fix: close os_check mode bypass #37
There are no files selected for viewing
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ | ||
| # Per-mode trust manifests for lex-os integration. | ||
| # | ||
| # Each AgentMode maps to a Grant that constrains what the mode can do | ||
| # on the three trust dimensions: filesystem, network, exec. | ||
| # | ||
| # Grant levels (from lex-types): | ||
| # filesystem: None | ReadOnly | ReadWrite | Full | ||
| # network: None | Loopback | Allowlist | Full | ||
| # exec: None | Sandboxed | Full | ||
| # | ||
| # Manifests are written to /tmp at call time and passed to `lex-os check`. | ||
|
|
||
| import "std.str" as str | ||
|
|
||
| import "std.int" as int | ||
|
|
||
| import "std.io" as io | ||
|
|
||
| fn manifest_json(goal :: Str, filesystem :: Str, network :: Str, exec_level :: Str, floor :: Str, wall :: Int, cmds :: Int, money :: Int, api_calls :: Int) -> Str { | ||
| str.join([ | ||
| "{\"goal\":{\"description\":\"", goal, "\"},", | ||
| "\"grant\":{\"filesystem\":\"", filesystem, "\",\"network\":\"", network, "\",\"exec\":\"", exec_level, "\"},", | ||
| "\"budget\":{\"wall_clock_secs\":", int.to_str(wall), ",", | ||
| "\"max_commands\":", int.to_str(cmds), ",", | ||
| "\"max_money_cents\":", int.to_str(money), ",", | ||
| "\"max_api_calls\":", int.to_str(api_calls), "},", | ||
| "\"isolation_floor\":\"", floor, "\",\"egress\":[]}" | ||
| ], "") | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn explore_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code explore mode", "ReadOnly", "None", "None", "Namespace", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn plan_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code plan mode", "ReadOnly", "None", "None", "Namespace", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn review_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code review mode", "ReadOnly", "None", "None", "Namespace", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn spec_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code spec mode", "ReadWrite", "None", "None", "Namespace", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn test_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code test mode", "ReadWrite", "None", "Sandboxed", "Gvisor", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn refactor_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code refactor mode", "ReadWrite", "None", "Sandboxed", "Gvisor", 300, 200, 0, 50) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn build_manifest_json() -> Str { | ||
| manifest_json("lex-code build mode", "Full", "Allowlist", "Full", "MicroVm", 600, 500, 500, 100) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn json_for_mode(mode :: Str) -> Str { | ||
| if mode == "explore" { | ||
| explore_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "plan" { | ||
| plan_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "review" { | ||
| review_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "spec" { | ||
| spec_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "test" { | ||
| test_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "refactor" { | ||
| refactor_manifest_json() | ||
| } else { | ||
| build_manifest_json() | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn temp_path_for_mode(mode :: Str) -> Str { | ||
| str.concat("/tmp/lex-code-manifest-", str.concat(mode, ".json")) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn write_manifest_for_mode(mode :: Str) -> [io] Result[Str, Str] { | ||
| let path := temp_path_for_mode(mode) | ||
| match io.write(path, json_for_mode(mode)) { | ||
| Ok(_) => Ok(path), | ||
| Err(e) => Err(e), | ||
| } | ||
| } |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ | ||
| import "std.proc" as proc | ||
|
|
||
| import "std.str" as str | ||
|
|
||
| import "std.list" as list | ||
|
|
||
| import "lex-llm/tool" as t | ||
|
|
||
| import "lex-schema/json_value" as jv | ||
|
|
||
| import "lex-schema/error" as e | ||
|
|
||
| import "lex-schema/schema" as s | ||
|
|
||
| import "./util" as util | ||
|
|
||
| fn params() -> s.ModelSchema { | ||
| { title: "OsCheckArgs", description: "Check a Lex file's declared effects against the refactor-mode trust grant", fields: [s.required_str("path", [])] } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| # Effects the mode forbids, derived from the lex-os grant for that mode. | ||
