Releases: dean0x/mino
Releases · dean0x/mino
v1.6.0
v1.5.1
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v1.5.0...v1.5.1
v1.5.0
What's Changed
- feat: improve version awareness UX with interactive prompts by @dean0x in #47
- feat: persistent per-project home volumes by @dean0x in #49
- feat: move runtimes and CLI tools to user-level installs by @dean0x in #51
- fix(images): fix aarch64 build failures for CLI tool downloads by @dean0x in #54
- fix(docker): fix aarch64 builds, use npm for Claude install by @dean0x in #55
Full Changelog: v1.4.1...v1.5.0
v1.4.1
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v1.4.0...v1.4.1
v1.4.0
v1.3.0
What's Changed
- refactor: decompose run.rs into focused modules by @dean0x in #35
- feat(cli): add shell completion generation by @dean0x in #36
- feat: add Python language layer with uv, ruff, pytest by @dean0x in #37
- feat: add --read-only filesystem mode by @dean0x in #38
- feat: parallelize volume queries + Linux/presets/audit docs by @dean0x in #39
- refactor: deduplicate volume operations between runtimes by @dean0x in #40
Full Changelog: v1.2.2...v1.3.0
v1.2.2
v1.2.1
What's Changed
- feat: trust gate for local .mino.toml config injection by @dean0x in #16
- fix: redact credentials from debug log output by @dean0x in #17
- security: harden trust gate — gate workdir and vm.* fields by @dean0x in #18
- security: remove default_project_dir to eliminate trust gate bypass by @dean0x in #19
Full Changelog: v1.2.0...v1.2.1
v1.2.0: Container Security Hardening
Highlights
Mino v1.2.0 brings defense-in-depth container hardening, network presets for common workflows, and automatic container cleanup to prevent credential leakage.
Breaking Changes
- Default network mode changed from
hosttobridge. Containers are now isolated from host localhost by default. Use--network hostor setcontainer.network = "host"in config to restore previous behavior. - All containers now run with
--cap-drop ALL. Custom images requiring specific Linux capabilities may fail. Allowlist mode (--network-allow) automatically addsCAP_NET_ADMIN. - Container processes limited to 4096 PIDs (
--pids-limit 4096).
Added
--network-preset dev|registriesflag with built-in allowlists for common services (GitHub, npm, crates.io, PyPI, AI APIs).- Interactive network mode prompt on first run — saves choice to config so it never prompts again.
--security-opt no-new-privilegeson all containers to prevent privilege escalation.- Container removal after all sessions (interactive and detached) to prevent credential persistence via
podman inspect. Detached containers use--rmfor automatic cleanup on process exit. capsh --drop=cap_net_adminafter iptables setup in allowlist mode — irrecoverably drops the capability before running user commands.libcapadded to base Dockerfile forcapshbinary.
Fixed
- Detached containers (
mino run -d) now auto-removed on exit via--rm, closing credential leakage gap where stopped containers exposed env vars viapodman inspect. mino stopnow tolerates already-removed containers gracefully.
Security
- Defense-in-depth: capability dropping, privilege escalation prevention, PID limits.
- Allowlist mode now irrecoverably drops
CAP_NET_ADMINbefore executing user commands. - All containers cleaned up after exit to prevent credential leakage (interactive via explicit removal, detached via
--rm).
Full Changelog: v1.1.0...v1.2.0
What's Changed
- feat: container security hardening by @dean0x in #14
- fix: auto-remove detached containers to prevent credential leakage by @dean0x in #15
Full Changelog: v1.1.0...v1.2.0