Last Updated: July 24, 2026 Status: Production Ready (v0.2.1-wave150x, S+ Tier)

• Zero unsafe code — forbid(unsafe_code) across all 31 crates; songbird-process-env evolved to in-memory overlay pattern (zero calls to std::env::set_var/remove_var)
• Cast discipline — All four cast lints denied at workspace level; justified sites use #[expect(reason)]
• Result-based errors — All fallible operations return Result<T, E>
• Strict linting — clippy::pedantic + clippy::nursery workspace-wide

• BTSP Phase 3 (FULL) — Incoming UDS connections require 4-step BTSP handshake when FAMILY_ID is set; crypto delegated to security provider via btsp.session.create/verify/negotiate; post-handshake btsp.negotiate upgrades to ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted framing (HKDF-SHA256 session keys, BondingPolicy cipher floor enforcement); negotiate dispatch wired on all 3 transport paths (NDJSON session, binary-framed BTSP, bin_interface); graceful NULL cipher fallback for backward compatibility; development mode (no FAMILY_ID) uses newline-delimited JSON-RPC
• TLS — Pure Rust TLS 1.3 implementation
• QUIC — Pure Rust QUIC transport
• Sovereign Onion — Privacy-preserving routing
• Dark Forest gating — TCP requests subject to trust verification

• Pre-dispatch method gate — Every JSON-RPC call passes through MethodGate::check before reaching the dispatch table on all transport paths (UDS, TCP NDJSON, BTSP-encrypted TCP)
• Transport-aware CallerContext — TCP connections classified as loopback or remote based on peer address; UDS connections carry ConnectionOrigin::Unix with SO_PEERCRED peer credentials (uid, pid) extracted on accept (Wave 150x)
• Public methods — health.*, identity.get, capabilities.list, lifecycle.status, auth.* — always accessible regardless of enforcement mode
• Protected methods — discovery.*, birdsong.*, mesh.*, ipc.* — require capability token when enforcement is active
• Permissive default — SONGBIRD_AUTH_MODE=permissive logs protected-method access without rejecting; switch to enforced to reject unauthenticated protected calls
• Introspection on all transports — auth.mode, auth.check, auth.peer_info accessible over UDS, TCP, and encrypted BTSP (not UDS-only)

• UDS-spoof prevention — SO_PEERCRED extracts caller uid/pid on every IPC accept; CallerContext.peer populated for downstream authorization
• Mesh-poison prevention — mesh.capabilities_announce rate-limited per peer (2s default, configurable via SONGBIRD_ANNOUNCE_RATE_LIMIT_MS); node_id + capability name format validation; max 64 capabilities per announcement
• Capability-escalation prevention — capability.call routing whitelist ("local" or "any" only); capability/operation name validation (length, control chars)
• Relay-abuse prevention — Drawbridge request limits: 10 MiB body, 128 headers, 8192 byte URI; path traversal patterns (/../, /./) blocked

• No hardcoded secrets — Environment-first configuration
• Capability-based routing — Runtime service discovery, no hardcoded endpoints
• Structured logging — tracing framework for observability
• JSON-RPC strict mode — Version validation, notification suppression, safe serialization fallbacks

cargo audit
cargo deny check advisories
cargo deny check                  # Full check: bans, licenses, advisories, sources (locally enforced since Wave 134; CI runs fmt + clippy + test)

• ring — ring-crypto feature removed (Wave 135); rustls_rustcrypto is the sole TLS bootstrap provider; ring remains only as unactivated optional dep of rustls in lockfile and via optional k8s feature; songbird-quic is fully ring-free (native QUIC engine with security provider crypto delegation)
• System metrics — Pure Rust /proc and /sys readers (replaced sysinfo)

Report security vulnerabilities through secure channels to the ecoPrimals development team.

Do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities.

AGPL-3.0-or-later — Ensures full transparency of security implementations.