Do not file a public issue for security vulnerabilities. Send an email to acharyapratik214@gmail.com with:

• A description of the issue
• Steps to reproduce
• The affected component (binary, agent loop, MCP layer, integrations, etc.)
• Your assessment of impact

You'll get an acknowledgement within 72 hours. Patches for confirmed issues are landed on main and shipped in the next release. CVE assignment is offered for valid findings.

• Command injection through the bash tool (the 4-level safety classifier in src/safety.rs is the primary defense)
• Path traversal in file tools (read_file, write_file, edit_file, delete_file)
• Credential leakage from .dipralix/, ~/.dipralix/, or audit logs
• MCP server escapes (parsing bugs in src/mcp.rs)
• Tampering with the // DIPRALIX: comment protocol to inject prompts

• Misuse by a user who has explicitly bypassed their own safety policy (safety.toml set to allow everywhere)
• Issues that only reproduce when running with a leaked or malicious API key
• Social engineering against the human at the keyboard

• Pin permissions.destructive_commands = "deny" in .dipralix/safety.toml
• Set bash_sudo = "Deny" in .dipralix/approval.toml
• Review the audit.log in .dipralix/ after long sessions
• Run untrusted projects under a non-privileged user account