L10 Token Engine v4.3.9 Weekly Run and Security Hardening

services/10-token-engine/WEEKLY_REPORT_AUGUST_2026.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# L10 Weekly Report: Token Engine v4.3.9 (August 2026)
+
+## 1. L10 Web3 & Rewards Report
+Within the MiGrid ecosystem (Platform standard **v10.1.6**, August 2026), the Token Engine operates on version **v4.3.9** as the high-performance Web3 bridge issuing ERC-20 utility tokens ($GRID) on the Polygon network. This weekly run focuses on cross-layer architectural alignment, particularly the mTLS security boundaries and the JWT secret hardening initiated in the Driver Experience API (L5) and Engagement Engine (L6), ensuring unified Zero-Trust compliance across the stack.
+
+### Cross-Layer Impact Analysis:
+*   **L5 Driver API (v4.1.0) Security Hardening Alignment**: The Sentinel security audit hardened the L5 API by rejecting default, weak, or insecure JWT secrets—including `dev_secret_change_in_production`—in production environments (`process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'`). To ensure seamless cross-pod security parity, L10 v4.3.9 has updated its token authentication middleware to explicitly include and reject the `dev_secret_change_in_production` key with a 500 configuration error in production, maintaining a strict Zero-Trust defense perimeter.
+*   **L1 Physics Engine (v10.1.6) & Telemetry Parity**: L1's high-fidelity telemetry scoring (separating raw floats from formatted 4-decimal strings) maps directly to L10’s telemetry standards. Standardizing both physics and confidence scores to strict 4-decimal strings (`safeFloat`) is critical for "Proof of Physics equals Proof of Value", preventing decimal rounding drift before rewards are logged and published to the L11 ML Engine training set.
+*   **L6 Engagement Engine (v5.18.0) Sync**: The L6 gamification update integrates the 'Hardware Health Guardian' achievement (consecutive high-fidelity sessions in zero-alarm regions). L10's logging standard tracks this site-specific alarm metadata under `token_reward_log`, verifying clean, verified sessions prior to queuing Web3 rewards.
+*   **L7 Device Gateway (v5.13.0) & L4 Market Gateway (v3.8.9) Alarms**: L7's normalized OCPP 2.1 `NotifyDERAlarm` events and L4's double parallel-scan architecture feed real-time regional alarms to Redis under the `l4:regional:alarms:<ISO>` namespace. L10 intercepts these via the `DER_ALARM_REPORTED` Kafka consumer to apply a dynamic hardware health penalty (-0.05 per active alarm, capped at -0.30) directly within `applyHardwarePenalty`.
+*   **L9 Commerce Engine (v5.1.0) Security Parity**: L9 has hardened multi-tenant fleet isolation by joining charging sessions with vehicle records to verify the target session belongs to the user's `fleet_id`. In parallel, L10 secures global data training streams (`GET /data/training/rewards`) by rejecting non-administrative/tenant tokens (tokens with a `fleet_id`), maintaining mTLS and Zero-Trust standards.
+
+### Smart Contract Lifecycle & Operational Strategy:
+*   **Open-Wallet Framework Integration**: Seamlessly abstracts private key signatures from end-users, delivering a fast, frictionless Web2 user experience. Gas fees, nonces, and blockchain finality on the Polygon network are managed silently via a backend custodial architecture.
+*   **Secure Private Key Infrastructure**: Planning the transition from mock key signatures to a secure Hardware Security Module (HSM) and AWS Key Management Service (KMS) setup to guarantee zero-vulnerability Web3 transaction signing.
+*   **Edge-Case Resilience (Outage Mitigation)**: To combat potential Polygon RPC node outages or dropped transactions, L10 leverages an asynchronous, gas-optimized batch minting worker. Queued rewards are processed using atomic state transitions (`FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`) to protect against double-spending and guarantee that transient RPC issues do not lead to lost driver rewards.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Backlog Updates
+*   **P0: Telemetry Format Audit [L10-P5]** — Fully verified 4-decimal string compliance for physics and confidence scores. (Complete)
+*   **P1: KMS/HSM Private Key Infrastructure [L10-P4]** — Integration of secure transaction-signing infrastructure for production deployments. (Active)
+*   **P2: ERC-20 Proxy Staking Contract Upgrade [L10-P7]** — Designing a proxy upgrade strategy to introduce non-custodial staking mechanics for drivers. (Planned)
+*   **P3: Gas-Optimized Batch Minting Protection [L10-P3]** — Enforced atomic transaction handling and overlap protection under high-concurrency environments. (Complete)
+*   **P4: Zero-Trust Token Auth Hardening [L10-SEC-01]** — Unified weak secret list mapping with L5/L6 API to eliminate insecure default configurations in production. (Complete)
+
+---
+
+## 3. Engineering Execution (v4.3.9)
+This week, we executed critical security-utility hardening and successfully validated our implementation:
+*   **Security Hardening**: Hardened `authenticateToken` middleware in `services/10-token-engine/index.js` to explicitly block `dev_secret_change_in_production` from being utilized in production environments, returning a 500 error.
+*   **Version and Telemetry Alignment**: Bumped L10 microservice version from `4.3.8` to `4.3.9` inside `package.json`, `/health` check response, and `/data/training/rewards` AI export standard.
+*   **Unit Tests Hardening**: Expanded `services/10-token-engine/tests/security_hardening.test.js` to include active verification assertions for the newly blocked weak production key.
+*   **Consolidated Verification**: Built and verified a new version verification script `verify_l10_v4_3_9.js` that checks for complete system health, duplicate declaration protection, and strict production token safety.
+
+**Status**: Operational • **Version**: v4.3.9 • **Platform Standard**: v10.1.6

services/10-token-engine/index.js

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ const authenticateToken = (req, res, next) => {
 
