Konclave is a self-custody tool for collective Zcash vaults using FROST threshold signatures. Key shares never leave a member's device; the coordination server sees only public protocol material. Because it can move real funds, we take security seriously and audit before publishing and whenever authentication, key custody, or fund-movement paths change.

Do not open a public issue for security problems. Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories.

Please include: affected component (FROST signer, PCZT bridge, the local HTTP bridge, key sealing, etc.), reproduction steps, and impact. We aim to acknowledge within a few days. Never include real key shares, seeds, passphrases, or a funded vault's secrets in a report.

In scope: the orchestrator (orchestrator/), the FROST↔PCZT bridge (konclave-signer/), the loopback HTTP bridge, key sealing/derivation, and the frontend (ui/).

Out of scope: the upstream Zcash Foundation tools (frostd, frost-client, zcash-sign, zcash-devtool) and librustzcash. Report those to their maintainers.

• Key shares are sealed at rest (XChaCha20-Poly1305); for DKG vaults the sealing key is derived from a passphrase via Argon2id and never stored.
• The coordination server (frostd) sees only public protocol material.
• Shielded-first: receiving is Orchard-only; transparent destinations are an explicit, warned exception.
• The local bridge binds 127.0.0.1 only; no telemetry; secrets never in logs/URLs.
• We run a security audit before publishing, before broadcasts of real funds, and when auth / key custody / fund-movement code changes. Findings are tracked internally.

This is hackathon-stage software under active hardening. Do not custody significant funds with it yet. The current threat model and open items are tracked in our internal audit log; headline residual risks (e.g. the local bridge's request authentication) are being addressed before any "production-ready" claim.