| # explore / plan / review — ReadOnly FS, No Net, No Exec | ||
| # spec — ReadWrite FS, No Net, No Exec | ||
| # test / refactor — ReadWrite FS, No Net, Sandboxed Exec | ||
| # build — Full FS, Allowlist Net, Full Exec (nothing forbidden) | ||
| fn forbidden_for_mode(mode :: Str) -> List[Str] { | ||
| if mode == "explore" or mode == "plan" or mode == "review" { | ||
| ["net", "proc", "fs_write"] | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "spec" { | ||
| ["net", "proc"] | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "test" or mode == "refactor" { | ||
| ["net"] | ||
| } else { | ||
| [] | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn effect_in(effect :: Str, lst :: List[Str]) -> Bool { | ||
| list.fold(lst, false, fn (acc :: Bool, x :: Str) -> Bool { | ||
| acc or x == effect | ||
| }) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn violations(required :: List[Str], forbidden :: List[Str]) -> List[Str] { | ||
| list.filter(required, fn (eff :: Str) -> Bool { | ||
| effect_in(eff, forbidden) | ||
| }) | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn extract_effects(check_json :: jv.Json) -> List[Str] { | ||
| match jv.get_field(check_json, "data") { | ||
| None => [], | ||
| Some(data) => match jv.get_field(data, "required_effects") { | ||
| Some(JList(items)) => list.fold(items, [], fn (acc :: List[Str], j :: jv.Json) -> List[Str] { | ||
| match j { | ||
| JStr(s) => list.concat(acc, [s]), | ||
| _ => acc, | ||
| } | ||
| }), | ||
| _ => [], | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn execute(args :: jv.Json) -> [net, io, proc] Result[jv.Json, e.Errors] { | ||
| let path := util.field_str_or(args, "path", ".") | ||
| let mode := "refactor" | ||
| match proc.spawn("lex", ["--output", "json", "check", path]) { | ||
| Err(msg) => Err(e.single("", "proc_error", msg)), | ||
| Ok(out) => if out.exit_code != 0 { | ||
| Err(e.single("", "lex_check_failed", str.concat(out.stdout, out.stderr))) | ||
| } else { | ||
| match jv.parse(out.stdout) { | ||
| Err(_) => Err(e.single("", "parse_error", "could not parse lex check output")), | ||
| Ok(parsed) => { | ||
| let required := extract_effects(parsed) | ||
| let forbidden := forbidden_for_mode(mode) | ||
| let violated := violations(required, forbidden) | ||
| if list.len(violated) == 0 { | ||
| Ok(JStr(str.concat("grant check passed [mode=", str.concat(mode, str.concat("] effects=", str.join(required, ",")))))) | ||
| } else { | ||
| Ok(JStr(str.join([ | ||
|
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. This is a critical policy-check bypass: the tool reports a refactor grant violation as |
||
| "GRANT VIOLATION [mode=", mode, "]\n", | ||
| " forbidden effects used: ", str.join(violated, ", "), "\n", | ||
| " all required effects: ", str.join(required, ", "), "\n", | ||
| " grant allows: ", grant_summary_for_mode(mode) | ||
| ], ""))) | ||
| } | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn grant_summary_for_mode(mode :: Str) -> Str { | ||
| if mode == "explore" or mode == "plan" or mode == "review" { | ||
| "fs=read-only net=none exec=none" | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "spec" { | ||
| "fs=read-write net=none exec=none" | ||
| } else { | ||
| if mode == "test" or mode == "refactor" { | ||
| "fs=read-write net=none exec=sandboxed" | ||
| } else { | ||
| "fs=full net=allowlist exec=full" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| fn tool() -> t.Tool { | ||
| t.define("os_check", "Check a Lex file's declared effects against the refactor-mode trust grant (lex-os integration). Run after lex_check to catch grant violations — e.g. a refactor agent must not use net effects. The grant mode is fixed by the tool and cannot be overridden by model input. Returns GRANT VIOLATION with details if the file exceeds the refactor grant.", params(), execute) | ||
| } | ||
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Oops, something went wrong.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Severity: Medium. These new git dependencies are not pinned to immutable commits/tags, and this repo has no lockfile. A future or compromised upstream commit can be pulled by
lex pkg install/CI without any change in this repo, letting attacker-controlled dependency code run in builds and developer installs. Pin each git dependency to a reviewed revision or commit the resolver lockfile.