   // Reject insecure or default keys in production
   if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' &&
-      (activeSecret === 'test_secret' || activeSecret === 'dev_secret' || activeSecret === 'default_secret' || activeSecret === 'secret')) {
+      (activeSecret === 'test_secret' || activeSecret === 'dev_secret' || activeSecret === 'default_secret' || activeSecret === 'secret' || activeSecret === 'dev_secret_change_in_production')) {
     console.error('Security Error: Weak JWT_SECRET detected in production environment.');
     return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server configuration error: Weak JWT secret in production.' });
   }
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ async function getDynamicMultiplier(isoRaw, actionType, isVppEvent = false) {
 app.get('/health', (req, res) => {
   res.json({
     service: 'token-engine',
-    version: '4.3.8',
+    version: '4.3.9',
     status: 'healthy',
     layer: 'L10',
     platform: 'v10.1.6'
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ app.get('/data/training/rewards', authenticateToken, async (req, res) => {
     res.json({
       count: result.rows.length,
       data: result.rows,
-      source: 'L10_TOKEN_ENGINE_V4.3.8',
+      source: 'L10_TOKEN_ENGINE_V4.3.9',
       fidelity_tier: 'SENTINEL'
     });
   } catch (error) {

services/10-token-engine/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@migrid/token-engine",
-  "version": "4.3.8",
+  "version": "4.3.9",
   "main": "index.js",
   "dependencies": {
     "axios": "^1.6.0",

services/10-token-engine/tests/security_hardening.test.js

@@ -100,4 +100,29 @@ describe('L10 Token Engine Security Hardening', () => {
     }
     process.env.JWT_SECRET = originalJwtSecret;
   });
+
+  test('GET /data/training/rewards should return 500 in production if dev_secret_change_in_production weak secret is used', async () => {
+    const originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    const originalJwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'dev_secret_change_in_production';
+
+    const token = jwt.sign({ driver_id: 'admin-1' }, process.env.JWT_SECRET);
+
+    const response = await request(app)
+      .get('/data/training/rewards')
+      .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(500);
+    expect(response.body.error).toContain('Internal server configuration error');
+
+    // Restore
+    if (originalNodeEnv === undefined) {
+      delete process.env.NODE_ENV;
+    } else {
+      process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
+    }
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = originalJwtSecret;
+  });
 });

services/10-token-engine/verify_l10_v4_3_9.js

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/**
+ * Verification Script for L10 Token Engine v4.3.9
+ * Verifies versioning, health status, security hardening, and core utility logic.
+ */
+
+const { app } = require('./index');
+const request = require('supertest');
+const fs = require('fs');
+
+async function verify() {
+  console.log('🚀 Starting L10 v4.3.9 Verification...');
+
+  // 1. Verify Health Check and Versioning
+  try {
+    const res = await request(app).get('/health');
+    if (res.status === 200 && res.body.version === '4.3.9') {
+      console.log('✅ Health Check: PASSED (Version 4.3.9)');
+    } else {
+      console.error('❌ Health Check: FAILED', res.body);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('❌ Health Check Request Error:', err.message);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // 2. Duplicate Function Check
+  const indexSource = fs.readFileSync('./index.js', 'utf8');
+  const occurrences = (indexSource.match(/function extractSiteId/g) || []).length;
+
+  if (occurrences === 1) {
+    console.log('✅ Duplicate Function Check: PASSED (Only 1 extractSiteId found)');
+  } else {
+    console.error(`❌ Duplicate Function Check: FAILED (${occurrences} found)`);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // 3. AI Export Standard Check
+  if (indexSource.includes("source: 'L10_TOKEN_ENGINE_V4.3.9'")) {
+    console.log('✅ AI Export Standard: PASSED (Version string updated)');
+  } else {
+    console.error('❌ AI Export Standard: FAILED (Version string not updated)');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // 4. Verification of behavioral types expansion
+  if (indexSource.includes("action_type === 'der_alarm_response'") && indexSource.includes("action_type === 'solar_ramp_response'")) {
+    console.log('✅ Behavioral Types Expansion: PASSED');
+  } else {
+    console.error('❌ Behavioral Types Expansion: FAILED');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // 5. Sentinel Fidelity Hardening Check
+  if (indexSource.includes("isSentinelFidelityVal === '1'")) {
+    console.log("✅ Sentinel Fidelity Hardening: PASSED ('1' string supported)");
+  } else {
+    console.error('❌ Sentinel Fidelity Hardening: FAILED');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  // 6. Production Weak Secret Hardening Check for dev_secret_change_in_production
+  if (indexSource.includes("activeSecret === 'dev_secret_change_in_production'")) {
+    console.log("✅ Weak Secret Hardening: PASSED ('dev_secret_change_in_production' is rejected in production)");
+  } else {
+    console.error('❌ Weak Secret Hardening: FAILED');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  console.log('🎉 L10 v4.3.9 Verification COMPLETE: ALL SYSTEMS NOMINAL');
+}
+
+verify();