CvmUtil and Vmgstool changes for CPSinTEE and VMGS provenance work #2773

canfikret · 2026-02-09T18:21:54Z

CvmUtil and VmgsTool changes for supporting provenance and confidential provisioning service in TEE.

…nlock failure

…TPM simulator for online unsealing

…eDoc)

Copilot

Pull request overview

This PR adds a new cvmutil workspace tool and expands TPM helper/protocol support to enable Ubuntu/Canonical interoperability (SRK template + sealed-key import/export flows) and to provide a socket-based vTPM interface for external TPM tooling.

Changes:

Add new vm/cvmutil CLI/tooling crate (vTPM blob management, sealed-key marshaling, and a TPM socket server).
Extend tpm_lib with SRK public template support and make some helper APIs/constants public for reuse.
Modify TPM protocol struct visibility and TPM2B buffer deserialization behavior for “compatibility” parsing.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 9 out of 10 changed files in this pull request and generated 17 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
vm/devices/tpm/tpm_protocol/src/tpm20proto.rs	Adds TPM2B deserialization “compat” path + makes several TPM structs’ fields public.
vm/devices/tpm/tpm_lib/src/lib.rs	Exposes RSA constants, makes `import/load` public, adds `srk_pub_template()`.
vm/devices/tpm/tpm_device/src/lib.rs	Attempts to expose TPM proto/helper modules + adds handle/NV constants (currently breaks build).
vm/cvmutil/src/main.rs	New CLI with multiple subcommands for blob creation, SRK template export, sealing/unsealing, import/export, socket server.
vm/cvmutil/src/marshal.rs	Implements marshaling/parsing for Canonical-style sealed key formats and AF split.
vm/cvmutil/src/vtpm_helper.rs	Builds an in-memory TPM engine helper around `ms-tpm-20-ref` for the tool.
vm/cvmutil/src/vtpm_sock_server.rs	Implements a TCP socket server intended to be compatible with TPM simulator clients.
vm/cvmutil/Cargo.toml	Introduces the new crate and its dependencies (currently has an invalid workspace dep).
Cargo.toml	Adds `vm/cvmutil` to workspace members and workspace dependencies.
Cargo.lock	Adds lock entries for the new `cvmutil` package.

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:55Z

vm/devices/tpm/tpm_protocol/src/tpm20proto.rs

+                // Common issue: size field includes/excludes padding or structure overhead
+                if bytes.len() >= start && (bytes.len() - start) <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE {
+                    let actual_data_size = bytes.len() - start;
+                    tracing::debug!(
+                        "TPM2B_PRIVATE compatibility: expected {} bytes, got {} bytes, using actual size {}",
+                        size, bytes.len() - start, actual_data_size
+                    );
+
+                    let mut buffer = [0u8; MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE];
+                    buffer[..actual_data_size].copy_from_slice(&bytes[start..]);
+
+                    return Some(Self {
+                        size: (actual_data_size as u16).into(),
+                        buffer,
+                    });


This change makes Tpm2bBuffer::deserialize accept inputs where the declared size exceeds the available bytes by silently truncating to bytes.len() - start. That relaxes TPM wire-format validation and can mask malformed/truncated data (and potentially enable weird parsing differentials). Consider keeping strict length validation, or gate this behind a very narrow compatibility rule (documented with exact expected delta) rather than accepting any shorter buffer.

Suggested change

// Common issue: size field includes/excludes padding or structure overhead

if bytes.len() >= start && (bytes.len() - start) <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE {

let actual_data_size = bytes.len() - start;

tracing::debug!(

"TPM2B_PRIVATE compatibility: expected {} bytes, got {} bytes, using actual size {}",

size, bytes.len() - start, actual_data_size

);

let mut buffer = [0u8; MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE];

buffer[..actual_data_size].copy_from_slice(&bytes[start..]);

return Some(Self {

size: (actual_data_size as u16).into(),

buffer,

});

// Common issue: size field includes/excludes padding or structure overhead.

