supports_tool_images(MagicMock()) is False
+
+    def test_returns_false_when_langchain_anthropic_not_installed(self) -> None:
+        """If import fails the function must return False without raising."""
+        import importlib
+        import sys
+
+        import uniharness.langchain.middleware as mod
+
+        # Temporarily hide langchain_anthropic so the module re-runs its try/except
+        original = sys.modules.get("langchain_anthropic")
+        sys.modules["langchain_anthropic"] = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        try:
+            importlib.reload(mod)
+            result = mod._supports_tool_images(MagicMock())
+        finally:
+            if original is None:
+                sys.modules.pop("langchain_anthropic", None)
+            else:
+                sys.modules["langchain_anthropic"] = original
+            importlib.reload(mod)
+        assert result is False
+
+    def test_returns_true_for_chat_anthropic_instance(self) -> None:
+        """ChatAnthropic instance yields True (requires langchain_anthropic)."""
+        pytest.importorskip("langchain_anthropic")
+        from langchain_anthropic import ChatAnthropic
+
+        # ChatAnthropic requires an API key; patch __init__ to avoid it.
+        with pytest.MonkeyPatch.context() as mp:
+            mp.setattr(ChatAnthropic, "__init__", lambda *_: None)
+            model = ChatAnthropic.__new__(ChatAnthropic)
+        assert _supports_tool_images(model) is True
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _extract_tool_images
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestExtractToolImages:
+    """Pure-function tests for image extraction from ToolMessages."""
+
+    def test_returns_none_when_no_messages(self) -> None:
+        assert _extract_tool_images([]) is None
+
+    def test_returns_none_for_string_content_tool_message(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage] = [ToolMessage(content="plain text", tool_call_id="tc_1")]
+        assert _extract_tool_images(msgs) is None
+
+    def test_returns_none_when_no_image_blocks(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage] = [
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[{"type": "text", "text": "just text"}],
+                tool_call_id="tc_1",
+            )
+        ]
+        assert _extract_tool_images(msgs) is None
+
+    def test_extracts_image_url_block_into_human_message(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[HumanMessage | AIMessage | ToolMessage] = [
+            HumanMessage(content="read img.png"),
+            AIMessage(content="", tool_calls=[{"id": "tc_1", "name": "read", "args": {}}]),
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "[Image: img.png]"},
+                    {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
+                ],
+                tool_call_id="tc_1",
+            ),
+        ]
+        result = _extract_tool_images(msgs)
+        assert result is not None
+        # Original 3 messages + 1 injected HumanMessage
+        assert len(result) == 4
+        human_msg = result[3]
+        assert isinstance(human_msg, HumanMessage)
+        assert isinstance(human_msg.content, list)
+        image_blocks = [b for b in human_msg.content if isinstance(b, dict) and b.get("type") == "image_url"]
+        assert len(image_blocks) == 1
+
+    def test_extracted_tool_message_marked_and_text_preserved(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage] = [
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "caption"},
+                    {"type": "image", "source": {"type": "base64", "media_type": "image/png", "data": "x"}},
+                ],
+                tool_call_id="tc_1",
+            )
+        ]
+        result = _extract_tool_images(msgs)
+        assert result is not None
+        tool_msg = result[0]
+        assert isinstance(tool_msg, ToolMessage)
+        assert tool_msg.additional_kwargs.get(_IMAGE_EXTRACTED) is True
+        # Text blocks must survive
+        assert any(isinstance(b, dict) and b.get("text") == "caption" for b in (tool_msg.content if isinstance(tool_msg.content, list) else []))
+
+    def test_placeholder_when_tool_message_has_only_images(self) -> None:
+        """When all content is images, use '[see image below]' as placeholder."""
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage] = [
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}}],
+                tool_call_id="tc_1",
+            )
+        ]
+        result = _extract_tool_images(msgs)
+        assert result is not None
+        tool_msg = result[0]
+        assert isinstance(tool_msg, ToolMessage)
+        assert tool_msg.content == "[see image below]"
+
+    def test_idempotent_skips_already_extracted(self) -> None:
+        """Messages already marked with _IMAGE_EXTRACTED are not processed again."""
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage | HumanMessage] = [
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[{"type": "text", "text": "[see image below]"}],
+                tool_call_id="tc_1",
+                additional_kwargs={_IMAGE_EXTRACTED: True},
+            ),
+            HumanMessage(
+                content=[
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "[Image from tool result]"},
+                    {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
+                ]
+            ),
+        ]
+        # Must return None — nothing changed
+        assert _extract_tool_images(msgs) is None
+
+    def test_preserves_tool_call_id_and_message_id(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[ToolMessage] = [
+            ToolMessage(
+                content=[
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "data"},
+                    {"type": "image", "source": {"type": "base64", "media_type": "image/png", "data": "x"}},
+                ],
+                tool_call_id="tc_99",
+                id="msg_42",
+            )
+        ]
+        result = _extract_tool_images(msgs)
+        assert result is not None
+        tool_msg = result[0]
+        assert isinstance(tool_msg, ToolMessage)
+        assert tool_msg.tool_call_id == "tc_99"
+        assert tool_msg.id == "msg_42"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _detect_skill_call
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDetectSkillCall:
+    """``_detect_skill_call`` operates on OpenAI-format messages."""
