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Security: bytesbrains/warden

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Warden is threshold cryptography for conditional decryption. Getting it right matters — a flaw can mean a payload is readable before its condition holds, or can never be read at all. Responsible disclosure is genuinely appreciated.

Phase 0 — proof of concept. Warden is not yet audited, and the current federation is run entirely by its authors, so it provides no security guarantee. Do not protect real secrets with it today. An independent-operator federation, an external audit, and a public testnet are on the roadmap (see docs/07-roadmap.md).

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security reports.

Report privately via GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" button (the repository's Security → Advisories tab), or email contact@bytesbrains.com. We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours.

Scope

In scope — the cryptography and the release logic:

  • core/ — threshold IBE, the warden-v1 double-wrap envelope, the federation file format.
  • node/ — the condition-watcher and threshold partial release, especially the evaluator (node/src/eval.rs) and finality handling.
  • cli/, ffi/, wasm/ — the client-side seal / combine / open paths.

Out of scope (intended and documented — not findings):

  • The all-ours proof-of-concept federation having "no security" — see the threat model, docs/05-threat-model.md.
  • The trusted-dealer ceremony (dealer/) being a single point of trust — it's testnet-only; mainnet uses DKG.
  • Denial of service against a single PoC node.

What we especially want to hear about

  • Any way a non-recipient can recover plaintext — the inner ECIES layer is meant to keep content unreadable even to a fully-colluding federation.
  • Any way a threshold of honest nodes can be made to release partials before the condition truly holds on finalized chain state (beyond the documented reorg / RPC-spoofing model).
  • Any way a sealed payload can be made permanently unrecoverable once its condition does hold.

Disclosure

Warden is a public good; there is no paid bounty. We credit reporters in the advisory and the fix notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous, and we ask for coordinated disclosure — a reasonable window to ship a fix before public detail.

There aren't any published security advisories