fix(hub): allow supervisor owner to invoke /:id/scan (CSRF bypass for legacy-JWT)#66
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fix(hub): allow supervisor owner to invoke /:id/scan (CSRF bypass for legacy-JWT)#66finedesignz wants to merge 1 commit into
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Root cause: csrfGuard rejected every mutating /api/* request that didn't carry a csrf_token cookie + matching X-CSRF-Token header. Users on the legacy-JWT soak path (authMethod=legacy_jwt) never get the csrf_token cookie issued, so POST /api/supervisors/:id/scan (and every other mutating REST call) returned 403 csrf_failed. Fix: skip CSRF enforcement when the request authenticates via Authorization: Bearer and has no session cookie. Bearer-only requests are not CSRF-vulnerable because browsers never auto-attach Authorization headers cross-origin (unlike cookies) — JS must opt-in, which a malicious cross-origin page cannot do without the token. When BOTH a session cookie AND a bearer token are present, CSRF is still enforced (cookie wins — matches authMiddleware precedence). Added 2 csrf.test.ts cases covering both branches; full suite 20/20.
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Summary
POST /api/supervisors/:id/scan(and every other mutating REST call) returned 403csrf_failedfor users on the legacy-JWT auth path. Hub logs confirmed the affected user (233c6d63-…) was authenticating viamethod=legacy_jwt.hub/src/csrf.tscsrfGuard()enforces double-submitcsrf_tokencookie +X-CSRF-Tokenheader on every mutating/api/*request. Legacy-JWT sessions never get thecsrf_tokencookie issued, so the web client (web/src/lib/api.ts) cannot echo it back, and every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE fails.Authorization: Bearer …and carries no session cookie. Bearer-only requests are not CSRF-vulnerable — browsers never auto-attachAuthorizationheaders cross-origin (unlike cookies), so a malicious page cannot forge them.authMiddlewarecookie-wins precedence).Why this is the right fix (not a security loosening)
CSRF only matters when the browser auto-attaches credentials. The threat model is: attacker.com loads
<form action="hub/api/supervisors/.../scan" method=POST>, browser auto-attaches the session cookie, request succeeds. With Bearer tokens this is impossible — JS must explicitly read the token and attach the header, and same-origin-policy blocks attacker.com from reading the legitimate site's storage. The standard treatment ofAuthorization: Beareris exactly this bypass.Test plan
bun test hub/test/csrf.test.ts— 20/20 pass (added 2 new cases: bearer-only bypass, bearer+cookie still enforces)/api/supervisors/9a6a325e-.../scanfrom the web UI returns 200, hub logs show nocsrf_failed🤖 Generated with Claude Code