+
+    def _skill_name(self) -> str:
+        from uniharness.tools.skill import SkillTool
+
+        return SkillTool.name
+
+    def test_returns_none_for_empty_list(self) -> None:
+        assert _detect_skill_call([]) is None
+
+    def test_detects_skill_from_last_tool_message(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "tc_1", "function": {"name": self._skill_name(), "arguments": '{"skill": "deploy"}'}},
+                ],
+            },
+            {"role": "tool", "content": "Launching skill: deploy", "tool_call_id": "tc_1"},
+        ]
+        assert _detect_skill_call(msgs) == "deploy"
+
+    def test_returns_none_for_non_skill_tool_call(self) -> None:
+        msgs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "tc_1", "function": {"name": "Bash", "arguments": '{"command": "ls"}'}},
+                ],
+            },
+            {"role": "tool", "content": "file.txt", "tool_call_id": "tc_1"},
+        ]
+        assert _detect_skill_call(msgs) is None
+
+    def test_returns_none_when_user_message_follows(self) -> None:
+        """User message after the tool message means skill was already injected."""
+        msgs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "tc_1", "function": {"name": self._skill_name(), "arguments": '{"skill": "commit"}'}},
+                ],
+            },
+            {"role": "tool", "content": "Launching skill: commit", "tool_call_id": "tc_1"},
+            {"role": "user", "content": "<skill content already injected>"},
+        ]
+        assert _detect_skill_call(msgs) is None
+
+    def test_handles_invalid_json_arguments_gracefully(self) -> None:
+        """Malformed JSON in tool_calls.function.arguments must not raise."""
+        msgs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "tc_1", "function": {"name": self._skill_name(), "arguments": "not-json"}},
+                ],
+            },
+            {"role": "tool", "content": "...", "tool_call_id": "tc_1"},
+        ]
+        # Should return None (no "skill" key in empty fallback dict)
+        assert _detect_skill_call(msgs) is None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# AgentMiddleware.awrap_tool_call — permission gating
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _DenyRule(SafetyRule):
+    """Denies every tool call."""
+
+    def check(self, tool_name: str, tool_args: dict[str, Any]) -> PermissionDecision | None:
+        return PermissionDecision(result=PermissionResult.DENIED, reason="blocked by test rule")
+
+
+class _ApprovalRule(SafetyRule):
+    """Requires approval for every tool call."""
+
+    def check(self, tool_name: str, tool_args: dict[str, Any]) -> PermissionDecision | None:
+        return PermissionDecision(result=PermissionResult.NEEDS_APPROVAL, approval_prompt="Approve?")
+
+
+class TestAwrapToolCallPermissionGating:
+    """``awrap_tool_call`` enforces permission decisions from ``PermissionGate``."""
+
+    async def test_allowed_call_invokes_handler_and_returns_result(self) -> None:
+        mw = _make_middleware()
+        expected = ToolMessage(content="success", tool_call_id="tc_1")
+        handler = AsyncMock(return_value=expected)
+        request = _make_request()
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        handler.assert_awaited_once()
+        assert result is expected
+
+    async def test_denied_call_returns_error_message_without_handler(self) -> None:
+        gate = _make_gate_with_rule(_DenyRule())
+        mw = _make_middleware(gate=gate)
+        handler = AsyncMock()
+        request = _make_request("bash")
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        handler.assert_not_awaited()
+        assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
+        assert "blocked by test rule" in result.content
+
+    async def test_denied_response_contains_permission_denied_prefix(self) -> None:
+        gate = _make_gate_with_rule(_DenyRule())
+        mw = _make_middleware(gate=gate)
+        request = _make_request("bash")
+        handler = AsyncMock()
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
+        assert isinstance(result.content, str)
+        assert result.content.startswith("Permission denied")
+
+    async def test_needs_approval_without_callback_returns_error(self) -> None:
+        gate = _make_gate_with_rule(_ApprovalRule())
+        mw = _make_middleware(gate=gate, approval_callback=None)
+        handler = AsyncMock()
+        request = _make_request("read")
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        handler.assert_not_awaited()
+        assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
+        assert isinstance(result.content, str)
+        assert "requires approval" in result.content.lower()
+
+    async def test_needs_approval_approved_by_callback_calls_handler(self) -> None:
+        gate = _make_gate_with_rule(_ApprovalRule())
+        callback = AsyncMock(return_value=True)
+        mw = _make_middleware(gate=gate, approval_callback=callback)
+        expected = ToolMessage(content="done", tool_call_id="tc_1")
+        handler = AsyncMock(return_value=expected)
+        request = _make_request("read")
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        callback.assert_awaited_once()
+        handler.assert_awaited_once()
+        assert result is expected
+
+    async def test_needs_approval_rejected_by_callback_returns_error(self) -> None:
+        gate = _make_gate_with_rule(_ApprovalRule())
+        callback = AsyncMock(return_value=False)
+        mw = _make_middleware(gate=gate, approval_callback=callback)
+        handler = AsyncMock()
+        request = _make_request("read")
+
+        result = await mw.awrap_tool_call(request, handler)
+
+        handler.assert_not_awaited()
+        assert isinstance(result, ToolMessage)
+        assert "denied by user" in result.content