//

// To avoid masking arbitrary truncation, only accept *small* and explicitly

// bounded mismatches between the declared size and the available bytes.

const TPM2B_SIZE_COMPAT_MAX_DELTA: usize = 2;

if bytes.len() >= start {

let available = bytes.len() - start;

// Only consider compatibility when the declared size is larger than what

// we actually have, and the difference is within the small, known delta.

if (size as usize) > available && available <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE {

let delta = (size as usize) - available;

if delta <= TPM2B_SIZE_COMPAT_MAX_DELTA {

tracing::debug!(

"TPM2B_PRIVATE compatibility: expected {} bytes, got {} bytes (delta {}), using actual size {}",

size,

available,

delta,

available

);

let mut buffer = [0u8; MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE];

buffer[..available].copy_from_slice(&bytes[start..]);

return Some(Self {

size: (available as u16).into(),

buffer,

});

}

}

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:56Z

vm/devices/tpm/tpm_device/src/lib.rs

+pub const TPM_RSA_SRK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x01);
+const TPM_AZURE_AIK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x03);
+const TPM_GUEST_SECRET_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x04);


These new ReservedHandle constants won’t compile as written because ReservedHandle and TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT are not in scope in this file. Either fully-qualify them (e.g. tpm_protocol::tpm20proto::ReservedHandle) or add the necessary use statements (and consider whether these constants should live in tpm_protocol instead of being duplicated here).

Suggested change

pub const TPM_RSA_SRK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x01);

const TPM_AZURE_AIK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x03);

const TPM_GUEST_SECRET_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x04);

pub const TPM_RSA_SRK_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =

tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x01);

const TPM_AZURE_AIK_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =

tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x03);

const TPM_GUEST_SECRET_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =

tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x04);

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:56Z

vm/cvmutil/src/marshal.rs

+    pub fn create(payload: &[u8]) -> Self {
+        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+        // Use Canonical's approach: target 128KB minimum size
+        let min_size = 128 * 1024; // 128KB like Canonical
+        let stripes = (min_size / payload.len()).max(1) + 1;
+


AfSplitData::create divides by payload.len() to compute stripes. If payload is empty, this will panic with division-by-zero. Handle the empty-payload case explicitly (return an error or define a minimum block size/stripes).

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:57Z

vm/cvmutil/src/vtpm_sock_server.rs

+fn handle_tpm_data_client(
+    stream: TcpStream,
+    tpm_engine: Arc<Mutex<TpmEngineHelper>>,
+    _nv_accessor: Arc<Mutex<impl std::any::Any + Send>>,


handle_tpm_data_client uses impl Trait nested inside Arc<Mutex<...>> (Arc<Mutex<impl Any + Send>>), which is not allowed and will not compile. Use a generic type parameter for the function, or use a concrete type (e.g. Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>) since the caller passes Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>.

Suggested change

fn handle_tpm_data_client(

stream: TcpStream,

tpm_engine: Arc<Mutex<TpmEngineHelper>>,

_nv_accessor: Arc<Mutex<impl std::any::Any + Send>>,

fn handle_tpm_data_client<N: std::any::Any + Send>(

stream: TcpStream,

tpm_engine: Arc<Mutex<TpmEngineHelper>>,

_nv_accessor: Arc<Mutex<N>>,

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:57Z

vm/cvmutil/src/main.rs

+/// Seal data to SRK using TPM-standard format compatible with Ubuntu secboot.
+fn seal_data_to_srk(srk_pub_path: &str, input_file: &str, output_file: &str) {
+    use marshal::{AfSplitData, CURRENT_METADATA_VERSION, KEY_DATA_HEADER};
+    use std::fs;
+
+    tracing::info!("Creating TPM-standard sealed key compatible with Ubuntu secboot");
+    tracing::info!("Reading input data from: {}", input_file);
+    let input_data = fs::read(input_file).expect("failed to read input file");
+    tracing::info!("Input data size: {} bytes", input_data.len());
+
+    // Create minimal TPM structures for a sealed data object
+    // We'll create a simple keyedobject that contains the sealed data
+
+    // 1. Create a minimal TPM2B_PRIVATE containing our data
+    let key_private = Tpm2bBuffer::new(&input_data).expect("input data too large for TPM2B buffer");
+
+    // 2. Create a minimal TPM2B_PUBLIC for the sealed object
+    // Use the SRK public key template but mark it as a data object
+    let srk_template = tpm_helper::srk_pub_template().expect("failed to create SRK template");
+    let mut sealed_template = srk_template;


