feat(04-coding-agents): add sample 05 — autonomous coding agent with durable orchestration

[smoell]

Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Samples Pull Request

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Issue number:

Concise description of the PR

Adds sample 05 (autonomous-coding-agent-durable) to 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/,
because the existing coding agent samples cover interactive use cases (Claude Code, CMA) but not
event-driven headless operation with durable orchestration, cross-ticket memory, and multi-agent review.

User experience

Before: No sample for building a fully autonomous, event-driven coding backend on AgentCore Runtime. Users wanting headless ticket-to-code pipelines with retry loops, evaluator agents, and cross-ticket learning had no reference implementation.

After: Users can deploy a complete 5-stage pipeline (admission → hydrate → code loop → review → finalize) via cdk deploy --all. The sample demonstrates:

• Lambda Durable Functions with zero-cost suspension (wait_for_callback)
• 4 specialized runtimes (coding agent, sandbox, Swift sandbox, evaluator)
• Cedar policy enforcement at the sandbox layer
• AgentCore Memory for per-repo lesson recall/write
• Deterministic test gates with orchestrator-level retry
• A demo UI for submitting tickets and viewing results

Checklist

If your change doesn't seem to apply, please leave them unchecked.

• I have reviewed the contributing guidelines
• Add your name to CONTRIBUTORS.md
• Have you checked to ensure there aren't other open Pull Requests for the same update/change?
• Are you uploading a dataset?
• Have you documented Introduction, Architecture Diagram, Prerequisites, Usage, Sample Prompts, and Clean Up steps in your example README?
• I agree to resolve any issues created for this example in the future.
• I have performed a self-review of this change
• Changes have been tested
• Changes are documented

Acknowledgment

By submitting this pull request, I confirm that you can use, modify, copy, and redistribute this contribution, under the terms of the project license.

[github-actions]

Latest scan for commit: 05cd489 | Updated: 2026-06-23 14:59:03 UTC

Security Scan Results

Scan Metadata

• Project: ASH
• Scan executed: 2026-06-23T14:58:47+00:00
• ASH version: 3.0.0

Summary

Scanner Results

The table below shows findings by scanner, with status based on severity thresholds and dependencies:

Column Explanations:

Severity Levels (S/C/H/M/L/I):

• Suppressed (S): Security findings that have been explicitly suppressed/ignored and don't affect the scanner's pass/fail status
• Critical (C): The most severe security vulnerabilities requiring immediate remediation (e.g., SQL injection, remote code execution)
• High (H): Serious security vulnerabilities that should be addressed promptly (e.g., authentication bypasses, privilege escalation)
• Medium (M): Moderate security risks that should be addressed in normal development cycles (e.g., weak encryption, input validation issues)
• Low (L): Minor security concerns with limited impact (e.g., information disclosure, weak recommendations)
• Info (I): Informational findings for awareness with minimal security risk (e.g., code quality suggestions, best practice recommendations)

Other Columns:

• Time: Duration taken by each scanner to complete its analysis
• Action: Total number of actionable findings at or above the configured severity threshold that require attention

Scanner Results:

• PASSED: Scanner found no security issues at or above the configured severity threshold - code is clean for this scanner
• FAILED: Scanner found security vulnerabilities at or above the threshold that require attention and remediation
• MISSING: Scanner could not run because required dependencies/tools are not installed or available
• SKIPPED: Scanner was intentionally disabled or excluded from this scan
• ERROR: Scanner encountered an execution error and could not complete successfully

Severity Thresholds (Thresh Column):

• CRITICAL: Only Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• HIGH: High and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• MEDIUM (MED): Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• LOW: Low, Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• ALL: Any finding of any severity level causes scanner to fail

Threshold Source: Values in parentheses indicate where the threshold is configured:

• (g) = global: Set in the global_settings section of ASH configuration
• (c) = config: Set in the individual scanner configuration section
• (s) = scanner: Default threshold built into the scanner itself

Statistics calculation:

• All statistics are calculated from the final aggregated SARIF report
• Suppressed findings are counted separately and do not contribute to actionable findings
• Scanner status is determined by comparing actionable findings to the threshold

Scanner	S	C	H	M	L	I	Time	Action	Result	Thresh
bandit	0	7	0	0	139	0	1.8s	7	FAILED	MED (g)
cdk-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.8s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
cfn-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	38ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
checkov	0	1	0	0	0	0	5.2s	1	FAILED	MED (g)
detect-secre…	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
grype	0	0	0	0	0	0	52.0s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
npm-audit	0	0	0	0	0	0	256ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
opengrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	SKIPPED	MED (g)
semgrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	MISSING	MED (g)
syft	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.8s	0	PASSED	MED (g)

Detailed Findings

Show 8 actionable findings

Finding 1: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/coding-agent/app.py:139-141

