security: sign registry registration — proof-of-possession (PPA-003)#37
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RegisterWithKeyOpts (the single builder emitting a public_key; RegisterWithKey funnels through it) now attaches a signature over "register:<listenAddr>:<publicKeyB64>", proving the submitter holds the private key for the registered public_key — matching the existing signed heartbeat/deregister/resolve operations. The challenge binds the public_key (defeats key-directory poisoning) and the listen_addr (hardens the re-registration endpoint-repoint vector), and is verifiable by the server before node_id assignment (node_id is not an input). Additive and backward-compatible: only an optional signature field is added, best-effort when a signer is configured; keyless/anonymous registration is unchanged. Server-side enforcement and registry-TLS-by-default are separate coordinated changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Registration was the only key-establishing registry operation with no signature, while
heartbeat/deregister/resolveall sign. This lets anyone reaching the registry claim a node_id / repoint a victim's endpoint (key-directory poisoning).Fix:
RegisterWithKeyOpts(the single builder emitting apublic_key;RegisterWithKeyfunnels through it) attaches a signature overregister:<listenAddr>:<publicKeyB64>, proving possession of the private key for the registeredpublic_key.public_key(defeats poisoning) andlisten_addr(hardens the re-registration endpoint-repoint vector).signaturefield is added, best-effort when a signer is configured; keyless/anonymous registration unchanged. An older server that ignores the field still accepts registration.Separate coordinated work (not here): server-side enforcement of this signature (rendezvous repo/deploy) and registry-TLS-by-default transport (would sever daemons from the current plaintext
:9000registry until the server serves TLS).Tests:
TestRegisterWithKeyOptsCarriesProofOfPossession,...ReRegistrationBindsPublicKey,...NoSignerOmitsSignature.go build ./... && go test ./registry/...green.🤖 Generated with Claude Code