Implement HTTP server and WrappedTestnetBTC contract #1474
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Added a simple HTTP server to serve a JSON file and a Solidity contract for Wrapped Testnet Bitcoin.
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Pull request overview
This pull request attempts to add a Python HTTP server and a Solidity smart contract for Wrapped Testnet Bitcoin to the repository. However, the implementation is fundamentally flawed as all code has been incorrectly appended to the README.md file rather than being placed in separate, appropriate files. Additionally, this code appears entirely unrelated to the setup-node GitHub Action project, which is focused on Node.js environment setup for GitHub Actions workflows.
Changes:
- Corrupted the README.md Code of Conduct section with Python import statement
- Appended Python HTTP server code (278 lines) to README.md
- Appended Solidity smart contract code (240 lines) to README.md, duplicated in full
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| function mint(address to, uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinTxId) | ||
| external | ||
| onlyBridgeOperator | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(to != address(0), "Mint to zero address"); | ||
| require(amount > 0, "Amount must be positive"); | ||
|
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| balanceOf[to] += amount; | ||
| totalSupply += amount; | ||
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| emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount); | ||
| emit Mint(to, amount, bitcoinTxId); | ||
| } |
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The bridgeOperator has unchecked power to mint unlimited tokens without any constraints or multi-signature requirements. This creates a single point of failure where a compromised operator key could mint arbitrary amounts of tokens. Consider implementing a multi-signature scheme, timelocks, or minting limits to reduce centralization risks.
| function burn(uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinAddress) | ||
| external | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient balance"); | ||
| require(bytes(bitcoinAddress).length > 0, "Bitcoin address required"); | ||
|
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| balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount; | ||
| totalSupply -= amount; | ||
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| emit Transfer(msg.sender, address(0), amount); | ||
| emit Burn(msg.sender, amount, bitcoinAddress); | ||
| } |
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The burn function doesn't validate the format or validity of the bitcoinAddress parameter. Users could burn tokens with an invalid or malformed Bitcoin address, resulting in permanent loss of tokens without any possibility of recovery. Consider implementing Bitcoin address format validation before accepting burn requests.
| { | ||
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | ||
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The approve function doesn't follow the ERC-20 best practice of requiring the allowance to be set to zero before setting it to a new non-zero value when changing from a non-zero allowance. This can lead to a known front-running attack where a spender can spend both the old and new allowance amounts. Consider implementing the increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance pattern or requiring allowance to be zero before setting a new value.
| { | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| { | |
| // Mitigate ERC-20 allowance front-running by requiring zeroing before changing | |
| require( | |
| amount == 0 || allowance[msg.sender][spender] == 0, | |
| "Non-zero allowance must be zeroed first" | |
| ); | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) | |
| external | |
| whenNotPaused | |
| returns (bool) | |
| { | |
| uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender]; | |
| uint256 newAllowance = currentAllowance + addedValue; | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = newAllowance; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, newAllowance); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) | |
| external | |
| whenNotPaused | |
| returns (bool) | |
| { | |
| uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender]; | |
| require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "Decreased allowance below zero"); | |
| uint256 newAllowance = currentAllowance - subtractedValue; | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = newAllowance; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, newAllowance); | |
| return true; | |
| } |
| { | ||
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | ||
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | ||
| return true; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The approve function doesn't follow the ERC-20 best practice of requiring the allowance to be set to zero before setting it to a new non-zero value when changing from a non-zero allowance. This can lead to a known front-running attack where a spender can spend both the old and new allowance amounts. Consider implementing the increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance pattern or requiring allowance to be zero before setting a new value.
| { | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| { | |
| uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender]; | |
| require( | |
| currentAllowance == 0 || amount == 0, | |
| "Approve from non-zero to non-zero allowance" | |
| ); | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) | |
| external | |
| whenNotPaused | |
| returns (bool) | |
| { | |
| uint256 newAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender] + addedValue; | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = newAllowance; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, newAllowance); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) | |
| external | |
| whenNotPaused | |
| returns (bool) | |
| { | |
| uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender]; | |
| require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "Decreased allowance below zero"); | |
| uint256 newAllowance = currentAllowance - subtractedValue; | |
| allowance[msg.sender][spender] = newAllowance; | |
| emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, newAllowance); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| :wave: Be nice. See [our code of conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) && import http.server | ||
| import socketserver | ||
| import json | ||
| import os | ||
|
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||
| PORT = 8000 | ||
| FILE_NAME = "nexus_seeds.json" | ||
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| class NexusHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): | ||
| def do_GET(self): | ||
| # Serve the JSON file regardless of the path for this demo | ||
| # This mimics the /.well-known/seeds-public.json endpoint | ||
| if self.path.endswith(".json") or self.path == "/": | ||
| if os.path.exists(FILE_NAME): | ||
| self.send_response(200) | ||
| self.send_header('Content-type', 'application/json') | ||
| self.end_headers() | ||
| with open(FILE_NAME, 'rb') as f: | ||
| self.wfile.write(f.read()) | ||
| print(f"⚡ [SERVER] Served {FILE_NAME} to Nexus Client") | ||
| else: | ||
| self.send_error(404, "Seeds file not found") | ||
| else: | ||
| self.send_error(404, "Endpoint not found") | ||
|
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||
| print(f"🌍 NEXUS AGI DIRECTORY ONLINE") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The original line ending the Code of Conduct section has been corrupted with " && import http.server" appended to it. This breaks the README formatting and syntax. The line should end cleanly after the closing parenthesis: ":wave: Be nice. See our code of conduct"
| :wave: Be nice. See [our code of conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) && import http.server | |
| import socketserver | |
| import json | |
| import os | |
| PORT = 8000 | |
| FILE_NAME = "nexus_seeds.json" | |
| class NexusHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): | |
| def do_GET(self): | |
| # Serve the JSON file regardless of the path for this demo | |
| # This mimics the /.well-known/seeds-public.json endpoint | |
| if self.path.endswith(".json") or self.path == "/": | |
| if os.path.exists(FILE_NAME): | |
| self.send_response(200) | |
| self.send_header('Content-type', 'application/json') | |
| self.end_headers() | |
| with open(FILE_NAME, 'rb') as f: | |
| self.wfile.write(f.read()) | |
| print(f"⚡ [SERVER] Served {FILE_NAME} to Nexus Client") | |
| else: | |
| self.send_error(404, "Seeds file not found") | |
| else: | |
| self.send_error(404, "Endpoint not found") | |
| print(f"🌍 NEXUS AGI DIRECTORY ONLINE") | |
| :wave: Be nice. See [our code of conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) |
| function mint(address to, uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinTxId) | ||
| external | ||
| onlyBridgeOperator | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(to != address(0), "Mint to zero address"); | ||
| require(amount > 0, "Amount must be positive"); | ||
|
|
||
| balanceOf[to] += amount; | ||
| totalSupply += amount; | ||
|
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| emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount); | ||
| emit Mint(to, amount, bitcoinTxId); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The mint function lacks protection against duplicate Bitcoin transaction IDs. There's no mechanism to track which bitcoinTxId values have already been used, allowing the bridge operator to mint tokens multiple times for the same Bitcoin transaction. A mapping to track used transaction IDs should be implemented to prevent double-minting.
| function mint(address to, uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinTxId) | ||
| external | ||
| onlyBridgeOperator | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(to != address(0), "Mint to zero address"); | ||
| require(amount > 0, "Amount must be positive"); | ||
|
|
||
| balanceOf[to] += amount; | ||
| totalSupply += amount; | ||
|
|
||
| emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount); | ||
| emit Mint(to, amount, bitcoinTxId); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The bridgeOperator has unchecked power to mint unlimited tokens without any constraints or multi-signature requirements. This creates a single point of failure where a compromised operator key could mint arbitrary amounts of tokens. Consider implementing a multi-signature scheme, timelocks, or minting limits to reduce centralization risks.
| function burn(uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinAddress) | ||
| external | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient balance"); | ||
| require(bytes(bitcoinAddress).length > 0, "Bitcoin address required"); | ||
|
|
||
| balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount; | ||
| totalSupply -= amount; | ||
|
|
||
| emit Transfer(msg.sender, address(0), amount); | ||
| emit Burn(msg.sender, amount, bitcoinAddress); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The burn function doesn't validate the format or validity of the bitcoinAddress parameter. Users could burn tokens with an invalid or malformed Bitcoin address, resulting in permanent loss of tokens without any possibility of recovery. Consider implementing Bitcoin address format validation before accepting burn requests.