seal_data_to_srk takes srk_pub_path but never uses it, so the --seal operation ignores the user-provided SRK public key and instead always uses srk_pub_template(). Either remove the unused argument or actually load/parse srk_pub_path and seal against that public area.

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:59Z

vm/devices/tpm/tpm_protocol/src/tpm20proto.rs

+            // if bytes.len() < end {
+            //     return None;
+            // }
+


Commented-out code was left in deserialize (the old if bytes.len() < end { return None; } block). Please remove the commented block to keep the parsing logic unambiguous and maintainable.

Suggested change

// if bytes.len() < end {

// return None;

// }

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:59Z

vm/devices/tpm/tpm_device/src/lib.rs

+pub mod tpm20proto;
+pub mod tpm_helper;


tpm_device declares pub mod tpm20proto; / pub mod tpm_helper; but there are no corresponding tpm20proto.rs/tpm_helper.rs files in this crate, so the crate will fail to compile. If the intent is to re-export tpm_protocol::tpm20proto and helper APIs, use pub use ... or add the missing module files.

Suggested change

pub mod tpm20proto;

pub mod tpm_helper;

pub use tpm_lib::tpm20proto;

pub use tpm_lib::tpm_helper;

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:31:59Z

vm/cvmutil/src/marshal.rs

+        // Read size (2 bytes, LITTLE endian to match our export format)
+        if data.len() < 10 {
+            return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "Data too short for size"));
+        }
+                // Read size (4 bytes, LITTLE endian to match our export format)
+        if data.len() < 12 {
+            return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "Data too short for size"));
+        }
+        let size = u32::from_le_bytes([data[8], data[9], data[10], data[11]]);


AfSplitData::from_bytes has inconsistent/duplicated size validation (checks for 10 bytes then immediately for 12 bytes) and a misindented comment suggesting a 2-byte size while actually reading a 4-byte size. This is easy to misread and could hide real format bugs; please remove the dead check and make the header parsing/comments match the actual serialized format.

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:32:00Z

vm/cvmutil/src/vtpm_sock_server.rs

+    running: Arc<AtomicBool>,
+) {
+    use std::io::Write;
+    let peer_addr = stream.peer_addr().unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".parse().unwrap());


The fallback in peer_addr().unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".parse().unwrap()) will still panic because "unknown" is not a valid SocketAddr. Use an Option<SocketAddr>/Result and log it, or fall back to a string without parsing.

Suggested change

let peer_addr = stream.peer_addr().unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".parse().unwrap());

let peer_addr = match stream.peer_addr() {

Ok(addr) => addr.to_string(),

Err(e) => {

tracing::warn!("Failed to get peer address: {}", e);

"unknown".to_string()

}

};

Copilot · 2026-02-09T18:32:00Z

vm/cvmutil/src/main.rs

+        // if the vtpm file exists, delet it and create a new one
+        if std::path::Path::new(&path).exists() {
+            tracing::info!(
+                "vTPM file already exists. Deleting the existing file and creating a new one."
+            );
+            fs::remove_file(&path).expect("failed to delete existing vtpm file");
+        }


Typo in comment: "delet it" -> "delete it".

chris-oo · 2026-02-09T18:49:32Z

Ples update the pr title with <area>: short desc and include more in the PR description about the rationale, what, why, and how.

canfikret · 2026-02-09T19:14:27Z

@mingweishih, @stunes-ms, FYI. Thanks.

