Skip to content

fix(hub): rotate coolify webhook secret accepts user auth #68

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
finedesignz merged 1 commit into from
May 26, 2026
Merged

fix(hub): rotate coolify webhook secret accepts user auth #68

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
1 commit
Select commit
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
10 changes: 9 additions & 1 deletion hub/src/index.ts
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -195,7 +195,15 @@ app.use('/api/api-keys', async (c, next) => {
if (m === 'POST' || m === 'DELETE') return requireRecentAuth()(c, next)
return next()
})
app.use('/api/account/coolify-webhook-secret/rotate', requireRecentAuth())
// NOTE: rotate intentionally does NOT require recent-auth. Legacy Bearer-JWT
// clients carry no session creation timestamp, so requireRecentAuth() would
// hard-fail them with `no_cookie_session` 401 with no client-side recovery.
// Cookie-auth users with a session >5 min old would also 401. Threat model
// for rotate: an attacker who already has the user's valid session/bearer
// can rotate the webhook secret — but they already control the account, so
// re-auth on rotate alone buys nothing. The userMutationLimit (10/min/user)
// below still applies. Sister gates on api-keys + error-projects DELETE
// remain — those grant credential issuance / data destruction.
app.use('/api/error-projects/:id', async (c, next) => {
if (c.req.method.toUpperCase() === 'DELETE') return requireRecentAuth()(c, next)
return next()
Expand Down
Loading