| function mint(address to, uint256 amount, string calldata bitcoinTxId) | ||
| external | ||
| onlyBridgeOperator | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| { | ||
| require(to != address(0), "Mint to zero address"); | ||
| require(amount > 0, "Amount must be positive"); | ||
|
|
||
| balanceOf[to] += amount; | ||
| totalSupply += amount; | ||
|
|
||
| emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount); | ||
| emit Mint(to, amount, bitcoinTxId); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
The mint function lacks protection against duplicate Bitcoin transaction IDs. There's no mechanism to track which bitcoinTxId values have already been used, allowing the bridge operator to mint tokens multiple times for the same Bitcoin transaction. A mapping to track used transaction IDs should be implemented to prevent double-minting.
| import json | ||
| import os | ||
|
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| PORT = 8000 | ||
| FILE_NAME = "nexus_seeds.json" | ||
|
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| class NexusHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): | ||
| def do_GET(self): | ||
| # Serve the JSON file regardless of the path for this demo | ||
| # This mimics the /.well-known/seeds-public.json endpoint | ||
| if self.path.endswith(".json") or self.path == "/": | ||
| if os.path.exists(FILE_NAME): | ||
| self.send_response(200) | ||
| self.send_header('Content-type', 'application/json') | ||
| self.end_headers() | ||
| with open(FILE_NAME, 'rb') as f: | ||
| self.wfile.write(f.read()) | ||
| print(f"⚡ [SERVER] Served {FILE_NAME} to Nexus Client") | ||
| else: | ||
| self.send_error(404, "Seeds file not found") | ||
| else: | ||
| self.send_error(404, "Endpoint not found") | ||
|
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| print(f"🌍 NEXUS AGI DIRECTORY ONLINE") | ||
| print(f"📡 Listening on http://localhost:{PORT}") | ||
| print(f"📂 Serving registry from: {FILE_NAME}") | ||
|
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| with socketserver.TCPServer(("", PORT), NexusHandler) as httpd: | ||
| httpd.serve_forever() | ||
| && // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT | ||
| pragma solidity ^0.8.20; | ||
|
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| contract WrappedTestnetBTC { | ||
| string public constant name = "Wrapped Testnet Bitcoin"; | ||
| string public constant symbol = "wTBTC"; | ||
| uint8 public constant decimals = 18; | ||
| uint256 public totalSupply; | ||
|
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| address public bridgeOperator; | ||
| bool public paused = false; | ||
|
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| mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf; | ||
| mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance; | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Python HTTP server code has been incorrectly appended to the README.md file instead of being placed in a separate file. This code should be in its own Python file (e.g., server.py or similar) in an appropriate directory, not concatenated to the README documentation. Additionally, this Python code appears unrelated to the setup-node GitHub Action, which is a Node.js-focused project.
| import json | |
| import os | |
| PORT = 8000 | |
| FILE_NAME = "nexus_seeds.json" | |
| class NexusHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): | |
| def do_GET(self): | |
| # Serve the JSON file regardless of the path for this demo | |
| # This mimics the /.well-known/seeds-public.json endpoint | |
| if self.path.endswith(".json") or self.path == "/": | |
| if os.path.exists(FILE_NAME): | |
| self.send_response(200) | |
| self.send_header('Content-type', 'application/json') | |
| self.end_headers() | |
| with open(FILE_NAME, 'rb') as f: | |
| self.wfile.write(f.read()) | |
| print(f"⚡ [SERVER] Served {FILE_NAME} to Nexus Client") | |
| else: | |
| self.send_error(404, "Seeds file not found") | |
| else: | |
| self.send_error(404, "Endpoint not found") | |
| print(f"🌍 NEXUS AGI DIRECTORY ONLINE") | |
| print(f"📡 Listening on http://localhost:{PORT}") | |
| print(f"📂 Serving registry from: {FILE_NAME}") | |
| with socketserver.TCPServer(("", PORT), NexusHandler) as httpd: | |
| httpd.serve_forever() | |
| && // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT | |
| pragma solidity ^0.8.20; | |
| contract WrappedTestnetBTC { | |
| string public constant name = "Wrapped Testnet Bitcoin"; | |
| string public constant symbol = "wTBTC"; | |
| uint8 public constant decimals = 18; | |
| uint256 public totalSupply; | |
| address public bridgeOperator; | |
| bool public paused = false; | |
| mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf; | |
| mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public allowance; | |
1 participant
Added a simple HTTP server to serve a JSON file and a Solidity contract for Wrapped Testnet Bitcoin.
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