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

region = os.environ.get("AWS_REGION", "us-east-1")
    home = os.environ.get("HOME") or "/tmp/agenthome"
    os.makedirs(os.path.join(home, ".claude"), exist_ok=True)

---

Finding 2: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/evaluator-agent/app.py:70-72

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

region = os.environ.get("AWS_REGION", "us-east-1")
    home = os.environ.get("HOME") or "/tmp/evalhome"
    os.makedirs(os.path.join(home, ".claude"), exist_ok=True)

---

Finding 3: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/orchestrator/handler.py:186-188

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

if runtime == "swift":
        scratch = f"/tmp/spmbuild_{ticket}"
        return (f'/bin/bash -c "cd /mnt/shared/{ticket} && '

---

Finding 4: B602

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B602
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/sandbox/app.py:285-290

Description:
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.

Code Snippet:

proc = subprocess.Popen(
                argv, shell=popen_shell, cwd=popen_cwd, env=env,
                stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            )
        except FileNotFoundError:
            # `unshare` not present on this image → degrade to unjailed (still cwd-confined).

---

Finding 5: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/tests/test_orchestrator.py:76-78

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

scratch = cmd.split("--scratch-path", 1)[1].split()[0]
        assert scratch.startswith("/tmp/")        # microVM-local, NOT the shared mount
        assert not scratch.startswith("/mnt/")

---

Finding 6: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/tests/test_poc_components.py:88-90

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

monkeypatch.setenv("SANDBOX_LANG", lang)
        monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_PATH", "/tmp/ws")
        import sandbox.app as app

---

Finding 7: B108

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B108
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/tests/test_validation.py:144-146

Description:
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.

Code Snippet:

link1 = os.path.join(inner_dir, "link1")
        os.symlink("/tmp", link1)
        with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="escapes base"):

---

Finding 8: CKV_DOCKER_3

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: checkov
• Rule ID: CKV_DOCKER_3
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/04-coding-agents/05-autonomous-coding-agent-durable/sandbox/Dockerfile.swift:1-51

Description:
Ensure that a user for the container has been created

Code Snippet:

# Sandbox (Swift toolchain) — AgentCore Runtime data plane (ARM64-only). NOT an agent.
# Same command-executor contract as the Python sandbox, but carries the Swift
# toolchain so it can `swift build` / `swift test` repo code. One image per language;
# the business-logic service picks which sandbox runtime to invoke per ticket.
#
# Security: non-root execution (via entrypoint), pinned Python deps, HEALTHCHECK.
FROM --platform=linux/arm64 swift:6.1-jammy

WORKDIR /app

ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
    PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
    PIP_NO_CACHE_DIR=1 \
    SANDBOX_LANG=swift

# The Swift image is Ubuntu-based; add Python 3 to run the same app.py executor.
# git + ca-certificates let SwiftPM resolve package dependencies.
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
        python3 python3-pip python3-venv git ca-certificates \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

COPY requirements.txt .
# swift:6.1-jammy ships Python 3.10 with an older pip (no PEP-668 / --break-system-packages).
RUN pip3 install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt

COPY app.py policy_engine.py entrypoint.sh .
COPY policies/ /app/policies/

# Copy shared security module (from repo root's shared/ directory)
COPY shared_libs/shared/ /app/shared_libs/shared/

ENV MOUNT_PATH=/mnt/shared \
    WORKSPACE_PATH=/mnt/workspace \
    HOME=/mnt/workspace \
    SWIFTPM_CACHE_DIR=/mnt/workspace/.spm-cache

# git refuses to operate on dependency checkouts under .build when they are owned by a
# different uid than the runner ("detected dubious ownership"). This also affects the
# test gate, which runs `swift test` via InvokeAgentRuntimeCommand (a plain shell, not our
# _run_command path), so the setting must live in the image, applied to ALL users.
RUN git config --system --add safe.directory '*'

RUN useradd -m -u 1000 -d /home/sbx sbx \
    && chmod +x /app/entrypoint.sh

HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
    CMD python3 -c "import urllib.request; urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8080/ping')" || exit 1

EXPOSE 8080
# entrypoint.sh ensures /mnt/workspace is writable by sbx before starting the app
CMD ["/app/entrypoint.sh"]

---

Report generated by Automated Security Helper (ASH) at 2026-06-23T14:58:43+00:00

[smoell]

fix: resolve ruff lint violations (E741, E401, F541) across four files

• Rename ambiguous variable l to lesson in list comprehensions
  (shared/memory.py, orchestrator/handler.py)
• Split multi-import into separate statements (sandbox/app.py)
• Remove unnecessary f-string prefix (cdk/stacks/storage_stack.py)
• Add property-based tests verifying lint compliance and behavior preservation

[evandrofranco]

ok