🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Frontend Authentication Bypass - #111
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**Severity**: CRITICAL
**Vulnerability**: The DisplayRulesManager component performed hardcoded client-side authentication checks ("admin" === "admin") before generating and storing an admin token. This allows any user inspecting the client bundle to bypass authentication logic completely.
**Impact**: An attacker could manipulate client-side logic to log in without valid credentials, gaining unauthorized access to configuration data.
**Fix**: Delegated authentication to the backend by removing the hardcoded check, encoding user-provided credentials into a Basic Auth token, and verifying them securely via an authenticated backend call (`fetchDisplayConfigs()`) before persisting the token.
**Verification**: Verified against the main branch test suite and ensured `DisplayRulesManager` correctly clears the token and handles unauthorized responses.
Co-authored-by: aperetti <482392+aperetti@users.noreply.github.com>
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Severity: CRITICAL
Vulnerability: The DisplayRulesManager component performed hardcoded client-side authentication checks ("admin" === "admin") before generating and storing an admin token. This allows any user inspecting the client bundle to bypass authentication logic completely.
Impact: An attacker could manipulate client-side logic to log in without valid credentials, gaining unauthorized access to configuration data.
Fix: Delegated authentication to the backend by removing the hardcoded check, encoding user-provided credentials into a Basic Auth token, and verifying them securely via an authenticated backend call (
fetchDisplayConfigs()) before persisting the token.Verification: Verified against the main branch test suite and ensured
DisplayRulesManagercorrectly clears the token and handles unauthorized responses.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2877723916104509646 started by @aperetti