canfikret and others added 15 commits September 12, 2025 15:46

Adding cmvutil: initial work

15e60f3

Update print srk key properties command

7c7bda6

Add create provisioning secret key - step 1

5a7da0f

Serialize srk pub correctly

24509ef

Export rsa public key in der pkcs1 format

d293e77

Cvmutil: fix rsa exponent. Remove srk_pub.bin during vtpm creation

1a6c9b5

Make the first byte as 1 in unique data. This is to fix Ubuntu disk u…

183c071

…nlock failure

Rebase. Fix bugs in cvmutil for create random rsa key

ba38589

Upgrading to rust 2024 edition. Some reformatting

f40ee88

Upgrading to rust edition matching workspace

f6413ef

Remove unnecessary crates

bbd3300

CvmUtil: add options for offline sealing/online unsealing. Also, add …

2b77264

…TPM simulator for online unsealing

Cvmutil vtpm simulator: handle ctrl-c to release port

5241c66

VMGS provenance: update vmgstool for new file ids (Seed and Provenanc…

1bc19ee

…eDoc)

Updates from upstream

3544ba2

canfikret requested review from a team as code owners February 9, 2026 18:21

Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings February 9, 2026 18:21

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of canfikret February 9, 2026 18:22 View session

Copilot AI reviewed Feb 9, 2026

View reviewed changes

-                // Common issue: size field includes/excludes padding or structure overhead
-                if bytes.len() >= start && (bytes.len() - start) <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE {
-                    let actual_data_size = bytes.len() - start;
-                    tracing::debug!(
-                        "TPM2B_PRIVATE compatibility: expected {} bytes, got {} bytes, using actual size {}",
-                        size, bytes.len() - start, actual_data_size
-                    );
-                    let mut buffer = [0u8; MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE];
-                    buffer[..actual_data_size].copy_from_slice(&bytes[start..]);
-                    return Some(Self {
-                        size: (actual_data_size as u16).into(),
-                        buffer,
-                    });
+                // Common issue: size field includes/excludes padding or structure overhead.
+                //
+                // To avoid masking arbitrary truncation, only accept *small* and explicitly
+                // bounded mismatches between the declared size and the available bytes.
+                const TPM2B_SIZE_COMPAT_MAX_DELTA: usize = 2;
+                if bytes.len() >= start {
+                    let available = bytes.len() - start;
+                    // Only consider compatibility when the declared size is larger than what
+                    // we actually have, and the difference is within the small, known delta.
+                    if (size as usize) > available && available <= MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE {
+                        let delta = (size as usize) - available;
+                        if delta <= TPM2B_SIZE_COMPAT_MAX_DELTA {
+                            tracing::debug!(
+                                "TPM2B_PRIVATE compatibility: expected {} bytes, got {} bytes (delta {}), using actual size {}",
+                                size,
+                                available,
+                                delta,
+                                available
+                            );
+                            let mut buffer = [0u8; MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER_SIZE];
+                            buffer[..available].copy_from_slice(&bytes[start..]);
+                            return Some(Self {
+                                size: (available as u16).into(),
+                                buffer,
+                            });
+                        }
+                    }

-pub const TPM_RSA_SRK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x01);
-const TPM_AZURE_AIK_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x03);
-const TPM_GUEST_SECRET_HANDLE: ReservedHandle = ReservedHandle::new(TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x04);
+pub const TPM_RSA_SRK_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =
+    tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x01);
+const TPM_AZURE_AIK_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =
+    tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x03);
+const TPM_GUEST_SECRET_HANDLE: tpm20proto::ReservedHandle =
+    tpm20proto::ReservedHandle::new(tpm20proto::TPM20_HT_PERSISTENT, 0x04);

-    let peer_addr = stream.peer_addr().unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".parse().unwrap());
+    let peer_addr = match stream.peer_addr() {
+        Ok(addr) => addr.to_string(),
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!("Failed to get peer address: {}", e);
+            "unknown".to_string()
+        }
+    };

CvmUtil and Vmgstool changes for CPSinTEE and VMGS provenance work #2773

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CvmUtil and Vmgstool changes for CPSinTEE and VMGS provenance work #2773

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chris-oo commented Feb 9, 2026

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